Effect of task-specific execution on accuracy of imagined aiming movements

Online corrections can occur within movement imagery: An investigation of the motor-cognitive model

The motor-cognitive model proposes that movement imagery additionally requires conscious monitoring owing to an absence of veridical online sensory feedback. Therefore, it is predicted that there would be a comparatively limited ability for individuals to update or correct movement imagery as they could within execution. To investigate, participants executed and imagined target-directed aiming movements featuring either an unexpected target perturbation (Exp. 1) or removal of visual sensory feedback (Exp. 2). The results of both experiments indicated that the time-course of executed and imagined movements was equally influenced by each of these online visual manipulations. Thus, contrary to some of the tenets of the motor-cognitive model, movement imagery holds the capacity to interpolate online corrections despite the absence of veridical sensory feedback. The further theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.

The "eye" in imagination: The role of eye movements in a reciprocal aiming task

Humans not only perform a variety of actions, but they also simulate or imagine themselves performing those actions. When individuals physically execute goal-directed hand movements, eye movements typically precede the hand movements to the target to enhance movement accuracy. Studies have also revealed that eye movements emerge during motor imagery. Although eye-hand coordination is clearly important for the execution of a goal-directed movement, less is known about the role or expression of eye movements in an imagined movement. The present experiments were designed to investigate the role of eye movements during an executed and imagined reciprocal aiming task. Participants executed and imagined reciprocal aiming movements under conditions in which they were allowed to freely move their eyes or were told to fixate at a fixation point. Speed-accuracy trade-offs consistent with Fitts' Law were observed across all conditions suggesting that eye movements were not necessary to execute or imagine movements. Movement times were longest, however, in the imagination task when the eye movements were restricted to the central fixation point, suggesting that eye movements might assist with the accuracy or calibration of the imagination process. Analysis of eye movements during the no fixation imagination task revealed that the eye movements during imagination mimicked the executed hand movements when gaze was not restricted. Overall, these results suggest that although the ability to make eye movements was not necessary for action execution or motor imagery, the use of eye movements likely enhancing the accuracy of motor imagery for this task.

TMS over dorsolateral prefrontal cortex affects the timing of motor imagery but not overt action: Further support for the motor-cognitive model

The Motor-Cognitive model suggests a functional dissociation between motor imagery and overt action, in contrast to the Functional Equivalence view of common processes between the two behaviours. According to the Motor-Cognitive model, motor imagery differs from overt action primarily through the use of executive resources to monitor and elaborate a motor image during execution, which can result in a lack of correspondence between motor imagery and its overt action counterpart. The present study examined the importance of executive resources in motor imagery by using TMS to impair the function of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex while measuring the time to complete imagined versus overt actions. In two experiments, TMS over the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex slowed motor imagery but did not affect overt actions. TMS over the same region also interfered with performance of a mental calculation task, though it did not reliably affect less demanding cognitive tasks also thought to rely on executive functions. Taken together, these results were consistent with the Motor-Cognitive model but not with the idea of functional equivalence. The implications of these results for the theoretical understanding of motor imagery, and potential applications of the Motor-Cognitive model to the use of motor imagery in training and rehabilitation, are discussed.

Examining the equivalence between imagery and execution within the spatial domain - Does motor imagery account for signal-dependent noise?

Motor imagery is suggested to be functionally equivalent to physical execution as they each utilise a common neural representation. The present study examined whether motor imagery correspondingly reflects the spatial characteristics of physically executed movements, including the signal-dependent noise that typically manifests in more variable end locations (as indicated by effective target width; W_e). Participants executed or imagined a single, upper-limb target-directed aim in the horizontal medio-lateral direction. The start and end of the imagined movements were indexed by the lifting and lowering of the limb over the home position, respectively. Following each imagined movement, participants had to additionally estimate their imagined end location relative to the target. All the movements had to be completed at a pre-specified criterion time (400 ms, 600 ms, 800 ms). The results indicated that the W_e increased following a decrease in movement time for execution, but not imagery. Moreover, the total error of imagined movements was greater than the actual error of executed movements. While motor imagery may comprise a neural representation that also contributes to the execution of movements, it is unable to closely reflect the random sources of variability. This limitation of motor imagery may be attributed to the comparatively limited efferent motor signals.

Executive functions in motor imagery: support for the motor-cognitive model over the functional equivalence model

The motor-cognitive model holds that motor imagery relies on executive resources to a much greater extent than do overt actions. According to this view, engaging executive resources with an interference task during motor imagery or overt actions will lead to a greater lengthening of the time required to imagine a movement than to execute it physically. This model is in contrast to a currently popular view, the functional equivalence model, which holds that motor imagery and overt action use identical mental processes, and thus should be equally affected by task manipulations. The two competing frameworks were tested in three experiments that varied the amount and type of executive resources needed to perform an interference task concurrent with either an overt or imagined version of a grasping and placing action. In Experiment 1, performing a concurrent calculation task led to a greater lengthening of the time required to execute motor imagery than overt action relative to a control condition involving no interference task. Further, an increase in the number of responses used to index performance affected the timing of motor imagery but not overt actions. In Experiment 2, a low-load repetition task interfered with the timing of motor imagery, but less so than a high load calculation task; both tasks had much smaller effects on overt actions. In Experiment 3, a word generation task also interfered with motor imagery much more than with overt actions. The results of these experiments provide broad support for the motor-cognitive model over the functional equivalence model in showing that interfering with executive functions had a much greater impact on the timing of motor imagery than on overt actions. The possible roles of different executive processes in motor imagery are discussed.

Examining the equivalence between imagery and execution - Do imagined and executed movements code relative environmental features?

Imagined actions engage some of the same neural substrates and related sensorimotor codes as executed actions. The equivalency between imagined and executed actions has been frequently demonstrated by the mental and physical chronometry of movements; namely, the imagination and execution of aiming movements in a Fitts paradigm. The present study aimed to examine the nature or extent of this equivalence, and more specifically, whether imagined movements encompass the relative environmental features as do executed movements. In two separate studies, participants completed a series of imagined or executed reciprocal aiming movements between standard control targets (no annuli), perceptually small targets (large annuli) and perceptually large targets (small annuli) (Ebbinghaus illusions). The findings of both studies replicated the standard positive relation between movement time and index of difficulty for imagined and executed movements. Furthermore, movement times were longer for targets with surrounding annuli compared to the movement times without the annuli suggesting a general interference effect. Hence, the surrounding annuli caused a longer time, independent of the illusory target size, most likely to avoid a potential collision and more precisely locate the endpoint. Most importantly, this feature could not be discriminated as a function of the task (imagined vs. executed). These findings lend support to the view of a common domain for imagined and executed actions, while elaborating on the precision of their equivalence.

Independent Development of Imagination and Perception of Fitts' Law in Late Childhood and Adolescence

Recent neurophysiological and behavioral research suggests perception-action systems are tightly coupled. Accordingly, Fitts' law has been observed when individuals execute, perceive, and imagine actions. Developmental research has found that (a) children demonstrate Fitts' law in imagined actions and (b) imagined movement time (MT) becomes closer to actual MT as age increases. However, action execution, imagination, and perception have yet to be assessed together in children. The authors investigated how imagined and perceived MTs related to actual MTs in children and adolescents. It was found that imagined MTs were longer than execution MTs were. Perception MTs were lower than execution MTs for children and more consistent with execution MTs for adolescents. These results suggest potential mechanistic differences in action imagination and perception.

The action-specific effect of execution on imagination of reciprocal aiming movements

Past research has shown that the movement times of imagined aiming movements were more similar to actual movement times after the individual has experienced executing the movements. The purpose of the present study was to determine if experience with a set of movements altered the imagination of movements that were not experienced. Participants imagined a series of reciprocal aiming movements in different movement difficulty contexts (created by altering target width and movement amplitude) before and after actually executing a series of aiming movements. The range of difficulties of the imagined movements included difficulty contexts that were within (Experiment 1) or outside (Experiment 2) the range of difficulty experienced during execution. It was found that imagined movement times of movements within the range of movement difficulties experienced were more consistent with Fitts' Law after movement experience, whereas imagination of more difficult movements was not altered by experience. It is suggested that execution did not enhance imagination of more difficult movements because the relative contributions of motor planning and control to the more difficult movements were different from those in the experienced movements. Thus, the enhancement of imagination through experience might only occur when mechanisms underlying the executed and imagined movements are similar.