Human movements and abstract motion displays activate different processes in the observer's motor system

Representational momentum of biological motion in full-body, point-light and single-dot displays

Observing the actions of others triggers, in our brain, an internal and automatic simulation of its unfolding in time. Here, we investigated whether the instantaneous internal representation of an observed action is modulated by the point of view under which an action is observed and the stimulus type. To this end, we motion captured the elliptical arm movement of a human actor and used these trajectories to animate a photorealistic avatar, a point-light stimulus or a single dot rendered either from an egocentric or an allocentric point of view. Crucially, the underlying physical characteristics of the movement were the same in all conditions. In a representational momentum paradigm, we then asked subjects to report the perceived last position of an observed movement at the moment in which the stimulus was randomly stopped. In all conditions, subjects tended to misremember the last configuration of the observed stimulus as being further forward than the veridical last showed position. This misrepresentation was however significantly smaller for full-body stimuli compared to point-light and single dot displays and it was not modulated by the point of view. It was also smaller when first-person full body stimuli were compared with a stimulus consisting of a solid shape moving with the same physical motion. We interpret these findings as evidence that full-body stimuli elicit a simulation process that is closer to the instantaneous veridical configuration of the observed movements while impoverished displays (both point-light and single-dot) elicit a prediction that is further forward in time. This simulation process seems to be independent from the point of view under which the actions are observed.

Motor invariants in action execution and perception

The nervous system is sensitive to statistical regularities of the external world and forms internal models of these regularities to predict environmental dynamics. Given the inherently social nature of human behavior, being capable of building reliable predictive models of others' actions may be essential for successful interaction. While social prediction might seem to be a daunting task, the study of human motor control has accumulated ample evidence that our movements follow a series of kinematic invariants, which can be used by observers to reduce their uncertainty during social exchanges. Here, we provide an overview of the most salient regularities that shape biological motion, examine the role of these invariants in recognizing others' actions, and speculate that anchoring socially-relevant perceptual decisions to such kinematic invariants provides a key computational advantage for inferring conspecifics' goals and intentions.

Action Observation Responses Are Influenced by Movement Kinematics and Target Identity

In order to inform the debate whether cortical areas related to action observation provide a pragmatic or a semantic representation of goal-directed actions, we performed 2 functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments in humans. The first experiment, involving observation of aimless arm movements, resulted in activation of most of the components known to support action execution and action observation. Given the absence of a target/goal in this experiment and the activation of parieto-premotor cortical areas, which were associated in the past with direction, amplitude, and velocity of movement of biological effectors, our findings suggest that during action observation we could be monitoring movement kinematics. With the second, double dissociation fMRI experiment, we revealed the components of the observation-related cortical network affected by 1) actions that have the same target/goal but different reaching and grasping kinematics and 2) actions that have very similar kinematics but different targets/goals. We found that certain areas related to action observation, including the mirror neuron ones, are informed about movement kinematics and/or target identity, hence providing a pragmatic rather than a semantic representation of goal-directed actions. Overall, our findings support a process-driven simulation-like mechanism of action understanding, in agreement with the theory of motor cognition, and question motor theories of action concept processing.

Observer-Agent Kinematic Similarity Facilitates Action Intention Decoding

It is well known that the kinematics of an action is modulated by the underlying motor intention. In turn, kinematics serves as a cue also during action observation, providing hints about the intention of the observed action. However, an open question is whether decoding others’ intentions on the basis of their kinematics depends solely on how much the kinematics varies across different actions, or rather it is also influenced by its similarity with the observer motor repertoire. The execution of reach-to-grasp and place actions, differing for target size and context, was recorded in terms of upper-limb kinematics in 21 volunteers and in an actor. Volunteers had later to observe the sole reach-to-grasp phase of the actor’s actions, and predict the underlying intention. The potential benefit of the kinematic actor-participant similarity for recognition accuracy was evaluated. In execution, both target size and context modulated specific kinematic parameters. More importantly, although participants performed above chance in intention recognition, the similarity of motor patterns positively correlated with recognition accuracy. Overall, these data indicate that kinematic similarity exerts a facilitative role in intention recognition, providing further support to the view of action intention recognition as a visuo-motor process grounded in motor resonance.

Interactor's body shape does not affect visuo-motor interference effects during motor coordination

The biological-tuning of the Action Observation Network is highly debated. A current open question relates to whether the morphological appearance (body shape) and/or the biological motion of the observed agent triggers action simulation processes. Motor simulation of the partner's action is critical for motor interactions, where two partners coordinate their actions in space and time. It supports interpersonal alignment and facilitates online coordination. However, motor simulation also leads to visuo-motor interference effects when people are required to coordinate with complementary actions, i.e. incongruent movements as compared to the observed ones. Movement kinematics of interactive partners allows us to capture their automatic tendency to simulate and imitate the partner's complementary movements. In an online reach-to-grasp task, we investigated whether visuo-motor interference effects, visible in the kinematics of complementary movements, are modulated by the visual presence of the interactor's body shape. We asked participants to interact with 1) a humanoid agent with a human-like body shape and with real human, biological, movement kinematics, or 2) a non-humanoid agent, which did not resemble the human body-shape but moved with the same real kinematics. Through the combination of inferential and Bayesian statistics, the results show no effect of interactor's body shape on visuo-motor interference in reaching and grasping kinematics during online motor coordination. We discuss the results and propose that the kinematics of the observed movements, during motor interactions, might be the key factor for visuo-motor interference to take place independently from the morphological appearance of the partner. This is particularly relevant in a technological society that constantly asks humans to interact with artificial agents.

The concreteness of abstract language: an ancient issue and a new perspective

This paper addresses the debated issue of abstract language in the framework of embodiment. First, we discuss the notion of abstractness in the light of the Western philosophical thought, with a focus on the English empiricist tradition. Second, we review the most relevant psychological models and neuroscientific empirical findings on abstract language. It turns out that abstract words are not such, because their meaning is "far from experience", but, because of the high complexity of the attached experiential clusters. Finally, we spell out the consequences of this understanding of abstractness in relation to the neural mechanisms subserving abstract language processing. If abstract words, as compared to concrete ones, imply an increasing complexity of the associated experiential clusters, then the processing of abstract language relies on the recruitment of several neural substrates coding for those experiences. We forward that, at the neural level, this complexity is coded by means of three main mechanisms: (1) the recruitment of the motor representations of different biological effectors (abstract meaning as effector-unspecific); (2) the recruitment of different systems, including sensory, motor, and emotional ones (abstract meaning as multi-systemic); (3) the recruitment of neural substrates coding for social contexts and levels of self-relatedness (abstract meaning as dynamic). As compared to the current approaches in the literature on abstract language that combine embodiment with some a-modal aspects, our proposal is fully embodied and rules out additional aspects. Our proposal may spur future empirical research on abstract language in the embodied approach.

Action perception and motor imagery: Mental practice of action

Motor cognition is related to the planning and generation of actions as well as to the recognition and imagination of motor acts. Recently, there is evidence that the motor system participates not only in overt actions but also in mental processes supporting covert actions. Within this framework, we have investigated the cortical areas engaged in execution, observation, and imagination of the same action, by the use of the high resolution quantitative ¹⁴C-deoxyglucose method in monkeys and by fMRI in humans, throughout the entire primate brain. Our data demonstrated that observing or imagining an action excites virtually the same sensory-motor cortical network which supports execution of that same action. In general agreement with the results of five relevant meta-analyses that we discuss extensively, our results imply mental practice, i.e. internal rehearsal of the action including movements and their sensory effects. We suggest that we actively perceive and imagine actions by selecting and running off-line restored sensory-motor memories, by mentally simulating the actions. We provide empirical evidence that mental simulation of actions underlies motor cognition, and conceptual representations are grounded in sensory-motor codes. Motor cognition may, therefore, be embodied and modal. Finally, we consider questions regarding agency attribution and the possible causal or epiphenomenal role the involved sensory-motor network could play in motor cognition.

Movement kinematics drive chain selection toward intention detection

Estimation of intentions from the observation of other people’s actions has been proposed to rely on the same motor chain organization supporting the execution of intentional actions. However, the nature of the mechanism by which a specific neuronal chain is selected among possible alternatives during action observation remains obscure. Our study shows that in absence of discriminative contextual cues, subtle changes in the kinematics of the observed action inform mapping to the most probable chain. These results shed light on the importance of kinematics for the attribution of intentions to actions.

The ability to understand intentions based on another’s movements is crucial for human interaction. This ability has been ascribed to the so-called motor chaining mechanism: anytime a motor chain is activated (e.g., grasp-to-drink), the observer attributes to the agent the corresponding intention (i.e., to drink) from the first motor act (i.e., the grasp). However, the mechanisms by which a specific chain is selected in the observer remain poorly understood. In the current study, we investigate the possibility that in the absence of discriminative contextual cues, slight kinematic variations in the observed grasp inform mapping to the most probable chain. Chaining of motor acts predicts that, in a sequential grasping task (e.g., grasp-to-drink), electromyographic (EMG) components that are required for the final act [e.g., the mouth-opening mylohyoid (MH) muscle] show anticipatory activation. To test this prediction, we used MH EMG, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS; MH motor-evoked potentials), and predictive models of movement kinematics to measure the level and timing of MH activation during the execution (Experiment 1) and the observation (Experiment 2) of reach-to-grasp actions. We found that MH-related corticobulbar excitability during grasping observation varied as a function of the goal (to drink or to pour) and the kinematics of the observed grasp. These results show that subtle changes in movement kinematics drive the selection of the most probable motor chain, allowing the observer to link an observed act to the agent’s intention.

Action Observation Areas Represent Intentions From Subtle Kinematic Features

Mirror neurons have been proposed to underlie humans' ability to understand others' actions and intentions. Despite 2 decades of research, however, the exact computational and neuronal mechanisms implied in this ability remain unclear. In the current study, we investigated whether, in the absence of contextual cues, regions considered to be part of the human mirror neuron system represent intention from movement kinematics. A total of 21 participants observed reach-to-grasp movements, performed with either the intention to drink or to pour while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging. Multivoxel pattern analysis revealed successful decoding of intentions from distributed patterns of activity in a network of structures comprising the inferior parietal lobule, the superior parietal lobule, the inferior frontal gyrus, and the middle frontal gyrus. Consistent with the proposal that parietal regions play a key role in intention understanding, classifier weights were higher in the inferior parietal region. These results provide the first demonstration that putative mirror neuron regions represent subtle differences in movement kinematics to read the intention of an observed motor act.

Evidence for the representation of movement kinematics in the discharge of F5 mirror neurons during the observation of transitive and intransitive actions

Mirror neurons (MirNs) are sensorimotor neurons that fire both when an animal performs a goal-directed action and when the same animal observes another agent performing the same or a similar transitive action. It has been claimed that the observation of intransitive actions does not activate MirNs in a monkey’s brain. Prompted by recent evidence indicating that the discharge of MirNs is modulated also by non-object-directed actions, we investigated thoroughly the efficacy of intransitive actions to trigger MirNs’ discharge. Using representational similarity analysis, we also studied whether the elements constituting the visual scene presented to the monkey during the observation of actions (both transitive and intransitive) are represented in the discharge of MirNs. For this purpose, the moving hand was modeled by its kinematics and the object by features of its geometry. We found that MirNs respond to the observation of both transitive and intransitive actions and that the discharge differences evoked by the observation of object- and non-object-directed actions are correlated more with the kinematic differences of these actions than with the differences of the objects’ features. These findings support the view that observed action kinematics contribute to action mirroring.

NEW & NOTEWORTHY Mirror neurons in the monkey brain are thought to respond exclusively to the observation of object-directed actions. Here, we show that mirror neurons also respond to the observation of intransitive actions and that the kinematics of the observed movements are represented in their discharge. This finding supports the view that mirror neurons provide also a kinematics-based representation of actions.

Changing Artificial Playback Speed and Real Movement Velocity Do Not Differentially Influence the Excitability of Primary Motor Cortex during Observation of a Repetitive Finger Movement

Action observation studies have investigated whether changing the speed of the observed movement affects the action observation network. There are two types of speed-changing conditions; one involves “changes in actual movement velocity,” and the other is “manipulation of video speed.” Previous studies have investigated the effects of these conditions separately, but to date, no study has directly investigated the differences between the effects of these conditions. In the “movement velocity condition,” increased velocity is associated with increased muscle activity; however, this change of muscle activities is not shown in the “video speed condition.” Therefore, a difference in the results obtained under these conditions could be considered to reflect a difference in muscle activity of actor in the video. The aim of the present study was to investigate the effects of different speed-changing conditions and spontaneous movement tempo (SMT) on the excitability of primary motor cortex (M1) during action observation, as assessed by motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) amplitudes induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). A total of 29 healthy subjects observed a video clip of a repetitive index or little finger abduction movement under seven different speed conditions. The video clip in the movement velocity condition showed repetitive finger abduction movements made in time with an auditory metronome, at frequencies of 0.5, 1, 2, and 3 Hz. In the video speed condition, playback of the 1-Hz movement velocity condition video clip was modified to show movement frequencies of 0.5, 2, or 3 Hz (Hz-Fake). TMS was applied at the time of maximal abduction and MEPs were recorded from two right-hand muscles. There were no differences in M1 excitability between the movement velocity and video speed conditions. Moreover, M1 excitability did not vary across the speed conditions for either presentation condition. Our findings suggest that changing playback speed and actual differences in movement velocity do not differentially influence M1 excitability during observation of a simple action task, such as repetitive finger movement, and that it is not affected by SMT. In simple and meaningless observational task, people might not be able to recognize the difference in muscle activity of actor in the video.

Primary Motor Cortex Activation during Action Observation of Tasks at Different Video Speeds Is Dependent on Movement Task and Muscle Properties

The aim of the present study was to investigate how the video speed of observed action affects the excitability of the primary motor cortex (M1), as assessed by the size of motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Twelve healthy subjects observed a video clip of a person catching a ball (Experiment 1: rapid movement) and another 12 healthy subjects observed a video clip of a person reaching to lift a ball (Experiment 2: slow movement task). We played each video at three different speeds (slow, normal and fast). The stimulus was given at two points of timing in each experiment. These stimulus points were locked to specific frames of the video rather than occurring at specific absolute times, for ease of comparison across different speeds. We recorded MEPs from the first dorsal interosseous muscle (FDI) and abductor digiti minimi muscle (ADM) of the right hand. MEPs were significantly different for different video speeds only in the rapid movement task. MEPs for the rapid movement task were higher when subjects observed an action played at slow speed than normal or fast speed condition. There was no significant change for the slow movement task. Video speed was effective only in the ADM. Moreover, MEPs in the ADM were significantly higher than in the FDI in a rapid movement task under the slow speed condition. Our findings suggest that the M1 becomes more excitable when subjects observe the video clip at the slow speed in a rapid movement, because they could recognize the elements of movement in others. Our results suggest the effects of manipulating the speed of the viewed task on the excitability of the M1 during passive observation differ depending on the type of movement task observed. It is likely that rehabilitation in the clinical setting will be more efficient if the video speed is changed to match the task’s characteristics.

Exercise Performance and Corticospinal Excitability during Action Observation

Purpose: Observation of a model performing fast exercise improves simultaneous exercise performance; however, the precise mechanism underpinning this effect is unknown. The aim of the present study was to investigate whether the speed of the observed exercise influenced both upper body exercise performance and the activation of a cortical action observation network (AON).

Method: In Experiment 1, 10 participants completed a 5 km time trial on an arm-crank ergometer whilst observing a blank screen (no-video) and a model performing exercise at both a typical (i.e., individual mean cadence during baseline time trial) and 15% faster than typical speed. In Experiment 2, 11 participants performed arm crank exercise whilst observing exercise at typical speed, 15% slower and 15% faster than typical speed. In Experiment 3, 11 participants observed the typical, slow and fast exercise, and a no-video, whilst corticospinal excitability was assessed using transcranial magnetic stimulation.

Results: In Experiment 1, performance time decreased and mean power increased, during observation of the fast exercise compared to the no-video condition. In Experiment 2, cadence and power increased during observation of the fast exercise compared to the typical speed exercise but there was no effect of observation of slow exercise on exercise behavior. In Experiment 3, observation of exercise increased corticospinal excitability; however, there was no difference between the exercise speeds.

Conclusion: Observation of fast exercise improves simultaneous upper-body exercise performance. However, because there was no effect of exercise speed on corticospinal excitability, these results suggest that these improvements are not solely due to changes in the activity of the AON.