No language unification without neural feedback: How awareness affects sentence processing

No electrophysiological evidence for semantic processing during inattentional blindness

A long-standing question concerns whether sensory input can reach semantic stages of processing in the absence of attention and awareness. Here, we examine whether the N400, an event related potential associated with semantic processing, can occur under conditions of inattentional blindness. By employing a novel three-phase inattentional blindness paradigm designed to maximise the opportunity for detecting an N400, we found no evidence for it when participants were inattentionally blind to the eliciting stimuli (related and unrelated word pairs). In contrast, participants noticed the same task-irrelevant word pairs when minimal attention was allocated to them, and a small N400 became evident. When the same stimuli were fully attended and relevant to the task, a robust N400 was observed. In addition to univariate ERP measures, multivariate decoding analyses were unable to classify related from unrelated word pairs when observers were inattentionally blind to the words, with decoding reaching above-chance levels only when the words were (at least minimally) attended. By comparison, decoding reached above-chance levels when contrasting word pairs with non-word stimuli, even when participants were inattentionally blind to these stimuli. Our results also replicated several previous studies by finding a "visual awareness negativity" (VAN) that distinguished task-irrelevant stimuli that participants noticed compared with those that were not perceived, and a P3b (or "late positivity") that was evident only when the stimuli were task relevant. Together, our findings suggest that semantic processing might require at least a minimal amount of attention.

How (not) to demonstrate unconscious priming: Overcoming issues with post-hoc data selection, low power, and frequentist statistics

One widely used scientific approach to studying consciousness involves contrasting conscious operations with unconscious ones. However, challenges in establishing the absence of conscious awareness have led to debates about the extent and existence of unconscious processes. We collected experimental data on unconscious semantic priming, manipulating prime presentation duration to highlight the critical role of the analysis approach in attributing priming effects to unconscious processing. We demonstrate that common practices like post-hoc data selection, low statistical power, and frequentist statistical testing can erroneously support claims of unconscious priming. Conversely, adopting best practices like direct performance-awareness contrasts, Bayesian tests, and increased statistical power can prevent such erroneous conclusions. Many past experiments, including our own, fail to meet these standards, casting doubt on previous claims about unconscious processing. Implementing these robust practices will enhance our understanding of unconscious processing and shed light on the functions and neural mechanisms of consciousness.

Unconscious integration: Current evidence for integrative processing under subliminal conditions

Integrative processing is traditionally believed to be dependent on consciousness. While earlier studies within the last decade reported many types of integration under subliminal conditions (i.e. without perceptual awareness), these findings are widely challenged recently. This review evaluates the current evidence for 10 types of subliminal integration that are widely studied: arithmetic processing, object-context integration, multi-word processing, same-different processing, multisensory integration and 5 different types of associative learning. Potential methodological issues concerning awareness measures are also taken into account. It is concluded that while there is currently no reliable evidence for subliminal integration, this does not necessarily refute 'unconscious' integration defined through non-subliminal (e.g. implicit) approaches.

Role of visual awareness on semantic integration of sequentially presented words: An fMRI study

Reading comprehension requires the semantic integration of words across space and time. However, it remains unclear whether comprehension requires visual awareness for such semantic integration. Compared to earlier studies that investigated semantic integration indirectly from its priming effect, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to directly examine the processes of semantic integration with or without visual awareness. Specifically, we manipulated participants' visual awareness by continuous flash suppression (CFS) while they viewed a meaningful sequence of four Chinese words (i.e., an idiom) or its meaningless counterpart (i.e., a random sequence). Behaviorally, participants had better recognition memory for idioms than random sequences only when their visual awareness was interfered rather than blocked by CFS. Neurally, semantics-processing areas, such as the superior temporal gyrus and inferior frontal gyrus, were significantly activated only when participants were aware of word sequences, be they meaningful or meaningless. By contrast, orthography-processing areas, such as the fusiform gyrus and inferior occipital gyrus, were significantly activated regardless of visual awareness or word sequence. Taken together, these results suggest that visual awareness modules the functioning of the semantic neural network in the brain and facilitates reading comprehension.

Neuroscientific Evidence for Processing Without Awareness

The extent to which we are affected by perceptual input of which we are unaware is widely debated. By measuring neural responses to sensory stimulation, neuroscientific data could complement behavioral results with valuable evidence. Here we review neuroscientific findings of processing of high-level information, as well as interactions with attention and memory. Although the results are mixed, we find initial support for processing object categories and words, possibly to the semantic level, as well as emotional expressions. Robust neural evidence for face individuation and integration of sentences or scenes is lacking. Attention affects the processing of stimuli that are not consciously perceived, and such stimuli may exogenously but not endogenously capture attention when relevant, and be maintained in memory over time. Sources of inconsistency in the literature include variability in control for awareness as well as individual differences, calling for future studies that adopt stricter measures of awareness and probe multiple processes within subjects.

EEG theta and N400 responses to congruent versus incongruent brand logos

Neuroimaging and behavioral studies have shown that brands convey meaning to consumers. To investigate the immediate reactions of the brain to brand logos, followed either by congruent or incongruent pictorial brand-related cues, can deepen understanding of the semantic processing of brands, and perhaps how consolidated the logo is in consumers’ minds. Participants were exposed to different brand-related image sets, that were either congruent (a match between brand-related images and brand logo) or incongruent (a mismatch between brand-related images and brand logo) while having their brain signals recorded. Event-related potential and EEG time–frequency domain features were extracted from the signals of the target image (brand logo). The results showed significantly larger N400 peak and relative theta power increase for incongruent compared to congruent logos, which could be attributed to an error-monitoring process. Thus, we argue that brands are encoded deeply in consumers’ minds, and cognitive processing of mismatched (vs matched) brand logos is more difficult, leading to greater error monitoring. The results were mostly consistent with previous studies investigating semantic incongruences in the linguistic field. Therefore, the error-monitoring process could be extended beyond linguistic forms, for example to images and brands.

Dividing attention influences contextual facilitation and revision during language comprehension

Although we often seem to successfully comprehend language in the face of distraction, few studies have examined the role of sustained attention in critical components of sentence processing, such as integrating information over a sentence and revising predictions when unexpected information is encountered. The current study investigated the impact of attention on sentence processing using a novel dual-task paradigm. Participants read weakly and strongly constraining sentences with expected or unexpected endings while also tracking the motion of dots in the background, and their EEG was recorded. Under full attention, the amplitude of the N400 component of the ERP, a measure of semantic access, was reduced (facilitated) in a graded fashion by contextual strength and fit. This context-based facilitation was attenuated when attention was divided, suggesting that sustained attention is important for building up message-level representations. In contrast, the post-N400 frontal positivity that has been observed to prediction violations and associated with revision processes was unaffected by dividing attention. However, under divided attention, participants also elicited posteriorly-distributed effects to these violations. Thus, predictive processes seem to be engaged even when attention is divided, but additional resources may then be required to process unexpected information.

How does inattention affect written and spoken language processing?

The classic cocktail party effect suggests that some, but probably not all levels of language processing can proceed without attention. We used whole-brain functional MRI to investigate how modality-specific and modality-independent language areas are modulated by the withdrawal of attention to another sensory modality (e.g., attending to vision during the presentation of auditory sentences, or vice-versa). We tested the hypotheses that inattention may abolish sentence-level integration and eliminate top-down effects. In both written and spoken modalities, language processing was strongly modulated by the distraction of attention, but this inattention effect varied considerably depending on the area and hierarchical level of language processing. Under inattention, a bottom-up activation remained in early modality-specific areas, particularly in superior temporal spoken-language areas, but the difference between sentences and words lists vanished. Under both attended and unattended conditions, ventral temporal cortices were activated in a top-down manner by spoken language more than by control stimuli, reaching posteriorily the Visual Word Form Area. We conclude that inattention prevents sentence-level syntactic and semantic integration, but preserves some top-down crossmodal processing, plus a large degree of bottom-up modality-specific processing, including a ventral occipito-temporal specialization for letter strings in a known alphabet.

Windows of Integration Hypothesis Revisited

In the ongoing research of the functions of consciousness, special emphasis has been put on integration of information: the ability to combine different signals into a coherent, unified one. Several theories of consciousness hold that this ability depends on - or at least goes hand in hand with - conscious processing. Yet some empirical findings have suggested otherwise, claiming that integration of information could take place even without awareness. Trying to reconcile this apparent contradiction, the "windows of integration" (WOI) hypothesis claims that conscious access enables signal processing over large integration windows. The hypothesis applies to integration windows defined either temporally, spatially, or semantically. In this review, we explain the hypothesis and re-examine it in light of new studies published since it was suggested. In line with the hypothesis, these studies provide compelling evidence for unconscious integration, but also demonstrate its limits with respect to time, space, and semantic distance. The review further highlights open questions that still need to be pursued to demonstrate the applicability of the WOI hypothesis as a guiding principle for understanding the depth and scope of unconscious processes.