How we sleep: From brain states to processes

Content-state dimensions characterize different types of neuronal markers of consciousness

Identifying the neuronal markers of consciousness is key to supporting the different scientific theories of consciousness. Neuronal markers of consciousness can be defined to reflect either the brain signatures underlying specific conscious content or those supporting different states of consciousness, two aspects traditionally studied separately. In this paper, we introduce a framework to characterize markers according to their dynamics in both the "state" and "content" dimensions. The 2D space is defined by the marker's capacity to distinguish the conscious states from non-conscious states (on the x-axis) and the content (e.g. perceived versus unperceived or different levels of cognitive processing on the y-axis). According to the sign of the x- and y-axis, markers are separated into four quadrants in terms of how they distinguish the state and content dimensions. We implement the framework using three types of electroencephalography markers: markers of connectivity, markers of complexity, and spectral summaries. The neuronal markers of state are represented by the level of consciousness in (i) healthy participants during a nap and (ii) patients with disorders of consciousness. On the other hand, the neuronal markers of content are represented by (i) the conscious content in healthy participants' perception task using a visual awareness paradigm and (ii) conscious processing of hierarchical regularities using an auditory local-global paradigm. In both cases, we see separate clusters of markers with correlated and anticorrelated dynamics, shedding light on the complex relationship between the state and content of consciousness and emphasizing the importance of considering them simultaneously. This work presents an innovative framework for studying consciousness by examining neuronal markers in a 2D space, providing a valuable resource for future research, with potential applications using diverse experimental paradigms, neural recording techniques, and modeling investigations.

Sleepiness and the transition from wakefulness to sleep

The transition from wakefulness to sleep is a progressive process that is reflected in the gradual loss of responsiveness, an alteration of cognitive functions, and a drastic shift in brain dynamics. These changes do not occur all at once. The sleep onset period (SOP) refers here to this period of transition between wakefulness and sleep. For example, although transitions of brain activity at sleep onset can occur within seconds in a given brain region, these changes occur at different time points across the brain, resulting in a SOP that can last several minutes. Likewise, the transition to sleep impacts cognitive and behavioral levels in a graded and staged fashion. It is often accompanied and preceded by a sensation of drowsiness and the subjective feeling of a need for sleep, also associated with specific physiological and behavioral signatures. To better characterize fluctuations in vigilance and the SOP, a multidimensional approach is thus warranted. Such a multidimensional approach could mitigate important limitations in the current classification of sleep, leading ultimately to better diagnoses and treatments of individuals with sleep and/or vigilance disorders. These insights could also be translated in real-life settings to either facilitate sleep onset in individuals with sleep difficulties or, on the contrary, prevent or control inappropriate sleep onsets.

Structural and Functional Neuroanatomy of Core Consciousness: A Primer for Disorders of Consciousness Clinicians

Understanding the structural and functional neuroanatomy of core consciousness (ie, wakefulness and awareness) is an asset to clinicians caring for persons with disorders of consciousness. This article provides a primer on the structural and functional neuroanatomy of wakefulness and awareness. The neuroanatomical structures supporting these elements of core consciousness functions are reviewed first, after which brief description of the clinically evaluable relationships between disruption of these structures and disorders of consciousness (ie, brain-behavior relationships) are outlined. Consideration of neuroanatomy at the mesoscale (ie, the mesocircuit hypothesis) as well as in relation to several large-scale neural networks is offered.