Hippocampus Is What Happens while You're Busy Making Other Plans

The Hippocampus in Pigeons Contributes to the Model-Based Valuation and the Relationship between Temporal Context States

Model-based decision-making guides organism behavior by the representation of the relationships between different states. Previous studies have shown that the mammalian hippocampus (Hp) plays a key role in learning the structure of relationships among experiences. However, the hippocampal neural mechanisms of birds for model-based learning have rarely been reported. Here, we trained six pigeons to perform a two-step task and explore whether their Hp contributes to model-based learning. Behavioral performance and hippocampal multi-channel local field potentials (LFPs) were recorded during the task. We estimated the subjective values using a reinforcement learning model dynamically fitted to the pigeon's choice of behavior. The results show that the model-based learner can capture the behavioral choices of pigeons well throughout the learning process. Neural analysis indicated that high-frequency (12-100 Hz) power in Hp represented the temporal context states. Moreover, dynamic correlation and decoding results provided further support for the high-frequency dependence of model-based valuations. In addition, we observed a significant increase in hippocampal neural similarity at the low-frequency band (1-12 Hz) for common temporal context states after learning. Overall, our findings suggest that pigeons use model-based inferences to learn multi-step tasks, and multiple LFP frequency bands collaboratively contribute to model-based learning. Specifically, the high-frequency (12-100 Hz) oscillations represent model-based valuations, while the low-frequency (1-12 Hz) neural similarity is influenced by the relationship between temporal context states. These results contribute to our understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying model-based learning and broaden the scope of hippocampal contributions to avian behavior.

Threat Prediction from Schemas as a Source of Bias in Pain Perception

Our sensory impressions of pain are generally thought to represent the noxious properties of an agent but can be influenced by the predicted level of threat. Predictions can be sourced from higher-order cognitive processes, such as schemas, but the extent to which schemas can influence pain perception relative to bottom-up sensory inputs and the underlying neural underpinnings of such a phenomenon are unclear. Here, we investigate how threat predictions generated from learning a cognitive schema lead to inaccurate sensory impressions of the pain stimulus. Healthy male and female participants first detected a linear association between cue values and stimulus intensity and rated pain to reflect the linear schema when compared with uncued heat stimuli. The effect of bias on pain ratings was reduced when prediction errors (PEs) increased, but pain perception was only partially updated when measured against stepped increases in PEs. Cognitive, striatal, and sensory regions graded their responses to changes in predicted threat despite the PEs (p < 0.05, corrected). Individuals with more catastrophic thinking about pain and with low mindfulness were significantly more reliant on the schema than on the sensory evidence from the pain stimulus. These behavioral differences mapped to variability in responses of the striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Thus, this study demonstrates a significant role of higher-order schemas in pain perception and indicates that pain perception is biased more toward predictions and less toward nociceptive inputs in individuals who report less mindfulness and more fear of pain.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT This study demonstrates that threat predictions generated from cognitive schemas continue to influence pain perception despite increasing prediction errors arising in pain pathways. Individuals first formed a cognitive schema of linearity in the relationship between the cued threat value and the stimulus intensity. Subsequently, the linearity was reduced gradually, and participants partially updated their evaluations of pain in relation to the stepped increases in prediction errors. Individuals who continued to rate pain based more on the predicted threat than on changes in nociceptive inputs reported high pain catastrophizing and less mindful-awareness scores. These two affects mapped to activity in the ventral and dorsal striatum, respectively. These findings direct us to a significant role of top-down processes in pain perception.