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Dominik T, Mele A, Schurger A, Maoz U. Libet's legacy: A primer to the neuroscience of volition. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 157:105503. [PMID: 38072144 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105503] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/03/2023] [Revised: 11/09/2023] [Accepted: 12/04/2023] [Indexed: 12/23/2023]
Abstract
The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Alfred Mele
- Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, FL, USA
| | | | - Uri Maoz
- Brain Institute, Chapman University, CA, USA
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2
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Vogel G, Hall L, Moore J, Johansson P. The right face at the wrong place: How motor intentions can override outcome monitoring. iScience 2024; 27:108649. [PMID: 38155771 PMCID: PMC10753065 DOI: 10.1016/j.isci.2023.108649] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/14/2023] [Revised: 10/03/2023] [Accepted: 12/04/2023] [Indexed: 12/30/2023] Open
Abstract
The concept of intentions is often taken for granted in the cognitive and neural sciences, and comparing outcomes with internal goals is seen as critical for our sense of agency. We created an experiment where participants decided which face they preferred, and we either created outcome errors by covertly switching the position of the chosen face or induced motor errors by deviating the mouse cursor, or we did both at the same time. In the final case, participants experienced a motor error, but the outcome ended up correct. The result showed that when they received the right face, but at the wrong place, participants rejected the outcome they actually wanted in a majority of the trials. Thus, contrary to common belief, higher-order outcomes do not always regulate our actions. Instead, motor "wrongness" might sometimes override goal "rightness" and lead us to reject the outcome we actually want.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gabriel Vogel
- Department of Cognitive Science, Lund University, Sweden, Helgonavägen 3, 222 22 Lund, Sweden
| | - Lars Hall
- Department of Cognitive Science, Lund University, Sweden, Helgonavägen 3, 222 22 Lund, Sweden
| | - James Moore
- Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths University of London, Lewisham Way, New Cross, London SE14 6NW, UK
| | - Petter Johansson
- Department of Cognitive Science, Lund University, Sweden, Helgonavägen 3, 222 22 Lund, Sweden
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3
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Derchi CC, Mikulan E, Mazza A, Casarotto S, Comanducci A, Fecchio M, Navarro J, Devalle G, Massimini M, Sinigaglia C. Distinguishing intentional from nonintentional actions through eeg and kinematic markers. Sci Rep 2023; 13:8496. [PMID: 37231006 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-34604-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/10/2023] [Accepted: 05/04/2023] [Indexed: 05/27/2023] Open
Abstract
How can an intentional movement be distinguished from the same movement done nonintentionally? How can this distinction be drawn without asking the subject, or in patients who are unable to communicate? Here we address these questions, by focusing on blinking. This is one of the most frequent spontaneous actions in our daily life, but it can also be done intentionally. Furthermore, blinking is often spared in patients with severe brain injuries, and for some, it is the only way to report complex meanings. Using kinematic and EEG-based measures, we found that intentional and spontaneous blinking are preceded by different brain activities, even when they are indistinguishable. Unlike spontaneous ones, intentional blinks are characterized by a slow negative EEG drift, resembling the classic readiness potential. We investigated the theoretical implication of this finding in stochastic decision models as well as the practical significance of using brain-based signals to improve the discrimination between intentional and nonintentional actions. As proof of principle, we considered three brain-injured patients with rare neurological syndromes characterized by motor and communicative impairments. Although further research is needed, our results indicate that brain-based signals can offer a feasible way to infer intentionality even in absence of overt communication.
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Affiliation(s)
- C C Derchi
- IRCCS, Fondazione Don Carlo Gnocchi ONLUS, 20148, Milan, Italy
| | - E Mikulan
- Department of Health Sciences, Università Degli Studi di Milano, Via di Rudinì 8, 20146, Milan, Italy
| | - A Mazza
- IRCCS, Fondazione Don Carlo Gnocchi ONLUS, 20148, Milan, Italy
| | - S Casarotto
- IRCCS, Fondazione Don Carlo Gnocchi ONLUS, 20148, Milan, Italy
- Department of Biomedical and Clinical Sciences, Università Degli Studi Di Milano, Via G. B. Grassi 75, 20157, Milan, Italy
| | - A Comanducci
- IRCCS, Fondazione Don Carlo Gnocchi ONLUS, 20148, Milan, Italy
| | - M Fecchio
- Center for Neurotechnology and Neurorecovery, Department of Neurology, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, MA, USA
| | - J Navarro
- IRCCS, Fondazione Don Carlo Gnocchi ONLUS, 20148, Milan, Italy
| | - G Devalle
- IRCCS, Fondazione Don Carlo Gnocchi ONLUS, 20148, Milan, Italy
| | - M Massimini
- IRCCS, Fondazione Don Carlo Gnocchi ONLUS, 20148, Milan, Italy.
- Department of Biomedical and Clinical Sciences, Università Degli Studi Di Milano, Via G. B. Grassi 75, 20157, Milan, Italy.
| | - C Sinigaglia
- Department of Philosophy, Università Degli Studi Di Milano, Via Festa del Perdono 7, 20122, Milan, Italy.
- Cognition in Action (CIA) Unit, PHILAB, 20122, Milan, Italy.
- Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA.
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Decroix J, Rossetti Y, Quesque F. Les neurones miroirs, hommes à tout faire des neurosciences : analyse critique des limites méthodologiques et théoriques. ANNEE PSYCHOLOGIQUE 2022. [DOI: 10.3917/anpsy1.221.0085] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/14/2022]
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5
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GOALIATH: a theory of goal-directed behavior. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 2021; 86:1054-1077. [PMID: 34324040 PMCID: PMC9090680 DOI: 10.1007/s00426-021-01563-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/12/2020] [Accepted: 07/19/2021] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
Abstract
Commonsense and theorizing about action control agree in assuming that human behavior is (mainly) driven by goals, but no mechanistic theory of what goals are, where they come from, and how they impact action selection is available. Here I develop such a theory that is based on the assumption that GOALs guide Intentional Actions THrough criteria (GOALIATH). The theory is intended to be minimalist and parsimonious with respect to its assumptions, as transparent and mechanistic as possible, and it is based on representational assumptions provided by the Theory of Event Coding (TEC). It holds that goal-directed behavior is guided by selection criteria that activate and create competition between event files that contain action-effect codes matching one or more of the criteria-a competition that eventually settles into a solution favoring the best-matching event file. The criteria are associated with various sources, including biological drives, acquired needs (e.g., of achievement, power, or affiliation), and short-term, sometimes arbitrary, instructed aims. Action selection is, thus, a compromise that tries to satisfy various criteria related to different driving forces, which are also likely to vary in strength over time. Hence, what looks like goal-directed action emerges from, and represents an attempt to satisfy multiple constraints with different origins, purposes, operational characteristics, and timescales-which among other things does not guarantee a high degree of coherence or rationality of the eventual outcome. GOALIATH calls for a radical break with conventional theorizing about the control of goal-directed behavior, as it among other things questions existing cognitive-control theories and dual-route models of action control.
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Bonicalzi S, Haggard P. From Freedom From to Freedom To: New Perspectives on Intentional Action. Front Psychol 2019; 10:1193. [PMID: 31191396 PMCID: PMC6546819 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01193] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/08/2019] [Accepted: 05/06/2019] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
There are few concepts as relevant as that of intentional action in shaping our sense of self and the interaction with the environment. At the same time, few concepts are so elusive. Indeed, both conceptual and neuroscientific accounts of intentional agency have proven to be problematic. On the one hand, most conceptual views struggle in defining how agents can adequately exert control over their actions. On the other hand, neuroscience settles for definitions by exclusion whereby key features of human intentional actions, including goal-directness, remain underspecified. This paper reviews the existing literature and sketches how this gap might be filled. In particular, we defend a gradualist notion of intentional behavior, which revolves around the following key features: autonomy, flexibility in the integration of causal vectors, and control.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sofia Bonicalzi
- Fakultät für Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich, Germany
| | - Patrick Haggard
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, United Kingdom.,Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives, Département d'Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, Paris, France.,Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London, London, United Kingdom
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Kalis A. No Intentions in the Brain: A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Science of Intention. Front Psychol 2019; 10:946. [PMID: 31105629 PMCID: PMC6499020 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00946] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/15/2018] [Accepted: 04/09/2019] [Indexed: 11/26/2022] Open
Abstract
In their paper “Why we may not find intentions in the brain,” Uithol et al. (2014) convincingly argue that “the processes underlying action initiation and control are considerably more dynamic and context sensitive than the concept of intention can allow for.” Their paper could be seen as a critical note to the widespread tendency to search for identifiable neurocorrelates of mental concepts. Their more specific suggestion is that the absence of clear neural correlates undermines the traditional understanding of intention. In this paper I will try to take their argument a step further. First of all, I will argue that our folk psychology leaves room for various understandings of intentions, and that the concept of intention discussed by Uithol et al. is an academic concept that has its roots in the causal theory of action and in functionalist approaches to cognition. I will argue that both these paradigms are contested, and that there seems to be theoretical wiggle room for alternative understandings of intention. Subsequently I outline such an alternative perspective based on Wittgensteinian philosophy of psychology, emphasizing the regulative role of intention talk. However, the proposed understanding raises the question how to think about neural realization: is intention talk “just” talk, or do intentions really exist? I will propose that intention talk should be understood as a form of pattern recognition, and that the patterns involved are extended in both space and time. The conclusion outlines some important implications for the neuroscientific investigation of intentions.
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Verbaarschot C, Haselager P, Farquhar J. Probing for Intentions: Why Clocks Do Not Provide the Only Measurement of Time. Front Hum Neurosci 2019; 13:68. [PMID: 30914934 PMCID: PMC6423073 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2019.00068] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/26/2018] [Accepted: 02/11/2019] [Indexed: 11/22/2022] Open
Abstract
Having an intention to act is commonly operationalized as the moment at which awareness of an urge or decision to act arises. Measuring this moment has been challenging due to the dependence on first-person reports of subjective experience rather than objective behavioral or neural measurements. Commonly, this challenge is met using (variants of) Libet's clock method. In 2008, Matsuhashi and Hallett published a novel probing strategy as an alternative to the clock method. We believe their probe method could provide a valuable addition to the clock method because: it measures the timing of an intention in real-time, it can be combined with additional (tactile, visual or auditory) stimuli to create a more ecologically valid experimental context, and it allows the measurement of the point of no return. Yet to this date, the probe method has not been applied widely - possibly due to concerns about the effects that the probes might have on the intention and/or action preparation processes. To address these concerns, a 2 × 2 within-subject design is tested. In this design, two variables are manipulated: (1) the requirement of an introspection report and (2) the presence of an auditory probe. Three observables are measured that provide information about the timing of an intention to act: (1) awareness reports of the subjective experience of having an intention, (2) neural preparatory activity for action, and (3) behavioral data of the performed actions. The presence of probes was found to speed up mean action times by roughly 300 ms, but did not alter the neural preparation for action. The requirement of an introspection report did influence brain signals: reducing the amplitude of the readiness potential and increasing the desynchronization in the alpha and beta bands over the motor cortex prior to action onset. By discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the probe method compared to the clock method, we hope to demonstrate its added value and promote its use in future research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ceci Verbaarschot
- Centre for Cognition, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands
| | - Pim Haselager
- Centre for Cognition, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands
| | - Jason Farquhar
- Centre for Cognition, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands
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Gilbert SJ, Fung H. Decoding intentions of self and others from fMRI activity patterns. Neuroimage 2018; 172:278-290. [DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2017.12.090] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/14/2017] [Revised: 11/28/2017] [Accepted: 12/28/2017] [Indexed: 02/07/2023] Open
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10
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Gygax L. Wanting, liking and welfare: The role of affective states in proximate control of behaviour in vertebrates. Ethology 2017. [DOI: 10.1111/eth.12655] [Citation(s) in RCA: 26] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/27/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Lorenz Gygax
- Centre for Proper Housing of Ruminants and Pigs; Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office FSVO; Ettenhausen Switzerland
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11
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Fausto C. The Integration of Emotional Expression and Experience: A Pragmatist Review of Recent Evidence From Brain Stimulation. EMOTION REVIEW 2017. [DOI: 10.1177/1754073917723461] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/31/2022]
Abstract
A common view in affective neuroscience considers emotions as a multifaceted phenomenon constituted by independent affective and motor components. Such dualistic connotation, obtained by rephrasing the classic Darwin and James’s theories of emotion, leads to the assumption that emotional expression is controlled by motor centers in the anterior cingulate, frontal operculum, and supplementary motor area, whereas emotional experience depends on interoceptive centers in the insula. Recent stimulation studies provide a different perspective. I will outline two sets of findings. First, affective experiences can be elicited also following the stimulation of motor centers. Second, emotional expressions can be elicited by stimulating interoceptive regions. Echoing the original pragmatist theories of emotion, I will make a case for the notion that emotional experience emerges from the integration of sensory and motor signals, encoded in the same functional network.
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Affiliation(s)
- Caruana Fausto
- Unit of Neuroscience, University of Parma, Italy
- Unit of Philosophy, University of Parma, Italy
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12
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Verbaarschot C, Haselager P, Farquhar J. Detecting traces of consciousness in the process of intending to act. Exp Brain Res 2016; 234:1945-1956. [PMID: 26920393 PMCID: PMC4893062 DOI: 10.1007/s00221-016-4600-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/06/2015] [Accepted: 02/14/2016] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
An intention to act has different onsets when it is measured in different ways. When participants provide a self-initiated report on the onset of their awareness of intending to act, the report occurs around 150 ms prior to action. However, when the same participants are repeatedly asked about their awareness of intending at different points in time, the onset of intending is found up to 2 s prior to action. This ‘probed’ awareness has its onset around the same time as the brain starts preparing the act, as measured using EEG. First of all, this undermines straightforward interpretations about the temporal relation between unconscious brain states and conscious intentions and actions. Secondly, we suggest that these results present a problem for the view that intentions are mental states occurring at a single point in time. Instead, we suggest the results to support the interpretation of an intention to act as a multistage process developing over time. This process of intending seems to develop during the process of acting, leaving reportable traces in consciousness at certain points along the road.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ceci Verbaarschot
- Center for Cognition, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University Nijmegen, PO Box 9104, 6500 HE, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
| | - Pim Haselager
- Center for Cognition, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University Nijmegen, PO Box 9104, 6500 HE, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Jason Farquhar
- Center for Cognition, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University Nijmegen, PO Box 9104, 6500 HE, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
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13
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Uithol S, Gallese V. The role of the body in social cognition. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2015; 6:453-60. [DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1357] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/05/2014] [Revised: 05/06/2015] [Accepted: 07/12/2015] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Sebo Uithol
- Department of NeuroscienceUniversity of ParmaParmaItaly
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Reddy V, Uithol S. Engagement: Looking beyond the mirror to understand action understanding. BRITISH JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 2015; 34:101-14. [PMID: 26234724 DOI: 10.1111/bjdp.12106] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2015] [Revised: 06/26/2015] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
In this paper, we argue that the current focus on mirroring as the route to explaining the development of action understanding is misleading and problematic. It facilitates a fundamentally spectatorial stance, ignoring engagement and dialogue; it focuses on similarity between self and other and neglects difference; and it succumbs to the static terminology of mechanism rather than a dynamic language of process. Contrary to this view, dialogic exchanges are evident from the start of life, revealing infants' ability to engage with and respond appropriately to actions that are outside their own motor repertoire. We suggest that engagement rather than mirroring better accounts for many current findings in action understanding. The neurological evidence to date shows that action perception involves a process of continuous synchronization and change, suggesting that it might be more fruitful for research and theory to look beyond mirroring and instead adopt dynamic processual explanations of action understanding within interaction.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Sebo Uithol
- Bernstein Centre for Advanced Neuroimaging, Charité Universitätsmedizin, Berlin, Germany.,Department of Neuroscience, University of Parma, Italy
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15
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Lost in time... Conscious Cogn 2015; 33:300-15. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2015.01.011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/15/2014] [Revised: 01/16/2015] [Accepted: 01/19/2015] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
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16
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From commonsense to science, and back: The use of cognitive concepts in neuroscience. Conscious Cogn 2014; 29:248-58. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2014.08.019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/28/2014] [Revised: 08/19/2014] [Accepted: 08/25/2014] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
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Caruana F, Uithol S, Cantalupo G, Sartori I, Lo Russo G, Avanzini P. How action selection can be embodied: intracranial gamma band recording shows response competition during the Eriksen flankers test. Front Hum Neurosci 2014; 8:668. [PMID: 25206328 PMCID: PMC4144204 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00668] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/15/2014] [Accepted: 08/11/2014] [Indexed: 12/02/2022] Open
Abstract
Recent findings in monkeys suggest that action selection is based on a competition between various action options that are automatically planned by the motor system. Here we discuss data from intracranial EEG recordings in human premotor cortex (PMC) during a bimanual version of the Eriksen flankers test that suggest that the same principles apply to human action decisions. Recording sites in the dorsal PMC show an early but undifferentiated activation, a delayed response that depends on the experimental conditions and, finally, a movement related activation during action execution. Additionally, we found that the medial part of the PMC show a significant increase in response for ipsilateral trials, suggesting a role in inhibiting the wrong response. The ventral PMC seems to be involved in action execution, rather than action selection. Together these findings suggest that the human PMC is part of a network that specifies, selects, and executes actions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Fausto Caruana
- Brain Center for Social and Motor Cognition - Istituto Italiano di Tecnologia Parma, Italy ; Department of Neuroscience, University of Parma Parma, Italy
| | - Sebo Uithol
- Department of Neuroscience, University of Parma Parma, Italy
| | - Gaetano Cantalupo
- Department of Life and Reproduction Sciences, University of Verona Verona, Italy
| | - Ivana Sartori
- "Claudio Munari" Center for Epilepsy Surgery, Ospedale Niguarda-Ca' Granda Milan, Italy
| | - Giorgio Lo Russo
- "Claudio Munari" Center for Epilepsy Surgery, Ospedale Niguarda-Ca' Granda Milan, Italy
| | - Pietro Avanzini
- Department of Neuroscience, University of Parma Parma, Italy ; Department of Biomedical, Metabolism, and Neural Science, NOCSAE Hospital, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia Modena, Italy
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