Acting, seeing, and conscious awareness

The prefrontal cortex: from monkey to man

The prefrontal cortex is so important to human beings that, if deprived of it, our behaviour is reduced to action-reactions and automatisms, with no ability to make deliberate decisions. Why does the prefrontal cortex hold such importance in humans? In answer, this review draws on the proximity between humans and other primates, which enables us, through comparative anatomical-functional analysis, to understand the cognitive functions we have in common and specify those that distinguish humans from their closest cousins. First, a focus on the lateral region of the prefrontal cortex illustrates the existence of a continuum between rhesus monkeys (the most studied primates in neuroscience) and humans for most of the major cognitive functions in which this region of the brain plays a central role. This continuum involves the presence of elementary mental operations in the rhesus monkey (e.g. working memory or response inhibition) that are constitutive of 'macro-functions' such as planning, problem-solving and even language production. Second, the human prefrontal cortex has developed dramatically compared to that of other primates. This increase seems to concern the most anterior part (the frontopolar cortex). In humans, the development of the most anterior prefrontal cortex is associated with three major and interrelated cognitive changes: (i) a greater working memory capacity, allowing for greater integration of past experiences and prospective futures; (ii) a greater capacity to link discontinuous or distant data, whether temporal or semantic; and (iii) a greater capacity for abstraction, allowing humans to classify knowledge in different ways, to engage in analogical reasoning or to acquire abstract values that give rise to our beliefs and morals. Together, these new skills enable us, among other things, to develop highly sophisticated social interactions based on language, enabling us to conceive beliefs and moral judgements and to conceptualize, create and extend our vision of our environment beyond what we can physically grasp. Finally, a model of the transition of prefrontal functions between humans and non-human primates concludes this review.

Neural correlates of an illusionary sense of agency caused by virtual reality

Sense of agency (SoA) is the sensation that self-actions lead to ensuing perceptual consequences. The prospective mechanism emphasizes that SoA arises from motor prediction and its comparison with actual action outcomes, while the reconstructive mechanism stresses that SoA emerges from retrospective causal processing about the action outcomes. Consistent with the prospective mechanism, motor planning regions were identified by neuroimaging studies using the temporal binding (TB) effect, a behavioral measure often linked to implicit SoA. Yet, TB also occurs during passive observation of another's action, lending support to the reconstructive mechanism, but its neural correlates remain unexplored. Here, we employed virtual reality (VR) to modulate such observation-based SoA and examined it with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). After manipulating an avatar hand in VR, participants passively observed an avatar's "action" and showed a significant increase in TB. The binding effect was associated with the right angular gyrus and inferior parietal lobule, which are critical nodes for inferential and agency processing. These results suggest that the experience of controlling an avatar may potentiate inferential processing within the right inferior parietal cortex and give rise to the illusionary SoA without voluntary action.

Theories of consciousness are solutions in need of problems

Doerig et al. point out a number of shortcomings with existing theories of consciousness and argue they should be systematically constrained by empirical data. In this commentary I suggest a further constraint - the potential functions of (the contents of) consciousness. One such candidate function in humans is the social sharing of reportable mental states. The social function of consciousnessprovides a general framework within which to understand the evolution and neurobiology of conscious awareness.

Visually evoked responses from the blind field of hemianopic patients

Hemianopia is a visual field defect characterized by decreased vision or blindness in the contralesional visual field of both eyes. The presence of well documented above-chance unconscious behavioural responses to visual stimuli presented to the blind hemifield (blindsight) has stimulated a great deal of research on the neural basis of this important phenomenon. The present study is concerned with electrophysiological responses from the blind field. Since previous studies found that transient Visual Evoked Potentials (VEPs) are not entirely suitable for this purpose here we propose to use Steady-State VEPs (SSVEPs). A positive result would have important implications for the understanding of the neural bases of conscious vision. We carried out a passive SSVEP stimulation with healthy participants and hemianopic patients. Stimuli consisted of four black-and-white sinusoidal Gabor gratings presented one in each visual field quadrant and flickering one at a time at a 12Hz rate. To assess response reliability a Signal-to-Noise Ratio analysis was conducted together with further analyses in time and frequency domains to make comparisons between groups (healthy participants and patients), side of brain lesion (left and right) and visual fields (sighted and blind). The important overall result was that stimulus presentation to the blind hemifield yielded highly reliable responses with time and frequency features broadly similar to those found for cortical extrastriate areas in healthy controls. Moreover, in the intact hemifield of hemianopics and in healthy controls there was evidence of a role of prefrontal structures in perceptual awareness. Finally, the presence of different patterns of brain reorganization depended upon the side of lesion.

Endogenous visuospatial attention increases visual awareness independent of visual discrimination sensitivity

Visuospatial attention often improves task performance by increasing signal gain at attended locations and decreasing noise at unattended locations. Attention is also believed to be the mechanism that allows information to enter awareness. In this experiment, we assessed whether orienting endogenous visuospatial attention with cues differentially affects visual discrimination sensitivity (an objective task performance) and visual awareness (the subjective feeling of perceiving) during the same discrimination task. Gabor patch targets were presented laterally, either at low contrast (contrast stimuli) or at high contrast embedded in noise (noise stimuli). Participants reported their orientation either in a 3-alternative choice task (clockwise, counterclockwise, unknown) that allowed for both objective and subjective reports, or in a 2-alternative choice task (clockwise, counterclockwise) that provided a control for objective reports. Signal detection theory models were fit to the experimental data: estimated perceptual sensitivity reflected objective performance; decision criteria, or subjective biases, were a proxy for visual awareness. Attention increased sensitivity (i.e., improved objective performance) for the contrast, but not for the noise stimuli. Indeed, with the latter, attention did not further enhance the already high target signal or reduce the already low uncertainty on its position. Interestingly, for both contrast and noise stimuli, attention resulted in more liberal criteria, i.e., awareness increased. The noise condition is thus an experimental configuration where people think they see the targets they attend to better, even if they do not. This could be explained by an internal representation of their attentional state, which influences awareness independent of objective visual signals.

The Brain in (Willed) Action: A Meta-Analytical Comparison of Imaging Studies on Motor Intentionality and Sense of Agency

Voluntary actions can be fractionated in different phenomena: from the emergence of intentions and the ensuing motor plans and actions, to the anticipation and monitoring of their outcomes, to the appreciation of their congruency with intentions and to the eventual emergence of a sense of agency. It follows that motor intention and the sense of agency should occur at different stages in the normal generation of willed actions. Both these processes have been associated with a fronto-parietal motor network, but no study has investigated to what extent the two experiences can be dissociated for the brain regions involved. To this end, we assessed the PET/fMRI literature on agency and intentionality using a meta-analytic technique based on a hierarchical clustering algorithm. Beside a shared brain network involving the meso-frontal and prefrontal regions, the middle insula and subcortical structures, we found that motor intention and the sense of agency are functionally underpinned by separable sets of brain regions: an “intentionality network,” involving the rostral area of the mesial frontal cortex (middle cingulum and pre-supplementary motor area), the anterior insula and the parietal lobules, and a “self-agency network,” which involves the posterior areas of the mesial frontal cortex (the SMA proper), the posterior insula, the occipital lobe and the cerebellum. We were then able to confirm this functional organization by a subsequent seed-based fMRI resting-state functional connectivity analysis, with seeds derived from the intentionality/sense of agency specific clusters of the medial wall of the frontal lobe. Our results suggest the existence of a rostro-caudal gradient within the mesial frontal cortex, with the more anterior regions linked to the concept of motor intentionality and the brain areas located more posteriorly associated with the direct monitoring between the action and its outcome. This suggestion is reinforced by the association between the sense of agency and the activation of the occipital lobes, to suggest a direct comparison between the movement and its external (e.g., visual) consequences. The shared network may be important for the integration of intentionality and agency in a coherent appreciation of self-generated actions.

Dissecting the neurofunctional bases of intentional action

Here we challenge and present evidence that expands the what, when, and whether anatomical model of intentional action, which states that internally driven decisions about the content and timing of our actions and about whether to act at all depend on separable neural systems, anatomically segregated along the medial wall of the frontal lobe. In our fMRI event-related paradigm, subjects acted following conditional cues or following their intentions. The content of the actions, their timing, or their very occurrence were the variables investigated, together with the modulating factor of intentionality. Besides a shared activation of the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) for all components and the SMA proper for the when component, we found specific activations beyond the mesial prefrontal wall involving the parietal cortex for the what component or subcortical gray structures for the when component. Moreover, we found behavioral, functional, anatomical, and brain connectivity evidence that the self-driven decisions on whether to act require a higher interhemispheric cooperation: This was indexed by a specific activation of the corpus callosum whereby the less the callosal activation, the greater was the decision cost at the time of the action in the whether trials. Furthermore, tractography confirmed that the fibers passing through the callosal focus of activation connect the two sides of the frontal lobes involved in intentional trials. This is evidence of non-unitary neural foundations for the processes involved in intentional actions with the pre-SMA/ACC operating as an intentional hub. These findings may guide the exploration of specific instances of disturbed intentionality.