The cognitive dynamics of small-sooner over large-later preferences during temporal discounting task through event-related oscillations (EROs)

Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation Decreases P3 Amplitude and Inherent Delta Activity during a Waiting Impulsivity Paradigm: Crossover Study

The inability to wait for a target before initiating an action (i.e., waiting impulsivity) is one of the main features of addictive behaviors. Current interventions for addiction, such as transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS), have been suggested to improve this inability. Nonetheless, the effects of tDCS on waiting impulsivity and underlying electrophysiological (EEG) markers are still not clear. Therefore, this study aimed to evaluate the effects of neuromodulation over the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) on the behavior and EEG markers of reward anticipation (i.e., cue and target-P3 and underlying delta/theta power) during a premature responding task. For that, forty healthy subjects participated in two experimental sessions, where they received active and sham tDCS over the rIFG combined with EEG recording during the task. To evaluate transfer effects, participants also performed two control tasks to assess delay discounting and motor inhibition. The active tDCS decreased the cue-P3 and target-P3 amplitudes, as well as delta power during target-P3. While no tDCS effects were found for motor inhibition, active tDCS increased the discounting of future rewards when compared to sham. These findings suggest a tDCS-induced modulation of the P3 component and underlying oscillatory activity during waiting impulsivity and the discounting of future rewards.

The Cost of Imagined Actions in a Reward-Valuation Task

Growing evidence suggests that humans and other animals assign value to a stimulus based not only on its inherent rewarding properties, but also on the costs of the action required to obtain it, such as the cost of time. Here, we examined whether such cost also occurs for mentally simulated actions. Healthy volunteers indicated their subjective value for snack foods while the time to imagine performing the action to obtain the different stimuli was manipulated. In each trial, the picture of one food item and a home position connected through a path were displayed on a computer screen. The path could be either large or thin. Participants first rated the stimulus, and then imagined moving the mouse cursor along the path from the starting position to the food location. They reported the onset and offset of the imagined movements with a button press. Two main results emerged. First, imagery times were significantly longer for the thin than the large path. Second, participants liked significantly less the snack foods associated with the thin path (i.e., with longer imagery time), possibly because the passage of time strictly associated with action imagery discounts the value of the reward. Importantly, such effects were absent in a control group of participants who performed an identical valuation task, except that no action imagery was required. Our findings hint at the idea that imagined actions, like real actions, carry a cost that affects deeply how people assign value to the stimuli in their environment.