Keeping the illusion of control under control: Ceilings, floors, and imperfect calibration

Are digital natives overconfident in their privacy literacy? Discrepancy between self-assessed and actual privacy literacy, and their impacts on privacy protection behavior

Privacy literacy is recognized as a crucial skill for safeguarding personal privacy online. However, self-assessed privacy literacy often diverges from actual literacy, revealing the presence of cognitive biases. The protection motivation theory (PMT) is widely used to explain privacy protection behavior, positing that whether individuals take defensive measures depends on their cognitive evaluation of threats and coping capabilities. However, the role of cognitive biases in this process has been understudied in previous research. This study focuses on Chinese digital natives and examines the differential impacts of subjective and objective privacy literacy on privacy protection behavior, as well as the role of cognitive biases in privacy decision-making. The results show that there is no significant correlation between subjective and objective privacy literacy, and a bias exists. When privacy concern is used as a mediating variable, there are significant differences in the paths through which subjective and objective privacy literacy influence privacy protection behavior. Furthermore, privacy literacy overconfidence moderates the relationship between privacy concern and privacy protection behavior. The findings confirm the influence of cognitive biases in privacy behavior decision-making and extend the PMT. This study also calls for the government to enhance privacy literacy training for digital natives to improve their privacy protection capabilities.

Prediction Biases: An Integrative Review

Research in psychology and related fields has documented a myriad of prediction biases, such as the underprediction of hedonic adaptation and the overprediction of other people’s concern for fairness. These prediction biases are ostensibly independent, each with its own cause. We argue, however, that many of these seemingly disparate biases are specific instances of a general bias—situation insensitivity: People are insensitive to variations in the situational variable that underlies the target variable (the variable to be predicted). Consequently, when encountering a condition in which the situational variable is at one of its ends such that the value of the target variable is low, people overpredict the value; conversely, when encountering a condition in which the situational variable is at its other end such that the value of the target variable is high, people underpredict it. Most prior research documenting prediction biases has focused on only one end of the situational variable and therefore has shown either only an overprediction bias or only an underprediction bias. We argue that at the other end of the situational variable, the originally documented bias can disappear or even reverse. Our framework not only explains known biases but also predicts new biases.

Does Choice Cause an Illusion of Control?

Previous research suggests that choice causes an illusion of control—that it makes people feel more likely to achieve preferable outcomes, even when they are selecting among options that are functionally identical (e.g., lottery tickets with an identical chance of winning). This research has been widely accepted as evidence that choice can have significant welfare effects, even when it confers no actual control. In this article, we report the results of 17 experiments that examined whether choice truly causes an illusion of control ( N = 10,825 online and laboratory participants). We found that choice rarely makes people feel more likely to achieve preferable outcomes—unless it makes the preferable outcomes actually more likely—and when it does, it is not because choice causes an illusion but because choice reflects some participants’ preexisting (illusory) beliefs that the functionally identical options are not identical. Overall, choice does not seem to cause an illusion of control.

Values-in-action that support safe production

INTRODUCTION

Safe production is a sustainable approach to managing an organization's operations that considers the interests of both management and workers as salient stakeholders in a productive and safe workplace. A supportive culture enacts values versus only espousing them. These values-in-action are beliefs shared by both management and workers that align what should happen in performing organizational routines to be safe and be productive with what actually is done. However, the operations and safety management literature provides little guidance on which values-in-action are most important to safe production and how they work together to create a supportive culture.

METHOD

The researchers conducted exploratory case studies in 10 manufacturing plants of 9 firms. The researchers compared plant managers' top-down perspectives on safety in the performance of work and workers' bottom-up experiences of the safety climate and their rates of injury on the job. Each case study used data collected from interviewing multiple managers, the administration of a climate survey to workers and the examination of the plant's injury rates over time as reported to its third party health and safety insurer.

RESULTS

The researchers found that plants with four values-in-action -a commitment to safety, discipline, prevention and participation-were capable of safe production, while plants without those values were neither safe nor productive. Where culture and climate aligned lower rates of injury were experienced.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The four value-in-actions must all be present and work together in a self-reinforcing manner to engage workers and managers in achieving safe production. Practical application: Managers of both operations and safety functions do impact safety outcomes such as reducing injuries by creating a participatory environment that encourage learning that improves both safety and production routines.

What is it like to use a BCI? - insights from an interview study with brain-computer interface users

Background

The neurotechnology behind brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) raises various ethical questions. The ethical literature has pinpointed several issues concerning safety, autonomy, responsibility and accountability, psychosocial identity, consent, privacy and data security. This study aims to assess BCI users’ experiences, self-observations and attitudes in their own right and looks for social and ethical implications.

Methods

We conducted nine semi-structured interviews with BCI users, who used the technology for medical reasons. The transcribed interviews were analyzed according to the Grounded Theory coding method.

Results

BCI users perceive themselves as active operators of a technology that offers them social participation and impacts their self-definition. Each of these aspects bears its own opportunities and risks. BCIs can contribute to retaining or regaining human capabilities. At the same time, BCI use contains elements that challenge common experiences, for example when the technology is in conflict with the affective side of BCI users. The potential benefits of BCIs are regarded as outweighing the risks in that BCI use is considered to promote valuable qualities and capabilities. BCI users appreciate the opportunity to regain lost capabilities as well as to gain new ones.

Conclusions

BCI users appreciate the technology for various reasons. The technology is highly appreciated in cases where it is beneficial in terms of agency, participation and self-definitions. Rather than questioning human nature, the technology can retain and restore characteristics and abilities which enrich our lives.

Friend and foe? Self-deception in organisations

Purpose

Self-deception is generally deemed an adaptive psychological mechanism that ensures well-being, a sense of identity and social advancement. However, self-deception becomes maladaptive in organised environments that undermine the critical thinking essential to development and change. The purpose of this paper is to advance a theoretical model of self-deception, specifying and contextualising its intrapersonal and relational components in organisations. Further, it provides guidelines for practitioners to identify self-deception tactics, and minimise maladaptive self-deception.

Design/methodology/approach

Drawing on affective coping, system justification and self-categorisation theories, the paper illustrates how the interplay of intrapersonal and relational factors with organisational practices explain self-deception.

Findings

Maladaptive self-deception is pervasive in organisations that deter critical reflection, and intensify motivated biases to self-enhance and self-protect.

Originality/value

This paper proposes a socially and organisationally embedded model of self-deception, specifies how self-deception develops and manifests in organisations, and suggests ways of identifying and managing self-deception towards positive organisational development and change.

Let me take the wheel: Illusory control and sense of agency

Illusory control refers to an effect in games of chance where features associated with skilful situations increase expectancies of success. Past work has operationalized illusory control in terms of subjective ratings or behaviour, with limited consideration of the relationship between these definitions, or the broader construct of agency. This study used a novel card-guessing task in 78 participants to investigate the relationship between subjective and behavioural illusory control. We compared trials in which participants (a) had no opportunity to exercise illusory control, (b) could exercise illusory control for free, or (c) could pay to exercise illusory control. Contingency Judgment and Intentional Binding tasks assessed explicit and implicit sense of agency, respectively. On the card-guessing task, confidence was higher when participants exerted control than in the baseline condition. In a complementary model, participants were more likely to exercise control when their confidence was high, and this effect was accentuated in the pay condition relative to the free condition. Decisions to pay were positively correlated with control ratings on the Contingency Judgment task, but were not significantly related to Intentional Binding. These results establish an association between subjective and behavioural illusory control and locate the construct within the cognitive literature on agency.

Decision-Making under Ambiguity Is Modulated by Visual Framing, but Not by Motor vs. Non-Motor Context. Experiments and an Information-Theoretic Ambiguity Model

A number of recent studies have investigated differences in human choice behavior depending on task framing, especially comparing economic decision-making to choice behavior in equivalent sensorimotor tasks. Here we test whether decision-making under ambiguity exhibits effects of task framing in motor vs. non-motor context. In a first experiment, we designed an experience-based urn task with varying degrees of ambiguity and an equivalent motor task where subjects chose between hitting partially occluded targets. In a second experiment, we controlled for the different stimulus design in the two tasks by introducing an urn task with bar stimuli matching those in the motor task. We found ambiguity attitudes to be mainly influenced by stimulus design. In particular, we found that the same subjects tended to be ambiguity-preferring when choosing between ambiguous bar stimuli, but ambiguity-avoiding when choosing between ambiguous urn sample stimuli. In contrast, subjects' choice pattern was not affected by changing from a target hitting task to a non-motor context when keeping the stimulus design unchanged. In both tasks subjects' choice behavior was continuously modulated by the degree of ambiguity. We show that this modulation of behavior can be explained by an information-theoretic model of ambiguity that generalizes Bayes-optimal decision-making by combining Bayesian inference with robust decision-making under model uncertainty. Our results demonstrate the benefits of information-theoretic models of decision-making under varying degrees of ambiguity for a given context, but also demonstrate the sensitivity of ambiguity attitudes across contexts that theoretical models struggle to explain.

Success-slope effects on the illusion of control and on remembered success-frequency

The illusion of control refers to the inference of action-outcome contingency in situations where outcomes are in fact random. The strength of this illusion has been found to be affected by whether the frequency of successes increases or decreases over repeated trials, in what can be termed a “success-slope” effect. Previous studies have generated inconsistent findings regarding the nature of this effect. In this paper we present an experiment (N = 334) that overcomes several methodological limitations within this literature, employing a wider range of dependent measures (measures of two different types of illusory control, primary (by self) and secondary (by luck), as well as measures of remembered success-frequency). Results indicate that different dependent measures lead to different effects. On measures of (primary, but not secondary) control over the task, scores were highest when the rate of success increased over time. Meanwhile, estimates of success-frequency in the task did not vary across conditions and showed trends consistent with the broader literature on human memory.