The effect of disgust conditioning and disgust sensitivity on appraisals of moral transgressions

Disgust as a basic, sexual, and moral emotion

Disgust is a basic emotion that increases the organism's survival success by preventing the transfer of pathogens. In this regard, it directs cognitive processes and motivates avoidance behaviors that prevent pathogens from entering the body. Moreover, disgust has many specific characteristics that distinguish it from other basic emotions. Firstly, unlike other basic emotions, it contaminates neutral objects around it and causes difficult-to-change learning. Another specific characteristic of disgust is that it depends on ideational processes. Objects, situations, and behaviors that do not contain pathogens can also cause disgust. In this regard, disgust appears not only as a basic emotion but also as different adaptations in different fields. In this context, two distinct adaptations of disgust stand out: sexual and moral disgust. These two adaptations of disgust benefit from disgust-related behaviors and motivations in different ways. Sexual disgust works as a gene protection mechanism, while moral disgust helps maintain social rules. The specific characteristics of disgust and its effects on cognitive processes such as attention and memory interact. In conclusion, the multifaceted structure of disgust shows that it needs to be studied more in the subfields of psychology. (Strohminger, Philos Compass 9:478-493, 2014) defines disgust as a psychological nebula that needs to be discovered. However, it is observed that disgust has not been adequately addressed. This review aims to comprehensively explore unique characteristics and diverse aspects of disgust, shedding light on its significance from various perspectives. This study underscores the broader understanding of disgust and its pivotal role in psychological research.

Four studies yield limited evidence for prepared (disgust) learning via evaluative conditioning

Prepared learning accounts suggest that specialized learning mechanisms increase the retention of associations linked to ancestrally-prevalent threats. Few studies have investigated specialized aversion learning for pathogen threats. In four pre-registered studies (N's = 515, 495, 164, 175), we employed an evaluative conditioning procedure to test whether foods (versus non-foods) are more readily associated with negative content associated with pathogens than negative content not associated with pathogens. Participants saw negatively valenced (either pathogen-relevant or -irrelevant), neutral or positively-valenced stimuli paired with meats and plants (in Studies 1 and 2) and with meats and abstract shapes (in Studies 3 and 4). They then evaluated each stimulus explicitly via self-reports (Studies 1-4) and implicitly via an Affect Misattribution Procedure (Studies 3 and 4). Linear mixed models revealed general evaluative conditioning effects, but inconsistent evidence for specialized (implicit or explicit) learning for a food-pathogen association. However, results from a mega-analysis across studies revealed stronger conditioning effects for meats paired with pathogen-relevant negative stimuli than pathogen-irrelevant negative stimuli.

WITHDRAWN: Four studies Yield limited evidence for prepared (disgust) learning via evaluative conditioning

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Spacious Environments Make Us Tolerant-The Role of Emotion and Metaphor

The physical environment plays an important role in moral cognition. Previous research has demonstrated that the physical environment affects individual moral judgment. Investigators have argued that the environment influences moral judgment through emotion and cognition, such as during metaphor processing. Following the intensification of urbanization and increases in population size, the phenomenon of a narrow environment has become more common. However, the relation between environmental spaciousness and moral judgment has not been thoroughly examined. We examined the effect of environmental spaciousness (spaciousness vs. narrowness) on moral judgments in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Results showed that participants report a higher rating score of moral judgment in more spacious environments compared with narrow environments. We further explored the roles of emotion and metaphor in the relation between environmental spaciousness and moral judgments. We found support for a partial mediation effect of emotion in the relationship between environmental spaciousness and moral judgment. The results also supported an association between the concept of spaciousness and tolerant cognition. Spacious environments may elicit positive emotions and more tolerant cognition, which in turn influences moral judgment. These results provide new evidence for the influence of the environment on moral judgments, and more attention may be warranted to incorporate this relationship in environmental design.

Contamination fear in the time of the COVID-19 pandemic: A moderated mediation quasi-experimental model of the effect of disgust on outgroup bias towards diaspora

Disgust sensitivity plays a key role in generating and maintaining outgroup biases. To test our hypotheses, we used a quasi-experimental between-subjects design, in which participants were randomly assigned to a disgust induction condition (N = 102) or a non-induction neutral group (N = 92). The induction scenario featured the return of the diaspora to their home country due to COVID-19 concerns. In one scenario, the diaspora lied about the country they arrived from, and in the other, there was no moral transgression. We hypothesized that the effect of disgust sensitivity on dehumanization and aggressive tendencies passed through contamination fear and the moderated mediation model indicated that this indirect effect was stronger for participants in the disgust-induction than in the non-induction group. This effect was found for biological dehumanization and passive aggression outcomes, both related to outgroup bias. Consistent with the role of disgust as a disease-avoidance mechanism, our results suggest that disgust could facilitate stronger outgroup bias in the context of a high health threat, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

Fairness, fast and slow: A review of dual process models of fairness

Fairness, the notion that people deserve or have rights to certain resources or kinds of treatment, is a fundamental dimension of moral cognition. Drawing on recent evidence from economics, psychology, and neuroscience, we ask whether self-interest is always intuitive, requiring self-control to override with reasoning-based fairness concerns, or whether fairness itself can be intuitive. While we find strong support for rejecting the notion that self-interest is always intuitive, the literature has reached conflicting conclusions about the neurocognitive systems underpinning fairness. We propose that this disagreement can largely be resolved in light of an extended Social Heuristics Hypothesis. Divergent findings may be attributed to the interpretation of behavioral effects of ego depletion or neurostimulation, reverse inference from brain activity to the underlying psychological process, and insensitivity to social context and inter-individual differences. To better dissect the neurobiological basis of fairness, we outline how future research should embrace cross-disciplinary methods that combine psychological manipulations with neuroimaging, and that can probe inter-individual, and cultural heterogeneities.

Reevaluating Moral Disgust: Sensitivity to Many Affective States Predicts Extremity in Many Evaluative Judgments

Disgust-sensitive individuals are particularly morally critical. Some theorists take this as evidence that disgust has a uniquely moral form: disgust contributes to moralization even of pathogen-free violations, and disgust’s contribution to moralization is unique from other emotional states. We argue that the relationship between disgust sensitivity (DS) and moral judgment is not special in two respects. First, trait sensitivity to many other affective states, beyond disgust, predicts moral evaluations. Second, DS also predicts nonnormative evaluative judgments. Four studies supported these hypotheses, using multiple measures of DS, and judgments of moral violations (Studies 1 and 4), conventional violations (Study 1), imprudent actions (Study 1), competence (Study 2), and aesthetic evaluations (Study 3). Our findings call into question the usefulness of “moral disgust” as a psychological construct by showing that the relationship between DS and moral condemnation is one instantiation of a more general association between affect and judgment.

So Gross and Yet so Far Away: Psychological Distance Moderates the Effect of Disgust on Moral Judgment

People morally evaluate norm violations that occur at various distances from the self (e.g., a corrupt politician vs. a cheating spouse). Yet, distance is rarely studied as a moderator of moral judgment processes. We focus on the influence of disgust on moral judgments, as evidence here has remained inconclusive. Based on feelings as information theory and the notion that disgust evolved as a pathogen avoidance mechanism, we argue that disgust influences moral judgment of psychologically distant (vs. near) norm violations. Studies 1 and 3 show that trait disgust sensitivity (but not trait anger and fear) more strongly predicts moral judgment of distant than near violations. Studies 2 and 4 show that incidental disgust affects moral judgment of distant (vs. near) violations and that the moderating role of distance is mediated by involvement of others (vs. the self) in the evaluator’s conceptualization of the violation.

Does Incidental Disgust Amplify Moral Judgment? A Meta-Analytic Review of Experimental Evidence

The role of emotion in moral judgment is currently a topic of much debate in moral psychology. One specific claim made by many researchers is that irrelevant feelings of disgust can amplify the severity of moral condemnation. Numerous researchers have found this effect, but there have also been several published failures to replicate it. Clarifying this issue would inform important theoretical debates among rival accounts of moral judgment. We meta-analyzed all available studies—published and unpublished—in which incidental disgust was manipulated prior to or concurrent with a moral judgment task ( k = 50). We found evidence for a small amplification effect of disgust ( d = 0.11), which is strongest for gustatory/olfactory modes of disgust induction. However, there is also some suggestion of publication bias in this literature, and when this is accounted for, the effect disappears entirely ( d = −0.01). Moreover, prevalent confounds mean that the effect size that we estimate is best interpreted as an upper bound on the size of the amplification effect. On the basis of the results of this meta-analysis, we argue against strong claims about the causal role of affect in moral judgment and suggest a need for new, more rigorous research on this topic.

A Constructionist Review of Morality and Emotions

Morality and emotions are linked, but what is the nature of their correspondence? Many “whole number” accounts posit specific correspondences between moral content and discrete emotions, such that harm is linked to anger, and purity is linked to disgust. A review of the literature provides little support for these specific morality–emotion links. Moreover, any apparent specificity may arise from global features shared between morality and emotion, such as affect and conceptual content. These findings are consistent with a constructionist perspective of the mind, which argues against a whole number of discrete and domain-specific mental mechanisms underlying morality and emotion. Instead, constructionism emphasizes the flexible combination of basic and domain-general ingredients such as core affect and conceptualization in creating the experience of moral judgments and discrete emotions. The implications of constructionism in moral psychology are discussed, and we propose an experimental framework for rigorously testing morality–emotion links.

Comment: Strohminger–McGinn: Deconstructing the Moral Amplification Effect

I use a number of McGinn’s (2011) ideas to identify likely confounds in the induction of incidental disgust as the basis of the moral amplification effect.