Multiple moral foundations predict responses to sacrificial dilemmas

Moral trade-offs reveal foundational representations that predict unique variance in political attitudes

Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) explains variation in moral judgements on the basis of multiple innate, intuitive foundations and has been subject to criticism over recent years. Prior research has tended to rely on explicit self-report in the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). In contrast, we seek to capture intuitive choices between foundations in a novel task - the Moral Foundations Conflict Task (MFCT). Across four studies, responses on this task reflect foundations measured by the MFQ (study 1), are not altered under cognitive load or reduced cognitive control (studies 2a and 2b); and explain unique variance in political orientation and related constructs (study 3). Furthermore, using responses and response times generated on the MFCT, we present a computationally explicit model of foundation-related intuitive judgements and show that these patterns are consistent with the theoretical claims of MFT. These findings show that the MFCT outperforms the MFQ and can contribute to the understanding of moral value conflicts, furthering debate on the nature of moral values.

Clarifying Measurement Issues With the Purity Subscale of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire in Christian and Nonreligious Participants

The moral foundation of Purity plays a prominent role in moral psychology. Previous studies have identified measurement issues with the standard operationalization of Purity (the Moral Foundations Questionnaire; MFQ) when comparing religious and nonreligious samples. The cause(s) and implications of such issues remain understudied. As the methodological backbone of much moral psychology research, the MFQ’s Purity subscale warrants further attention. In four samples (total N = 8,005), we identify measurement problems traceable to a single problematic item serving as a proxy for religious identification. Conservative estimates of the bias introduced by this item suggest that an average nonreligious participant’s Purity score are underestimated by at least 0.2 standard deviations, compared with an average Christian. Given Purity’s centrality to moral psychology, this bias may have influenced many findings. We offer recommendations for new and existing studies to avoid this bias at little cost. Data and analysis code are available at https://osf.io/ek98n/ .

Individual and Environmental Correlates of Adolescents' Moral Decision-Making in Moral Dilemmas

While extensive research has been conducted on adults' judgments in moral sacrificial dilemmas, there is little research on adolescents. The present study aimed at: (1) adding further empirical evidence about adolescents' moral decisions (deontological vs. utilitarian) in sacrificial moral dilemmas and (2) investigating how these moral decisions relate with gender, school grade, emotional traits (callous-unemotional traits), context-related experiences (perceived parental rejection and community violence exposure), and moral-related factors (moral disengagement and universalism value). A sample of 755 Italian adolescents (54.7% females; Mean age=16.45, SD=1.61) attending the second and the fifth year of secondary school took part in the study. Two sacrificial trolley-type dilemmas (where harmful actions promote the greater good) were presented. In the "switch" scenario (impersonal sacrificial dilemma), the choice is whether to hit a switch to save five people killing only one person. In the "footbridge" scenario (personal sacrificial dilemma), the choice is whether to push a large man off a footbridge saving five persons. For each scenario, participants had to indicate whether the proposed action was "morally acceptable" or not. Data were analyzed performing generalized linear mixed models. Our results showed that: (1) Adolescents were more likely to indicate as admissible to hit the switch rather than to push the large man; (2) male adolescents, compared to females, were more likely to say it was morally acceptable to intervene in the footbridge dilemma, whereas younger adolescents said it was morally acceptable both in the switch and the footbridge situations; and (3) higher levels of callous-unemotional traits, perceived parental rejection, and moral disengagement, on the one hand, and lower levels of universalism, on the other hand, were associated to higher admissibility to intervene in the footbridge scenario. Higher community violence exposure was associated with a lower propensity to intervene in the switch scenario. Overall, the present study expands the research on sacrificial dilemmas involving a sample of adolescents. The findings support previous studies concerning the role of emotions in making moral decisions but, at the same, open new perspectives regarding the role of contextual experiences and moral-related factors.

Remapping the foundations of morality: Well-fitting structural model of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire

Moral foundations theory posits five moral foundations, however 5-factor models provide poor fit to the data. Here, in five studies, each with large samples (total N = 11,496), we construct and replicate a well-fitting model of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). In study 1 (N = 2,271) we tested previously theorised models, confirming none provide adequate fit. We then developed a well-fitting model of the MFQ. In this model, the fairness/reciprocity and harm/care foundations were preserved intact. The binding foundations, however, divided into five, rather than the original three foundations. Purity/sanctity split into independent foundations of purity and sanctity. Similarly, Ingroup/loyalty divided into independent factors of loyalty to clan and loyalty to country. Authority/respect was re-focussed on hierarchy, losing one item to the new sanctity foundation and another into loyalty to country. In addition to these 7 foundations, higher-level factors of binding and individualizing were supported, along with a general/acquiescence factor. Finally, a "moral tilt" factor corresponding to coordinated left-leaning vs. right-leaning moral patterns was supported. We validated the model in four additional studies, testing replication of the 7-foundation model in data including from US, Australia, and China (total N = 9,225). The model replicated with good fit found in all four samples. These findings demonstrate the first well-fitting replicable model of the MFQ. They also highlight the importance of modelling measurement structure, and reveal important additional foundations, and structure (binding, individualizing, tilt) above the foundations.

Prosocial responses to COVID-19: Examining the role of gratitude, fairness and legacy motives

The COVID-19 pandemic has produced an unprecedented collective action problem. Individuals must make a variety of decisions that influence both their own well-being and the health of those around them. Achieving the collective best-interest depends on most individuals responding in socially optimal ways, which includes remaining familiar with the current status of the pandemic, adhering to health guidelines relevant to the pandemic, and having a constructive emotional response to the pandemic. We sought to examine how individual differences in core moral motivators of collective action (i.e., fairness and gratitude) relate to individuals' COVID-19 responses. In a two-wave study (T1: N = 254; T2: N = 135) conducted in May and June 2020, we find that individual differences in fairness and gratitude were associated with more adaptive (i.e. positive emotions) and prosocial (i.e. remaining familiar with the pandemic, adhering to public health guidelines, prioritizing saving lives) responses to the pandemic. These effects are mediated through differences in impact legacy motives (i.e. being concerned about the impact one leaves behind once they have passed). Understanding the links between gratitude, fairness and legacy motives, and their impact on prosociality, could promote both current and intergenerational prosocial decision making.

Developing brief versions of the Moral Foundations Vignettes using a genetic algorithm-based approach

The time-efficient assessment of moral values using systematically validated measures is a high priority in moral psychology research. However, few such options exist for researchers working with Moral Foundations Theory, one of the most popular theories in moral psychology. Across two samples totaling 1336 participants (756 Australian undergraduates and 580 American Mechanical Turk workers), we used a genetic algorithm-based (GA) approach to construct and validate abbreviated versions of the Moral Foundations Vignettes (MFV), a 90-item scale comprising vignettes of concrete violations of each of the six moral foundations. We constructed 36- and 18-item versions of the MFV, demonstrating close correspondence with the complete MFV, and adequate reliability, predictive validity, and factor-analytic goodness of fit for both abbreviated versions. Overall, the abbreviated scales achieve substantially reduced length with minimal loss of information, providing a useful resource for moral psychology researchers.

Good Robots, Bad Robots: Morally Valenced Behavior Effects on Perceived Mind, Morality, and Trust

Both robots and humans can behave in ways that engender positive and negative evaluations of their behaviors and associated responsibility. However, extant scholarship on the link between agent evaluations and valenced behavior has generally treated moral behavior as a monolithic phenomenon and largely focused on moral deviations. In contrast, contemporary moral psychology increasingly considers moral judgments to unfold in relation to a number of moral foundations (care, fairness, authority, loyalty, purity, liberty) subject to both upholding and deviation. The present investigation seeks to discover whether social judgments of humans and robots emerge differently as a function of moral foundation-specific behaviors. This work is conducted in two studies: (1) an online survey in which agents deliver observed/mediated responses to moral dilemmas and (2) a smaller laboratory-based replication with agents delivering interactive/live responses. In each study, participants evaluate the goodness of and blame for six foundation-specific behaviors, and evaluate the agent for perceived mind, morality, and trust. Across these studies, results suggest that (a) moral judgments of behavior may be agent-agnostic, (b) all moral foundations may contribute to social evaluations of agents, and (c) physical presence and agent class contribute to the assignment of responsibility for behaviors. Findings are interpreted to suggest that bad behaviors denote bad actors, broadly, but machines bear a greater burden to behave morally, regardless of their credit- or blame-worthiness in a situation.

Individual differences in the early recognition of moral information in lexical processing: An event-related potential study

Previous studies have shown that intuitive moral cognition occurs at an early stage. However, inconsistent findings indicate that moral information is recognized at a relatively late stage. This study uses the recognition potential (RP) as a neural index and simultaneously measures individuals' moral preferences using the Moral Foundation Questionnaire. We aim to investigate how individual differences in moral preferences modulate the processing of morality in the pre-semantic stage and provide some insights to explain the variation in rapid information processing linked to morality. The participants performed an implicit task in which recognizable words depicting geographical names or behaviors related to moral, disgusting or neutral content alternated with background stimuli at high rates of presentation. The results showed that the early recognition of moral information manifested in the RP depended on an individual's moral concerns. Participants with a higher level of endorsement of the harm/care foundation exhibited a greater net moral effect, namely, greater mean amplitudes of the moral-neutral RP difference waves. Meanwhile, only the group that was more sensitive to the harm/care foundation showed a distinctively larger RP for the moral words than for the neutral words. Overall, these findings suggest that the early processing of moral cognition may hinge on individual differences in moral concerns about other people's suffering.