Psychological bases of support for radical right parties

Openness buffers the impact of Belief in Conspiracy Theories on COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy: Evidence from a large, representative Italian sample

As COVID-19 continues to incur enormous personal and societal costs, widespread vaccination against the virus remains the most effective strategy to end the pandemic. However, vaccine hesitancy is rampant and has been steadily rising for decades. Seeking to remedy this, personality psychologists have begun to explore psychological drivers of vaccine hesitancy, including the Big Five. Openness to Experience presents itself as a vexing case as previous attempts to study its association with vaccine hesitancy have yielded mixed findings. In this preregistered study, we hypothesise that the impact of Openness to Experience on Vaccine Hesitancy depends on its interplay with other factors, namely conspiracy beliefs. To test this, we apply logistic regressions, simple slopes analyses, and propensity score matching to a nationally representative sample of 2500 Italian citizens, collected in May 2021. Contrary to our original hypothesis (i.e., Openness will have a positive association with Vaccine Hesitancy at high – and a negative at low – levels of Conspiracy Beliefs) we find that high Openness diminishes the impact of Belief in Conspiracy Theories on Vaccine Hesitancy. Consistent with previous research, we propose that Openness serves as a buffer against extreme positions by allowing individuals to be exposed to a greater diversity of information.

Dangerous Worldview and Perceived Sociopolitical Control: Two Mechanisms to Understand Trust in Authoritarian Political Leaders in Economically Threatening Contexts

In this research we analyzed the relationship between threatening economic contexts (i.e., undergoing the economic crisis and having low socioeconomic status) and trust in authoritarian ideologies and leaders, regardless of the left-right political axis. Based on two theoretical approaches (i.e., the dual-process model and the compensatory control model), we argue that this relationship is mediated by dangerous worldview and low perceived sociopolitical control. We conducted two correlational studies with samples of the general population. In Study 1 (N = 185), we found that perceived threat from the economic crisis and low socioeconomic status were correlated with a higher dangerous worldview, which resulted in a more authoritarian ideology (i.e., authoritarianism) and finally in greater trust in an authoritarian political leader. In Study 2 (N = 413), we replicated the findings of Study 1 and demonstrated that low perceived sociopolitical control was associated with higher authoritarianism. Moreover, low perceived sociopolitical control partially mediated the relationship between dangerous worldview and authoritarianism. Overall, our results show that two economically threatening contexts (i.e., the economic crisis and low socioeconomic status) promote authoritarianism and trust in authoritarian leaders (with unspecified political orientation) through psychological processes (i.e., perception of the social world and perceived control). These results are useful to understand and combat the rise of authoritarianism in our societies during financially difficult times such as economic crises.

Brexit: The influence of motivation to respond without prejudice, willingness to disagree, and attitudes to immigration

Britain's unexpected vote to leave the European Union (Brexit) in June 2016 has proved divisive and damaging both within the United Kingdom and internationally. Across two correlational studies, the current research proposed a model to explain the Brexit vote, with attitudes to immigration and willingness to disagree (WD) as direct predictors of the referendum result, and internal (IMS) and external (EMS) motivation to respond without prejudice as indirect predictors. Study 1 (N = 353) and Study 2 (N = 363) both showed good fit with the model and, respectively, explained 48% and 46% of the referendum result. More positive attitudes to immigration predicted a vote to remain. Higher IMS and lower EMS predicted a vote to remain, fully mediated by attitudes to immigration. In Study 1, lower WD also predicted a vote to remain, both directly and indirectly via attitudes to immigration, although this was not replicated in Study 2. These results are discussed both in relation to the Brexit result, and the implications for motivation to respond without prejudice, WD, and political correctness more generally.

Age, gender, personality, ideological attitudes and individual differences in a person's news spectrum: how many and who might be prone to "filter bubbles" and "echo chambers" online?

Potential effects of demographics, personality, and ideological attitudes on the number of news sources consumed should be investigated. The number of news sources consumed, in turn, was seen as inverse proxy for the susceptibility to be caught in “filter bubbles” and/or “echo chambers” (online), which are hotly discussed topics also in politics. A sample of 1,681 (n = 557 males) participants provided data on demographics, the Big Five as well as Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) alongside the number of different news sources consumed and current voting preferences. Results showed that age (positively), gender (higher in males), Openness (positively), and RWA (negatively) predicted the number of different news sources consumed. The group of participants consuming news exclusively offline showed highest scores in Conscientiousness and lowest scores in Neuroticism compared to the “news feeds only” and the “news feeds and online” groups. However, less than 5% of the participants exclusively consumed news via news feeds of social networking sites. Participants who stated that they would not vote reported the lowest number of different news sources consumed. These findings reveal first insights into predisposing factors for the susceptibility to be caught in “filter bubbles” and/or “echo chamber” online and how this might be associated with voting preferences.

Testing the Social Identity Model of Collective Action Longitudinally and Across Structurally Disadvantaged and Advantaged Groups

Although the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA) demonstrates that identity, efficacy, and injustice are key correlates of collective action, longitudinal tests of these causal assumptions are absent from the literature. Moreover, most collective action research focuses on disadvantaged groups’ responses to injustice, with few studies examining what motivates advantaged groups to protest. We address these oversights using nationally representative longitudinal panel data to investigate SIMCA among members of disadvantaged ( N = 2,574) and advantaged ( N = 13,367) groups. As hypothesized, identity predicted increases in injustice, efficacy, and collective action support over time. In turn, injustice (but not efficacy) mediated the longitudinal association between identity and collective action support. Notably, results were largely consistent across disadvantaged and advantaged groups. Thus, we provide the first demonstration that identity temporally precedes collective action across objectively disadvantaged and advantaged groups, but identify complexities regarding the role of efficacy in protest.

Opposition to Nonprescription Naloxone Access: Measurement and Psychosocial Predictors

Background: Access of naloxone has been increased in recent years, yet opposition to unrestricted availability persists. Objectives: To validate a measure of opposition to the policy of nonprescription naloxone and foster a better understanding of the characteristics of individuals who oppose such a policy. Methods: Respondents from a crowdsource platform (N = 621) responded to an instrument developed to assess opposition to nonprescription naloxone. Construct validity was assessed by examining the relationship of the opposition scale with measures of social distance, belief in a just world, right wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation (SDO), perceptions of the degree of threat to the nation presented by opioid users, past exposure to opioid misuse, and conservative political ideology. Results: A 9-item measure of opposition emerged (α=.96). Opposition to nonprescription naloxone was generally associated with construct validation variables as expected. In a regression analysis that adjusted for demographic characteristics, opposition was most strongly related to authoritarianism, the perception that opioid users present a threat to our nation, the belief that we live in a just world, social dominance orientation, greater perceived social distance between self and opioid users, and past experiences with users. Opposition scores differentiated those who supported versus opposed specific policies regarding naloxone access and were particularly high among Republicans. Most respondents did not oppose policies on nonprescription naloxone access. Conclusions/Importance: The instrument developed provides a reliable and valid tool that enables future investigations into understanding and overcoming the psychological, social, and political foundations of opposition to expanded naloxone access.

Rigidity of the far-right? Motivated social cognition in a nationally representative sample of Hungarians on the eve of the far-right breakthrough in the 2010 elections

We investigated the "rigidity of the right" hypothesis in the context of the far-right breakthrough in the 2010 Hungarian parliamentary elections. This hypothesis suggests that psychological characteristics having to do with need for security and certainty attract people to a broad-based right-wing ideology. A nationally representative sample (N = 1000) in terms of age, gender and place of residence was collected by means of the random walking method and face-to-face interviews. Voters of JOBBIK (n = 124), the radically nationalist conservative far-right party, scored lower on System Justifying Belief, Belief in a Just World (Global) and higher on Need for Cognition than other voters. Our results contradict the "rigidity of the right" hypothesis: JOBBIK voters scored, on many measures, opposite to what the hypothesis would predict.

Radical distinction: Support for radical left and radical right parties in Europe

Support for radical parties on both the left and right is on the rise, fueling intuition that both radicalisms have similar underpinnings. Indeed, existing studies show that radical left and right voters have overlapping positions and preferences. In this article, however, we focus on the differences in the voting bases of such parties. We show that radical left and right voters have sharply diverging ideological profiles. When it comes to the historical traditions of the 'left' and 'right', these voters differ radically from each other. Both groups express the traditions associated with their mainstream counterparts-particularly with respect to (non-)egalitarian, (non-)altruistic, and (anti-)cosmopolitan values. Such differences also explain why radical left voters tend to be more, not less, educated than mainstream or radical right voters.

The Relationship between the Brexit Vote and Individual Predictors of Prejudice: Collective Narcissism, Right Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation

The Leave campaign in the U.K., which advocated exiting the European Union, emphasized anxiety over immigration and the need to take control of the U.K.'s borders. Citizens who expressed concerns about immigration to the U.K. were more likely to vote to leave. Two correlational studies examined the previously unexplored question of whether the Brexit vote and support for the outcome of the E.U. referendum were linked to individual predictors of prejudice toward foreigners: British collective narcissism (a belief in national greatness), right wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation. The results converged to indicate that all three variables were independently related to the perceived threat of immigrants and, via this variable, to the Brexit vote and a support for the outcome of the E.U. referendum. These variables explained the variance in the perceived threat of immigrants and support for the Brexit vote over and above other previously examined predictors such as age, education, or ethnicity, as well as, national identification and national attachment.