Savage or satire: Individual differences in perceptions of disparaging and subversive racial humor

The effect of relational status on perceptions of gay disparaging humor

A lot of popular comedians are known for their transgressive humor towards social groups, but disparagement humor is not just restricted to stages or media performances. We encounter it everywhere or perhaps use it ourselves. In this paper, we were interested in how people react to disparaging jokes (i.e., homophobic jokes) across different relational settings. Adapting Fiske’s relational models theory, we examined how status differences in relationships affect the perception of and cognition about socially disparaging jokes. In Study 1 (N = 77), we piloted seven potentially disparaging jokes about gay men in relation to how they are perceived. In Study 2 (N = 288), using one joke from Study 1, we constructed vignettes manipulating the sexual orientation of the source of the joke in the dyad (i.e., heterosexual, gay, both heterosexual) and their status differences across relational models (i.e., high, equal, and low status). We found that the joke was perceived to be less funny, more offensive, and more morally wrong, and to contain more harm intent if it came from a heterosexual person rather than a gay person. Study 3 (N = 197) used concrete status differences in relationships in terms of existing intergroup dimensions. Results showed that the joke was perceived as more offensive, less acceptable and more morally wrong when it came from a high authority source (e.g., professor rather than a student). Overall, these findings bring the first evidence to link disparagement humor with relational models and show the importance status differences in the perception of disparagement humor.

Moral Evaluations of Humor Apply Beyond Just Those Telling the Joke

Humor involves both joke-tellers and listeners, both of whom are subject to observers' evaluations. Past research has suggested a tension between humor and morality such that moral individuals may be less humorous, and humor may promote tolerance of moral violations. Building on this work, we highlight that individuals engaging in humor are themselves subject to inferences of moral character. Joke-tellers are evaluated as less moral people when their jokes are offensive. Individuals who laugh at jokes are similarly evaluated as less moral, but only when the jokes are offensive, not clean. Across two experiments (Studies 1 and 2) using different manipulations, we found support for these effects and the mediating role of perceived norm violations. In Study 3, we further found preliminary evidence depicting nuanced similarities and differences between the effects on moral evaluations and other-person perceptions such as warmth and competence. These findings contribute to understanding of moral judgment in humor.