Attention control and the attention schema theory of consciousness

Unconscious and Conscious Gaze-Triggered Attentional Orienting: Distinguishing Innate and Acquired Components of Social Attention in Children and Adults with Autistic Traits and Autism Spectrum Disorders

Typically developing (TD) individuals can readily orient attention according to others' eye-gaze direction, an ability known as social attention, which involves both innate and acquired components. To distinguish between these two components, we used a critical flicker fusion technique to render gaze cues invisible to participants, thereby largely reducing influences from consciously acquired strategies. Results revealed that both visible and invisible gaze cues could trigger attentional orienting in TD adults (aged 20 to 30 years) and children (aged 6 to 12 years). Intriguingly, only the ability to involuntarily respond to invisible gaze cues was negatively correlated with autistic traits among all TD participants. This ability was substantially impaired in adults with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and in children with high autistic traits. No such association or reduction was observed with visible gaze cues. These findings provide compelling evidence for the functional demarcation of conscious and unconscious gaze-triggered attentional orienting that emerges early in life and develops into adulthood, shedding new light on the differentiation of the innate and acquired aspects of social attention. Moreover, they contribute to a comprehensive understanding of social endophenotypes of ASD.

Design and evaluation of a global workspace agent embodied in a realistic multimodal environment

As the apparent intelligence of artificial neural networks (ANNs) advances, they are increasingly likened to the functional networks and information processing capabilities of the human brain. Such comparisons have typically focused on particular modalities, such as vision or language. The next frontier is to use the latest advances in ANNs to design and investigate scalable models of higher-level cognitive processes, such as conscious information access, which have historically lacked concrete and specific hypotheses for scientific evaluation. In this work, we propose and then empirically assess an embodied agent with a structure based on global workspace theory (GWT) as specified in the recently proposed "indicator properties" of consciousness. In contrast to prior works on GWT which utilized single modalities, our agent is trained to navigate 3D environments based on realistic audiovisual inputs. We find that the global workspace architecture performs better and more robustly at smaller working memory sizes, as compared to a standard recurrent architecture. Beyond performance, we perform a series of analyses on the learned representations of our architecture and share findings that point to task complexity and regularization being essential for feature learning and the development of meaningful attentional patterns within the workspace.

An Overview of the Body Schema and Body Image: Theoretical Models, Methodological Settings and Pitfalls for Rehabilitation of Persons with Neurological Disorders

Given the widespread debate on the definition of the terms "Body Schema" and "Body Image", this article presents a broad overview of the studies that have investigated the nature of these types of body representations, especially focusing on the innovative information about these two representations that could be useful for the rehabilitation of patients with different neurological disorders with motor deficits (especially those affecting the upper limbs). In particular, we analyzed (i) the different definitions and explicative models proposed, (ii) the empirical settings used to test them and (iii) the clinical and rehabilitative implications derived from the application of interventions on specific case reports. The growing number of neurological diseases with motor impairment in the general population has required the development of new rehabilitation techniques and a new phenomenological paradigm placing body schema as fundamental and intrinsic parts for action in space. In this narrative review, the focus was placed on evidence from the application of innovative rehabilitation techniques and case reports involving the upper limbs, as body parts particularly involved in finalistic voluntary actions in everyday life, discussing body representations and their functional role.

Brain Mechanisms of Conscious Awareness: Detect, Pulse, Switch, and Wave

Consciousness is a fascinating field of neuroscience research where questions often outnumber the answers. We advocate an open and optimistic approach where converging mechanisms in neuroscience may eventually provide a satisfactory understanding of consciousness. We first review several characteristics of conscious neural activity, including the involvement of dedicated systems for content and levels of consciousness, the distinction and overlap of mechanisms contributing to conscious states and conscious awareness of transient events, nonlinear transitions and involvement of large-scale networks, and finally the temporal nexus where conscious awareness of discrete events occurs when mechanisms of attention and memory meet. These considerations and recent new experimental findings lead us to propose an inclusive hypothesis involving four phases initiated shortly after an external sensory stimulus: (1) Detect-primary and higher cortical and subcortical circuits detect the stimulus and select it for conscious perception. (2) Pulse-a transient and massive neuromodulatory surge in subcortical-cortical arousal and salience networks amplifies signals enabling conscious perception to proceed. (3) Switch-networks that may interfere with conscious processing are switched off. (4) Wave-sequential processing through hierarchical lower to higher cortical regions produces a fully formed percept, encoded in frontoparietal working memory and medial temporal episodic memory systems for subsequent report of experience. The framework hypothesized here is intended to be nonexclusive and encourages the addition of other mechanisms with further progress. Ultimately, just as many mechanisms in biology together distinguish living from nonliving things, many mechanisms in neuroscience synergistically may separate conscious from nonconscious neural activity.

Trauma as Absence: A Biopsychosocial-AIP Definition of Trauma and Its Treatment in EMDR

This paper advances the biopsychosocial adaptive information processing model (BPS-AIP) and theory (Cotraccia, 2012) by adding consciousness as a mechanism of action activated via social behavior in EMDR. An attention schema is conceptualized as content integrated with dynamic self-models that maintain subjective mental states of biopsychosocial connectivity or disconnectivity. These implicit self-models are portrayed as determining 1) the disposition of the BPS-AIP system of clients presenting for EMDR as more or less connected or disconnected prior to, at the time of, and following, a stressful event; and 2) whether or not stressful events become traumatizing over time. Attention schema theory (Graziano, 2021) is integrated to further describe how establishing and enhancing attentional agency when addressing simple and complex-PTSD facilitates consolidation of autobiographical memory. Self-integration in the context of an attuned therapeutic relationship is described in terms of patterns of tracking attention to promote heightened states of self/other consciousness and activate the innate healing system. Attention schema theory, as a prominent theory of consciousness, adds to BPS-AIP’s compelling description of how an innate neurophysiological system can be integrated with psychosocial components that explain how both subjective and intersubjective experiences are causally relevant to the processing of autobiographical memory.

A conceptual framework for consciousness

This article argues that consciousness has a logically sound, explanatory framework, different from typical accounts that suffer from hidden mysticism. The article has three main parts. The first describes background principles concerning information processing in the brain, from which one can deduce a general, rational framework for explaining consciousness. The second part describes a specific theory that embodies those background principles, the Attention Schema Theory. In the past several years, a growing body of experimental evidence-behavioral evidence, brain imaging evidence, and computational modeling-has addressed aspects of the theory. The final part discusses the evolution of consciousness. By emphasizing the specific role of consciousness in cognition and behavior, the present approach leads to a proposed account of how consciousness may have evolved over millions of years, from fish to humans. The goal of this article is to present a comprehensive, overarching framework in which we can understand scientifically what consciousness is and what key adaptive roles it plays in brain function.

Consciousness is already solved: The continued debate is not about science

A logical explanation of consciousness has been known for decades. The brain must construct a specific set of information about conscious feeling (theory-of-mind information), causing people to believe, think, and claim to have consciousness. Theories that propose an actual, intangible feeling are non-explanatory. They add a magical red herring while leaving unexplained the objective phenomena: the believing, thinking, and claiming.

Consciousness explained or described?

Consciousness is an unusual phenomenon to study scientifically. It is defined as a subjective, first-person phenomenon, and science is an objective, third-person endeavor. This misalignment between the means—science—and the end—explaining consciousness—gave rise to what has become a productive workaround: the search for ‘neural correlates of consciousness’ (NCCs). Science can sidestep trying to explain consciousness and instead focus on characterizing the kind(s) of neural activity that are reliably correlated with consciousness. However, while we have learned a lot about consciousness in the bargain, the NCC approach was not originally intended as the foundation for a true explanation of consciousness. Indeed, it was proposed precisely to sidestep the, arguably futile, attempt to find one. So how can an account, couched in terms of neural correlates, do the work that a theory is supposed to do: explain consciousness? The answer is that it cannot, and in fact most modern accounts of consciousness do not pretend to. Thus, here, we challenge whether or not any modern accounts of consciousness are in fact theories at all. Instead we argue that they are (competing) laws of consciousness. They describe what they cannot explain, just as Newton described gravity long before a true explanation was ever offered. We lay out our argument using a variety of modern accounts as examples and go on to argue that at least one modern account of consciousness, attention schema theory, goes beyond describing consciousness-related brain activity and qualifies as an explanatory theory.

The myth of when and where: How false assumptions still haunt theories of consciousness

Recent advances in neural sciences have uncovered countless facts about the brain. Although there is a plethora of theories of consciousness, it seems to some philosophers that there is still an explanatory gap when it comes to a scientific account of subjective experience. In what follows, I argue why some of our more commonly acknowledged theories do not at all provide us with an account of subjective experience as they are built on false assumptions. These assumptions have led us into a state of cognitive dissonance between maintaining our standard scientific practices on the one hand, and maintaining our folk notions on the other. I end by proposing Illusionism as the only option for a scientific investigation of consciousness and that even if ideas like panpsychism turn out to be holding the seemingly missing piece of the puzzle, the path to them must go through Illusionism.

The attention schema theory in a neural network agent: Controlling visuospatial attention using a descriptive model of attention

Attention, the deep processing of select items, is one of the most important cognitive operations in the brain. But how does the brain control its attention? One proposed part of the mechanism is that the brain builds a model, or attention schema, that helps monitor and predict the changing state of attention. Here, we show that an artificial neural network agent can be trained to control visual attention when it is given an attention schema, but its performance is greatly reduced when the schema is not available. We suggest that the brain may have evolved a model of attention because of the profound practical benefit for the control of attention.

In the attention schema theory (AST), the brain constructs a model of attention, the attention schema, to aid in the endogenous control of attention. Growing behavioral evidence appears to support the presence of a model of attention. However, a central question remains: does a controller of attention actually benefit by having access to an attention schema? We constructed an artificial deep Q-learning neural network agent that was trained to control a simple form of visuospatial attention, tracking a stimulus with an attention spotlight in order to solve a catch task. The agent was tested with and without access to an attention schema. In both conditions, the agent received sufficient information such that it should, theoretically, be able to learn the task. We found that with an attention schema present, the agent learned to control its attention spotlight and learned the catch task. Once the agent learned, if the attention schema was then disabled, the agent’s performance was greatly reduced. If the attention schema was removed before learning began, the agent was impaired at learning. The results show how the presence of even a simple attention schema can provide a profound benefit to a controller of attention. We interpret these results as supporting the central argument of AST: the brain contains an attention schema because of its practical benefit in the endogenous control of attention.

Brain-Adjusted Relational Leadership: A Social-Constructed Consciousness Approach to Leader-Follower Interaction

Relationship-based approaches to leadership represent one of the fastest-growing leadership fields and help us to understand better organizational leadership. Relation-based approaches emphasize the relationship and interaction between the leader and the follower. The emphasis is placed on the way that they interact and influence each other at attaining mutual goals. It is known that leaders are linked to followers and vice versa in a sense of responding to other's needs toward the achievement of mutual goals. Leaders and followers are an essential part of this social process implying that they are losing their traditional identity rooted in the formal organizational structure (manager-subordinate) and become inseparable actors of a co-constructing process of leadership. What is less known though is the way that leadership actors are linked to each other and in particular how they try to understand how to do that in the workplace. What is even less understood is the importance and role of consciousness in this relationship. Especially since consciousness appears to be both a fundamental and a very elusive element in human relations. Therefore, this paper conceptually explores the concept of consciousness within the context of the social brain theory to argue that leadership actors need to rethink their approach to individuality and focus on mutually dependent relations with each other. This paper contributes to the field of Neuro-management by introducing the concept of Homo Relationalis. In this respect, we suggest that leadership is not just a socially constructed element but also a social brain constructed phenomenon that requires an understanding of the human brain as a social organ. We further recommend a new approach of applying cognitive style analysis to capture the duality of leader/follower in the same person, following the self-illusion theory. Finally, we conclude that we need to further emphasize a social brain-adjusted relational leadership approach and we introduce two new cognitive styles that can help capture the essence of it.

Attention, awareness, and the right temporoparietal junction

The attention schema theory posits a specific relationship between subjective awareness and attention, in which awareness is the control model that the brain uses to aid in the endogenous control of attention. In previous experiments, we developed a behavioral paradigm in human subjects to manipulate awareness and attention. The paradigm involved a visual cue that could be used to guide attention to a target stimulus. In task 1, subjects were aware of the cue, but not aware that it provided information about the target. The cue measurably drew exogenous attention to itself. In addition, implicitly, the subjects' endogenous attention mechanism used the cue to help shift attention to the target. In task 2, subjects were no longer aware of the cue. The cue still measurably drew exogenous attention to itself, yet without awareness of the cue, the subjects' endogenous control mechanism was no longer able to use the cue to control attention. Thus, the control of attention depended on awareness. Here, we tested the two tasks while scanning brain activity in human volunteers. We predicted that the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ) would be active in relation to the process in which awareness helps control attention. This prediction was confirmed. The right TPJ was active in relation to the effect of the cue on attention in task 1; it was not measurably active in task 2. The difference was significant. In our interpretation, the right TPJ is involved in an interaction in which awareness permits the control of attention.

Understanding consciousness

The word consciousness has different meanings to different people. Michael Graziano argues that the three major perspectives on consciousness – the spiritual, the hard problem, and the self-model – represent a progression in our understanding, with only the self-model framework able to account for subjective experience.