Unifying heritability in evolutionary theory

Artificial selection of microbial communities: what have we learnt and how can we improve?

Microbial communities are capable of performing diverse functions with important bioindustrial and medical applications. One approach to improving community function is to breed new communities by artificially selecting for those displaying high community function ('community selection'). Importantly, community selection can improve the function of interest without needing to understand how the function arises, just like in classical artificial selection of individuals. However, experimental studies of community selection have had varied and largely limited success. Here, we review a conceptual framework to help foster an understanding of community selection and its associated challenges, and provide broad insights for designing effective selection strategies.

How should we distinguish between selectable and circumstantial traits?

There is surprisingly little philosophical work on conceptually spelling out the difference between the traits on which natural selection may be said to act (e.g. "having a high running speed") and mere circumstantial traits (e.g. "happening to be in the path of a forest fire"). I label this issue the "selectable traits problem" and, in this paper, I propose a solution for it. I first show that, contrary to our first intuition, simply equating selectable traits with heritable ones is not an adequate solution. I then go on to argue that two recent philosophical solutions to this problem-due to Peter Godfrey-Smith and Pierrick Bourrat-are unconvincing because they cannot accommodate frequency-dependent selection. The way out of this difficulty is, I argue, to accept that extrinsic properties dependent on relations between intrinsic properties of the population members should also count as selectable traits. I then show that my proposal is legitimized by more than the simple accommodation of frequency-dependent selection.

Spontaneous Emergence of Multicellular Heritability

The major transitions in evolution include events and processes that result in the emergence of new levels of biological individuality. For collectives to undergo Darwinian evolution, their traits must be heritable, but the emergence of higher-level heritability is poorly understood and has long been considered a stumbling block for nascent evolutionary transitions. Using analytical models, synthetic biology, and biologically-informed simulations, we explored the emergence of trait heritability during the evolution of multicellularity. Prior work on the evolution of multicellularity has asserted that substantial collective-level trait heritability either emerges only late in the transition or requires some evolutionary change subsequent to the formation of clonal multicellular groups. In a prior analytical model, we showed that collective-level heritability not only exists but is usually more heritable than the underlying cell-level trait upon which it is based, as soon as multicellular groups form. Here, we show that key assumptions and predictions of that model are borne out in a real engineered biological system, with important implications for the emergence of collective-level heritability.

New historical and philosophical perspectives on quantitative genetics

The aim of this virtual special issue is to bring together philosophical and historical perspectives to address long-standing issues in the interpretation, utility, and impacts of quantitative genetics methods and findings. Methodological approaches and the underlying scientific understanding of genetics and heredity have transformed since the field's inception. These advances have brought with them new philosophical issues regarding the interpretation and understanding of quantitative genetic results. The contributions in this issue demonstrate that there is still work to be done integrating old and new methodological and conceptual frameworks. In some cases, new results are interpreted using assumptions based on old concepts and methodologies that need to be explicitly recognised and updated. In other cases, new philosophical tools can be employed to synthesise historical quantitative genetics work with modern methodologies and findings. This introductory article surveys three general themes that have dominated philosophical discussion of quantitative genetics throughout history: (1) how methodologies have changed and transformed our knowledge and interpretations; (2) whether or not quantitative genetics can offer explanations relating to causation and prediction; and (3) the importance of defining the phenotypes under study. We situate the contributions in this virtual special issue within a historical framework addressing these three themes.