Is the philosophy of mechanism philosophy enough?

Expanding the notion of mechanism to further understanding of biopsychosocial disorders? Depression and medically-unexplained pain as cases in point

Evidence-Based Medicine has little consideration for mechanisms and philosophers of science and medicine have recently made pleas to increase the place of mechanisms in the medical evidence hierarchy. However, in this debate the notions of mechanisms seem to be limited to 'mechanistic processes' and 'complex-systems mechanisms,' understood as 'componential causal systems'. I believe that this will not do full justice to how mechanisms are used in biological, psychological and social sciences and, consequently, in a more biopsychosocial approach to medicine. Here, I propose, following (Kuorikoski, 2009), to pay more attention to 'abstract forms of interaction' mechanisms. The present work scrutinized review articles on depression and medically unexplained pain, which are considered to be of multifactorial pathogenesis, for their use of mechanisms. In review articles on these disorders there seemed to be a range of uses between more 'abstract forms of interaction' and 'componential causal system' mechanisms. I therefore propose to expand the notions of mechanisms considered in medicine to include that of more 'abstract forms of interaction' to better explain and manage biopsychosocial disorders.

Artifacts and levels of abstraction

The purpose of this article is to show how the comparison or analogy with artifacts (i.e., systems engineered by humans) is foundational for the idea that complex neuro-cognitive systems are amenable to explanation at distinct levels, which is a central simplifying strategy for modeling the brain. The most salient source of analogy is of course the digital computer, but I will discuss how some more general comparisons with the processes of design and engineering also play a significant role. I will show how the analogies, and the subsequent notion of a distinct computational level, have engendered common ideas about how safely to abstract away from the complexity of concrete neural systems, yielding explanations of how neural processes give rise to cognitive functions. I also raise worries about the limitations of these explanations, due to neglected differences between the human-made devices and biological organs.

A New Approach to Disease, Risk, and Boundaries Based on Emergent Probability

The status of risk factors and disease remains a disputed question in the theory and practice of medicine and healthcare, and so does the related question of delineating disease boundaries. I present a framework based on Bernard Lonergan's account of emergent probability for differentiating (1) generically distinct levels of systematic function within organisms and between organisms and their environments and (2) the methods of functional, genetic, and statistical investigation. I then argue on this basis that it is possible to understand disease in terms of biological or higher intra-level dysfunction, risk factors-including genetic risk factors-in terms of statistical inter-level conditioning of a given stage or developmental sequence of systematic functioning, and the empirical boundaries of disease in terms of the limits of both functional categorization (from an epistemic standpoint) and upper-level integration of lower-level processes and events (from an ontological standpoint).

Mechanistic philosophies of development: Theodor Boveri and Eric H. Davidson

Theodor Boveri's (1862-1915) and Eric Davidson's (1937-2015) achievements represent thoroughly two quite distant time frames in the history of the mechanistic approaches to development, that Jane Maienschein (2014) has characterized respectively as the era of the "experimental embryo" and of the "computed embryo". Nonetheless, Davidson's special bond to Boveri is meant to emphasize the genealogical continuity of an embryological tradition of mechanistic philosophy that, differently from molecular biology, is committed to an explanation of the hereditary transmission of organization. Davidson's genealogical claim is reconsidered through a contextualized analysis of the function of machine-like models and of the role of experiment in the making of their respective mechanistic philosophies. This analysis may help to shed light on resilience and change in the understanding of a mechanistic approach to development.

Unitary Physiology

The common relationships among a great variety of biological phenomena seem enigmatic when considered solely at the level of the phenotype. The deep connections in physiology, for example, between the effects of maternal food restriction in utero and the subsequent incidence of metabolic syndrome in offspring, the effects of microgravity on cell polarity and reproduction in yeast, stress effects on jellyfish, and their endless longevity, or the relationship between nutrient abundance and the colonial form in slime molds, are not apparent by phenotypic observation. Yet all of these phenomena are ultimately determined by the Target of Rapamycin (TOR) gene and its associated signaling complexes. In the same manner, the unfolding of evolutionary physiology can be explained by a comparable application of the common principle of cell-cell signaling extending across complex developmental and phylogenetic traits. It is asserted that a critical set of physiologic and phenotypic adaptations emanated from a few crucial, ancestral receptor gene duplications that enabled the successful terrestrial transition of vertebrates from water to land. In combination, mTor and its cognate receptors and a few crucial genetic duplications provide a mechanistic common denominator across a diverse spectrum of biological responses. The proper understanding of their purpose yields a unified concept of physiology and its evolutionary development. © 2018 American Physiological Society. Compr Physiol 8:761-771, 2018.

Development and mechanistic explanation

Within modern philosophy of biology the topic of mechanistic explanation has become a central theme for critical discussion. The neo-mechanical philosophers have developed accounts that emphasize intervention and manipulation as the central epistemic tools that allow gaining epistemic access upon the mechanisms and have argued that the processes of inter-field integration across disciplines can be understood through the analysis of mechanisms spanning multiple levels. In this paper I revisit current proposals on mechanistic explanation in order to show some of their limitations when dealing with developmental mechanisms. I basically argue that (i) developmental mechanisms cannot be accommodated within a framework centered upon the mutual manipulation principle, (ii) the distinction between causal relations vs. constitutive relations cannot be easily demarcated within developmental biology and (iii) the notion of "part" underlying the neo-mechanical accounts on explanation is not suitable for developmental biology.