Communicating with scientific graphics: A descriptive inquiry into non-ideal normativity

Much ado about mice: Standard-setting in model organism research

Recently there has been a practice turn in the philosophy of science that has called for analyses to be grounded in the actual doings of everyday science. This paper is in furtherance of this call and it does so by employing participant-observation ethnographic methods as a tool for discovering epistemological features of scientific practice in a neuroscience lab. The case I present focuses on a group of neurobiologists researching the genetic underpinnings of cognition in Down syndrome (DS) and how they have developed a new mouse model which they argue should be regarded as the "gold standard" for all DS mouse research. Through use of ethnographic methods, interviews, and analyses of publications, I uncover how the lab constructed their new mouse model. Additionally, I describe how model organisms can serve as abstract standards for scientific work that impact the epistemic value of scientific claims, regulate practice, and constrain future work.

Sketching Biological Phenomena and Mechanisms

In many fields of biology, both the phenomena to be explained and the mechanisms proposed to explain them are commonly presented in diagrams. Our interest is in how scientists construct such diagrams. Researchers begin with evidence, typically developed experimentally and presented in data graphs. To arrive at a robust diagram of the phenomenon or the mechanism, they must integrate a variety of data to construct a single, coherent representation. This process often begins as the researchers create a first sketch, and it continues over an extended period as they revise the sketch until they arrive at a diagram they find acceptable. We illustrate this process by examining the sketches developed in the course of two research projects directed at understanding the generation of circadian rhythms in cyanobacteria. One identified a new aspect of the phenomenon itself, whereas the other aimed to develop a new mechanistic account. In both cases, the research resulted in a paper in which the conclusion was presented in a diagram that the authors deemed adequate to convey it. These diagrams violate some of the normative "cognitive design principles" advanced by cognitive scientists as constraints on successful visual communication. We suggest that scientists' sketching is instead governed by norms of success that are broadly explanatory: conveying the phenomenon or mechanism.