Participatory technologies in smart cities: What citizens want and how to ask them

Do R&D intensity and capacity utilisation matter for SMEs' innovations within the CEE region? Testing moderating roles of different ownership structures

Existing innovation literature has assumed that the relationship between firms' R&D intensity and innovation take place without the interplay of other organizational factors. However, the reality differs, and research to date has shown that other factors affecting firms' innovation need to be considered. This is important especially in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries, which are highly dependent on both internal and external R&D and are associated with an inability to use R&D resources effectively. This study therefore responds to calls for further analysis, especially within the CEE region, and focuses on the role of two factors affecting SMEs' innovativeness and their effects, which have been mixed so far. First, we investigate the effects of SMEs' R&D intensity and capacity utilisation on product innovation. Second, we reveal the moderating role of SMEs' different ownership structures (ownership concentration; private/public ownership; family/non-family ownership) in the relationship between R&D intensity and product innovation. We confirm that CEE SMEs' ownership concentration and private ownership moderate the relationship between R&D intensity and product innovation. In contrast, we reject our hypothesis expecting that family ownership of SMEs can significantly moderate the relationship between R&D intensity and product innovation. Interestingly, we also show that the relationship between capacity utilisation and innovation is non-linear (inverted U-shaped). This study makes a significant contribution in the form of analysis within the CEE region, whose innovation systems are seen to be weak, and it is therefore necessary to bring new knowledge and recommendations to managers and public policymakers.

Promotion Strategy of Smart Construction Site Based on Stakeholder: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

Smart Construction Sites (SCS) are important drivers for the construction of high-quality development. In order to determine the evolution of SCS advancement systems, an evolutionary game model consisting of government, enterprises and projects was constructed. The experimental simulations were performed by using a system dynamics approach. The findings were as follows: (1) There are three stable equilibrium strategies in the evolution of the game system: government, enterprises and projects all adopt positive strategies; government intervention, enterprises’ advancement, and projects’ non-participation; and government intervention, enterprises and projects adopting negative strategies. (2) Government penalties and balance of interests between enterprises and projects are the main factors affecting the evolution. (3) In the state (1,1,1), the influence of a government regulatory system is more significant in encouraging enterprises to promote SCS and projects to participate in building an SCS platform. (4) Government rewards and penalties, costs and benefits of corporate support for SCS, benefits when projects do not participate in SCS, are the main factors influencing the adoption of proactive strategies by companies and projects, and there are significant differences in the strategic directions and marginal impacts of each factor on stakeholders’ choices. These findings provide a reference for further refining stakeholder theory and for promoting the sustainable development of SCS.