Embracing Dynamic Models for Gene Drive Management

Curing mosquitoes with genetic approaches for malaria control

Malaria remains a persistent global public health challenge because of the limitations of current prevention tools. The use of transgenic mosquitoes incapable of transmitting malaria, in conjunction with existing methods, holds promise for achieving elimination of malaria and preventing its reintroduction. In this context, population modification involves the spread of engineered genetic elements through mosquito populations that render them incapable of malaria transmission. Significant progress has been made in this field over the past decade in revealing promising targets, optimizing genetic tools, and facilitating the transition from the laboratory to successful field deployments, which are subject to regulatory scrutiny. This review summarizes recent advances and ongoing challenges in 'curing' Anopheles vectors of the malaria parasite.

Leveraging eco-evolutionary models for gene drive risk assessment

Engineered gene drives create potential for both widespread benefits and irreversible harms to ecosystems. CRISPR-based systems of allelic conversion have rapidly accelerated gene drive research across diverse taxa, putting field trials and their necessary risk assessments on the horizon. Dynamic process-based models provide flexible quantitative platforms to predict gene drive outcomes in the context of system-specific ecological and evolutionary features. Here, we synthesize gene drive dynamic modeling studies to highlight research trends, knowledge gaps, and emergent principles, organized around their genetic, demographic, spatial, environmental, and implementation features. We identify the phenomena that most significantly influence model predictions, discuss limitations of biological complexity and uncertainty, and provide insights to promote responsible development and model-assisted risk assessment of gene drives.

Recommendations for environmental risk assessment of gene drive applications for malaria vector control

Building on an exercise that identified potential harms from simulated investigational releases of a population suppression gene drive for malaria vector control, a series of online workshops identified nine recommendations to advance future environmental risk assessment of gene drive applications.

Gene drives for vertebrate pest control: realistic spatial modelling of eradication probabilities and times for island mouse populations

Invasive alien species continue to threaten global biodiversity. CRISPR‐based gene drives, which can theoretically spread through populations despite imparting a fitness cost, could be used to suppress or eradicate pest populations. We develop an individual‐based, spatially explicit, stochastic model to simulate the ability of CRISPR‐based homing and X chromosome shredding drives to eradicate populations of invasive house mice (Mus muculus) from islands. Using the model, we explore the interactive effect of the efficiency of the drive constructs and the spatial ecology of the target population on the outcome of a gene‐drive release. We also consider the impact of polyandrous mating and sperm competition, which could compromise the efficacy of some gene‐drive strategies. Our results show that both drive strategies could be used to eradicate large populations of mice. Whereas parameters related to drive efficiency and demography strongly influence drive performance, we find that sperm competition following polyandrous mating is unlikely to impact the outcome of an eradication effort substantially. Assumptions regarding the spatial ecology of mice influenced the probability of and time required for eradication, with short‐range dispersal capacities and limited mate‐search areas producing ‘chase’ dynamics across the island characterized by cycles of local extinction and recolonization by mice. We also show that highly efficient drives are not always optimal, when dispersal and mate‐search capabilities are low. Rapid local population suppression around the introduction sites can cause loss of the gene drive before it can spread to the entire island. We conclude that, although the design of efficient gene drives is undoubtedly critical, accurate data on the spatial ecology of target species are critical for predicting the result of a gene‐drive release.

Risk management recommendations for environmental releases of gene drive modified insects

The ability to engineer gene drives (genetic elements that bias their own inheritance) has sparked enthusiasm and concerns. Engineered gene drives could potentially be used to address long-standing challenges in the control of insect disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, or help to rescue endangered species. However, risk concerns and uncertainty associated with potential environmental release of gene drive modified insects (GDMIs) have led some stakeholders to call for a global moratorium on such releases or the application of other strict precautionary measures to mitigate perceived risk assessment and risk management challenges. Instead, we provide recommendations that may help to improve the relevance of risk assessment and risk management frameworks for environmental releases of GDMIs. These recommendations include: (1) developing additional and more practical risk assessment guidance to ensure appropriate levels of safety; (2) making policy goals and regulatory decision-making criteria operational for use in risk assessment so that what constitutes harm is clearly defined; (3) ensuring a more dynamic interplay between risk assessment and risk management to manage uncertainty through closely interlinked pre-release modelling and post-release monitoring; (4) considering potential risks against potential benefits, and comparing them with those of alternative actions to account for a wider (management) context; and (5) implementing a modular, phased approach to authorisations for incremental acceptance and management of risks and uncertainty. Along with providing stakeholder engagement opportunities in the risk analysis process, the recommendations proposed may enable risk managers to make choices that are more proportionate and adaptive to potential risks, uncertainty and benefits of GDMI applications, and socially robust.

Potential use of gene drive modified insects against disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species poses new challenges for risk assessment

Potential future application of engineered gene drives (GDs), which bias their own inheritance and can spread genetic modifications in wild target populations, has sparked both enthusiasm and concern. Engineered GDs in insects could potentially be used to address long-standing challenges in control of disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, or help to rescue endangered species, and thus provide important public benefits. However, there are concerns that the deliberate environmental release of GD modified insects may pose different or new harms to animal and human health and the wider environment, and raise novel challenges for risk assessment. Risk assessors, risk managers, developers, potential applicants and other stakeholders at many levels are currently discussing whether there is a need to develop new or additional risk assessment guidance for the environmental release of GD modified organisms, including insects. Developing new or additional guidance that is useful and practical is a challenge, especially at an international level, as risk assessors, risk managers and many other stakeholders have different, often contrasting, opinions and perspectives toward the environmental release of GD modified organisms, and on the adequacy of current risk assessment frameworks for such organisms. Here, we offer recommendations to overcome some of the challenges associated with the potential future development of new or additional risk assessment guidance for GD modified insects and provide considerations on areas where further risk assessment guidance may be required.

Systematic identification of plausible pathways to potential harm via problem formulation for investigational releases of a population suppression gene drive to control the human malaria vector Anopheles gambiae in West Africa

BACKGROUND

Population suppression gene drive has been proposed as a strategy for malaria vector control. A CRISPR-Cas9-based transgene homing at the doublesex locus (dsxFCRISPRh) has recently been shown to increase rapidly in frequency in, and suppress, caged laboratory populations of the malaria mosquito vector Anopheles gambiae. Here, problem formulation, an initial step in environmental risk assessment (ERA), was performed for simulated field releases of the dsxFCRISPRh transgene in West Africa.

METHODS

Building on consultative workshops in Africa that previously identified relevant environmental and health protection goals for ERA of gene drive in malaria vector control, 8 potentially harmful effects from these simulated releases were identified. These were stratified into 46 plausible pathways describing the causal chain of events that would be required for potential harms to occur. Risk hypotheses to interrogate critical steps in each pathway, and an analysis plan involving experiments, modelling and literature review to test each of those risk hypotheses, were developed.

RESULTS

Most potential harms involved increased human (n = 13) or animal (n = 13) disease transmission, emphasizing the importance to subsequent stages of ERA of data on vectorial capacity comparing transgenics to non-transgenics. Although some of the pathways (n = 14) were based on known anatomical alterations in dsxFCRISPRh homozygotes, many could also be applicable to field releases of a range of other transgenic strains of mosquito (n = 18). In addition to population suppression of target organisms being an accepted outcome for existing vector control programmes, these investigations also revealed that the efficacy of population suppression caused by the dsxFCRISPRh transgene should itself directly affect most pathways (n = 35).

CONCLUSIONS

Modelling will play an essential role in subsequent stages of ERA by clarifying the dynamics of this relationship between population suppression and reduction in exposure to specific potential harms. This analysis represents a comprehensive identification of plausible pathways to potential harm using problem formulation for a specific gene drive transgene and organism, and a transparent communication tool that could inform future regulatory studies, guide subsequent stages of ERA, and stimulate further, broader engagement on the use of population suppression gene drive to control malaria vectors in West Africa.

Gene Drive-Modified Organisms: Developing Practical Risk Assessment Guidance

Risk assessors, risk managers, developers, potential applicants, and other stakeholders at many levels discuss the need for new or further risk assessment guidance for deliberate environmental releases of gene drive-modified organisms. However, preparing useful and practical guidance entails challenges, to which we offer recommendations based on our experience drafting guidance.

Adequacy and sufficiency evaluation of existing EFSA guidelines for the molecular characterisation, environmental risk assessment and post-market environmental monitoring of genetically modified insects containing engineered gene drives

Advances in molecular and synthetic biology are enabling the engineering of gene drives in insects for disease vector/pest control. Engineered gene drives (that bias their own inheritance) can be designed either to suppress interbreeding target populations or modify them with a new genotype. Depending on the engineered gene drive system, theoretically, a genetic modification of interest could spread through target populations and persist indefinitely, or be restricted in its spread or persistence. While research on engineered gene drives and their applications in insects is advancing at a fast pace, it will take several years for technological developments to move to practical applications for deliberate release into the environment. Some gene drive modified insects (GDMIs) have been tested experimentally in the laboratory, but none has been assessed in small-scale confined field trials or in open release trials as yet. There is concern that the deliberate release of GDMIs in the environment may have possible irreversible and unintended consequences. As a proactive measure, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has been requested by the European Commission to review whether its previously published guidelines for the risk assessment of genetically modified animals (EFSA, 2012 and 2013), including insects (GMIs), are adequate and sufficient for GDMIs, primarily disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, for deliberate release into the environment. Under this mandate, EFSA was not requested to develop risk assessment guidelines for GDMIs. In this Scientific Opinion, the Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) concludes that EFSA's guidelines are adequate, but insufficient for the molecular characterisation (MC), environmental risk assessment (ERA) and post-market environmental monitoring (PMEM) of GDMIs. While the MC,ERA and PMEM of GDMIs can build on the existing risk assessment framework for GMIs that do not contain engineered gene drives, there are specific areas where further guidance is needed for GDMIs.