Can Ordinary People Detect Deception After All?

Arabic within culture forensic interviews: Arabic native speaking lay-observer truth and lie accuracy, confidence, and verbal cue selection

Cross cultural differences in behavioral and verbal norms and expectations can undermine credibility, often triggering a lie bias which can result in false convictions. However, current understanding is heavily North American and Western European centric, hence how individuals from non-western cultures infer veracity is not well understood. We report novel research investigating native Arabic speakers' truth and lie judgments having observed a matched native language forensic interview with a mock person of interest. 217 observers viewed a truthful or a deceptive interview and were directed to attend to detailedness as a veracity cue or given no direction. Overall, a truth bias (66% accuracy) emerged, but observers were more accurate (79%) in the truth condition with the truthful interviewee rated as more plausible and more believable than the deceptive interviewee. However, observer accuracy dropped to just 23% when instructed to use the detailedness cue when judging veracity. Verbal veracity cues attended too were constant across veracity conditions with 'corrections' emerging as an important veracity cue. Some results deviate from the findings of research with English speaking western participants in cross- and matched-culture forensic interview contexts, but others are constant. Nonetheless, this research raises questions for research to practice in forensic contexts centred on the robustness of western centric psychological understanding for non-western within culture interviews centred on interview protocols for amplifying veracity cues and the instruction to note detailedness of verbal accounts which significantly hindered Arabic speaker's performance. Findings again highlight the challenges of pancultural assumptions for real-world practices.

The impact of romantic relationships on deception detection: Exploring the gender differences and the mediating role of mentalizing

In evolution, romantic relationships serve as the foundation for breeding and producing offspring. The ability to detect deception in these relationships can safeguard the investment and cultivation of descendants, leading to greater chances of survival and reproduction. However, barely any research has been carried out within this domain. The current study investigated the preliminary relationship between romantic relationships, mentalizing ability, and deception detection ability through an empirical experiment. Participants were primed by their romantic experiences and neutral experiences, and then went through a Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RTM) task and the deception detecting task for real person crime-type videos. Results showed that romantic relationships can improve participants' emotion recognition ability toward negative emotions, and females performed better in the deception detection task than males did. Most importantly, romantic relationships can improve participants' deception detection ability through the mediator of mentalizing ability. Though gender difference was not statistically significant in the RTM task, the results lay a solid foundation for further investigation into females' mentalizing ability and disclose the evolutionary meaning of romantic relationships.

Some Evidence That Truth-Tellers Are More Attractive Than Liars

Despite the prevalence of deception, people rarely doubt others' sincerity. However, indirect evaluations of liars and truth-tellers may differ even in the absence of suspicion about veracity. Across three studies, we provide evidence for the truth attraction effect in two samples of target stimuli and three samples of participant judges. Target people are perceived as more attractive when telling the truth versus when they lie, an effect mediated by target warmth and openness. The truth attraction effect is stronger for female targets (vs. males); however, it is unaffected by the gender of the judge. Findings suggest people may be more likely to approach truth-tellers versus liars, even when not actively judging veracity. We discuss the challenges and benefits of treating both targets and participants as random factors in linear mixed-effect analyses and join the chorus of calls to increase the number of target stimuli in deception research.

Neural mechanisms of response priming do not support veridical unconscious processing

Studies using the priming paradigm often infer that unconscious processes have more veridical access to the world than conscious processes. These interpretations are based on a standard reasoning that erroneously infers good sensitivity of indirect measures from a clear priming effect. To correct for this fallacy, researchers should explicitly compute the sensitivities from indirect measures and compare them against the sensitivities of direct measures. Recent results suggest that indirect behavioral measures are not more sensitive than direct measures and challenge interpretations about veridical unconscious processing. We add to these behavioral results by focusing on neurophysiological indirect measures. In two EEG experiments, we investigate whether event related potentials (ERPs) are more sensitive to different visual stimuli than direct measures. The results show the opposite effect: higher sensitivities for direct than indirect measures. Therefore-contrasting commonly held belief-we find no evidence for more veridical unconscious than conscious processes in ERP measures.

The better to fool you with: Deception and self-deception

Deception is used by plants, animals, and humans to increase their fitness by persuading others of false beliefs that benefit the self, thereby creating evolutionary pressure to detect deception and avoid providing such unearned benefits to others. Self-deception can disrupt detection efforts by eliminating cognitive load and idiosyncratic deceptive cues, raising the possibility that persuading others of a false belief might be more achievable after first persuading oneself. If people self-deceive in service of their persuasive goals, self-deception should emerge whenever persuasion is paramount and hence should be evident in information sharing, generalized beliefs about the self, and intergroup relations. The mechanism, costs, and benefits of self-deceptive biases are explored from this evolutionary perspective.

Are You for Real? Perceptions of Authenticity Are Systematically Biased and Not Accurate

Can people accurately perceive who is authentic? Laypeople believe they can tell who is authentic, and they report that authenticity is an important attribute in others (Studies 1a and 1b; N = 369). However, when we directly tested the accuracy of perceived authenticity, we found no significant correlation between self- and other-rated authenticity in two cohorts of adult students in randomly assigned teams (Studies 2 and 3; 4,040 self-other observations). In addition, we found that perceived authenticity was biased in two ways: (a) Other-rated authenticity showed a positivity bias compared with self-ratings, and (b) other-rated authenticity was biased by the rater's own authenticity. In Study 3, we also investigated authenticity meta-perceptions; although people expect their authenticity to be accurately perceived by others, their meta-perceptions did not correlate with other-rated authenticity. That is, beliefs about the visibility of one's authenticity are similarly not accurate. Overall, we found no evidence that people can accurately identify who is authentic.

Lie to my face: An electromyography approach to the study of deceptive behavior

BACKGROUND

Deception is present in all walks of life, from social interactions to matters of homeland security. Nevertheless, reliable indicators of deceptive behavior in real-life scenarios remain elusive.

METHODS

By integrating electrophysiological and communicative approaches, we demonstrate a new and objective detection approach to identify participant-specific indicators of deceptive behavior in an interactive scenario of a two-person deception task. We recorded participants' facial muscle activity using novel dry screen-printed electrode arrays and applied machine-learning algorithms to identify lies based on brief facial responses.

RESULTS

With an average accuracy of 73%, we identified two groups of participants: Those who revealed their lies by activating their cheek muscles and those who activated their eyebrows. We found that the participants lied more often with time, with some switching their telltale muscle groups. Moreover, while the automated classifier, reported here, outperformed untrained human detectors, their performance was correlated, suggesting reliance on shared features.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings demonstrate the feasibility of using wearable electrode arrays in detecting human lies in a social setting and set the stage for future research on individual differences in deception expression.

Anger Damns the Innocent

False accusations of wrongdoing are common and can have grave consequences. In six studies, we document a worrisome paradox in perceivers' subjective judgments of a suspect's guilt. Specifically, we found that people (including online panelists, n = 4,983, and working professionals such as fraud investigators and auditors, n = 136) use suspects' angry responses to accusations as cues of guilt. However, we found that such anger is an invalid cue of guilt and is instead a valid cue of innocence; accused individuals (university students, n = 230) and online panelists (n = 401) were angrier when they are falsely relative to accurately accused. Moreover, we found that individuals who remain silent are perceived to be at least as guilty as those who angrily deny an accusation.

Number processing outside awareness? Systematically testing sensitivities of direct and indirect measures of consciousness

In priming research, it is often argued that humans can discriminate stimuli outside consciousness. For example, the semantic meaning of numbers can be processed even when the numbers are so strongly masked that participants are not aware of them. These claims are typically based on a certain pattern of results: Direct measures indicate no conscious awareness of the masked stimuli, while indirect measures show clear priming effects of the same stimuli on reaction times or neurophysiological measures. From this pattern, preserved (unconscious) processing in the indirect task is concluded. However, this widely used standard reasoning is problematic and leads to spurious claims of unconscious processing. Such problems can be avoided by comparing sensitivities of direct and indirect measures. Many studies are affected by these problems, such that a reassessment of the literature is needed. Here, we investigated whether numbers can be processed unconsciously. In three experiments, we replicated and extended well-established effects of number priming over a wide range of stimulus visibilities. We then compared the standard reasoning to a sensitivity analysis, where direct and indirect effects are compared using the same metric. Results show that the sensitivities of indirect measures did not exceed those of direct measures, thereby indicating no evidence for preserved unconscious processing when awareness of the stimuli is low. Instead, it seems that at low visibility there is residual processing that affects direct and indirect measures to a similar degree. This suggests that similar processing modes cause those effects in direct and indirect measures.

Listeners' perceptions of the certainty and honesty of a speaker are associated with a common prosodic signature

The success of human cooperation crucially depends on mechanisms enabling individuals to detect unreliability in their conspecifics. Yet, how such epistemic vigilance is achieved from naturalistic sensory inputs remains unclear. Here we show that listeners' perceptions of the certainty and honesty of other speakers from their speech are based on a common prosodic signature. Using a data-driven method, we separately decode the prosodic features driving listeners' perceptions of a speaker's certainty and honesty across pitch, duration and loudness. We find that these two kinds of judgments rely on a common prosodic signature that is perceived independently from individuals' conceptual knowledge and native language. Finally, we show that listeners extract this prosodic signature automatically, and that this impacts the way they memorize spoken words. These findings shed light on a unique auditory adaptation that enables human listeners to quickly detect and react to unreliability during linguistic interactions.

Predicting Group Contribution Behaviour in a Public Goods Game from Face-to-Face Communication

Experimental economic laboratories run many studies to test theoretical predictions with actual human behaviour, including public goods games. With this experiment, participants in a group have the option to invest money in a public account or to keep it. All the invested money is multiplied and then evenly distributed. This structure incentivizes free riding, resulting in contributions to the public goods declining over time. Face-to-face Communication (FFC) diminishes free riding and thus positively affects contribution behaviour, but the question of how has remained mostly unknown. In this paper, we investigate two communication channels, aiming to explain what promotes cooperation and discourages free riding. Firstly, the facial expressions of the group in the 3-minute FFC videos are automatically analysed to predict the group behaviour towards the end of the game. The proposed automatic facial expressions analysis approach uses a new group activity descriptor and utilises random forest classification. Secondly, the contents of FFC are investigated by categorising strategy-relevant topics and using meta-data. The results show that it is possible to predict whether the group will fully contribute to the end of the games based on facial expression data from three minutes of FFC, but deeper understanding requires a larger dataset. Facial expression analysis and content analysis found that FFC and talking until the very end had a significant, positive effect on the contributions.

Delta plots do not reveal response inhibition in lying

The role of response inhibition in lying is debated. By using the delta-plot method applied to the Sheffield Lie Test, Debey, Ridderinkhof, De Houwer, De Schryver, and Verschuere (2015) provided evidence supporting the role of inhibition in lying. In the study of Debey et al., inhibitory skill was measured in terms of the size of the lie effect. However, to provide convincing evidence that delta plots highlight the role of response inhibition in lying, inhibitory ability must be evaluated independently from the size of the lie effect. After replicating original findings, this article shows that a delta plot analysis does not differentiate individuals with different inhibitory abilities, when inhibitory skill is measured by means of the Stop Signal Task, instead of the size of the lie effect. This suggests that researchers should be cautious when making conclusions about cognitive mechanisms based on the sole analysis of delta plots.

Can We Detect Cooperators by Looking at Their Face?

Humans are willing to cooperate with each other for mutual benefit—and to accept the risk of exploitation. To avoid collaborating with the wrong person, people sometimes attempt to detect cooperativeness in others’ body language, facial features, and facial expressions. But how reliable are these impressions? We review the literature on the detection of cooperativeness in economic games, from those with protocols that provide a lot of information about players (e.g., through long personal interactions) to those with protocols that provide minimal information (e.g., through the presentation of passport-like pictures). This literature suggests that people can detect cooperativeness with a small but significant degree of accuracy when they have interacted with or watched video clips of other players, but that they have a harder time extracting information from pictures. The conditions under which people can detect cooperation from pictures with better than chance accuracy suggest that successful cooperation detection is supported by purely intuitive processes.

Can the Unconscious Boost Lie-Detection Accuracy?

Recently, a variety of methods have been used to show that unconscious processes can boost lie-detection accuracy. This article considers the latest developments in the context of research into unconscious cognition. Unconscious cognition has been under attack in recent years because the findings do not replicate, and when they do show reliably improved performance, they fail to exclude the possibility that conscious processing is at work. Here we show that work into unconscious lie detection suffers from the same weaknesses. Future research would benefit from taking a stronger theoretical stance and explicitly attempting to exclude conscious-processing accounts.