Mind Control Tricks: Magicians’ Forcing and Free Will

Too perfect to be good? An investigation of magicians' Too Perfect Theory

The "Too Perfect Theory" states that if a trick is too perfect, it might paradoxically become less impressive, or give away its secret method. This theory suggests that an increased impossibility results in a less magical effect. The Too Perfect Theory is often applied to magic effects, but it conflicts with recent scientific investigations showing that participants' level of enjoyment of a magic performance is positively related to their perceived impossibility of the trick. The current article investigated whether an imperfect magic performance is more impressive than a perfect one. Across two experiments, we studied whether participants enjoy a performance more if the effect is not perfect. We also examined the different types of explanations people give to these two types of performances. The results showed that participants enjoyed a perfect performance more than an imperfect one. However, consistently with the Too Perfect Theory, participants watching the perfect performance also discovered the correct method behind the magic trick more frequently and believed the performance was staged more often. Moreover, participants' method explanation significantly impacted their reports about the performance.

Differential Effects of Experience and Information Cues on Metacognitive Judgments About Others' Change Detection Abilities

This study explored the interaction between visual metacognitive judgments about others and cues related to the workings of System 1 and System 2. We examined how intrinsic cues (i.e., saliency of a visual change) and experience cues (i.e., detection/blindness) affect people's predictions about others' change detection abilities. In Experiment 1, 60 participants were instructed to notice a subtle and a salient visual change in a magic trick that exploits change blindness, after which they estimated the probability that others would detect the change. In Experiment 2, 80 participants watched either the subtle or the salient version of the trick and they were asked to provide predictions for the experienced change. In Experiment 1, participants predicted that others would detect the salient change more easily than the subtle change, which was consistent with the actual detection reported in Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, participants' personal experience (i.e., whether they detected the change) biased their predictions. Moreover, there was a significant difference between their predictions and offline predictions from Experiment 1. Interestingly, change blindness led to lower predictions. These findings point to joint contributions of experience and information cues on metacognitive judgments about other people's change detection abilities.

Cognitive style predicts how people explain mental magic tricks

Magic tricks are deceiving, yet we can readily generate an explanation for a trick that we do not fully understand. In three experiments, we show that the way people explain a mental magic trick depends on their individual cognitive style. Analytical thinkers tend to generate explanations that appeal to rationality, such as using physical props to accomplish an effect. In contrast, intuitive thinkers are more likely to generate irrational explanations that accord with the magician's provided backstory, such as using subliminal cues to guide a spectator's choices. We observe this effect when measuring a participant's cognitive style using the Cognitive Reflection Test, and also when manipulating a participant's cognitive style using a simple narrative prompt.