Dynamic estimation of future obsolete laptop flows and embedded critical raw materials: The case study of Greece

Material flow analysis on the critical resources from spent power lithium-ion batteries under the framework of China's recycling policies

With the rapid growth of electric vehicles in China, the number of spent power lithium-ion batteries is dramatically increased. Considering the environmental risk, security risk, and potential resource value, China has issued a series of laws and regulations to manage the spent power lithium-ion batteries. This work employs the material flow analysis method to evaluate the material flows of Li, Ni, Co, and Mn during the life cycle of power lithium-ion batteries under the framework of China's recycling policy system. The results show that the demand for primary Li, Ni, Co, and Mn can achieve 26.9, 68.1, 20.4, and 21.9 kt in 2021, and a lot of primary critical resources will inburst the in-use stage. Moreover, the number of secondary Li, Ni, Co, and Mn can achieve 6.1, 15.4, 4.6, and 5 kt in 2021, accounting for 22.7%, 22.6%, 22.5%, and 22.8% of their corresponding demand. Based on the economic evaluation under the framework of China's recycling policy system, it is found that the potential recycling values of Li, Ni, Co, and Mn are approximately 966, 523, 414, and 43 million RMB yuan, which are 66.4%, 71%, 59.6%, and 66.4% higher than those in the absence of China's recycling policy system. It is implied that China's recycling policy system could markedly improve the collection rate by reducing losses and indirectly enhancing the recycling and reuse of spent power lithium-ion batteries. This work is expected to provide guidance for policymakers to improve the management of spent power lithium-ion batteries in China.

Evolutionary game analysis of WEEE recycling tripartite stakeholders under variable subsidies and processing fees

The standardization of formal recycling and rational subsidy plays an important role in waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling. In order to explore the tripartite decision and evolution path of waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling in different time periods, a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of recyclers, manufacturers, and government are presented. Moreover, the evolution stability strategies and conditions in each period are calculated by replicating the dynamic equation and Jacobian matrix. Numerical simulations on tripartite evolution stability strategies corresponding to different stages of industry development are used to verify the rationality of the model. The results indicate that there is existed an indirect effect between tripartite decisions, and the indirect effect can expand the slack of tripartite decisions' thresholds of waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling. The variable subsidy in waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling proposed in this paper is useful to incentive recyclers to choose a formal recycling strategy, and manufacturers also choose production with recycled materials as subsidy varies. Besides, the appropriate waste electrical and electronic equipment processing fee is a conducive indirect effect for the tripartite decision to the optimal evolutionary stability strategy in waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling and can promote manufacturers to produce with the recycled materials. The research can assist in benefit coordination and behavior adjustment of waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling members and provide a theoretical basis for the government to formulate appropriate recycling subsidies to promote the formal recycling of electronic waste recycling.

Stackelberg Game Analysis of E-Waste Recycling Stakeholders under Recovery Time Sensitivity and CRMs Life Expectancy Sensitivity

In order to discuss the participation selection strategy of relevant subjects in WEEE recycling, a Stackelberg game model of “recyclers—remanufacturers—government” in a WEEE recycling network is constructed, and the system’s stability strategy and conditions are analyzed. Besides this, the direct and indirect effects of recovery time sensitivity, CRMs’ life expectancy sensitivity, and government subsidies on the optimal decision-making of both recyclers and remanufacturers are explored. The results show that the system can achieve a stable and ideal equilibrium, and achieve win–win for all parties, through reasonable profit transfer and cost-sharing. The dual sensitivity of manufacturers’ demand and policy subsidies has the same qualitative impact on the decision variables of the recyclers and remanufacturers. The subsidies vary depending on the CRMs’ recovery effort level of remanufacturers, and these can incentivize the remanufacturers to increase CRMs’ life expectancy. Moreover, a cost-sharing contract between recyclers and remanufacturers can avoid “free-riding” behavior in WEEE recycling. The research can assist in the benefit coordination and behavior adjustment of WEEE recycling members, and provide a theoretical basis for governments to formulate appropriate recycling subsidies to promote the formal recycling of E-waste.