Forced conceptual thought induced by electrical stimulation of the left prefrontal gyrus involves widespread neural networks

Prefrontal activity during IOWA Gambling Task in young adult women

This study aims to investigate the relationships between personality traits of impulsivity, using the UPPS-P Impulsive Behaviour Scales shortened version, and prefrontal cortex (PFC) activity during the IOWA Gambling Task (IGT) in young adult women. The study included a sample of 83 young, healthy females (19.8 ± 1.4 years), who voluntarily took part in the study. Repeated measures analysis during the IGT revealed a significant increase in HbO (all p <.001; ηp2 >.31) and a decrease in Hbr (all p <.003; ηp2 >.08) in all prefrontal quadrants. This increase in oxygenation occurs primarily during the choice period under ambiguity (r =.23; p =.039). Additionally, there was a significant linear decrease in selecting the decks associated with a high frequency of losses (p <.001), while the favorable deck with low losses showed a linear increase (F = 12.96; p <.001). Notably, discrepancies were found between UPPS-P and IGT impulsivity ratings. The Lack of Perseverance and Lack of Premeditation scales from the UPPS-P were identified as significant predictors of HbO levels, mainly in the two quadrants of the left hemisphere's, lateral (adjusted R2 =.23; p <.001; f2 =.34) and rostral (adjusted R2 =.13; p <.002; f2 =.17). These findings suggest that young adult women predominantly adopt a punishment-avoidance strategy during IGT, exhibiting increased activation in the left hemisphere, especially during the task's initial phase characterized by ambiguity.

Decoding rapidly presented visual stimuli from prefrontal ensembles without report nor post-perceptual processing

The role of the primate prefrontal cortex (PFC) in conscious perception is debated. The global neuronal workspace theory of consciousness predicts that PFC neurons should contain a detailed code of the current conscious contents. Previous research showed that PFC is indeed activated in paradigms of conscious visual perception, including no-report paradigms where no voluntary behavioral report of the percept is given, thus avoiding a conflation of signals related to visual consciousness with signals related to the report. Still, it has been argued that prefrontal modulation could reflect post-perceptual processes that may be present even in the absence of report, such as thinking about the perceived stimulus, therefore reflecting a consequence rather than a direct correlate of conscious experience. Here, we investigate these issues by recording neuronal ensemble activity from the macaque ventrolateral PFC during briefly presented visual stimuli, either in isolated trials in which stimuli were clearly perceived or in sequences of rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) in which perception and post-perceptual processing were challenged. We report that the identity of each stimulus could be decoded from PFC population activity even in the RSVP condition. The first visual signals could be detected at 60 ms after stimulus onset and information was maximal at 150 ms. However, in the RSVP condition, 200 ms after the onset of a stimulus, the decoding accuracy quickly dropped to chance level and the next stimulus started to be decodable. Interestingly, decoding in the ventrolateral PFC was stronger compared to posterior parietal cortex for both isolated and RSVP stimuli. These results indicate that neuronal populations in the macaque PFC reliably encode visual stimuli even under conditions that have been shown to challenge conscious perception and/or substantially reduce the probability of post-perceptual processing in humans. We discuss whether the observed activation reflects conscious access, phenomenal consciousness, or merely a preconscious bottom-up wave.

Does the Prefrontal Cortex Play an Essential Role in Consciousness? Insights from Intracranial Electrical Stimulation of the Human Brain

A central debate in philosophy and neuroscience pertains to whether PFC activity plays an essential role in the neural basis of consciousness. Neuroimaging and electrophysiology studies have revealed that the contents of conscious perceptual experience can be successfully decoded from PFC activity, but these findings might be confounded by postperceptual cognitive processes, such as thinking, reasoning, and decision-making, that are not necessary for consciousness. To clarify the involvement of the PFC in consciousness, we present a synthesis of research that has used intracranial electrical stimulation (iES) for the causal modulation of neural activity in the human PFC. This research provides compelling evidence that iES of only certain prefrontal regions (i.e., orbitofrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex) reliably perturbs conscious experience. Conversely, stimulation of anterolateral prefrontal sites, often considered crucial in higher-order and global workspace theories of consciousness, seldom elicits any reportable alterations in consciousness. Furthermore, the wide variety of iES-elicited effects in the PFC (e.g., emotions, thoughts, and olfactory and visual hallucinations) exhibits no clear relation to the immediate environment. Therefore, there is no evidence for the kinds of alterations in ongoing perceptual experience that would be predicted by higher-order or global workspace theories. Nevertheless, effects in the orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate cortices suggest a specific role for these PFC subregions in supporting emotional aspects of conscious experience. Overall, this evidence presents a challenge for higher-order and global workspace theories, which commonly point to the PFC as the basis for conscious perception based on correlative and possibly confounded information.