Paradox and cross purposes in recent work on consciousness

What does decoding from the PFC reveal about consciousness?

Disputes between rival theories of consciousness have often centered on whether perceptual contents can be decoded from the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Failures to decode from the PFC are taken to challenge 'cognitive' theories of consciousness such as the global workspace theory and higher-order monitoring theories, and decoding successes have been taken to confirm these theories. However, PFC decoding shows both too much and too little. Too much because cognitive theories of consciousness do not need PFC rerepresentation of perceptual contents since pointers to perceptual representations suffice. Too little because there is evidence that PFC decoding of perceptual content reflects postperceptual cognitive representation, such as thoughts that have those perceptual contents rather than conscious percepts.

Consciousness as the Temporal Propagation of Information

Our ability to understand the mind and its relation to the body is highly dependent on the way we define consciousness and the lens through which we study it. We argue that looking at conscious experience from an information-theory perspective can help obtain a unified and parsimonious account of the mind. Today's dominant models consider consciousness to be a specialized function of the brain characterized by a discrete neural event. Against this background, we consider subjective experience through information theory, presenting consciousness as the propagation of information from the past to the future. We examine through this perspective major characteristics of consciousness. We demonstrate that without any additional assumptions, temporal continuity in perception can explain the emergence of volition, subjectivity, higher order thoughts, and body boundaries. Finally, we discuss the broader implications for the mind-body question and the appeal of embodied cognition.

What is visible across the visual field?

It is sometimes claimed that because the resolution and sensitivity of visual perception are better in the fovea than in the periphery, peripheral vision cannot support the same kinds of colour and sharpness percepts as foveal vision. The fact that a scene nevertheless seems colourful and sharp throughout the visual field then poses a puzzle. In this study, I use a detailed model of human spatial vision to estimate the visibility of certain properties of natural scenes, including aspects of colourfulness, sharpness, and blurriness, across the visual field. The model is constructed to reproduce basic aspects of human contrast and colour sensitivity over a range of retinal eccentricities. I apply the model to colourful, complex natural scene images, and estimate the degree to which colour and edge information are present in the model's representation of the scenes. I find that, aside from the intrinsic drift in the spatial scale of the representation, there are not large qualitative differences between foveal and peripheral representations of 'colourfulness' and 'sharpness'.

The Effects of Anesthetics on the Cortex-Lessons From Event-Related Potentials

Consciousness while under general anesthesia is a dreadful condition. Various electroencephalogram (EEG)-based technologies have been developed, on the basis of empirical evidence, in order to identify this condition. However, certain electrophysiological phenomena, which seem strongly related with depth of anesthesia in some drugs, appear less consistent with those of other anesthetic drugs. There is a gap between the complexity of the phenomenon of consciousness and its behavioral manifestations, on the one hand, and the empirical nature of the reported electrophysiological markers, which are associated with it, on the other hand. In fact, such a gap might prevent us from progressing toward unified electrophysiological markers of consciousness while under anesthesia, which are applicable to all anesthetic drugs. We believe that there is a need to bridge this conceptual gap. Therefore, in this work, we will try to present a theoretical framework for such bridging. First, we suggest focusing on neuropsychological processes, which seem to have a clear role in the behavioral manifestations of consciousness while under anesthesia but seem, nevertheless, better defined than consciousness itself-such as perception and attention. Then, we suggest analyzing the effects of anesthesia upon these neuropsychological processes, as they are manifested in the EEG signal. Specifically, we will focus on the effects of anesthesia on event-related potentials (ERPs), which seem more easily associable with neuropsychological modeling.

Unitary and dual models of phenomenal consciousness

There is almost unanimous consensus among the theorists of consciousness that the phenomenal character of a mental state cannot exist without consciousness. We argue for a reappraisal of this consensus. We distinguish two models of phenomenal consciousness: unitary and dual. Unitary model takes the production of a phenomenal quality and it's becoming conscious to be one and the same thing. The dual model, which we advocate in this paper, distinguishes the process in which the phenomenal quality is formed from the process that makes this quality conscious. We put forward a conceptual, methodological, neuropsychological and neural argument for the dual model. These arguments are independent but provide mutual support to each other. Together, they strongly support the dual model of phenomenal consciousness and the concomitant idea of unconscious mental qualities. The dual view is thus, we submit, a hypothesis worthy of further probing and development.

Different Electrophysiological Correlates of Visual Awareness for Detection and Identification

Detecting the presence of an object is a different process than identifying the object as a particular object. This difference has not been taken into account in designing experiments on the neural correlates of consciousness. We compared the electrophysiological correlates of conscious detection and identification directly by measuring ERPs while participants performed either a task only requiring the conscious detection of the stimulus or a higher-level task requiring its conscious identification. Behavioral results showed that, even if the stimulus was consciously detected, it was not necessarily identified. A posterior electrophysiological signature 200–300 msec after stimulus onset was sensitive for conscious detection but not for conscious identification, which correlated with a later widespread activity. Thus, we found behavioral and neural evidence for elementary visual experiences, which are not yet enriched with higher-level knowledge. The search for the mechanisms of consciousness should focus on the early elementary phenomenal experiences to avoid the confounding effects of higher-level processes.

Basic Emotions, Natural Kinds, Emotion Schemas, and a New Paradigm

Research on emotion flourishes in many disciplines and specialties, yet experts cannot agree on its definition. Theorists and researchers use the term emotion in ways that imply different processes and meanings. Debate continues about the nature of emotions, their functions, their relations to broad affective dimensions, the processes that activate them, and their role in our daily activities and pursuits. I will address these issues here, specifically in terms of basic emotions as natural kinds, the nature of emotion schemas, the development of emotion—cognition relations that lead to emotion schemas, and discrete emotions in relation to affective dimensions. Finally, I propose a new paradigm that assumes continual emotion as a factor in organizing consciousness and as an influence on mind and behavior. The evidence reviewed suggests that a theory that builds on concepts of both basic emotions and emotion schemas provides a viable research tool and is compatible with more holistic or dimensional approaches.

Partial Awareness Creates the “Illusion” of Subliminal Semantic Priming

We argue that the lack of consensus regarding the existence of subliminal semantic processing arises from not taking into account the fact that linguistic stimuli are represented across several processing levels (features, letters, word form) that can independently reach or not reach awareness. Using masked words, we constructed conditions in which participants were aware of some letters or fragments of a word, while remaining unaware of the whole word. Three experiments using the Stroop priming paradigm show that when the stimulus set is reduced and participants are encouraged to guess the identity of the prime, such partially perceived stimuli can nonetheless give rise to “semantic” processing. We provide evidence that this effect is due to illusory reconstruction of the incompletely perceived stimulus, followed by usual semantic processing of the result. We conclude that previously reported unconscious Stroop priming is in fact a conscious effect, but applied to a perceptual illusion.

Understanding visual consciousness in autism spectrum disorders

The paper focuses on the question of what the (visual) perceptual differences are between individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and typically developing (TD) individuals. We argue against the view that autistic subjects have a deficiency in the most basic form of perceptual consciousness—namely, phenomenal consciousness. Instead, we maintain, the perceptual atypicality of individuals with autism is of a more conceptual and cognitive sort—their perceptual experiences share crucial aspects with TD individuals. Our starting point is Ben Shalom’s (2005, 2009) three-level processing framework for explaining atypicality in several domains of processing among autistics, which we compare with two other tripartite models of perception—Jackendoff’s (1987) and Prinz’s (2000, 2005a, 2007) Intermediate Level Hypothesis and Lamme’s (2004, 2006, 2010) neural account of consciousness. According to these models, whereas the second level of processing is concerned with viewer-centered visual representations of basic visual properties and incorporates some early forms of integration, the third level is more cognitive and conceptual. We argue that the data suggest that the atypicality in autism is restricted mainly to the third level. More specifically, second-level integration, which is the mark of phenomenal consciousness, is typical, yet third-level integration of perceptual objects and concepts is atypical. Thus, the basic experiences of individuals with autism are likely to be similar to typical subjects’ experiences; the main difference lies in the sort of cognitive access the subjects have to their experiences. We conclude by discussing implications of the suggested analysis of experience in autism for conceptions of phenomenal consciousness.

Isolating neural correlates of conscious perception from neural correlates of reporting one's perception

To isolate neural correlates of conscious perception (NCCs), a standard approach has been to contrast neural activity elicited by identical stimuli of which subjects are aware vs. unaware. Because conscious experience is private, determining whether a stimulus was consciously perceived requires subjective report: e.g., button-presses indicating detection, visibility ratings, verbal reports, etc. This reporting requirement introduces a methodological confound when attempting to isolate NCCs: The neural processes responsible for accessing and reporting one's percept are difficult to distinguish from those underlying the conscious percept itself. Here, we review recent attempts to circumvent this issue via a modified inattentional blindness paradigm (Pitts et al., 2012) and present new data from a backward masking experiment in which task-relevance and visual awareness were manipulated in a 2 × 2 crossed design. In agreement with our previous inattentional blindness results, stimuli that were consciously perceived yet not immediately accessed for report (aware, task-irrelevant condition) elicited a mid-latency posterior ERP negativity (~200–240 ms), while stimuli that were accessed for report (aware, task-relevant condition) elicited additional components including a robust P3b (~380–480 ms) subsequent to the mid-latency negativity. Overall, these results suggest that some of the NCCs identified in previous studies may be more closely linked with accessing and maintaining perceptual information for reporting purposes than with encoding the conscious percept itself. An open question is whether the remaining NCC candidate (the ERP negativity at 200–240 ms) reflects visual awareness or object-based attention.

Quality-space theory in olfaction

Quality-space theory (QST) explains the nature of the mental qualities distinctive of perceptual states by appeal to their role in perceiving. QST is typically described in terms of the mental qualities that pertain to color. Here we apply QST to the olfactory modalities. Olfaction is in various respects more complex than vision, and so provides a useful test case for QST. To determine whether QST can deal with the challenges olfaction presents, we show how a quality space (QS) could be constructed relying on olfactory perceptible properties and the olfactory mental qualities then defined by appeal to that QS of olfactory perceptible properties. We also consider how to delimit the olfactory QS from other modalities. We further apply QST to the role that experience plays in refining our olfactory discriminative abilities and the occurrence of olfactory mental qualities in non-conscious olfactory states. QST is shown to be fully applicable to and useful for understanding the complex domain of olfaction.

Efficiency of conscious access improves with coupling of slow and fast neural oscillations

Global workspace access is considered as a critical factor for the ability to report a visual target. A plausible candidate mechanism for global workspace access is coupling of slow and fast brain activity. We studied coupling in EEG data using cross-frequency phase-amplitude modulation measurement between delta/theta phases and beta/gamma amplitudes from two experimental sessions, held on different days, of a typical attentional blink (AB) task, implying conscious access to targets. As the AB effect improved with practice between sessions, theta-gamma and theta-beta coupling increased generically. Most importantly, practice effects observed in delta-gamma and delta-beta couplings were specific to performance on the AB task. In particular, delta-gamma coupling showed the largest increase in cases of correct target detection in the most challenging AB conditions. All these practice effects were observed in the right temporal region. Given that the delta band is the main frequency of the P3 ERP, which is a marker of global workspace activity for conscious access, and because the gamma band is involved in visual object processing, the current results substantiate the role of phase-amplitude modulation in conscious access to visual target representations.

The wild ways of conscious will: what we do, how we do it, and why it has meaning

It is becoming increasingly mainstream to claim that conscious will is an illusion. This assertion is based on a host of findings that indicate conscious will does not share an efficient-cause relationship with actions. As an alternative, the present paper will propose that conscious will is not about causing actions, but rather, about constraining action systems toward producing outcomes. In addition, it will be proposed that we generate and sustain multiple outcomes simultaneously because the multi-scale dynamics by which we do so are, themselves, self-sustaining. Finally, it will be proposed that self-sustaining dynamics entail meaning (i.e., conscious content) because they naturally and necessarily constitute embodiments of context.

How and to what end may consciousness contribute to action? Attributing properties of consciousness to an embodied, minimally cognitive artificial neural network

An artificial neural network called reaCog is described which is based on a decentralized, reactive and embodied architecture developed to control non-trivial hexapod walking in an unpredictable environment (Walknet) while using insect-like navigation (Navinet). In reaCog, these basic networks are extended in such a way that the complete system, reaCog, adopts the capability of inventing new behaviors and - via internal simulation - of planning ahead. This cognitive expansion enables the reactive system to be enriched with additional procedures. Here, we focus on the question to what extent properties of phenomena to be characterized on a different level of description as for example consciousness can be found in this minimally cognitive system. Adopting a monist view, we argue that the phenomenal aspect of mental phenomena can be neglected when discussing the function of such a system. Under this condition, reaCog is discussed to be equipped with properties as are bottom-up and top-down attention, intentions, volition, and some aspects of Access Consciousness. These properties have not been explicitly implemented but emerge from the cooperation between the elements of the network. The aspects of Access Consciousness found in reaCog concern the above mentioned ability to plan ahead and to invent and guide (new) actions. Furthermore, global accessibility of memory elements, another aspect characterizing Access Consciousness is realized by this network. reaCog allows for both reactive/automatic control and (access-) conscious control of behavior. We discuss examples for interactions between both the reactive domain and the conscious domain. Metacognition or Reflexive Consciousness is not a property of reaCog. Possible expansions are discussed to allow for further properties of Access Consciousness, verbal report on internal states, and for Metacognition. In summary, we argue that already simple networks allow for properties of consciousness if leaving the phenomenal aspect aside.

Towards an integrative theory of consciousness: part 2 (an anthology of various other models)

The study of consciousness has today moved beyond neurobiology and cognitive models. In the past few years, there has been a surge of research into various newer areas. The present article looks at the non-neurobiological and non-cognitive theories regarding this complex phenomenon, especially ones that self-psychology, self-theory, artificial intelligence, quantum physics, visual cognitive science and philosophy have to offer. Self-psychology has proposed the need to understand the self and its development, and the ramifications of the self for morality and empathy, which will help us understand consciousness better. There have been inroads made from the fields of computer science, machine technology and artificial intelligence, including robotics, into understanding the consciousness of these machines and their implications for human consciousness. These areas are explored. Visual cortex and emotional theories along with their implications are discussed. The phylogeny and evolution of the phenomenon of consciousness is also highlighted, with theories on the emergence of consciousness in fetal and neonatal life. Quantum physics and its insights into the mind, along with the implications of consciousness and physics and their interface are debated. The role of neurophilosophy to understand human consciousness, the functions of such a concept, embodiment, the dark side of consciousness, future research needs and limitations of a scientific theory of consciousness complete the review. The importance and salient features of each theory are discussed along with certain pitfalls, if present. A need for the integration of various theories to understand consciousness from a holistic perspective is stressed.

Error awareness and the error-related negativity: evaluating the first decade of evidence

From its discovery in the early 1990s until this day, the error-related negativity (ERN) remains the most widely investigated electrophysiological index of cortical error processing. When researchers began addressing the electrophysiology of subjective error awareness more than a decade ago, the role of the ERN, alongside the subsequently occurring error positivity (Pe), was an obvious locus of attention. However, the first two studies explicitly addressing the role of error-related event-related brain potentials (ERPs) would already set the tone for what still remains a controversy today: in contrast to the clear-cut findings that link the amplitude of the Pe to error awareness, the association between ERN amplitude and error awareness is vastly unclear. An initial study reported significant differences in ERN amplitude with respect to subjective error awareness, whereas the second failed to report this result, leading to a myriad of follow-up studies that seemed to back up or contradict either view. Here, I review those studies that explicitly dealt with the role of the error-related ERPs in subjective error awareness, and try to explain the differences in reported effects of error awareness on ERN amplitude. From the point of view presented here, different findings between studies can be explained by disparities in experimental design and data analysis, specifically with respect to the quantification of subjective error awareness. Based on the review of these results, I will then try to embed the error-related negativity into a widely known model of the implementation of access consciousness in the brain, the global neuronal workspace (GNW) model, and speculate as the ERN's potential role in such a framework. At last, I will outline future challenges in the investigation of the cortical electrophysiology of error awareness, and offer some suggestions on how they could potentially be addressed.

Have we vindicated the motivational unconscious yet? A conceptual review

Motivationally unconscious (M-unconscious) states are unconscious states that can directly motivate a subject's behavior and whose unconscious character typically results from a form of repression. The basic argument for M-unconscious states claims that they provide the best explanation for some seemingly non-rational behaviors, like akrasia, impulsivity, or apparent self-deception. This basic argument has been challenged on theoretical, empirical, and conceptual grounds. Drawing on recent works on apparent self-deception and on the "cognitive unconscious" I assess those objections. I argue that (i) even if there is a good theoretical argument for its existence, (ii) most empirical vindications of the M-unconscious miss their target. (iii) As for the conceptual objections, they compel us to modify the classical picture of the M-unconscious. I conclude that M-unconscious states and processes must be affective states and processes that the subject really feels and experiences - and which are in this sense conscious - even though they are not, or not well, cognitively accessible to him. Dual-process psychology and the literature on cold-hot empathy gaps partly support the existence of such M-unconscious states.

Event-related brain potential correlates of visual awareness

Electrophysiological recordings during visual tasks can shed light on the temporal dynamics of the subjective experience of seeing, visual awareness. This paper reviews studies on electrophysiological correlates of visual awareness operationalized as the difference between event-related potentials (ERPs) in response to stimuli that enter awareness and stimuli that do not. There are three candidates for such a correlate: enhancement of P1 around 100 ms, enhancement of early posterior negativity around 200 ms (visual awareness negativity, VAN), and enhancement of late positivity (LP) in the P3 time window around 400 ms. Review of studies using different manipulations of awareness suggests that VAN is the correlate of visual awareness that most consistently emerges across different manipulations of visual awareness. VAN emerges also relatively independent of manipulations of nonspatial attention, but seems to be dependent on spatial attention. The results suggest that visual awareness emerges about 200 ms after the onset of visual stimulation as a consequence of the activation of posterior occipito-temporal and parietal networks.

Neural Correlates of Subjective Awareness and Unconscious Processing: An ERP Study

The aim of the present study was to dissociate the ERP (Event Related Potentials) correlates of subjective awareness from those of unconscious perception. In a backward masking paradigm, participants first produced a forced-choice response to the location of a liminal target presented for an individually calibrated duration, and then reported on their subjective awareness of the target's presence. We recorded (Event-Related Potentials) ERPs and compared the ERP waves when observers reported being aware vs. unaware of the target but localized it correctly, thereby isolating the neural correlates of subjective awareness while controlling for differences in objective performance. In addition, we compared the ERPs when participants were subjectively unaware of the target's presence and localized it correctly versus incorrectly, thereby isolating the neural correlates of unconscious perception. All conditions involved stimuli that were physically identical and were presented for the same duration. Both behavioral measures were associated with modulation of the amplitude of the P3 component of the ERP. Importantly, this modulation was widely spread across all scalp locations for subjective awareness, but was restricted to the parietal electrodes for unconscious perception. These results indicate that liminal stimuli that do not affect performance undergo considerable processing and that subjective awareness is associated with a late wave of activation with widely distributed topography.

The role of selective attention in visual awareness of stimulus features: electrophysiological studies

Attention and awareness are closely related, but the nature of their relationship is unclear. The present study explores the timing and temporal evolution of their interaction with event-related potentials. The participants attended to specific conjunctions of spatial frequency and orientation in masked (unaware) and unmasked (aware) visual stimuli. A correlate of awareness appeared 100-200 msec from stimulus onset similarly to both attended and unattended features. Selection negativity (SN), a correlate of attentional selection, emerged in response to both masked and unmasked stimuli after 200 msec. This double dissociation between correlates of awareness and SN suggests that the electrophysiological processes associated with feature-based attentional selection and visual awareness of features can be dissociated from each other at early stages of processing. In a passive task, requiring no attention to the stimuli, early electrophysiological responses (before 200 msec) related to awareness were attenuated, suggesting that focal attention modulates visual awareness earlier than does selective feature-based attention.

Concepts of visual consciousness and their measurement

Although visual consciousness can be manipulated easily (e.g., by visual masking), it is unresolved whether it can be assessed accurately with behavioral measures such as discrimination ability and self-report. Older theories of visual consciousness postulated a sensory threshold and distinguished between subjective and objective thresholds. In contrast, newer theories distinguish among three aspects: phenomenal, access, and reflexive consciousness. This review shows that discrimination ability and self-report differ in their sensitivity to these aspects. Therefore, both need to be assessed in the study of visual consciousness.

Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience

How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We see the problem in stark form if we ask how we can tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: Find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases--when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority--and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: Do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is "Yes," then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is "Yes"? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! This target article argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. I argue that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if we assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things being equal) by the explanations it allows.

Reportability and illusions of phenomenality in the light of the global neuronal workspace model

Can we ever experimentally disentangle phenomenal consciousness from the cognitive accessibility inherent to conscious reports? In this commentary, we suggest that (1) Block's notion of phenomenal consciousness remains intractably entangled with the need to obtain subjective reports about it; and (2) many experimental paradigms suggest that the intuitive notion of a rich but non-reportable phenomenal world is, to a large extent illusory – in a sense that requires clarification.

Overflow, access, and attention

In this response to 32 commentators, I start by clarifying the overflow argument. I explain why the distinction between generic and specific phenomenology is important and why we are justified in acknowledging specific phenomenology in the overflow experiments. Other issues discussed are the relations among report, cognitive access, and attention; panpsychic disaster; the mesh between psychology and neuroscience; and whether consciousness exists.

The earliest electrophysiological correlate of visual awareness?

To examine the neural correlates and timing of human visual awareness, we recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) in two experiments while the observers were detecting a grey dot that was presented near subjective threshold. ERPs were averaged for conscious detections of the stimulus (hits) and nondetections (misses) separately. Our results revealed that hits, as compared to misses, showed a negativity around 180-350 ms at occipital and posterior temporal sites. It was followed by a positive wave after 400-500 ms, peaking at parietal sites. These correlates were not affected by a manipulation of attention. The early negativity, called 'visual awareness negativity' (VAN), may be a general, primary electrophysiological correlate of visual awareness. The present data show that it can be observed in response to appearance of a stimulus in visual awareness and that it generalizes across different manipulations of stimulus visibility.

Variability in response criteria affects estimates of conscious identification and unconscious semantic priming

Three experiments examined the role of response criteria in a masked semantic priming paradigm using an exclusion task. Experiment 1 used on-line prime-report ("report the prime if you saw it") and exclusion instructions in which participants were told to avoid completing a word stem (e.g. mo-) with a word related to a prime (e.g. cash) flashed for 0, 38 or 212ms. Semantic priming (i.e. exclusion failure) was significant in the items analysis, but was moderated by peoples' ability to report the prime in the participant analysis. Prime-report thresholds in Experiment 2 were made more liberal by instructing participants to guess on every trial. Prime-report increased from Experiment 1 as exclusion failures were eliminated. Experiment 3 clarified the relationship between awareness and prime identification using an on-line measure of confidence and different liberal prime report instructions. The current findings suggest that the ability to act upon (via exclusion performance) and report information in a masked prime is determined by a variable response criterion, which can be manipulated as an independent variable.

Comparison of event-related potentials in attentional blink and repetition blindness

Attending to the first target in rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) interferes with processing of the second target so that the participants fail to recognize the second target if the targets are separated by a stimulus onset asynchrony of 200-500 ms. This phenomenon is attentional blink (AB). Repetition blindness (RB) is an additional difficulty to recognize the second occurrence of the same stimulus in RSVP. A controversial issue in studies of both deficits is the processing level at which they occur. To compare the timing and mechanisms of AB and RB directly during the same RSVP stream, we recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) in response to repeated and unrepeated targets. Comparable to earlier ERP studies on visual awareness, the results showed for both types of targets a negative amplitude difference between ERPs to consciously recognized and unrecognized targets during 250-350 ms from stimulus onset, suggesting that both AB and RB are associated with deficits of conscious perception, occurring at earlier stages than access to working memory. However, the perceptual deficit in RB is more severe, which may be related to higher overall negativity in response to repeated targets observed 150-300 ms after stimulus onset, suggesting stronger cortical baseline activation and higher perceptual threshold for repeated targets as compared with unrepeated ones.

Timing of the earliest ERP correlate of visual awareness

The earliest reliably occurring event-related brain potential (ERP) correlate of visual awareness (visual awareness negativity, VAN) emerges after 100 ms and peaks between 200 and 300 ms from stimulus onset. In a study using low-contrast stimuli, VAN was significantly delayed, peaking at 460 ms (V. Ojanen, A. Revonsuo, & M. Sams, 2003). In that study physical differences between the conscious and nonconscious stimuli may have confounded the results. Here we explored whether VAN is similarly delayed for physically identical stimuli. We presented low-contrast stimuli near an individually determined subjective contrast threshold. A delayed VAN peaked at 400 ms at occipito-temporal sites to subjectively perceived stimuli. Our results support the interpretation that VAN is the earliest ERP correlate of phenomenal visual awareness. The electrophysiological processes eliciting VAN may become delayed as a function of the difficulty of the early perceptual discrimination.

Electrophysiological correlates of visual consciousness and selective attention

It is not clear whether attention is necessary or not for consciousness. We studied the relationship between attention and consciousness by tracking their electrophysiological correlates. The participants attended to visual targets, ignored nontargets in the prespecified visual field and ignored all stimuli in the opposite field. Visual consciousness was varied by masking. Our results showed that the earliest electrophysiological correlate of consciousness emerged independent of the manipulations of spatial and nonspatial attention. Conversely, the electrophysiological correlate of attention, selection negativity, was elicited regardless of the presence or absence of consciousness. Only the correlates of later, higher-level conscious processes strongly depended on attention. Thus, the electrophysiological brain responses reflecting visual consciousness and attention are initially independent of each other.

Independence of Visual Awareness from the Scope of Attention: an Electrophysiological Study

Recent brain imaging studies have revealed that increased neural activity along the ventral visual stream and parietal and frontal areas is associated with visual awareness. In order to study the time-course and temporal aspects of awareness, we examined electrophysiological correlates of conscious vision in two masking experiments. The differences in event-related potentials (ERPs) between unmasked (consciously recognized) and masked (unrecognized) stimuli were considered to be electrophysiological correlates of awareness. Two attentional conditions (global, local) were included to examine the relationship between the scope of attention and awareness. Two ERP-deflections were found to correlate with awareness. First, awareness was associated with a posterior negative amplitude shift 130-320 ms after the stimulus. This effect was present in both attention conditions, suggesting that it emerges independent of the scope of attention. Second, ERPs to unmasked stimuli became more positive as compared with masked stimuli around 400 ms, peaking at parietal sites. This effect was attenuated in the local attention condition, although the participants were aware of the stimuli, suggesting that the late positivity does not directly correlate with visual awareness. The results imply that the earlier negativity is the earliest and most direct correlate of visual awareness.

Independence of visual awareness from attention at early processing stages

According to a widely accepted idea, only the results of attentional selection reach visual awareness. A competing model postulates that awareness is independent of attentional selection: contents of subjective visual experience may also exist without the contribution of attention. We tested these competing models by tracking the independent contributions of selective attention and awareness to electrophysiological brain responses. Our results showed that the earliest effects of visual awareness emerged earlier than the effects of attention and regardless of the presence or absence of attention. The early effects of attention were elicited regardless of the presence or absence of awareness. The results suggest that visual awareness and selective attention are initially independent of each other.

Measuring unconscious knowledge: distinguishing structural knowledge and judgment knowledge

This paper investigates the dissociation between conscious and unconscious knowledge in an implicit learning paradigm. Two experiments employing the artificial grammar learning task explored the acquisition of unconscious and conscious knowledge of structure (structural knowledge). Structural knowledge was contrasted to knowledge of whether an item has that structure (judgment knowledge). For both structural and judgment knowledge, conscious awareness was assessed using subjective measures. It was found that unconscious structural knowledge could lead to both conscious and unconscious judgment knowledge. When structural knowledge was unconscious, there was no tendency for judgment knowledge to become more conscious over time. Furthermore, conscious rather than unconscious structural knowledge produced more consistent errors in judgments, was facilitated by instructions to search for rules, and after such instructions was harmed by a secondary task. The dissociations validate the use of these subjective measures of conscious awareness.

Two neural correlates of consciousness

Neuroscientists continue to search for "the" neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). In this article, I argue that a framework in which there are at least two distinct NCCs is increasingly making more sense of empirical results than one in which there is a single NCC. I outline the distinction between phenomenal NCC and access NCC, and show how they can be distinguished by experimental approaches, in particular signal-detection theory approaches. Recent findings in cognitive neuroscience provide an empirical case for two different NCCs.

Extending the global workspace theory to emotion: phenomenality without access

Recent accounts on the global workspace theory suggest that consciousness involves transient formations of functional connections in thalamo-cortico-cortical networks. The level of connectivity in these networks is argued to determine the state of consciousness. Emotions are suggested to play a role in shaping consciousness, but their involvement in the global workspace theory remains elusive. In the present study, the role of emotion in the neural workspace theory of consciousness was scrutinized by investigating, whether unconscious (masked) and conscious (unmasked) display of emotional compared to neutral facial expressions would differentially modulate EEG coherence. EEG coherence was measured by means of computing an average EEG coherence value between the frontal, parietal, and midline scalp sites. Objective awareness checks evidenced that conscious identification of the masked facial expressions was precluded. Analyses revealed reductions in EEG coherence in the lower frequency range for the masked as compared to unmasked neutral facial expressions. Crucially, a decline in EEG coherence was not observed for the emotional facial expressions. In other words, the level of EEG coherence did apparently vary as a function of awareness, but not when emotion was involved. The current finding suggests that EEG coherence is modulated by unconscious emotional processes, which extends common views on the global workspace architecture of consciousness.