Similarity and rules: distinct? Exhaustive? Empirically distinguishable?

Analogy is indispensable but rule is a must: Insights from Turkish

Inflectional morphology provides a unique platform for a discussion of whether morphological productivity is rule-based or analogy-based. The present study testing 140 children (range = 29 to 97 months; M(SD) = 64.1(18.8)) on an elicited production task investigated the acquisition of the irregular distribution in the Turkish aorist. Results suggested that to discover the allomorphs of the Turkish aorist, children initially carried out similarity comparisons between analogous exemplars, which helped them tap into phonological features to induce generalizations for regulars and irregulars. Thereafter to tackle the irregularity, children entertained competing hypotheses yielding overregularizations and irregularizations. While the trajectory of overregularizations implicated the gradual formulation of an abstraction based on type-frequency, irregularizations suggested both intrusion of analogous exemplars and children's attempts to default to an erroneous micro-generalization. Our findings supported a model of morphological learning that is driven by analogy at the outset and that invokes rule-induction in later stages.

On the Generalization of Simple Alternating Category Structures

A fundamental question in the study of human cognition is how people learn to predict the category membership of an example from its properties. Leading approaches account for a wide range of data in terms of comparison to stored examples, abstractions capturing statistical regularities, or logical rules. Across three experiments, participants learned a category structure in a low-dimension, continuous-valued space consisting of regularly alternating regions of class membership (A B A B). The dependent measure was generalization performance for novel items outside the range of the training space. Human learners often extended the alternation pattern--a finding of critical interest given that leading theories of categorization based on similarity or dimensional rules fail to predict this behavior. In addition, we provide novel theoretical interpretations of the observed phenomenon.

Does practice in category learning increase rule use or exemplar use-or both?

Categorization research has demonstrated the use of both rules and remembered exemplars in classification, although there is disagreement over whether learners shift from one to the other or use both strategies simultaneously. Theoretical arguments can motivate predictions for both rule use and exemplar use increasing with more practice. We describe a single large experiment (n = 190) that manipulated the number of training items (category size), the number of presentations of each training item, and the similarity between the training and the transfer stimuli in order to discover when rules and exemplars are most likely to be used. Results showed that rules and exemplars both influenced classification and that exemplars were used more often with smaller categories, with more training on items, and when test items were similar to training items. There was no consistent evidence of a shift from rule-based to exemplar-based categorization with more learning. Importantly, we found a number of conditions in which rules and exemplars were both used, even within individual participants. We discuss our results in terms of hybrid models of classification.

Tracing the path of forgetting in rule abstraction and exemplar retrieval

People often forget acquired knowledge over time such as names of former classmates. Which knowledge people can access, however, may modify the judgement process and affect judgement accuracy. Specifically, we hypothesised that judgements based on retrieving past exemplars from long-term memory may be more vulnerable to forgetting than remembering rules that relate the cues to the criterion. Experiment 1 systematically tracked the individual course of forgetting from initial learning to later tests (immediate, 1 day, and 1 week) in a linear judgement task facilitating rule-based strategies and a multiplicative judgement task facilitating exemplar-based strategies. Practising the acquired judgement strategy in repeated tests helped participants to consistently apply the learnt judgement strategy and retain a high judgement accuracy even after a week. Yet, whereas a long retention interval did not affect judgements in the linear task, a long retention interval impaired judgements in the multiplicative task. If practice was restricted as in Experiment 2, judgement accuracy suffered in both tasks. In addition, after a week without practice, participants tried to reconstruct their judgements by applying rules in the multiplicative task. These results emphasise that the extent to which decision makers can still retrieve previously learned knowledge limits their ability to make accurate judgements and that the preferred strategies change over time if the opportunity for practice is limited.

Behavioral evidence for the use of functional categories during group reversal task performance in monkeys

A functional category is a set of stimuli that are regarded as equivalent independently of their physical properties and elicit the same behavioral responses. Major psychological theories suggest the ability to form and utilize functional categories as a basis of higher cognition that markedly increases behavioral flexibility. Vaughan claimed the category use in pigeons on the basis of partition, a mathematical criterion for equivalence, however, there have been some criticisms that the evidence he showed was insufficient. In this study, by using a group reversal task, a procedure originally used by Vaughan, we aimed to gather further evidence to prove the category use in animals. Macaque monkeys, which served as subjects in our study, could efficiently perform the task not only with familiar stimulus sets as Vaughan demonstrated but also with novel sets, and furthermore the task performance was stable even when the number of stimuli in a set was increased, which we consider as further evidence for the category use in animals. In addition, by varying the timing of the reversal, we found that a category formation takes place soon after encountering new stimuli, i.e. in a few blocks of trial after a novel stimulus set was introduced.

How Do Actions Influence Attitudes? An Inferential Account of the Impact of Action Performance on Stimulus Evaluation

Over the past decade, an increasing number of studies have shown that the performance of specific actions (e.g., approach and avoidance) in response to a stimulus can lead to changes in how that stimulus is evaluated. In contrast to the reigning idea that these effects are mediated by the automatic formation and activation of associations in memory, we describe an inferential account that specifies the inferences underlying the effects and how these inferences are formed. We draw on predictive processing theories to explain the basic processes underlying inferential reasoning and their main characteristics. Our inferential account accommodates past findings, is supported by new findings, and leads to novel predictions as well as concrete recommendations for how action performance can be used to influence real-world behavior.

The Search for Simplicity: A Fundamental Cognitive Principle?

It is proposed that the cognitive system imposes patterns on the world according to a simplicity principle: Choose the pattern that provides the briefest representation of the available information. The simplicity principle is normatively justified—patterns that support simple representations provide good explanations and predictions on the basis of which the agent can make decisions and actions. Moreover, the simplicity principle appears to be consistent with empirical data from many psychological domains, including perception, similarity, learning, memory, and reasoning. Thus, the simplicity principle promises to serve as the starting point for the rational analysis of a wide range of cognitive processes, in Anderson's (1990, 1991a) sense. The simplicity principle also provides a framework for integrating a wide range of existing psychological proposals.

Ignore Similarity If You Can: A Computational Exploration of Exemplar Similarity Effects on Rule Application

It is generally assumed that when making categorization judgments the cognitive system learns to focus on stimuli features that are relevant for making an accurate judgment. This is a key feature of hybrid categorization systems, which selectively weight the use of exemplar- and rule-based processes. In contrast, Hahn et al. (2010) have shown that people cannot help but pay attention to exemplar similarity, even when doing so leads to classification errors. This paper tests, through a series of computer simulations, whether a hybrid categorization model developed in the ACT-R cognitive architecture (by Anderson and Betz, 2001) can account for the Hahn et al. dataset. This model implements Nosofsky and Palmeri's (1997) exemplar-based random walk model as its exemplar route, and combines it with an implementation of Nosofsky et al. (1994) rule-based model RULEX. A thorough search of the model's parameter space showed that while the presence of an exemplar-similarity effect on response times was associated with classification errors it was possible to fit both measures to the observed data for an unsupervised version of the task (i.e., in which no feedback on accuracy was given). Difficulties arose when the model was applied to a supervised version of the task in which explicit feedback on accuracy was given. Modeling results show that the exemplar-similarity effect is diminished by feedback as the model learns to avoid the error-prone exemplar-route, taking instead the accurate rule-route. In contrast to the model, Hahn et al. found that people continue to exhibit robust exemplar-similarity effects even when given feedback. This work highlights a challenge for understanding how and why people combine rules and exemplars when making categorization decisions.

The Simplicity Principle in Human Concept Learning

How do we learn concepts and categories from examples? Part of the answer might be that we induce the simplest category consistent with a given set of example objects. This seemingly obvious idea, akin to simplicity principles in many fields, plays surprisingly little role in contemporary theories of concept learning, which are mostly based on the storage of exemplars, and avoid summarization or overt abstraction of any kind. This article reviews some evidence that complexity minimization does indeed play a central role in human concept learning. The chief finding is that subjects' ability to learn concepts depends heavily on the concepts' intrinsic complexity; more complex concepts are more difficult to learn. This pervasive effect suggests, contrary to exemplar theories, that concept learning critically involves the extraction of a simplified or abstracted generalization from examples.

The Influence of Presentation Order on Category Transfer

This study of supervised categorization shows how different kinds of category representations are influenced by the order in which training examples are presented. We used the well-studied 5-4 category structure of Medin and Schaffer (1978) , which allows transfer of category learning to new stimuli to be discriminated as a function of rule-based or similarity-based category knowledge. In the rule-based training condition (thought to facilitate the learning of abstract logical rules and hypothesized to produce rule-based classification), items were grouped by subcategories and randomized within each subcategory. In the similarity-based training condition (thought to facilitate associative learning and hypothesized to produce exemplar classification), transitions between items within the same category were determined by their featural similarity and subcategories were ignored. We found that transfer patterns depended on whether the presentation order was similarity-based, or rule-based, with the participants particularly capitalizing on the rule-based order.

The Problem of Circularity in Evidence, Argument, and Explanation

A number of recent articles (Fiedler, 2011, this issue; Gigerenzer, 2009; Kriegeskorte, Simmons, Bellgowen, & Baker, 2009; Vul & Kanwisher, 2010) have highlighted seemingly circular arguments and explanations in psychological research, which suggests that the problem is rife within psychology. The article reviews the literature on circularity, and, in light of this, evaluates these recent examples from psychology to determine whether it is indeed circularity that is the underlying problem and to make suggestions for what paths improvements might pursue.

Neural substrates of similarity and rule-based strategies in judgment

Making accurate judgments is a core human competence and a prerequisite for success in many areas of life. Plenty of evidence exists that people can employ different judgment strategies to solve identical judgment problems. In categorization, it has been demonstrated that similarity-based and rule-based strategies are associated with activity in different brain regions. Building on this research, the present work tests whether solving two identical judgment problems recruits different neural substrates depending on people's judgment strategies. Combining cognitive modeling of judgment strategies at the behavioral level with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we compare brain activity when using two archetypal judgment strategies: a similarity-based exemplar strategy and a rule-based heuristic strategy. Using an exemplar-based strategy should recruit areas involved in long-term memory processes to a larger extent than a heuristic strategy. In contrast, using a heuristic strategy should recruit areas involved in the application of rules to a larger extent than an exemplar-based strategy. Largely consistent with our hypotheses, we found that using an exemplar-based strategy led to relatively higher BOLD activity in the anterior prefrontal and inferior parietal cortex, presumably related to retrieval and selective attention processes. In contrast, using a heuristic strategy led to relatively higher activity in areas in the dorsolateral prefrontal and the temporal-parietal cortex associated with cognitive control and information integration. Thus, even when people solve identical judgment problems, different neural substrates can be recruited depending on the judgment strategy involved.

A taxonomy of inductive problems

Inductive inferences about objects, features, categories, and relations have been studied for many years, but there are few attempts to chart the range of inductive problems that humans are able to solve. We present a taxonomy of inductive problems that helps to clarify the relationships between familiar inductive problems such as generalization, categorization, and identification, and that introduces new inductive problems for psychological investigation. Our taxonomy is founded on the idea that semantic knowledge is organized into systems of objects, features, categories, and relations, and we attempt to characterize all of the inductive problems that can arise when these systems are partially observed. Recent studies have begun to address some of the new problems in our taxonomy, and future work should aim to develop unified theories of inductive reasoning that explain how people solve all of the problems in the taxonomy.

Memory, reasoning, and categorization: parallels and common mechanisms

Traditionally, memory, reasoning, and categorization have been treated as separate components of human cognition. We challenge this distinction, arguing that there is broad scope for crossover between the methods and theories developed for each task. The links between memory and reasoning are illustrated in a review of two lines of research. The first takes theoretical ideas (two-process accounts) and methodological tools (signal detection analysis, receiver operating characteristic curves) from memory research and applies them to important issues in reasoning research: relations between induction and deduction, and the belief bias effect. The second line of research introduces a task in which subjects make either memory or reasoning judgments for the same set of stimuli. Other than broader generalization for reasoning than memory, the results were similar for the two tasks, across a variety of experimental stimuli and manipulations. It was possible to simultaneously explain performance on both tasks within a single cognitive architecture, based on exemplar-based comparisons of similarity. The final sections explore evidence for empirical and processing links between inductive reasoning and categorization and between categorization and recognition. An important implication is that progress in all three of these fields will be expedited by further investigation of the many commonalities between these tasks.

Organization as Information – a Space Odyssey

This Vita Contemplativa has been written in recognition of Max Boisot, who died in 2011. It reflects on his work and its contributions to organization studies and beyond. Boisot created a knowledge-based lens for studying complex organizational phenomena. He argued that the ways in which agents process information have fundamental implications for our understanding of groups and organizations within the emerging knowledge society. He articulated this argument with a set of elegant conceptual frameworks that have been widely used by scholars and practitioners to address the dynamics of information, knowledge and learning and the organization of social and scientific activity. We provide an overview of Boisot’s conceptual frameworks before reviewing the impact of his work in the organizational field, which included contemporary developments in China, the role of information in organizations, and more recently organizational complexity and the management of Big Science at CERN. Boisot’s analysis opens up a number of avenues for further development, which are also discussed.

Haunted by a Doppelgänger

Judging other people is a common and important task. Every day professionals make decisions that affect the lives of other people when they diagnose medical conditions, grant parole, or hire new employees. To prevent discrimination, professional standards require that decision makers render accurate and unbiased judgments solely based on relevant information. Facial similarity to previously encountered persons can be a potential source of bias. Psychological research suggests that people only rely on similarity-based judgment strategies if the provided information does not allow them to make accurate rule-based judgments. Our study shows, however, that facial similarity to previously encountered persons influences judgment even in situations in which relevant information is available for making accurate rule-based judgments and where similarity is irrelevant for the task and relying on similarity is detrimental. In two experiments in an employment context we show that applicants who looked similar to high-performing former employees were judged as more suitable than applicants who looked similar to low-performing former employees. This similarity effect was found despite the fact that the participants used the relevant résumé information about the applicants by following a rule-based judgment strategy. These findings suggest that similarity-based and rule-based processes simultaneously underlie human judgment.

Programs as causal models: speculations on mental programs and mental representation

Judea Pearl has argued that counterfactuals and causality are central to intelligence, whether natural or artificial, and has helped create a rich mathematical and computational framework for formally analyzing causality. Here, we draw out connections between these notions and various current issues in cognitive science, including the nature of mental "programs" and mental representation. We argue that programs (consisting of algorithms and data structures) have a causal (counterfactual-supporting) structure; these counterfactuals can reveal the nature of mental representations. Programs can also provide a causal model of the external world. Such models are, we suggest, ubiquitous in perception, cognition, and language processing.

Similarity-dissimilarity competition in disjunctive classification tasks

Typical disjunctive artificial classification tasks require participants to sort stimuli according to rules such as “x likes cars only when black and coupe OR white and SUV.” For categories like this, increasing the salience of the diagnostic dimensions has two simultaneous effects: increasing the distance between members of the same category and increasing the distance between members of opposite categories. Potentially, these two effects respectively hinder and facilitate classification learning, leading to competing predictions for learning. Increasing saliency may lead to members of the same category to be considered lesssimilar, while the members of separate categories might be considered moredissimilar. This implies a similarity-dissimilarity competition between two basic classification processes. When focusing on sub-category similarity, one would expect more difficult classification when members of the same category become less similar (disregarding the increase of between-category dissimilarity); however, the between-category dissimilarity increase predicts a less difficult classification. Our categorization study suggests that participants rely more on using dissimilarities between opposite categories than finding similarities between sub-categories. We connect our results to rule- and exemplar-based classification models. The pattern of influences of within- and between-category similarities are challenging for simple single-process categorization systems based on rules or exemplars. Instead, our results suggest that either these processes should be integrated in a hybrid model, or that category learning operates by forming clusters within each category.

Developing representations of compound stimuli

Classification based on multiple dimensions of stimuli is usually associated with similarity-based representations, whereas uni-dimensional classifications are associated with rule-based representations. This paper studies classification of stimuli and category representations in school-aged children and adults when learning to categorize compound, multi-dimensional stimuli. Stimuli were such that both similarity-based and rule-based representations would lead to correct classification. This allows testing whether children have a bias for formation of similarity-based representations. The results are at odds with this expectation. Children use both uni-dimensional and multi-dimensional classification, and the use of both strategies increases with age. Multi-dimensional classification is best characterized as resulting from an analytic strategy rather than from procedural processing of overall-similarity. The conclusion is that children are capable of using complex rule-based categorization strategies that involve the use of multiple features of the stimuli. The main developmental change concerns the efficiency and consistency of the explicit learning system.

Conceptual complexity and the bias/variance tradeoff

In this paper we propose that the conventional dichotomy between exemplar-based and prototype-based models of concept learning is helpfully viewed as an instance of what is known in the statistical learning literature as the bias/variance tradeoff. The bias/variance tradeoff can be thought of as a sliding scale that modulates how closely any learning procedure adheres to its training data. At one end of the scale (high variance), models can entertain very complex hypotheses, allowing them to fit a wide variety of data very closely--but as a result can generalize poorly, a phenomenon called overfitting. At the other end of the scale (high bias), models make relatively simple and inflexible assumptions, and as a result may fit the data poorly, called underfitting. Exemplar and prototype models of category formation are at opposite ends of this scale: prototype models are highly biased, in that they assume a simple, standard conceptual form (the prototype), while exemplar models have very little bias but high variance, allowing them to fit virtually any combination of training data. We investigated human learners' position on this spectrum by confronting them with category structures at variable levels of intrinsic complexity, ranging from simple prototype-like categories to much more complex multimodal ones. The results show that human learners adopt an intermediate point on the bias/variance continuum, inconsistent with either of the poles occupied by most conventional approaches. We present a simple model that adjusts (regularizes) the complexity of its hypotheses in order to suit the training data, which fits the experimental data better than representative exemplar and prototype models.

The dynamics of syntax acquisition: facilitation between syntactic structures

This paper sets out to show how facilitation between different clause structures operates over time in syntax acquisition. The phenomenon of facilitation within given structures has been widely documented, yet inter-structure facilitation has rarely been reported so far. Our findings are based on the naturalistic production corpora of six toddlers learning Hebrew as their first language. We use regression analysis, a method that has not been used to study this phenomenon. We find that the proportion of errors among the earliest produced clauses in a structure is related to the degree of acceleration of that structure's learning curve; that with the accretion of structures the proportion of errors among the first clauses of new structures declines, as does the acceleration of their learning curves. We interpret our findings as showing that learning new syntactic structures is made easier, or facilitated, by previously acquired ones.

Automatic Constructive Appraisal as a Candidate Cause of Emotion

Critics of appraisal theory have difficulty accepting appraisal (with its constructive flavor) as an automatic process, and hence as a potential cause of most emotions. In response, some appraisal theorists have argued that appraisal was never meant as a causal process but as a constituent of emotional experience. Others have argued that appraisal is a causal process, but that it can be either rule-based or associative, and that the associative variant can be automatic. This article first proposes empirically investigating whether rule-based appraisal can also be automatic and then proposes investigating the automatic nature of constructive (instead of rule-based) appraisal because the distinction between rule-based and associative is problematic. Finally, it discusses experiments that support the view that constructive appraisal can be automatic.

Developmental "roots" in mature biological knowledge

Young children tend to claim that moving artifacts and nonliving natural kinds are alive, but neglect to ascribe life to plants. This research tested whether adults exhibit similar confusions when verifying life status in a speeded classification task. Experiment 1 showed that undergraduates encounter greater difficulty (reduced accuracy and increased response times) in determining life status for plants, relative to animals, and for natural and moving nonliving things, relative to artifacts and non-moving things. Experiment 2 replicated these effects in university biology professors. The professors showed a significantly reduced effect size for living things, as compared with the students, but still showed greater difficulty for plants than animals, even as no differences from the students were apparent in their responses to nonliving things. These results suggest that mature biological knowledge relies on a developmental foundation that is not radically overwritten or erased with the profound conceptual changes that accompany mastery of the domain.

Developmental "roots" in mature biological knowledge

Young children tend to claim that moving artifacts and nonliving natural kinds are alive, but neglect to ascribe life to plants. This research tested whether adults exhibit similar confusions when verifying life status in a speeded classification task. Experiment 1 showed that undergraduates encounter greater difficulty (reduced accuracy and increased response times) in determining life status for plants, relative to animals, and for natural and moving nonliving things, relative to artifacts and non-moving things. Experiment 2 replicated these effects in university biology professors. The professors showed a significantly reduced effect size for living things, as compared with the students, but still showed greater difficulty for plants than animals, even as no differences from the students were apparent in their responses to nonliving things. These results suggest that mature biological knowledge relies on a developmental foundation that is not radically overwritten or erased with the profound conceptual changes that accompany mastery of the domain.

Evidence for an Expectancy-Based Theory of Avoidance Behaviour

In most studies on avoidance learning, participants receive an aversive unconditioned stimulus after a warning signal is presented, unless the participant performs a particular response. Lovibond (2006) recently proposed a cognitive theory of avoidance learning, according to which avoidance behaviour is a function of both Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning. In line with this theory, we found that avoidance behaviour was based on an integration of acquired knowledge about, on the one hand, the relation between stimuli and, on the other hand, the relation between behaviour and stimuli.

Information integration in multiple cue judgment: a division of labor hypothesis

There is considerable evidence that judgment is constrained to additive integration of information. The authors propose an explanation of why serial and additive cognitive integration can produce accurate multiple cue judgment both in additive and non-additive environments in terms of an adaptive division of labor between multiple representations. It is hypothesized that, whereas the additive, independent linear effect of each cue can be explicitly abstracted and integrated by a serial, additive judgment process, a variety of sophisticated task properties, like non-additive cue combination, non-linear relations, and inter-cue correlation, are carried implicitly by exemplar memory. Three experiments investigating the effect of additive versus non-additive cue combination verify the predicted shift in cognitive representations as a function of the underlying combination rule.

The Origin of Exemplar Effects in Rule-Driven Categorization

S. W. Allen and L. R. Brooks (1991) have shown that exemplar memory can affect categorization even when participants are provided with a classification rule. G. Regehr and L. R. Brooks (1993) argued that stimuli must be individuated for such effects to occur. In this study, the authors further analyze the conditions that yield exemplar effects in this rule application paradigm. The results of Experiments 1-3 show that interchangeable attributes, which are not part of the rule, influence categorization only when attention is explicitly drawn on them. Experiment 4 shows that exemplar effects can occur in an incidental learning condition, whether stimulus individuation is preserved or not. The authors conclude that the influence of exemplar learning in rule-driven categorization stems from the attributes specified in the rule or in the instructions, not from the stimulus gestalts.

Multidimensional rule, unidimensional rule, and similarity strategies in categorization: event-related brain potential correlates

Forty participants assigned artificial creatures to categories after explicit rule instruction or feedback alone. Stimuli were typical and atypical exemplars of 2 categories with independent prototypes, conflicting exemplars sharing features of both categories, and "Others" with only 1 or 2 features of the well-defined categories. Ten feedback-only participants spontaneously adopted a unidimensional rule; 10 used a multidimensional similarity strategy. Event-related potentials (ERPs) recorded during the transfer phase showed a commonality between multidimensional rule and similarity strategies in late frontal brain activity that differentiated both from unidimensional rule use. Multidimensional rule users alone showed an earlier prefrontal ERP effect that may reflect inhibition of responses based on similarity. The authors also discuss the role of declarative memory for features and exemplars.

Rules vs. analogy in English past tenses: a computational/experimental study

Are morphological patterns learned in the form of rules? Some models deny this, attributing all morphology to analogical mechanisms. The dual mechanism model (Pinker, S., & Prince, A. (1998). On language and connectionism: analysis of a parallel distributed processing model of language acquisition. Cognition, 28, 73-193) posits that speakers do internalize rules, but that these rules are few and cover only regular processes; the remaining patterns are attributed to analogy. This article advocates a third approach, which uses multiple stochastic rules and no analogy. We propose a model that employs inductive learning to discover multiple rules, and assigns them confidence scores based on their performance in the lexicon. Our model is supported over the two alternatives by new "wug test" data on English past tenses, which show that participant ratings of novel pasts depend on the phonological shape of the stem, both for irregulars and, surprisingly, also for regulars. The latter observation cannot be explained under the dual mechanism approach, which derives all regulars with a single rule. To evaluate the alternative hypothesis that all morphology is analogical, we implemented a purely analogical model, which evaluates novel pasts based solely on their similarity to existing verbs. Tested against experimental data, this analogical model also failed in key respects: it could not locate patterns that require abstract structural characterizations, and it favored implausible responses based on single, highly similar exemplars. We conclude that speakers extend morphological patterns based on abstract structural properties, of a kind appropriately described with rules.

Causes and prevention of laparoscopic bile duct injuries: analysis of 252 cases from a human factors and cognitive psychology perspective

OBJECTIVE

To apply human performance concepts in an attempt to understand the causes of and prevent laparoscopic bile duct injury.

SUMMARY BACKGROUND DATA

Powerful conceptual advances have been made in understanding the nature and limits of human performance. Applying these findings in high-risk activities, such as commercial aviation, has allowed the work environment to be restructured to substantially reduce human error.

METHODS

The authors analyzed 252 laparoscopic bile duct injuries according to the principles of the cognitive science of visual perception, judgment, and human error. The injury distribution was class I, 7%; class II, 22%; class III, 61%; and class IV, 10%. The data included operative radiographs, clinical records, and 22 videotapes of original operations.

RESULTS

The primary cause of error in 97% of cases was a visual perceptual illusion. Faults in technical skill were present in only 3% of injuries. Knowledge and judgment errors were contributory but not primary. Sixty-four injuries (25%) were recognized at the index operation; the surgeon identified the problem early enough to limit the injury in only 15 (6%). In class III injuries the common duct, erroneously believed to be the cystic duct, was deliberately cut. This stemmed from an illusion of object form due to a specific uncommon configuration of the structures and the heuristic nature (unconscious assumptions) of human visual perception. The videotapes showed the persuasiveness of the illusion, and many operative reports described the operation as routine. Class II injuries resulted from a dissection too close to the common hepatic duct. Fundamentally an illusion, it was contributed to in some instances by working too deep in the triangle of Calot.

CONCLUSIONS

These data show that errors leading to laparoscopic bile duct injuries stem principally from misperception, not errors of skill, knowledge, or judgment. The misperception was so compelling that in most cases the surgeon did not recognize a problem. Even when irregularities were identified, corrective feedback did not occur, which is characteristic of human thinking under firmly held assumptions. These findings illustrate the complexity of human error in surgery while simultaneously providing insights. They demonstrate that automatically attributing technical complications to behavioral factors that rely on the assumption of control is likely to be wrong. Finally, this study shows that there are only a few points within laparoscopic cholecystectomy where the complication-causing errors occur, which suggests that focused training to heighten vigilance might be able to decrease the incidence of bile duct injury.

Exemplar effects in categorization and multiple-cue judgment

Categorization and multiple-cue judgment are similar tasks, but the influential models in the two areas are different in terms of the computations, processes, and neural substrates that they imply. In categorization, exemplar memory is often emphasized, whereas multiple-cue judgment generally is interpreted in terms of integration of cues that have been abstracted in training. In 3 experiments the authors investigated whether these conclusions derive from genuine differences in the processes or are accidental to the different research methods. The results revealed large individual differences and a shift from exemplar memory to cue abstraction when the criterion is changed from a binary to a continuous variable, especially for a probabilistic criterion. People appear to switch between qualitatively distinct processes in the 2 tasks.

Domain differences in the structure of artifactual and natural categories

In three experiments, different methodologies, measures, and items were employed to address the question of whether, and to what extent, membership in a semantic category is all or none (i.e., absolute) or a matter of degree (i.e., graded). Resemblance theory claims that categorization is based on similarity, and because similarity is graded, category membership may also be graded. Psychological essentialism asserts that categorization is based on the presumption of the category essence. Because artifactual (e.g., FURNITURE) and natural (e.g., FRUIT) categories have different sorts of essences, artifacts and natural kinds may be categorized in qualitatively different manners. The results converged onthe finding of a robust domain difference in category structure: Artifactual categories were more graded than natural categories. Furthermore, typicality reliably predicted absolute category membership, but failed to predict graded category membership. These results suggest that resemblance theory and psychological essentialism may provide a concerted account of representation and categorization across domains.