The development of spatial perspective taking

Malleability of spatial skills: bridging developmental psychology and toy design for joyful STEAM development

Previous research has established that advances in spatial cognition predict STEAM success, and construction toys provide ample opportunities to foster spatial cognition. Despite various construction toy designs in the market, mostly brick-shaped building blocks are used in spatial cognition research. This group of toys is known to enhance mental rotation; however, mental rotation is not the only way to comprehend the environment three-dimensionally. More specifically, mental folding and perspective taking training have not received enough attention as they can also be enhanced with the construction toys, which are framed based on the 2×2 classification of spatial skills (intrinsic-static, intrinsic-dynamic, extrinsic-static, extrinsic-dynamic). To address these gaps, we compile evidence from both developmental psychology and toy design fields to show the central role played by mental folding and perspective taking skills as well as the importance of the variety in toy designs. The review was conducted systematically by searching peer reviewed design and psychology journals and conference proceedings. We suggest that, over and above their physical properties, construction toys offer affordances to elicit spatial language, gesture, and narrative among child-caregiver dyads. These interactions are essential for the development of spatial skills in both children and their caregivers. As developmental psychology and toy design fields are two domains that can contribute to the purpose of developing construction toys to boost spatial skills, we put forward six recommendations to bridge the current gaps between these fields. Consequently, new toy designs and empirical evidence regarding malleability of different spatial skills can contribute to the informal STEAM development.

Dissociating visual perspective taking and belief reasoning using a novel integrated paradigm: A preregistered online study

There is considerable conceptual overlap between Level-2 Visual Perspective Taking (VPT-2) and Belief Reasoning; both cognitive processes require us to represent another's viewpoint and experience of reality while inhibiting our own egocentric representations. This study investigated if these facets of mentalising are distinct from one another in the general adult population. To do so, we developed a novel "Seeing-Believing Task" with which to compare VPT-2 and true belief (TB) reasoning directly - one in which both judgement types refer to the same state of reality, requiring identical responses, and where self and other perspectives can be dissociated. Across three preregistered online experiments, this task demonstrated consistent differences between these two cognitive processes; specifically, TB judgements were associated with slower response times than VPT-2. This suggests that VPT-2 and TB reasoning are at least partly distinct psychological processes. Further, the greater cognitive effort required for TB reasoning is unlikely to be explained by differences in mnemonic processing. We suggest, therefore, that VPT-2 and TB reasoning differ in the complexity of social processing involved and we discuss theoretical implications based on minimal vs. full-blown Theory of Mind. Future research must attempt to test these conjectures.

EXPRESS: Sex Differences in Social and Spatial Perspective Taking: A Replication and Extension of Tarampi et al. (2016)

Tarampi and colleagues (2016) found that females performed better on spatial perspective-taking tasks when social information was present. They interpreted this finding to suggest that adding social information would uniquely improve the performance of females due to their better social perspective taking. In this replication and extension study, we tested an alternative explanation for their results: the tasks with social information also provided spatial information which could explain improved performance. In a study with 278 college students, we used the two versions of the tasks from their study (no social or spatial information and with social and spatial information) and added two versions that isolate only social and only spatial information. Our replication of Tarampi et al.'s analyses found no difference in females' performance on the tasks, however, when both females and males were included, we found some evidence for better performance in the social and spatial condition. Examining both males' and females' performance in all four conditions, we found that males outperformed females. In addition, participants who completed tasks with spatial information performed better. Findings suggest the difference observed in Tarampi et al. may have been due to the inclusion of spatial information, not social information, that improves task performance for both females and males. These results suggest that spatial perspective-taking performance is better when given even subtle spatial cues, but that social information does not appear to improve performance, despite ties with social perspective taking.

Taking apart what brings us together: The role of action prediction, perspective-taking, and theory of mind in joint action

The ability to act together with others to achieve common goals is crucial in life, yet there is no full consensus on the underlying cognitive skills. While influential theoretical accounts suggest that interaction requires sophisticated insights into others' minds, alternative views propose that high-level social skills might not be necessary because interactions are grounded on sensorimotor predictive mechanisms. At present, empirical evidence is insufficient to decide between the two. This study addressed this issue and explored the association between performance at joint action tasks and cognitive abilities in three domains-action prediction, perspective-taking, and theory of mind-in healthy adults (N = 58). We found that, while perspective-taking played a role in reading the behaviour of others independently of the social context, action prediction abilities specifically influenced the agents' performance in an interactive task but not in a control (social but non-interactive) task. In our study, performance at a theory of mind test did not play any role, as confirmed by Bayesian analyses. The results suggest that, in adults, sensorimotor predictive mechanisms might play a significant and specific role in supporting interpersonal coordination during motor interactions. We discuss the implications of our findings for the contrasting theoretical views described earlier and propose a way they might be partly reconciled.

Brain mechanisms of visuospatial perspective-taking in relation to object mental rotation and the theory of mind

Visuospatial perspective-taking (VPT) is a process of imagining what can be seen and how a scene looks from a location and orientation in space that differs from one's own. It comprises two levels that are underpinned by distinct neurocognitive processes. Level-2 VPT is often studied in relation to two other cognitive phenomena, object mental rotation (oMR) and theory of mind (ToM). With the aim to describe the broad picture of neurocognitive processes underlying level-2 VPT, here we give an overview of the recent behavioral and neuroscientific findings of level-2 VPT. We discuss its relation to level-1 VPT, which is also referred to as perspective-tracking, and the neighboring topics, oMR and ToM. Neuroscientific research shows that level-2 VPT is a diverse cognitive process, encompassing functionally distinct neural circuits. It shares brain substrates with oMR, especially those parietal brain areas that are specialized in spatial reasoning. However, compared to oMR, level-2 VPT involves additional activations in brain structures that are typically involved in ToM tasks and deal with self/other distinctions. In addition, level-2 VPT has been suggested to engage brain areas coding for internal representations of the body. Thus, the neurocognitive model underpinning level-2 VPT can be understood as a combination of visuospatial processing with social cognition and body schema representations.

Perspective-Taking: In Search of a Theory

Perspective-taking has been one of the central concerns of work on social attention and developmental psychology for the past 60 years. Despite its prominence, there is no formal description of what it means to represent another’s viewpoint. The present article argues that such a description is now required in the form of theory—a theory that should address a number of issues that are central to the notion of assuming another’s viewpoint. After suggesting that the mental imagery debate provides a good framework for understanding some of the issues and problems surrounding perspective-taking, we set out nine points that we believe any theory of perspective-taking should consider.

The determinants of strategic thinking in preschool children

Strategic thinking is an essential component of rational decision-making. However, little is known about its developmental aspects. Here we show that preschoolers can reason strategically in simple individual decisions that require anticipating a limited number of future decisions. This ability is transferred only partially to solve more complex individual decision problems and to efficiently interact with others. This ability is also more developed among older children in the classroom. Results indicate that while preschoolers potentially have the capacity to think strategically, it does not always translate into the ability to behave strategically.

Transformations of Visuospatial Images

Transformations of visuospatial mental images are important for action, navigation, and reasoning. They depend on representations in multiple spatial reference frames, implemented in the posterior parietal cortex and other brain regions. The multiple systems framework proposes that different transformations can be distinguished in terms of which spatial reference frame is updated. In an object-based transformation, the reference frame of an object moves relative to those of the observer and the environment. In a perspective transformation, the observer's egocentric reference frame moves relative to those of the environment and of salient objects. These two types of spatial reference frame updating rely on distinct neural processing resources in the parietal, occipital, and temporal cortex. They are characterized by different behavioral patterns and unique individual differences. Both object-based transformations and perspective transformations interact with posterior frontal cortical regions subserving the simulation of body movements. These interactions indicate that multiple systems coordinate to support everyday spatial problem solving.

Embodied learning of a generative neural model for biological motion perception and inference

Although an action observation network and mirror neurons for understanding the actions and intentions of others have been under deep, interdisciplinary consideration over recent years, it remains largely unknown how the brain manages to map visually perceived biological motion of others onto its own motor system. This paper shows how such a mapping may be established, even if the biologically motion is visually perceived from a new vantage point. We introduce a learning artificial neural network model and evaluate it on full body motion tracking recordings. The model implements an embodied, predictive inference approach. It first learns to correlate and segment multimodal sensory streams of own bodily motion. In doing so, it becomes able to anticipate motion progression, to complete missing modal information, and to self-generate learned motion sequences. When biological motion of another person is observed, this self-knowledge is utilized to recognize similar motion patterns and predict their progress. Due to the relative encodings, the model shows strong robustness in recognition despite observing rather large varieties of body morphology and posture dynamics. By additionally equipping the model with the capability to rotate its visual frame of reference, it is able to deduce the visual perspective onto the observed person, establishing full consistency to the embodied self-motion encodings by means of active inference. In further support of its neuro-cognitive plausibility, we also model typical bistable perceptions when crucial depth information is missing. In sum, the introduced neural model proposes a solution to the problem of how the human brain may establish correspondence between observed bodily motion and its own motor system, thus offering a mechanism that supports the development of mirror neurons.

Spatial perspective taking is robust in later life

In developmental studies of spatial perspective taking, it is important to clearly distinguish imagining body movement from other related cognitive information processing, to capture the genuine features of this ability in aging. This study examined the characteristics of these abilities in the older adults by comparing differences among age groups. A video game task was devised to evaluate response times from various angles of rotation. Four hundred twenty-eight healthy individuals aged 6 to 79 years (eight age groups at 10-year intervals) participated. Average response times for each age group confirmed a curvilinear change that accelerated from childhood to early adulthood and decelerated in later life. However, older participants did not display inferior performance compared with the younger adults on the response times to rotate an imaginary self to a 180 degrees position. These results confirm previous findings that spatial perspective taking, particularly imagining body movement, remains robust in normal aging.

Picturing perspectives: development of perspective-taking abilities in 4- to 8-year-olds

Although the development of perspective taking has been well researched, there is no uniform methodology for assessing this ability across a wide age span when frames of reference conflict. To address this gap, we created scenes of toy photographers taking pictures of layouts of objects from different angles, and presented them to 4- to 8-year-olds (N = 80). Children were asked to choose which one of four pictures could have been taken from a specific viewpoint. Results showed that this new technique confirmed the classic pattern of developmental progress on this kind of spatial skill: (1) 4-year-olds responded near chance level, regardless of layout complexity, (2) there was a growing ability to inhibit egocentric choices around age 6 with layouts of low complexity (one object), (3) performance increased and egocentric responses decreased dramatically around age 7, (4) even at age 8, children still showed considerable individual variability. This perspective taking task can thus be used to address important questions about the supports for early spatial development and the structure of early intellect.

"Making it explicit" makes a difference: evidence for a dissociation of spontaneous and intentional level 1 perspective taking in high-functioning autism

The ability of perspective taking is a fundamental aspect of social cognition. The ability to decide, what another person can or cannot see is referred to as "level 1 perspective taking." This is thought to be a process that we can make use of intentionally, but which also takes place spontaneously. Autism is characterized by impairments of social interaction, which are thought to be related to deficits in implicit rather than explicit perspective taking. In order to assess both levels of processing with regard to perspective taking, we employed an established task in patients and controls. Our results demonstrate that both groups engage in spontaneous level 1 perspective taking. In contrast to controls, however, patients reacted more slowly if they had to verify the other's as compared to their own perspective, which shows that participants with high-functioning autism have selective difficulties in explicit, but not implicit, level 1 perspective taking. These findings demonstrate that while spontaneous level 1 perspective taking appears to be intact in autism, this ability is impaired in patients when used explicitly.

Visual spatial cue use for guiding orientation in two-to-three-year-old children

In spatial development representations of the environment and the use of spatial cues change over time. To date, the influence of individual differences in skills relevant for orientation and navigation has not received much attention. The current study investigated orientation abilities on the basis of visual spatial cues in 2-3-year-old children, and assessed factors that possibly influence spatial task performance. Thirty-month and 35-month-olds performed an on-screen Virtual Reality (VR) orientation task searching for an animated target in the presence of visual self-movement cues and landmark information. Results show that, in contrast to 30-month-old children, 35-month-olds were successful in using visual spatial cues for maintaining orientation. Neither age group benefited from landmarks present in the environment, suggesting that successful task performance relied on the use of optic flow cues, rather than object-to-object relations. Analysis of individual differences revealed that 2-year-olds who were relatively more independent in comparison to their peers, as measured by the daily living skills scale of the parental questionnaire Vineland-Screener were most successful at the orientation task. These results support previous findings indicating that the use of various spatial cues gradually improves during early childhood. Our data show that a developmental transition in spatial cue use can be witnessed within a relatively short period of 5 months only. Furthermore, this study indicates that rather than chronological age, individual differences may play a role in successful use of visual cues for spatial updating in an orientation task. Future studies are necessary to assess the exact nature of these individual differences.

Feeling the pain of others is associated with self-other confusion and prior pain experience

Some chronic pain patients and healthy individuals experience pain when observing injury or others in pain. To further understand shared pain, we investigated perspective taking, bodily ownership and tooth pain sensitivity. First, participants who reported shared pain (responders) and those who did not (non-responders) viewed an avatar on a screen. Intermittently, 0–3 circles appeared. Sometimes the participant's and avatar's perspective were consistent, both directly viewed the same circles, and sometimes inconsistent, both directly viewed different circles. Responders were faster than non-responders to identify the number of circles when adopting a consistent perspective. Second, participants sat with their left hand hidden while viewing a rubber hand. All participants reported an illusory sensation of feeling stroking in the rubber hand and a sense of ownership of the rubber hand during synchronous stroking of the rubber and hidden hand. The responders also reported feeling the stroking and a sense of ownership of the rubber hand during asynchronous stroking. For experiment three, participants with either low, moderate, or high tooth sensitivity observed a series of images depicting someone eating an ice-popsicle. Low sensitivity participants never reported pain. In contrast, moderate and high sensitivity participants reported pain in response to an image depicting someone eating an ice popsicle (4 and 19% of the time, respectively) and depicting someone eating an ice-popsicle and expressing pain (23 and 40%, respectively). In summary, responders have reduced ability to distinguish their own and others' visual perspective and enhanced ability to integrate a foreign arm into their bodily representation. The tendency to share pain is also enhanced when an observed pain is commonly experienced by the observer. Shared pain may therefore involve reactivation of pain memories or pain schema that are readily integrated into a self perspective and bodily representation.

Distinctive features of spatial perspective-taking in the elderly

This study aimed to ascertain the characteristics of spatial perspective-taking ability--assumed to be a form of imaginary body movement in three-dimensional space--in the elderly. A new task was devised to evaluate the development of this function: 20 children, 20 university students, and 20 elderly people (each group comprising 10 men and 10 women) were asked to locate themselves in different vantage points. The relationship between angular deviations from the participants to the points from which perspectives were to be obtained did not differ between the elderly and university students. However, the performance of the elderly and children was inferior to that of the university students with respect to the general response time and percentage of correct responses, which indicates that imaginary body movement can be maintained in normal aging, and an apparent decline in the spatial perspective-taking ability of the elderly may arise from other cognitive information processes.

Exploring the effects of similarity on mapping spatial relations

Solving a map task requires transferring information acquired in one spatial context to another context, an ability that marks an important step in cognitive development. This study investigated how preschoolers' mapping performance was affected by the extent of similarity between spaces. Whereas prior work examined effects of similarity in tasks involving matching individual objects, our tasks required considering spatial relations among objects. We found that the accuracy of mapping between two spaces with somewhat different perceptual features was higher than the accuracy of mapping between spaces with identical features. Yet, a further increase in differences between the two spaces had a detrimental effect on mapping. The results suggest that some degree of similarity between spaces is beneficial to children's ability to transfer relational information. However, when the spaces have the same surface features, it may draw children's attention to individual objects and inhibit their ability to focus on common relations across contexts.

Differential involvement of the posterior temporal cortex in mentalizing but not perspective taking

Understanding and predicting other people's mental states and behavior are important prerequisites for social interactions. The capacity to attribute mental states such as desires, thoughts or intentions to oneself or others is referred to as mentalizing. The right posterior temporal cortex at the temporal-parietal junction has been associated with mentalizing but also with taking someone else's spatial perspective onto the world--possibly an important prerequisite for mentalizing. Here, we directly compared the neural correlates of mentalizing and perspective taking using the same stimulus material. We found significantly increased neural activity in the right posterior segment of the superior temporal sulcus only during mentalizing but not perspective taking. Our data further clarify the role of the posterior temporal cortex in social cognition by showing that it is involved in processing information from socially salient visual cues in situations that require the inference about other people's mental states.

Dissociation Between Key Processes of Social Cognition in Autism: Impaired Mentalizing But Intact Sense of Agency

Deficits in social cognition and interaction, such as in mentalizing and imitation behavior, are hallmark features of autism spectrum disorders. Both imitation and mentalizing are at the core of the sense of agency, the awareness that we are the initiators of our own behavior. Little evidence exists regarding the sense of agency in autism. Thus, we compared high-functioning adults with autism to healthy control subjects using an action monitoring and attribution task. Subjects with autism did not show deficits in this task, yet they showed significant mentalizing deficits. Our findings indicate a dissociation between the sense of agency and ascription of mental states in autism. We propose that social-cognitive deficits in autism may arise on a higher level than that of action monitoring and awareness.

Neural Representations of Self versus Other: Visual-Spatial Perspective Taking and Agency in a Virtual Ball-tossing Game

Human self-consciousness relies on the ability to distinguish between oneself and others. We sought to explore the neural correlates involved in self-other representations by investigating two critical processes: perspective taking and agency. Although recent research has shed light on the neural processes underlying these phenomena, little is known about how they overlap or interact at the neural level. In a two-factorial functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment, participants played a ball-tossing game with two virtual characters (“avatars”). During an active/agency (ACT) task, subjects threw a ball to one of the avatars by pressing a button. During a passive/nonagency (PAS) task, they indicated which of the other avatars threw the ball. Both tasks were performed from a first-person perspective (1PP), in which subjects interacted from their own perspective, and a third-person perspective (3PP), in which subjects interacted from the perspective of an avatar with another location in space. fMRI analyses revealed overlapping activity in medial prefrontal regions associated with representations of one's own perspective and actions (1PP and ACT), and overlapping activity in temporal-occipital, premotor, and inferior frontal, as well as posterior parietal regions associated with representation of others' perspectives and actions (3PP and PAS). These findings provide evidence for distinct neural substrates underlying representations of the self and others and provide support for the idea that the medial prefrontal cortex crucially contributes to a neural basis of the self. The lack of a statistically significant interaction suggests that perspective taking and agency represent independent constituents of self-consciousness.

The nativist-empiricist controversy in the context of recent research on spatial and quantitative development

Demonstrations of cognitive competence in preschool children and infants played an important role in the waning influence of Piagetian theory and the rise of nativism. Arguments and data favoring modularity have further buttressed the casefor nativism. This article reviews evidence concerning early competence and modularity in the spatial and quantitative domains, as well as the role of experience in development. This evidence provides little reason to support nativist claims in either domain.

Spatial perspective-taking errors in children

Spatial perspective-taking was examined in 49 children between the ages of 3.3 and 10.9 yr. Participants completed (a) a screening test in which they matched pictures of a scene to the actual scene and (b) procedures designed to differentiate four types of spatial errors: left-right, before-behind, egocentric, and random. Among those who passed the screening test the most common mistake was to choose a picture that depicted a left-right reversal of the scene, and there were relatively few egocentric errors. Even our youngest group made mistakes on only 21% of the trials that tested for egocentric responses. The pattern of results implied that perspective reversals of left and right were the likely origin of many mistakes that have been interpreted as egocentric in previous research.

Methodology of motor skill and laterality: new test of hand preference in Macaca nemestrina

Ten female pig-tailed macaques (Macaca nemestrina) were tested for hand preference and hand skill (i.e., speed of performance and error rate). The experimental task was naturalistic, calling for adaptive manual skills and fine manipulation: the monkeys had to remove small food rewards embedded in a vertical array, and precision opposition of thumb and forefinger was needed to extract each pellet. Each monkey was tested 10 times on 10 different days. The results indicated individual hand preference rather than population-level handedness; however, a tendency toward right predominance was found. The results on hand skill showed a relation between error rate and hand preference, as the preferred hand made fewer errors. A different and unexpected finding was obtained when skill was evaluated in terms of speed of performance: in adult subjects the left hand was quicker than the right. Therefore, different kinds of skill showed different patterns in relation to hand preference.