Managed competition and consumer price sensitivity in social health insurance

How does managed competition affect hospital prices in a social health insurance system? The Colombian case

This paper studies the effect on hospital service prices of a health system reform that allows managed selective contracting and regulation as a means for efficiency and price competition. Cross-sectional data about prices and market structure were analysed from a pool of 20 markets which includes 15 million Colombians. A multilevel regression method comparing three different market settings was performed. The analysis evaluates the effects of insurer choice, hospital quality and market characteristics using a nationwide health services transactional database. A Hirshmann-Herfindahl index was applied to evaluate the markets concentration. Among the results, bilateral monopolies were made evident, both in insurance and hospital markets. Insurer selective contracting policy has the greatest impact on pricing with hospital monopoly heavy effect on health service prices. Colombian government has a challenge in regulating managed competition in order to maintain competition and access to healthcare. Health reforms using market competition as a mechanism for efficiency should follow closely health services market evolution in order to introduce effective regulatory policies.

Switching benefits and costs in the Irish health insurance market: an analysis of consumer surveys

Relatively little analysis has taken place internationally on the consumer-reported benefits and costs to switching insurer in multi-payer health insurance markets. Ideally, consumers should be willing to switch out of consideration for price and quality and switching should be able to take place without incurring significant switching costs. Costs to switching come in many forms and understanding the nature of these costs is necessary if policy interventions to improve market competition are to be successful. This study utilises data from consumer surveys of the Irish health insurance market collected between 2009 and 2013 (N [Formula: see text] 1703) to examine consumer-reported benefits and costs to switching insurer. Probit regression models are specified to examine the relationship between consumer characteristics and reported switching costs, and switching behaviour, respectively. Overall evidence suggests that switchers in the Irish market mainly did so out of consideration for price. Transaction cost was the most common switching cost identified, reported by just under 1 in 7 non-switchers. Psychological switching costs may also be impacting behaviour. Moreover, high-risk individuals were more likely to experience switching costs and this was reflected in actual switching behaviour. A recent information campaign launched by the market regulator may prove beneficial in reducing perceived transaction costs in the market, however, a more focused campaign aimed at high-risk consumers may be necessary to reduce inequalities. Policy-makers should also consider the impact insurer behaviour may have on decision-making.

Introducing risk adjustment and free health plan choice in employer-based health insurance: Evidence from Germany

To equalize differences in health plan premiums due to differences in risk pools, the German legislature introduced a simple Risk Adjustment Scheme (RAS) based on age, gender and disability status in 1994. In addition, effective 1996, consumers gained the freedom to choose among hundreds of existing health plans, across employers and state-borders. This paper (a) estimates RAS pass-through rates on premiums, financial reserves, and expenditures and assesses the overall RAS impact on market price dispersion. Moreover, it (b) characterizes health plan switchers and investigates their annual and cumulative switching rates over time. Our main findings are based on representative enrollee panel data linked to administrative RAS and health plan data. We show that sickness funds with bad risk pools and high pre-RAS premiums lowered their total premiums by 42 cents per additional euro allocated by the RAS. Consequently, post-RAS, health plan prices converged but not fully. Because switchers are more likely to be white collar, young and healthy, the new consumer choice resulted in more risk segregation and the amount of money redistributed by the RAS increased over time.

Switching gains and health plan price elasticities: 20 years of managed competition reforms in The Netherlands

In this paper we estimate health plan price elasticities and financial switching gains for consumers over a 20-year period in which managed competition was introduced in the Dutch health insurance market. The period is characterized by a major health insurance reform in 2006 to provide health insurers with more incentives and tools to compete, and to provide consumers with a more differentiated choice of products. Prior to the reform, in the period 1995-2005, we find a low number of switchers, between 2 and 4% a year, modest average total switching gains of 2 million euros per year and short-term health plan price elasticities ranging from -0.1 to -0.4. The major reform in 2006 resulted in an all-time high switching rate of 18%, total switching gains of 130 million euros, and a high short-term price elasticity of -5.7. During 2007-2015 switching rates returned to lower levels, between 4 and 8% per year, with total switching gains in the order of 40 million euros per year on average. Total switching gains could have been 10 times higher if all consumers had switched to one of the cheapest plans. We find short-term price elasticities ranging between -0.9 and -2.2. Our estimations suggest substantial consumer inertia throughout the entire period, as we find degrees of choice persistence ranging from about 0.8 to 0.9.

Switching insurer in the Irish voluntary health insurance market: determinants, incentives, and risk equalization

BACKGROUND

The determinants of consumer mobility in voluntary health insurance markets providing duplicate cover are not well understood. Consumer mobility can have important implications for competition. Consumers should be price-responsive and be willing to switch insurer in search of the best-value products. Moreover, although theory suggests low-risk consumers are more likely to switch insurer, this process should not be driven by insurers looking to attract low risks.

METHODS

This study utilizes data on 320,830 VHI healthcare policies due for renewal between August 2013 and June 2014. At the time of renewal, policyholders were categorized as either 'switchers' or 'stayers', and policy information was collected for the prior 12 months. Differences between these groups were assessed by means of logistic regression. The ability of Ireland's risk equalization scheme to account for the relative attractiveness of switchers was also examined.

RESULTS

Policyholders were price sensitive (OR 1.052, p < 0.01), however, price-sensitivity declined with age. Age (OR 0.971; p < 0.01) and hospital utilization (OR 0.977; p < 0.01) were both negatively associated with switching. In line with these findings, switchers were less costly than stayers for the 12 months prior to the switch/renew decision for single person (difference in average cost = €540.64) and multiple-person policies (difference in average cost = €450.74). Some cost differences remain for single-person policies following risk equalization (difference in average cost = €88.12).

CONCLUSIONS

Consumers appear price-responsive, which is important for competition provided it is based on correct incentives. Risk equalization payments largely eliminated the profitable status of switchers, although further refinements may be required.

Switching health insurers: the role of price, quality and consumer information search

We examine the impact of price, service quality and information search on people's propensity to switch health insurers in the competitive Dutch health insurance market. Using panel data from annual household surveys and data on health insurers' premiums and quality ratings over the period 2006-2012, we estimate a random effects logit model of people's switching decisions. We find that switching propensities depend on health plan price and quality, and on people's age, health, education and having supplementary or group insurance. Young people (18-35 years) are more sensitive to price, whereas older people are more sensitive to quality. Searching for health plan information has a much stronger impact on peoples' sensitivity to price than to service quality. In addition, searching for health plan information has a stronger impact on the switching propensity of higher than lower educated people, suggesting that higher educated people make better use of available health plan information. Finally, having supplementary insurance significantly reduces older people's switching propensity.

Differences in price elasticities of demand for health insurance: a systematic review

Many health insurance systems apply managed competition principles to control costs and quality of health care. Besides other factors, managed competition relies on a sufficient price-elastic demand. This paper presents a systematic review of empirical studies on price elasticity of demand for health insurance. The objective was to identify the differing international ranges of price elasticity and to find socio-economic as well as setting-oriented factors that influence price elasticity. Relevant literature for the topic was identified through a two-step identification process including a systematic search in appropriate databases and further searches within the references of the results. A total of 45 studies from countries such as the USA, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland were found. Clear differences in price elasticity by countries were identified. While empirical studies showed a range between -0.2 and -1.0 for optional primary health insurance in the US, higher price elasticities between -0.6 and -4.2 for Germany and around -2 for Switzerland were calculated for mandatory primary health insurance. Dutch studies found price elasticities below -0.5. In consideration of all relevant studies, age and poorer health status were identified to decrease price elasticity. Other socio-economic factors had an unclear impact or too limited evidence. Premium level, range of premiums, homogeneity of benefits/coverage and degree of forced decision were found to have a major influence on price elasticity in their settings. Further influence was found from supplementary insurance and premium-dependent employer contribution.

Pricing behaviour of nonprofit insurers in a weakly competitive social health insurance market

In this paper we examine the pricing behaviour of nonprofit health insurers in the Dutch social health insurance market. Since for-profit insurers were not allowed in this market, potential spillover effects from the presence of for-profit insurers on the behaviour of nonprofit insurers were absent. Using a panel data set for all health insurers operating in the Dutch social health insurance market over the period 1996-2004, we estimate a premium model to determine which factors explain the price setting behaviour of nonprofit health insurers. We find that financial stability rather than profit maximisation offers the best explanation for health plan pricing behaviour. In the presence of weak price competition, health insurers did not set premiums to maximize profits. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that regulations on financial reserves are needed to restrict premiums.

Consumer price sensitivity in Dutch health insurance

Aim To estimate the price sensitivity of consumer choice of health insurance firm. Method Using paneldata of the flows of insured between pairs of Dutch sickness funds during the period 1993–2002, we estimate the sensitivity of these flows to differences in insurance premium. Results The price elasticity of residual demand for health insurance was low during the period 1993–2002, confirming earlier findings based on annual changes in market share. We find small but significant elasticities for basic insurance but insignificant elasticities for supplementary insurance. Young enrollees are more price sensitive than older enrollees. Conclusion Competition was weak in the market for health insurance during the period under study. For the market-based reforms that are currently under way, this implies that measures to promote competition in the health insurance industry may be needed.

Elasticities of market shares and social health insurance choice in Germany: a dynamic panel data approach

In 1996, free choice of health insurers was introduced to the German social health insurance system. One objective was to increase efficiency through competition. A crucial precondition for effective competition among health insurers is that consumers search for lower-priced health insurers. We test this hypothesis by estimating the price elasticities of insurers' market shares. We use unique panel data and specify a dynamic panel model to explain changes in market shares. Estimation results suggest that short-run price elasticities are smaller than previously found by other studies. In the long-run, however, estimation results suggest substantial price effects.

Cost assessment and price setting of inpatient care in The Netherlands. the DBC case-mix system

In February 2005, a case-mix system based on 'diagnosis treatment combinations' (DBCs) was introduced in The Netherlands for the registration and reimbursement of hospital and medical specialist care. This paper describes the characteristics of the DBC system and how it is used for the reimbursement of hospitals. Prices for reimbursement are either based on fixed tariffs ('list A') or negotiated between health insurers and hospitals ('list B') and are partly based on information about unit costs of health care services. Because the DBC system is still under development we will describe the current situation (March 2006), but also focus on the most likely future developments.

Rationing and competition in the Dutch health-care system

In this paper we examine the goals and effects of health-care policy in the Netherlands over the period 1980--2000. During this period Dutch health-care policy is marked by a peculiar combination of increasingly stringent cost-containment policies alongside a persistent pursuit of market-oriented reforms. The main goal of cost containment was to keep labour costs down under the restriction of universal equal access to health care. Supply and price control policies were quite successful in achieving cost containment, but in due course prolonged quantity rationing began to jeopardise universal physical access to health services. The main goal of market-oriented health-care reforms is to increase the system's efficiency and its responsiveness to patient's needs, while maintaining equal access. The feasibility of the reforms crucially hinges on the realisation of adequate methods of risk adjustment, product classification and quality measurement, an appropriate consumer information system and an effective competition policy. Realising these preconditions requires a lengthy and cautious implementation process. Although considerable progress has been made in setting the appropriate stage for regulated competition in Dutch health care, the role of the market is still limited.

Consumer preferences in social health insurance

Allowing consumers greater choice of health plans is believed to be the key to high quality and low costs in social health insurance. This study investigates consumer preferences (361 persons, response rate 43%) for hypothetical health plans which differed in 12 characteristics (premium, deductibles, no-claim discount, extension of insurance and financial services, red tape involved, medical help-desk, choice of family physicians and hospitals, dental benefits, physical therapy benefits, benefits for prescription drugs and homeopathy). In 90% the health plan with the most attractive characteristics was preferred, indicating a predominantly rational kind of choice. The most decisive characteristics for preference were: complete dental benefits, followed by zero deductibles, and free choice of hospitals.

Consumer price sensitivity and social health insurer choice in Germany and The Netherlands

In this paper, we examine the effects of the introduction of free choice and price competition in social health insurance in Germany and the Netherlands. Using panel data at the sickness fund level we estimate the price elasticity of sickness fund choice in both countries. We find that the price elasticity in Germany is high and rapidly increasing. Consistent with findings of other studies on health plan choice, the price elasticity is much lower for elderly than for non-elderly. In the Netherlands, by contrast, the price elasticity of fund choice is negligible. Only when people were forced to choose a sickness fund, they were quite sensitive to premium differences. Key factors in explaining the observed differences in switching behavior between both countries are the degree of financial risk for sickness funds, the features of the risk-adjustment mechanism and the role of employers.