Hospital-insurer bargaining: an empirical investigation of appendectomy pricing

Treatment flows after outsourcing public insurance provision: Evidence from Florida Medicaid

While politics can determine what public goods are available, elected officials must decide on the method of allocation. Commonly, governments provide public health insurance directly or pay private parties to administer it on their behalf. Such contracting can leverage private sector expertise but also raises agency concerns. In particular, little is known about how private provision of public health insurance impacts medical decision-making and treatment flows for low-income populations. An example comes from the Medicaid program, which has increasingly relied on outside insurers to deliver health services to enrollees. We exploit a large legislative intervention in Florida to show that Medicaid managed care (MMC) organizations generally do not skimp on short-run treatment delivery in the inpatient setting. In fact, patients with severe and chronic illnesses receive more inpatient services under these contracts, especially in relation to managing care transitions. We also document increased competition in the MMC market following the state's policy intervention.

Do All Hospital Systems Have Market Power? Association Between Hospital System Types and Cardiac Surgery Prices

OBJECTIVE

This study explores the price implications of hospital systems by analyzing the association of system characteristics with selected cardiac surgery pricing.

DATA SOURCE

Using a large private insurance claim database, the authors identified 11 282 coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) cases and 49 866 percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) cases from 2002 to 2007.

STUDY DESIGN

We conducted a retrospective observational study using generalized linear models.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

We found that the CABG and PCI prices in centralized health and physician insurance systems were significantly lower than the prices in stand-alone hospitals by 4.4% and 6.4%, respectively. In addition, the CABG and PCI prices in independent health systems were significantly lower than in stand-alone hospitals, by 15.4% and 14.5%, respectively.

CONCLUSION

The current antitrust guidelines tend to focus on the market share of merging parties and pay less attention to the characteristics of merging parties. The results of this study suggest that antitrust analysis could be more effective by considering characteristics of hospital systems.

Overcoming resistance against managed care - insights from a bargaining model

Recent healthcare reforms have sought to increase efficiency by introducing managed care (MC) while respecting consumer preferences by admitting choice between MC and conventional care. This article proposes an institutional change designed to let German consumers choose between the two settings through directing payments from the Federal Health Fund to social health insurers (SHIs) or to specialized MC organizations (MCOs). To gauge the chance of success of this reform, a game involving a SHI, a MCO, and a representative insured (RI) is analyzed. In a "three-player/three-cake" game the coalitions {SHI, MCO}, {MCO, RI}, and {SHI, RI} can form. Players' possibility to switch between coalitions creates new outside options, causing the conventional bilateral Nash bargaining solution to be replaced by the so-called von Neumann-Morgenstern triple. These triples are compared to the status quo (where the RI has no threat potential) and related to institutional conditions characterizing Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.

Quality target negotiation in health care: evidence from the English NHS

We examine how public sector third-party purchasers and hospitals negotiate quality targets when a fixed proportion of hospital revenue is required to be linked to quality. We develop a bargaining model linking the number of quality targets to purchaser and hospital characteristics. Using data extracted from 153 contracts for acute hospital services in England in 2010/2011, we find that the number of quality targets is associated with the purchaser's population health and its budget, the hospital type, whether the purchaser delegated negotiation to an agency, and the quality targets imposed by the supervising regional health authority.

Insurers' Negotiating Leverage and the External Effects of Medicare Part D

By influencing the size and bargaining power of private insurers, public subsidization of private health insurance may project effects beyond the subsidized population. We test for such spillovers by analyzing how increases in insurer size resulting from the implementation of Medicare Part D affected drug prices negotiated in the non-Medicare commercial market. On average, Part D lowered prices for commercial enrollees by 3.7%. The external commercial market savings amount to $1.5 billion per year, which, if passed to consumers, approximates the internal cost-savings of newly-insured subsidized beneficiaries. If retained by insurers, it corresponds to a 5% average increase in profitability.

Is there a Medicaid penalty? The effect of hospitals' Medicaid population on their private payer market share

This study examines whether privately insured patients avoid hospitals with large Medicaid populations. I use a conditional logit model of hospital choice to determine whether the size of a hospital's Medicaid population affects the probability that a privately insured patient will choose that hospital. I focus on the metropolitan area of Tampa, Florida, in the years 1994-1996. I control for hospital fixed effects, hospital-specific time trends, patients' driving time to the hospital, and interactions between patient and hospital characteristics. I also instrument for the Medicaid population using the predicted Medicaid population. The results show that privately insured patients are less likely to choose a hospital if it served a larger number of Medicaid patients who were admitted through the emergency department in the previous 6 months. The effect persists over time-an additional 6-month lag cuts the effect in half. Capacity constraints do not seem to be the reason for the effect. I show that the Medicaid effect size could have a moderate effect on the profits of some hospitals. Although limited in scope, this study suggests that hospitals may experience a negative effect on their private revenues when they admit a large population of Medicaid patients.

Bargaining and the provision of health services

We model and compare the bargaining process between a purchaser of health services, such as a health authority, and a provider (the hospital) in three plausible scenarios: (a) activity bargaining: the purchaser sets the price and activity (number of patients treated) is bargained between the purchaser and the provider; (b) price bargaining: the price is bargained between the purchaser and the provider, but activity is chosen unilaterally by the provider; (c) efficient bargaining: price and activity are simultaneously bargained between the purchaser and the provider. We show that: (1) if the bargaining power of the purchaser is high (low), efficient bargaining leads to higher (lower) activity and purchaser's utility, and lower (higher) prices and provider's utility compared to price bargaining. (2) In activity bargaining, prices are lowest, the purchaser's utility is highest and the provider's utility is lowest; activity is generally lowest, but higher than in price bargaining for high bargaining power of the purchaser. (3) If the purchaser has higher bargaining power, this reduces prices and activity in price bargaining, it reduces prices but increases activity in activity bargaining, and it reduces prices but has no effect on activity in efficient bargaining.

Pricing of surgeries for colon cancer: patient severity and market factors

BACKGROUND

This study examined effects of health maintenance organization (HMO) penetration, hospital competition, and patient severity on the uptake of laparoscopic colectomy and its price relative to open surgery for colon cancer.

METHODS

The MarketScan Database (data from 2002-2007) was used to identify admissions for privately insured colorectal cancer patients undergoing laparoscopic or open partial colectomy (n = 1035 and n = 6389, respectively). Patient and health plan characteristics were retrieved from these data; HMO market penetration rates and an index of hospital market concentration, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), were derived from national databases. Logistic and logarithmic regressions were used to examine the odds of having laparoscopic colectomy, effect of covariates on colectomy prices, and the differential price of laparoscopy.

RESULTS

Adoption of laparoscopy was highly sensitive to market forces, with a 10% increase in HMO penetration leading to a 10.9% increase in the likelihood of undergoing laparoscopic colectomy (adjusted odds ratio = 1.109; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.062, 1.158) and a 10% increase in HHI resulting in 6.6% lower likelihood (adjusted odds ratio = 0.936; 95% CI = 0.880, 0.996). Price models indicated that the price of laparoscopy was 7.6% lower than that of open surgery (transformed coefficient = 0.927; 95% CI = 0.895, 0.960). A 10% increase in HMO penetration was associated with 1.6% lower price (transformed coefficient = 0.985; 95% CI = 0.977, 0.992), whereas a 10% increase in HHI was associated with 1.6% higher price (transformed coefficient = 1.016; 95% CI = 1.006, 1.027; P < .001 for all comparisons).

CONCLUSIONS

Laparoscopy was significantly associated with lower hospital prices. Moreover, laparoscopic surgery may result in cost savings, while market pressures contribute to its adoption.

Market structure and hospital-insurer bargaining in the Netherlands

In 2005, competition was introduced in part of the hospital market in the Netherlands. Using a unique dataset of transactions and list prices between hospitals and insurers in the years 2005 and 2006, we estimate the influence of buyer and seller concentration on the negotiated prices. First, we use a traditional structure-conduct-performance model (SCP-model) along the lines of Melnick et al. (J Health Econ 11(3): 217-233, 1992) to estimate the effects of buyer and seller concentration on price-cost margins. Second, we model the interaction between hospitals and insurers in the context of a generalized bargaining model similar to Brooks et al. (J Health Econ 16: 417-434, 1997). In the SCP-model, we find that the market shares of hospitals (insurers) have a significantly positive (negative) impact on the hospital price-cost margin. In the bargaining model, we find a significant negative effect of insurer concentration, but no significant effect of hospital concentration. In both models, we find a significant impact of idiosyncratic effects on the market outcomes. This is consistent with the fact that the Dutch hospital sector is not yet in a long-run equilibrium.

Hospital prices and market structure in the hospital and insurance industries

There has been substantial consolidation among health insurers and hospitals, recently, raising questions about the effects of this consolidation on the exercise of market power. We analyze the relationship between insurer and hospital market concentration and the prices of hospital services. We use a national US dataset containing transaction prices for health care services for over 11 million privately insured Americans. Using three years of panel data, we estimate how insurer and hospital market concentration are related to hospital prices, while controlling for unobserved market effects. We find that increases in insurance market concentration are significantly associated with decreases in hospital prices, whereas increases in hospital concentration are non-significantly associated with increases in prices. A hypothetical merger between two of five equally sized insurers is estimated to decrease hospital prices by 6.7%.

Retail pharmacy market structure and insurer-independent pharmacy bargaining in the Medicare Part D era

OBJECTIVE

To examine whether local area pharmacy market structure influences contract terms between prescription drug plans (PDPs) and pharmacies under Part D.

DATA

Data were collected and compiled from four sources: a national mail survey to independent pharmacies, National Councilfor Prescription Drug Programs (NCPDP) Pharmacy database, 2000 U.S. Census data, and 2006 Economic Census data.

RESULTS

Reimbursements varied substantially across pharmacies. Reimbursement for 20mg Lipitor (30 tablets) ranged from $62.40 to $154.80, and for 10mg Lisinopril (30 tablets), it ranged from $1.05 to $18. For brand-name drug Lipitor, local area pharmacy ownership concentration had a consistent positive effect on pharmacy bargaining power across model specifications (estimates between 0.084 and 0.097), while local area per capita income had a consistent negative effect on pharmacy bargaining power across specifications(-0.149 to -0.153). Few statistically significant relationships were found for generic drug Lisinopril.

CONCLUSION

Significant variation exists in PDP reimbursement and pharmacy bargaining power with PDPs. Pharmacy bargaining power is negatively related to the competition level and the income level in the area. These relationships are stronger for brand name than for generics. As contract offers tend to be non-negotiable, variation in reimbursements and pharmacy bargaining power reflect differences in initial insurer contract offerings. Such observations fit Rubinstein's subgame perfect equilibrium model.

IMPLICATION

Our results suggest pharmacies at the most risk of closing due to low reimbursements are in areas with many competing pharmacies. This implies that closures related to Part D changes will have limited effect on Medicare beneficiaries' access to pharmacies.

Managed care's price bargaining with hospitals

Research has shown that managed care (MC) slowed the rate of growth in health care spending in the 1990s, primarily via lower unit prices paid. However, the mechanism of MC's price bargaining has not been well studied. This article uses a unique panel dataset with actual hospital prices in Massachusetts between 1994 and 2000 to examine the sources of MC's bargaining power. I find two significant determinants of price discounts. First, plans with large memberships are able to extract volume discounts across hospitals. Second, health plans that are more successful at channeling patients can extract greater discounts. Patient channeling can add to the volume discount that plans negotiate.

Insurer-Provider Networks in the Medical Care Market

I use data on the hospital networks offered by managed care health insurers to estimate the expected division of profits between insurers and providers. I include a simple profit-maximization framework and an additional effect: hospitals that can secure demand without contracting with all insurers (e.g., those most attractive to consumers and those that are capacity constrained) may demand high prices that some insurers refuse to pay. Hospital mergers may also affect price bargaining. I estimate that all three types of hospitals capture higher markups than other providers. These results provide information on the hospital investment incentives generated by bargaining.

Safety-net activities and hospital contracting with managed care organizations

This article studies factors of safety-net hospitals that affect contracting with managed-care organizations. Web-based data were used to identify the hospital networks of managed-care plans in 71 metropolitan statistical areas. We collected lists of hospitals from a national sample of managed-care plans. After combining these data with hospital, managed-care, and area characteristics, multivariate logistic regressions with random effects were estimated to determine hospital characteristics that influence the probability of a contract between the plan and hospital. Hospital characteristics included size, ownership, whether it was part of a system, teaching status, and safety-net activities. Managed-care plan characteristics included type of plan and ownership. Certain safety-net hospital measures and a cluster of related hospital characteristics are associated with a lower probability of contract. Hospitals accounting for a disproportionate share of safety-net activities are less likely to belong to managed-care networks, which may place them at a competitive disadvantage.

Has competition lowered hospital prices?

On Jan. 1, 1997, New York ended its regulation of hospital prices with the intent of using competitive markets to control prices and increase efficiency. This paper uses data that come from annual reports filed by all health maintenance organizations (HMOs) operating in New York and include payments to and usage in the major hospitals in an HMO's network. We estimate the relationship between implied prices and hospital, plan, and market characteristics. The models show that after 1997, hospitals in more competitive markets paid less. Partially offsetting these price reductions were price increases associated with hospital mergers that reduced the competitiveness of the local market. Hospital deregulation was successful, at least in the short run, in using price competition to reduce hospital payments; it is unclear whether this success will be undermined by the structural changes taking place in the hospital industry.

Managed care discounting: evidence from the MarketScan database

The paper examines price discounting by health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and preferred provider organizations (PPOs) in markets for hospital services. Our empirical analysis focuses on transaction prices for angioplasty, which is a relatively common procedure with well-defined "product" characteristics. After controlling for patient and procedure heterogeneity and market power, we find that on average angioplasty prices are 8% lower for PPOs than for fee-for-service plans, followed by point-of-service HMOs, which capture a 24% discount. Our results are in general agreement with earlier work by Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse (2000), who show that managed care discounts are "real," after accounting for case severity and process of care.

Trends in hospital consolidation: the formation of local systems

During the past decade the hospital industry has made profound organizational changes, including the extensive consolidation of hospitals through merger and the formation of hospital systems. Although the rate of hospital system acquisitions may be slowing, the local presence of hospital systems is growing. Locally concentrated systems have been formed by both for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. Researchers have tended to ignore acquisitions or have portrayed system formation as primarily an issue of hospital ownership conversion, thereby focusing on the expansion of national, for-profit systems. This has left a large gap in policymakers' understanding of how locally concentrated systems may affect patient care and competition.

Employer contribution methods and health insurance premiums: does managed competition work?

We derive a two-stage model in which health plans first compete to be selected by employers and subsequently compete to be chosen by employees. We identify the key determinants of competition and show that increasing competition at one stage often comes at the expense of competition at the other stage. Many economists and policymakers have argued that in order to increase competition among health plans, employers should offer multiple plans and structure premium contributions to make employees more price sensitive. While our theoretical model shows that following this policy prescription may not actually lead to lower premiums, our empirical analysis provides some support for this recommendation. We also find that if employers instead pay the full premium, premiums increase when they offer additional plans. These results have important implications for both employers and policymakers.

Managed care and employer premiums

This paper used 1993-1997 data from medium and large size employers to examine the effects of market wide managed care penetration on the premiums paid for employer sponsored health insurance. Regressions were run for weighted average single coverage premiums and for premiums on conventional, HMO, and PPO coverage. Four findings emerged from the analysis. First, increased managed care penetration had no statistically significant effect on weighted average employer premiums. Second, higher HMO penetration resulted in lower HMO premiums but higher conventional and PPO premiums. Third, higher PPO penetration had no statistically meaningful effects across plan types. Finally, the results depended critically on whether firms offered self-insured plans. Higher levels of HMO penetration led to smaller increases in conventional and PPO premiums for firms with self-insured plans, but also yielded smaller premium reductions from HMOs relative to those with purchased coverage.

Hospital cost efficiency and system membership

Using a recently developed taxonomy of hospital organizations, this paper estimates a stochastic frontier cost function to test for inefficiency differences among system hospitals having common strategic and/or structural characteristics. System hospitals that centralized around physician arrangements and insurance products display the smallest deviations from the least cost locus. This suggests efficiency benefits from organization of physician and insurance activities at the system level, with discretion over the array of service offerings left to individual members. Policymakers should be mindful of potential efficiency gains from hospital consolidations and be aware that common ownership alone may be too general a rubric for evaluating those gains usefully.

Hospital selective contracting without consumer choice: what can we learn from Medi-Cal?

In the selective contracting era, consumer choice has generally been absent in most state Medicaid programs, including California's (called Medi-Cal). In a setting where beneficiary exit is not a threat, a large payer may have both the incentives and the ability to exercise undue market power, potentially exposing an already vulnerable population to further harm. The analyses presented here of Medi-Cal contracting data, however, do not yield compelling evidence in favor of the undue market power hypothesis. Instead, hospital competition appears to explain with greater consistency why certain hospitals choose to contract with Medi-Cal while others do not, the trends in inpatient prices paid by Medi-Cal over time, and the effect of price competition on service cutbacks, such as emergency room closures.

The use of expensive health technologies in the era of managed care: the remarkable case of neonatal intensive care

The use of neonatal intensive care (NIC) continued to rise rapidly in the 1990s despite the concerns of observers about its cost effectiveness and its successes being mostly in facilities with high volume and capabilities. The objective of this study is to test the effects of insurance type, competition among hospitals, and market pressure from managed care plans on the supply and cost of NIC. The analysis uses logistic and linear models with techniques to avoid bias from (a) market area definitions based on actual patient flows and (b) self-selection of hospitals by patients with unmeasured risk of needing NIC. The data source contains all births in short-term hospitals in New Jersey during 1990 and 1994. Both the number of days and charges for NIC are reported. Key findings are that the decision of a hospital to offer NIC was associated with teaching status, the proportion of infants in the market area with documented high risk, and the market concentration of major competitors. The market share of managed care plans and the concentration of enrollment were not associated with either NIC being offered or with the standardized charges. Whether a particular patient was given to a NIC depended on patient risk factors and whether a NIC unit was present, but not on payer group. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that young insured parents (with the advice of their obstetricians) prefer hospitals with NIC and also are relatively profitable enrollees for health plans.

IN CONCLUSION

using the results here and in other research, public and private policy makers may consider several ways to strengthen the incentives for health plans to contract for cost-effective birth-related services. The results also raise questions for a number of regulatory and payment policies and call for better public data on costs and outcomes for NIC.

Third party bargaining and contract terms: a link over time?

OBJECTIVE

To evaluate whether prior pharmacy bargaining process strategies and pharmacy dependence on third parties affect the bargaining power of pharmacies in price negotiations with third parties.

DESIGN

One-time survey.

SETTING

Random sample of 900 independent and small chain pharmacies in nine states: Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.

PARTICIPANTS

Two hundred sixteen of the returned surveys contained sufficient responses for this analysis.

INTERVENTIONS

Survey data on pharmacy bargaining power and prior pharmacy bargaining strategies, pharmacy dependence, and market characteristics were analyzed using multiple regression in a previously developed and modified provider/third party bargaining model.

MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE

Pharmacy bargaining power.

RESULTS

Pharmacy bargaining power varied across our sample. Pharmacy bargaining power was positively related to whether a pharmacy previously bargained with the third parties, negatively related to prior requests for contract changes, and negatively related to the pharmacy's dependence on third parties in total.

CONCLUSION

Pharmacy bargaining power is related to the bargaining strategies employed by pharmacies during the previous year and the dependence of pharmacies on third party payers in total. With the prevalence of "take-it-or-leave-it" contracts from third parties, prior pharmacy bargaining behavior may affect the initial terms of the contracts that pharmacies are offered.

Hospital competition in HMO networks

We develop a framework for analyzing bargaining relationships between hospitals and HMOs under selective contracting. Using a unique dataset on hospitals in the Los Angeles area from 1990 to 1993, we estimate the determinants of actual negotiated prices paid to hospitals by two major HMOs. We find that a hospital's bargaining power, and thus its price, decrease when the HMO can readily turn to alternative networks that exclude the hospital. We simulate the effect of hypothetical hospital mergers on bargaining power and find that some hospital mergers, even in urban areas with many nearby hospitals, can lead to significant price increases.

Market restructuring and pricing in the hospital industry

This paper examines the diagnosis related group-level (DRG) price effects of recent hospital mergers and acquisitions that occurred in Ohio and California. Empirical results indicate that hospital mergers and acquisitions increase prices at the DRG level. Further, price increases are greater in DRGs where the merging hospitals gained substantial market share compared to DRGs where the merging hospitals did not gain significant market share. These results suggest that DRG specific market share plays an important role in a hospital's post-merger pricing strategy.

Data watch: research data in health economics

In this paper, we discuss some important data sets that can be used by economists interested in conducting research in health economics. We describe six types of data sets: health components of data sets traditionally used by economists; longitudinal surveys of health and economic behavior; data on employer-provided insurance; cross-sectional surveys of households that focus on health; data on health care providers; and vital statistics. We summarize some of the leading surveys, discuss the availability of the data, identify how researchers have utilized these data and when possible, include a web address that contains more detailed information about each survey.

Market factors and the availability of community pharmacies

The purpose of this study was to examine the relationships between the availability of community pharmacies and 4 types of market factors. A composite data set was created that linked, at the county level, data on: (1) type and number of pharmacies; (2) population characteristics; (3) payer variables; (4) health care system factors; and (5) competitive factors. In this exploratory study, secondary data were used to assess the association between the availability of community pharmacies and the influence of market factors. To assess the market influences on availability of community pharmacies, 2 regressions were performed. In 1 model, the number of community pharmacies per 10,000 population was the dependent variable, whereas the dependent variable in the other regression was the proportion of independently owned community pharmacies. The independent variables in each regression were the market factors--population characteristics, payer variables, health care system factors, and competitive variables. Squared terms were included for 8 of 15 market factors to account for nonlinearities in the relationships. Multiple market factors were correlated with both the number of community pharmacies and the proportion of independently owned pharmacies in an area. Several of the relationships were not linear and changed direction within the range of data. Counties with either a low or a high percentage of elderly people had fewer pharmacies and a lower proportion of independently owned pharmacies compared with counties with a moderate percentage of elderly people. Counties that were scarcely or highly rural had fewer community pharmacies but a higher proportion of independently owned pharmacies than counties that were moderately rural. Areas with a greater percentage of the population earning less than the poverty level had more pharmacies, especially independently owned ones. Fewer community pharmacies were found in areas with higher health maintenance organization penetration rates. The number of hospital admissions was positively associated with the number of pharmacies but negatively associated with the proportion of independently owned pharmacies. The availability of community pharmacies varies across the country. In light of the trend toward fewer independently owned pharmacies, potential problems in accessing pharmacy services could develop in certain areas, including those that are highly rural and those with a high percentage of people earning less than the poverty level. Future research and policy issues are identified.

SSRI antidepressant drug use patterns in the naturalistic setting: a multivariate analysis

BACKGROUND

The study of the duration and pattern of antidepressant use in actual clinical practice can provide important insights into how antidepressant prescribing patterns compare with recommended depression treatment guidelines.

OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this study, using data available from depressed outpatients in the United States, is to assess the effects of initial SSRI antidepressant selection on the subsequent pattern and duration of antidepressant use.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Multiple logistic regression analysis of data from a large prescription and medical claims database (MarketScan) for the years 1993 and 1994 were used to estimate the determinants of antidepressant drug use patterns for 1,034 patients with a "new" episode of antidepressant therapy who were prescribed one of three most often prescribed selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), paroxetine, sertraline, or fluoxetine.

RESULTS

Patients initiating therapy on sertraline or paroxetine were less likely than patients initiating therapy on fluoxetine to have four or more prescriptions of their initial antidepressant within the first 6 months.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings suggest that antidepressant selection is an important determinant of the initial duration and pattern of antidepressant use which is consistent with current recommended depression treatment guidelines.

Change, consolidation, and competition in health care markets

The health care industry is being transformed. Large firms are merging and acquiring other firms. Alliances and contractual relations between players in this market are shifting rapidly. Within the next few years, many markets are predicted to be dominated by a few large firms. Antitrust enforcement authorities like the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, as well as courts and legislators at both the federal and state levels, are struggling with the implications of these changes for the nature and consequences of competition in health care markets. In this paper we summarize the nature of the changes in the structure of the health care industry. We focus on the markets for health insurance, hospital services, and physician services. We then discuss the potential implications of the restructuring of the health care industry for competition, efficiency, and public policy. As will become apparent, this area offers a number of intriguing questions for inquisitive researchers.