Emergency Department Response to Hazardous Materials Incidents

A highly sensitive quantification method for 12 plant toxins in human serum using liquid chromatography tandem mass spectrometry with a quick solid-phase extraction technique

We developed a highly sensitive quantification method using liquid chromatography tandem mass spectrometry (LC/MS/MS) for 12 plant toxins in human serum. In this paper, we selected lycorine, galanthamine, protoveratrine A, protoveratrine B, veratramine, veratridine, jervine, cyclopamine, cevadine, α-solanine, α-chaconine, and solanidine as targeted analytes. The ADME column was utilized for LC separation and a Monolithic SPE column (MonoSpin® C18) for analyte extraction. The total time for SPE clean-up and LC/MS/MS analysis was completed within 30 min. The method validation results were as follows: the linearity (r²) of each calibration curve was over 0.99; the inter- and intra-day accuracies were 92.7 %-116 % and 91.6 %-106 %, respectively; and the inter- and intra-day precisions were below 14 % and 11 %, respectively. Also, the lower limits of detection and quantification were 0.0071-0.15 and 0.022-0.46 ng/mL, respectively, indicating the method's high sensitivity. Finally, to confirm its feasibility, our method was applied to two model samples: (1) commercially available human serum and (2) pseudo poisoning serum via dilution of mouse serum with human serum. We were able to quantify α-chaconine at 0.84 ± 0.02 ng/mL in the serum (Case 1) and protoveratrine A at 0.15 ± 0.032 ng/mL in the pseudo poisoning serum (Case 2), demonstrating our method's practicality. This is the first time that the 12 plant toxins in human serum were simultaneously quantitated. Our method can investigate accidental poisonings involving toxic plants, enabling prompt decisions on patient treatment.

Anion gap and base deficit are predictors of mortality in acute pesticide poisoning

BACKGROUND:

Acute pesticide poisoning has long been a serious problem as a method of suicide worldwide. This poisoning is a highly fatal condition that requires a rapid and precise diagnosis for adequate treatment. However, various studies on mortality predictor factors have been insufficient for whole pesticide treatments. We hypothesized that the initial plasma anion gap (AG) and base deficit (BD) are reliable prognostic factors.

METHODS:

A retrospective study analyzed 561 patients with a diagnosis of acute pesticide poisoning between January 1, 2014 and June 30, 2017. The initial AG and BD values were divided into quartiles according to the number of patients. Survival at 30 days from admission was estimated using the Kaplan-Meier survival analysis. Receiver-operator characteristic (ROC) curves were drawn, and the areas under the curve for AG and BD for mortality were calculated.

RESULTS:

Fifty-eight (10.3%) of 561 patients died within 30 days. The highest AG quartile (>22 mEq/L) was associated with an increased risk of 30-day hospital mortality. Compared to patients with an AG less than 14.7 mEq/L, these patients had a 4.18-fold higher risk of 30-day hospital mortality and the highest BD quartile (>7.9 mEq/L) was associated with an increased risk of 30-day hospital mortality. Compared to patients with a BD less than 1.4 mEq/L, these patients had 2.23-fold higher risk of 30-day hospital mortality. The areas under the ROC for AG and BD curve were 0.699 and 0.744, respectively.

CONCLUSIONS:

Initial high AG and BD values could predict mortality and require precise intensive care.

A Descriptive Analysis of Prehospital Response to Hazardous Materials Events

OBJECTIVE

Little is known about the overall frequency of hazardous materials (HazMat) events in the United States and the nature of prehospital care for those exposed. The purpose of the current study was to perform a descriptive analysis of Emergency Medical Services (EMS) activations reported to a national EMS database.

METHODS

Analysis of the 2012 National EMS Information System (NEMSIS) Public Release Research Data Set v.2.2.1, containing EMS emergency response data submitted by 41 states, was conducted. Mandatory data elements E0207 (Type of Response Delay), E0208 (Type of Scene Delay), and E0209 (Type of Transport Delay) contained specific codes for HazMat events and were used to identify specific EMS activation records for subsequent analysis. Overlapping data elements were identified and combined in order to prevent duplicate entries. Descriptive analyses were generated from the NEMSIS Research Data Set.

RESULTS

A total of 17,479,328 EMS activations were reported, of which 2,527 unique activations involved HazMat response. Mass-casualty incident was coded for 5.6% of activations. The most common level of prehospital care present on scene was Basic Life Support (BLS; 51.1%); 2.1% required aggressive Advanced Life Support (ALS) response. The most common locations for HazMat activations were homes (36.2%), streets or highways (26.3%), and health care facilities (11.6%). The primary symptoms observed by EMS personnel were pain (29.6%), breathing problems (12.2%), and change in responsiveness (9.6%). Two percent of HazMat activations involved cardiac arrest, with 21.7% occurring after EMS arrival. Delays in patient care included response delay, scene delay, and transport delay.

CONCLUSION

Hazardous materials events are rare causes of EMS activation in the United States. The majority occur in non-industrial venues and involve two or fewer patients. Scene time frequently is delayed due to multiple barriers. Cardiac arrest is rare but occurred after EMS arrival in one-fifth of patients.

Intubation Efficiency and Perceived Ease of Use of Video Laryngoscopy vs Direct Laryngoscopy While Wearing HazMat PPE: A Preliminary High-fidelity Mannequin Study

INTRODUCTION

Management of contaminated patients in the decontamination corridor requires the use of hazardous material (HazMat) personal protective equipment (PPE). Previous studies have demonstrated that HazMat PPE may increase the difficulty of airway management. This study compared the efficiency of video laryngoscopy (VL) with traditional direct laryngoscopy (DL) during endotracheal intubation (ETI) while wearing HazMat PPE.

METHODS

Post-graduate year (PGY) 1-3 Emergency Medicine residents were randomized to VL or DL while wearing encapsulating PPE. Video laryngoscopy was performed using the GlideScope Cobalt AVL video laryngoscope. The primary outcome measure was time to successful ETI in a high-fidelity simulation mannequin. Three time points were utilized in the analysis: Time 0 (blade at lips), Time 1 (blade removed from lips after endotracheal tube placement), and Time 2 (bag valve mask [BVM] attached to endotracheal tube). Secondary outcome measures were perceived ease of use and feasibility of VL and DL ETI modalities.

RESULTS

Twenty-one of 23 (91.3%) eligible residents participated. Mean time to ETI was 10.0 seconds (SD=5.3 seconds) in the DL group and 7.8 seconds (SD=3.0 seconds) in the VL group (P=.081). Mean times from blade insertion until BVM attachment were 17.4 seconds (SD=6.0 seconds) and 15.6 seconds (SD=4.6 seconds), respectively (P=.30). There were no unsuccessful intubation attempts. Seventeen out of 20 participants (85.0%) perceived VL to be easier to use when performing ETI in PPE. Twelve out of 20 participants (60%) perceived DL to be more feasible in an actual HazMat scenario.

CONCLUSION

The time to successful ETI was not significantly different between VL and DL. Video laryngoscopy had a greater perceived ease of use, but DL was perceived to be more feasible for use in actual HazMat situations. These findings suggest that both DL and VL are reasonable modalities for use in HazMat situations, and the choice of modality could be based on the clinical situation and provider experience.

Hospital preparedness for chemical and radiological disasters

Hospital planning for chemical or radiological events is essential but all too often treated as a low priority. Although some other types of disasters like hurricanes and tornadoes may be more frequent, chemical and radiological emergencies have the potential for major disruptions to clinical care. Thorough planning can mitigate the impact of a chemical or radiological event. Planning needs to include all 4 phases of an event: mitigation (preplanning), preparation, response, and recovery. Mitigation activities should include the performance of a hazards vulnerability analysis and identification of local subject-matter experts and team leaders.

Decontamination of Mass Casualties — Re-evaluating Existing Dogma

The events of 11 September 2001 became the catalyst for many to shift their disaster preparedness efforts towards mass-casualty incidents. Emergency responders, healthcare workers, emergency managers, and public health officials worldwide are being tasked to improve their readiness by acquiring equipment, providing training and implementing policy, especially in the area of mass-casualty decontamination. Accomplishing each of these tasks requires good information, which is lacking. Management of the incident scene and the approach to victim care varies throughout the world and is based more on dogma than scientific data. In order to plan effectively for and to manage a chemical, mass-casualty event, we must critically assess the criteria upon which we base our response.

This paper reviews current standards surrounding the response to a release of hazardous materials that results in massive numbers of exposed human survivors. In addition, a significant effort is made to prepare an international perspective on this response.

Preparations for the 24-hour threat of exposure of a community to hazardous material are a community responsibility for first-responders and the hospital. Preparations for a mass-casualty event related to a terrorist attack are a governmental responsibility. Reshaping response protocols and decontamination needs on the differences between vapor and liquid chemical threats can enable local responders to effectively manage a chemical attack resulting in mass casualties. Ensuring that hospitals have adequate resources and training to mount an effective decontamination response in a rapid manner is essential.

Decontamination of Multiple Casualties Who Are Chemically Contaminated: A Challenge for Acute Hospitals

Patients who have been contaminated by chemical compounds present a number of difficulties to emergency departments, in particular, the risk of secondary contamination of healthcare staff and facilities. The Department of Health in the United Kingdom has provided equipment to decontaminate chemically contaminated casualties who present at emergency departments. The capacity of this equipment is limited, and although both the ambulance and fire services have equipment to cope with mass casualties at the scene of a chemical incident, there is still the possibility that acute hospitals will be overwhelmed by large numbers of self-presenting patients. The risks and potential consequences of this gap in resilience are discussed and a number of possible practical solutions are proposed.

Poison Centers as Information Resources for Volunteer EMS in a Suspected Chemical Exposure

In the early part of chemical terrorism or hazardous materials events, protective actions and patient care require empirical decisions because reliable and accurate information may not be readily available. It has become increasingly important to identify reliable information resources that are the most likely to be accessed for information during these events. We sought to identify information resources that volunteer Emergency Medical Services (EMS) providers would use during a suspected chemical exposure. Survey questionnaires were completed by 116 of 151 (76.8%) suburban and rural EMS providers. In the past 12 months, most participants used medical journals and textbooks (59.5%), internet sites (57.8%), and poison centers (55.2%) as information resources. For two hypothetical scenarios involving chemical exposures, poison centers were most frequently chosen as likely contacts for information regarding the identity of the agent (case 1: 52.6%, case 2: 48.3%), treatment (74.1%, 64.7%, respectively), and antidote (59.5%, 49.1%, respectively). Fire department hazardous materials team tied with poison centers as the highest for chemical agent in the second scenario (48.3%) and was ranked highest both for decontamination (75.0%, 64.7%, respectively) and personal protection (56.9%, 45.7%, respectively). Poison centers were selected as the best resource for timely information (70.7%), availability (69.0%), and ease of contact (72.4%), and second highest for knowledge of chemical agents (44.0%), after CHEMTREC (56.9%). Finally, poison centers and CHEMTREC received the highest overall ratings (28.4% and 26.7%, respectively). Poison centers are viewed as an important information resource by EMS providers and may be the most commonly sought resource for various information needs during a suspected chemical exposure.

Decontamination

Decontamination is the removal or reduction of chemical, biologic, or radiologic agents from the patient's skin, mucosa, lungs, and gastrointestinal tract. Decontamination is an important step in decreasing the clinical effects of the agent on the patient, as well as protecting coworkers from exposure. For most agents and the vast majority of scenarios, the removal of clothing and a simple 5- to 6-minute shower with soap and water is sufficient to eliminate the risks to the patient and hospital staff. In rare circumstances, additional steps in decontamination including gastric lavage, broncho-alveolar lavage, surgical removal of wound foreign bodies, and administration of activated charcoal, polyethylene glycol electrolyte solution, and radioisotope binding agents, may be necessary.

Hospital response to chemical terrorism: personal protective equipment, training, and operations planning

BACKGROUND

Hospitals distant from the immediate site of an incident involving a hazardous materials (HAZMATs) release which could include chemical warfare agents, must develop emergency response plans (ERPs) to protect healthcare professionals if they receive potentially contaminated victims. The ERP must address OSHA, EPA, and JCAHO requirements.

METHODS

The VHA convened groups to develop a hazard and exposure assessment, identify actions for compliance with existing regulatory standards, and review site and operational planning issues. Exposure modeling results were used to derive relationships between operational parameters (time and distance from sites/sources) and potential exposure for healthcare workers.

RESULTS

According to exposure modeling, level C personal protective equipment is adequate to protect hospital staff distant from the chemical release site. Decontamination runoff and contaminated clothing should also be controlled to limit exposure.

CONCLUSIONS

Development and coordination of ERPs must include the local emergency planning committee, with clear assignment of tasks, locations, and training in order to prevent exposures to healthcare workers.

Developing an emergency department based Special Operations Team: Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital's experience

Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital initiated an emergency department based Special Operations Team as a way to help prepare staff for the care of hazardous material incidents (HAZMAT) victims and the unexpected consequences of a mass casualty incident. The team evolved over a period of 5 years and is now able to provide significant educational offerings, policy and procedure review and participation in extensive planning efforts in the hospital and community. This article will review the process and present future goals of the team.

Lack of hospital preparedness for chemical terrorism in a major US city: 1996-2000

INTRODUCTION

The [US] Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Act (the WMD Act of 1996) heralded a new wave of spending by the federal government on counter-terrorism efforts. Between 1996 and 2000, the United States of America (US) federal government allocated large sums of funding to the States for bioterrorism preparedness. Distribution of these funds between institutions involved in first-responder care (e.g., fire and safety departments) and hospitals was uneven. It is unknown whether these additional funds had an impact on the level of hospital preparedness for managing mass casualties involving hazardous materials at the local level, including potential terrorist attacks with chemical agents.

OBJECTIVES

(1) To compare 1996 and 2000 measures of preparedness among hospitals of a major US metropolitan area for dealing with hazardous material casualties, including terrorism that involved the use of weapons of mass destruction; and (2) To provide guidance for the improvement of emergency preparedness and response in US hospitals.

METHODS

In July 1996 and again in July 2000,21 hospitals in one major US city were surveyed by questionnaire. A survey was used to assess the amounts of antidote stocks held available for treatment of casualties caused by toxic chemical agents and institutional response capabilities including the number of showers for decontaminating patients, the level of worker protection, and the number of staff trained to decontaminate patients.

RESULTS

Hospital preparedness for treating and decontaminating patients exposed to toxic chemical agents was inadequate in 1996 and in 2000. From 1996 to 2000, there was no statistically significant change in the lack of hospital preparedness for stocking of nerve agent and cyanide antidotes. Capacity for decontamination of patients, which included appropriate hazardous material infrastructure and trained staff, generally was unimproved from 1996 to 2000 with the exception of an increase of nearly 30% in hospitals with at least one decontamination shower facility.

CONCLUSION

Hospitals surveyed in this study were poorly prepared to manage chemical emergency incidents, including terrorism. This lack of hospital preparedness did not change significantly between 1996 and 2000 despite increased funds allocated to bioterrorism preparedness at the local level.

Protective equipment for health care facility decontamination personnel: regulations, risks, and recommendations

After recent terrorist attacks, new attention has been focused on health care facility decontamination practices. This article reviews core issues related to the selection of appropriate personal protective equipment for health care facility decontamination personnel, with an emphasis on respiratory protection. Existing federal regulations focus primarily on scene response and not on issues specific to health care facility decontamination practices. Review of existing databases, relevant published literature, and individual case reports reveal some provider health risks, especially when the exposure involves organophosphate agents. However, reported risks from secondary exposure to contaminated patients at health care facilities are low. These risks should be adequately addressed with Level C personal protective equipment, including air-purifying respirator technologies, unless the facility determines that specific local threats require increased levels of protection.

Establishing and training health care facility decontamination teams

Recent terrorist events, changes in Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations requirements, and availability of grant funding have focused health care facility attention on emergency preparedness. Health care facilities have historically been underprepared for contaminated patients presenting to their facilities. These incidents must be properly managed to reduce the health risks to the victims, providers, and facility. A properly equipped and well-trained health care facility team is a prerequisite for rapid and effective decontamination response. This article reviews Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) training requirements for personnel involved with decontamination responses, as well as issues of team selection and training. Sample OSHA operations-level training curricula tailored to the health care environment are outlined. Initial and ongoing didactic and practical training can be implemented by the health care facility to ensure effective response when contaminated patients arrive seeking emergency medical care.

Hazardous materials responses in a mid-sized metropolitan area

OBJECTIVE

To determine the chemicals involved in fire department hazardous materials (hazmat) responses and analyze the concomitant emergency medical services' patient care needs.

METHODS

The setting was a mid-sized metropolitan area in the southwestern United States with a population base of 400,000 and an incorporated area of 165 square miles. The authors conducted a retrospective evaluation of all fire department hazmat reports, with associated emergency medical services patient encounter forms, and in-patient hospital records from January 1, 1992, through December 31, 1994.

RESULTS

The fire department hazardous materials control team responded to 468 hazmat incidents, involving 62 chemicals. The majority of incidents occurred on city streets, with a mean incident duration of 46 minutes. More than 70% of the responses involved flammable gases or liquids. A total of 32 incidents generated 85 patients, 53% of whom required transport for further evaluation and care. Most patients were exposed to airborne toxicants. Only two patients required hospital admission for carbon monoxide poisoning.

CONCLUSION

Most hazmat incidents result in few exposed patients who require emergency medical services care. Most patients were exposed to airborne toxicants and very few required hospitalization. Routine data analysis such as this provides emergency response personnel with the opportunity to evaluate current emergency plans and identify areas where additional training may be necessary.

Emergency department hazardous materials protocol for contaminated patients

Emergency department handling and treatment of chemically contaminated patients can have potentially serious consequences. Medical staff can be exposed to hazardous chemicals through dermal contact or inhalation of volatile compounds or particulate matter. Exposure can result in symptomatic illness from either a direct chemical toxic effect or an odor-mediated psychologic response. Either situation can severely affect ED function and lead to facility evacuation. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations standards and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations for participation in community hazardous materials incident emergency response plans require hospital EDs to prepare for hazardous materials incidents. This study provides a template protocol for ED preparation for and treatment of patients exposed to hazardous materials.

Hospital evacuations due to hazardous materials incidents

In a previous study 12 Washington State hospitals reported evacuations due to hazardous materials incidents. A telephone survey was conducted to further describe these incidents. Ten hospitals responded to the survey, including one institution reporting two incidents. The incidents included threatened explosions or releases in three cases and actual chemical exposures in eight cases. The actual exposures included irritant gases from mixtures of cleaners in two cases, an unknown exposure in one case, and a variety of other chemicals or products in the remaining cases. Seven of the 11 incidents resulted in emergency department (ED) evacuation. Two incidents involved secondary contamination of ED staff from treatment of patients with chemical exposures who were not decontaminated prior to arrival. Fire department personnel assisted in the majority of incidents. Review of these cases provides useful information for planning drills to test emergency preparedness as required under Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations standards.

Personal decontamination after exposure to stimulated liquid phase contaminants: functional assessment of a new unit

OBJECTIVE

To evaluate the efficacy of a decontamination station following exposure of volunteers to liquids with physical characteristics comparable to sarin and mustard gas.

DESIGN

Twenty-four volunteers participated in the experiment which was performed with all staff wearing personal protective equipment including respiratory protection. The clothes, skin, and hair of the volunteers were contaminated with the simulated liquid phase contaminants, ethyl lactate and methyl salicylate. Sulphur hexafluoride gas was used to confirm the ventilation efficacy. Decontamination followed guidelines using a two-stage procedure. In the first chamber, all volunteers received a 3-minute shower with water at 30 degrees C, and their clothes but not their respiratory masks were removed. In the second, they were twice washed thoroughly with soap and water. After decontamination, the volunteers entered a third chamber for first aid measures.

RESULTS

The air concentration of sulphur hexafluoride was reduced by 1:10,000 between the first and the third chambers. Ethyl lactate and methyl salicylate were measured in low concentrations in the third chamber. The capacity was 16 volunteers per hour with two-thirds on stretchers. After self-decontamination of the staff, the concentration of ethyl lactate increased significantly in the third chamber, consistent with residual ethyl lactate adsorbed by their underwear. This observation revealed a deficiency in the guidelines for self-decontamination.

CONCLUSION

The capacity of the decontamination unit was found to be 16 volunteers per hour. The ventilation system and guidelines of the decontamination unit were demonstrated to be effective under the conditions examined. The self-decontamination of the staff was not optimal.

Injuries caused by hazardous materials accidents

STUDY OBJECTIVE

To describe exposures that prehospital and ED personnel may encounter as a result of hazardous material incidents.

METHODS

Retrospective analysis of hazardous material incident reports from six district hazardous material teams in Massachusetts from their inception through May 1996.

RESULTS

The chemicals most frequently involved were various hydrocarbons and corrosive materials. Chlorine derivatives were involved in 18% of all incidents and 23% of all incidents resulting in victims. Victims were produced by 47 of 162 (29%) incidents. Respiratory exposures were the most frequent type of exposure and resulted in the largest number of victims transported to a hospital. Overall 24 of 26 (92%) incidents with chemical exposures resulted in symptomatic victims and 33 of 35 (94%) incidents produced victims requiring hospital transport. Respiratory symptoms were the most frequent, both in the number of incidents where they were observed and the total number of victims with symptoms.

CONCLUSION

Multiple victim transport to EDs from a single hazardous material incident is most likely to result from an inhalation exposure to a respiratory irritant. Information from descriptive studies should allow improved preparation for potential hazardous material victims.

Disaster planning, Part I. Overview of hospital and emergency department planning for internal and external disasters

The definition and causes for internal and external disasters are discussed in this article. Features of a hospital disaster plan are outlined with special reference to the role of the emergency department. Examples of previous disasters involving hospitals are presented to demonstrate problems that disaster planners should anticipate.

Hazardous materials. Disaster medical planning and response

Hazardous materials offer a variety of unique challenges to emergency personnel. These agents have immense economic impact, but when mishandled, they become notorious for turning contained accidents into disasters involving the entire community. During a hazmat accident, the victims often ignore the rules of the disaster plan by seeking out the nearest hospital for medical care, regardless of that institution's capabilities. Health care workers rushing to the aid of contaminated individuals, without taking appropriate precautions (i.e., donning PPE), potentially make themselves victims. Disaster preparedness requires planning, policy, and procedure development, hazard analysis, training, and the availability of personal protective equipment for all responding personnel. Presently, the level of hazmat preparedness varies greatly among different hospitals, EMS and fire services, and disaster response teams. These differences in hazmat preparedness can be linked to a variety of factors (lack of awareness, funding, and support) and controversies (types of PPE and level of training required) which have prevented the establishment of a national hazmat policy for most of these organizations. Despite these difficulties, emergency departments continue to be the primary provider of care to contaminated individuals. As a result, emergency physicians must work with their hospital to implement a hazmat decontamination program in order to appropriately care for these individuals. The appendix to this article presents a list of recommendations for hospital hazmat preparedness. It is modeled after existing CDC and OSHA guidelines.