Unconscious Orientation Processing

Emotional contextual effects of face perception: a test of the affective realism hypothesis

Affective feelings naturally infuse individuals' perceptions, serving as valid windows onto the real world. The affective realism hypothesis further explains how these feelings work: as properties of individuals' perceptual experiences, these feelings influence perception. Notably, this hypothesis based on affective feelings with different valences has been substantiated, whereas the existing evidence is not compelling enough. Moreover, whether specific affective feelings can be experienced as properties of target perception remains unclear. Addressing these two issues deepens our understanding of the nature of emotional representation. Hence, we investigated the affective realism hypothesis based on affective feelings with different valences and specific emotions, comparing it with the affective misattribution hypothesis. In Experiment 1, we examined the effects of affective feelings with various valences on targets' perception through the AM (1a) and CFS paradigms (1b). In Experiment 2, we investigated the effects of affective feelings with anger, sadness, and disgust using similar methods. Results from Experiments 1a and 1b consistently indicated significant differences in valence ratings of neutral faces under emotional contexts with varying valences. Experiment 2a revealed significant differences in specific emotion ratings of neutral faces under different specific emotional contexts in the AM paradigm, whereas such differences were not observed in the CFS paradigm in Experiment 2b. We concluded that affective feelings with different valences, rather than specific emotions, can be experienced as inherent properties of target perception, validating the affective realism hypothesis. These findings supported the view that the nature of emotional representation should be described as affective dimensions.

Visual adaptation and 7T fMRI reveal facial identity processing in the human brain under shallow interocular suppression

Face identity is represented at a high level of the visual hierarchy. Whether the human brain can process facial identity information in the absence of visual awareness remains unclear. In this study, we investigated potential face identity representation through face-identity adaptation with the adapting faces interocularly suppressed by Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS) noise, a modified binocular rivalry paradigm. The strength of interocular suppression was manipulated by varying the contrast of CFS noise. While obeservers reported the face images subjectively unperceived and the face identity objectively unrecognizable, a significant face identity aftereffect was observed under low but not high contrast CFS noise. In addition, the identity of face images under shallow interocular suppression can be decoded from multi-voxel patterns in the right fusiform face area (FFA) obtained with high-resolution 7T fMRI. Thus the comined evidence from visual adaptation and 7T fMRI suggest that face identity can be represented in the human brain without explicit perceptual recognition. The processing of interocularly suppressed faces could occur at different levels depending on how "deep" the information is suppressed.

Interaction Between Conscious and Unconscious Information-Processing of Faces and Words

It is widely acknowledged that holistic processing is a key characteristic of face perception. Although holistic processing implies the automatic integration of face parts, it is unclear whether such processing requires the awareness of face parts. Here, we investigated the interactions between visible face parts and face parts rendered invisible using continuous flash suppression (CFS). In the first experiment with the upper half-face visible and the lower half-face invisible, the results showed that perceived face identity was influenced by the invisible lower half-face, suggesting that integration occurs between the visible and invisible face parts, a variant of the "composite face effect". In the second experiment, we investigated the influence of visible face parts on the processing of invisible face parts, as measured by the time it took for the invisible parts to break out from CFS. The results showed a visible-to-invisible facilitation effect, that the aligned invisible face parts broke through CFS faster than when the visible and invisible face parts were misaligned. Visible eyes had a stronger influence on the invisible nose/mouth than the other way around. Such facilitation of processing from visible to invisible parts was also found when Chinese characters were used as stimuli. These results show that information integration occurs across the consciousness boundary.

Feature-Based Attentional Weighting and Re-weighting in the Absence of Visual Awareness

Visual attention evolved as an adaptive mechanism allowing us to cope with a rapidly changing environment. It enables the facilitated processing of relevant information, often automatically and governed by implicit motives. However, despite recent advances in understanding the relationship between consciousness and visual attention, the functional scope of unconscious attentional control is still under debate. Here, we present a novel masking paradigm in which volunteers were to distinguish between varying orientations of a briefly presented, masked grating stimulus. Combining signal detection theory and subjective measures of awareness, we show that performance on unaware trials was consistent with visual selection being weighted towards repeated orientations of Gabor patches and reallocated in response to a novel unconsciously processed orientation. This was particularly present in trials in which the prior feature was strongly weighted and only if the novel feature was invisible. Thus, our results provide evidence that invisible orientation stimuli can trigger the reallocation of history-guided visual selection weights.

Implicit Detection Observation in Different Features, Exposure Duration, and Delay During Change Blindness

To investigate whether implicit detection occurs uniformly during change blindness with single or combination feature stimuli, and whether implicit detection is affected by exposure duration and delay, two one-shot change detection experiments are designed. The implicit detection effect is measured by comparing the reaction times (RTs) of baseline trials, in which stimulus exhibits no change and participants report “same,” and change blindness trials, in which the stimulus exhibits a change but participants report “same.” If the RTs of blindness trials are longer than those of baseline trials, implicit detection has occurred. The strength of the implicit detection effect was measured by the difference in RTs between the baseline and change blindness trials, where the larger the difference, the stronger the implicit detection effect. In both Experiments 1 and 2, the results showed that the RTs of change blindness trials were significantly longer than those of baseline trials. Whether under set size 4, 6, or 8, the RTs of the change blindness trials were significantly longer than those in the baseline trials. In Experiment 1, the difference between the baseline trials’ RTs and change blindness trials’ RTs of the single features was significantly larger than that of the combination features. However, in Experiment 2, the difference between the baseline trials’ RTs and the change blindness trials’ RTs of single features was significantly smaller than that of the combination features. In Experiment 1a, when the exposure duration was shorter, the difference between the baseline and change blindness trials’ RTs was smaller. In Experiment 2, when the delay was longer, the difference between the two trials’ RTs was larger. These results suggest that regardless of whether the change occurs in a single or a combination of features and whether there is a long exposure duration or delay, implicit detection occurs uniformly during the change blindness period. Moreover, longer exposure durations and delays strengthen the implicit detection effect. Set sizes had no significant impact on implicit detection.

Is It Implicit Detection or Perception During Change Blindness?

Purpose

Implicit detection differs from implicit perception. The former includes implicit registration, localisation, identification and comparison of an object. Implicit comparison is not necessary for implicit perception, and should not involve the identification or localisation of objects. While many studies have reported evidence of implicit detection in change blindness, they may, in fact, have only observed implicit perception. In this study, we aimed to find out whether there is implicit detection or perception during the change blindness period.

Methods

In Experiments 1 and 2, we used a simple change detection paradigm, coupled with a speeded attribute discrimination task. Reaction times (RTs) and accuracy of the participants were measured for the speeded attribute discrimination task. We compared differences in RT and accuracy of the invalid and congruent cue trials to find evidence for implicit detection. Invalid trials referred to stimuli where the appearance of the cue does not change, whereas congruent trials involved cued objects with the same attributes as that of the change object. In Experiment 3, a one-shot change detection experiment was conducted, where subjects were required to report whether the objects were the same or different as quickly as possible. We compared the differences in RTs between trials in which the stimulus exhibited a change but participants reported “same” (change blindness trails) and trials in which the stimulus exhibited no change and participants reported “same” (baseline trials), to find evidence for implicit perception.

Results

In Experiments 1 and 2, the difference in accuracy and RTs under invalid and congruent conditions was not significant. We did not observe a validity effect as evidence for implicit localisation or a congruency effect as evidence for identification. In Experiment 3, the RTs were longer in the change blindness relative no-change trials, which indicated that there was implicit perception.

Conclusion

The results of this study showed that there was no evidence supporting implicit detection in colour or orientation as a single or a combination of features. However, we report evidence for implicit perception during the change blindness period. Change may be implicitly perceived, but not located or identified before there is conscious detection.

Short-Term Attractive Tilt Aftereffects Predicted by a Recurrent Network Model of Primary Visual Cortex

Adaptation is a multi-faceted phenomenon that is of interest in terms of both its function and its potential to reveal underlying neural processing. Many behavioral studies have shown that after exposure to an oriented adapter the perceived orientation of a subsequent test is repulsed away from the orientation of the adapter. This is the well-known Tilt Aftereffect (TAE). Recently, we showed that the dynamics of recurrently connected networks may contribute substantially to the neural changes induced by adaptation, especially on short time scales. Here we extended the network model and made the novel behavioral prediction that the TAE should be attractive, not repulsive, on a time scale of a few 100 ms. Our experiments, using a novel adaptation protocol that specifically targeted adaptation on a short time scale, confirmed this prediction. These results support our hypothesis that recurrent network dynamics may contribute to short-term adaptation. More broadly, they show that understanding the neural processing of visual inputs that change on the time scale of a typical fixation requires a detailed analysis of not only the intrinsic properties of neurons, but also the slow and complex dynamics that emerge from their recurrent connectivity. We argue that this is but one example of how even simple recurrent networks can underlie surprisingly complex information processing, and are involved in rudimentary forms of memory, spatio-temporal integration, and signal amplification.

The Neural Correlates of Consciousness and Attention: Two Sister Processes of the Brain

During the last three decades our understanding of the brain processes underlying consciousness and attention has significantly improved, mainly because of the advances in functional neuroimaging techniques. Still, caution is needed for the correct interpretation of these empirical findings, as both research and theoretical proposals are hampered by a number of conceptual difficulties. We review some of the most significant theoretical issues concerning the concepts of consciousness and attention in the neuroscientific literature, and put forward the implications of these reflections for a coherent model of the neural correlates of these brain functions. Even though consciousness and attention have an overlapping pattern of neural activity, they should be considered as essentially separate brain processes. The contents of phenomenal consciousness are supposed to be associated with the activity of multiple synchronized networks in the temporo-parietal-occipital areas. Only subsequently, attention, supported by fronto-parietal networks, enters the process of consciousness to provide focal awareness of specific features of reality.

Sensory processing in Huntington's disease

OBJECTIVE

An intriguing electrophysiological feature of patients with Huntington's disease (HD) is the delayed latency and decreased amplitude of somatosensory long-latency evoked potentials (LLeps). We investigated whether such dysfunction was associated with delayed conscious perception of the sensory stimulus.

METHODS

Sixteen HD patients and 16 control subjects faced a computer screen showing the Libet's clock (Libet et al., 1983). In Rest trials, subjects had to memorize the position of the clock handle at perception of either electrical or thermal stimuli (AW). In React, additionally, they were asked to make a fist with their right hand, in a simple reaction time task (SRT). LLseps were recorded from Cz in both conditions.

RESULTS

LLeps negative peak latency (N2) and SRT were abnormally delayed in patients in all conditions. AW was only abnormally prolonged in the React condition but the time difference between AW and the negative peak of the LLeps was not different in the two groups. There was a significant negative correlation between SRT and AW or LLeps amplitude in patients but not in healthy subjects.

CONCLUSION

Our HD patients did not show abnormalities in conscious perception of sensory stimuli but their LLeps abnormalities were more marked when they had to react. This is compatible with failure to detect stimulus salience rather than with a cognitive defect.

SIGNIFICANCE

HD patients at early stages of the disease have preserved subjective perception of sensation but faulty sensorimotor integration.

Differential Visual Processing of Animal Images, with and without Conscious Awareness

The human visual system can quickly and efficiently extract categorical information from a complex natural scene. The rapid detection of animals in a scene is one compelling example of this phenomenon, and it suggests the automatic processing of at least some types of categories with little or no attentional requirements (Li et al., 2002, 2005). The aim of this study is to investigate whether the remarkable capability to categorize complex natural scenes exist in the absence of awareness, based on recent reports that “invisible” stimuli, which do not reach conscious awareness, can still be processed by the human visual system (Pasley et al., 2004; Williams et al., 2004; Fang and He, 2005; Jiang et al., 2006, 2007; Kaunitz et al., 2011a). In two experiments, we recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) in response to animal and non-animal/vehicle stimuli in both aware and unaware conditions in a continuous flash suppression (CFS) paradigm. Our results indicate that even in the “unseen” condition, the brain responds differently to animal and non-animal/vehicle images, consistent with rapid activation of animal-selective feature detectors prior to, or outside of, suppression by the CFS mask.

No attentional capture from invisible flicker

We tested whether fast flicker can capture attention using eight flicker frequencies from 20–96 Hz, including several too high to be perceived (>50 Hz). Using a 480 Hz visual display rate, we presented smoothly sampled sinusoidal temporal modulations at: 20, 30, 40, 48, 60, 69, 80, and 96 Hz. We first established flicker detection rates for each frequency. Performance was at or near ceiling until 48 Hz and dropped sharply to chance level at 60 Hz and above. We then presented the same flickering stimuli as pre-cues in a visual search task containing five elements. Flicker location varied randomly and was therefore congruent with target location on 20% of trials. Comparing congruent and incongruent trials revealed a very strong congruency effect (faster search for cued targets) for all detectable frequencies (20–48 Hz) but no effect for faster flicker rates that were detected at chance. This pattern of results (obtained with brief flicker cues: 58 ms) was replicated for long flicker cues (1000 ms) intended to allow for entrainment to the flicker frequency. These results indicate that only visible flicker serves as an exogenous attentional cue and that flicker rates too high to be perceived are completely ineffective.

The tilt illusion: phenomenology and functional implications

The perceived orientation of a line or grating is affected by the orientation structure of the surrounding image: the tilt illusion. Here, I offer a selective review of the literature on the tilt illusion, focusing on functional aspects. The review explores the merits of mechanistic accounts of the tilt illusion based upon sensory gain control in which neuronal responses are normalized by the pooled activity of other units. The role of inhibition between orientation-selective neurons is discussed, and it is argued that their associated disinhibition must also be taken into account in order to model the full angular dependence of the tilt illusion on surround orientation. Parallels are drawn with adaptation as modulation by the temporal rather than spatial context within which an image fragment is processed. The chromatic selectivity of the tilt illusion and the extent of its dependence on the visibility of the surround are used to infer characteristics of the neuronal normalization pools and the loci in the cortical processing hierarchy at which gain control operates. Finally, recent evidence is discussed as to the possible clinical relevance of the tilt illusion as a biomarker for schizophrenia.

Integration of 3D structure from disparity into biological motion perception independent of depth awareness

Images projected onto the retinas of our two eyes come from slightly different directions in the real world, constituting binocular disparity that serves as an important source for depth perception - the ability to see the world in three dimensions. It remains unclear whether the integration of disparity cues into visual perception depends on the conscious representation of stereoscopic depth. Here we report evidence that, even without inducing discernible perceptual representations, the disparity-defined depth information could still modulate the visual processing of 3D objects in depth-irrelevant aspects. Specifically, observers who could not discriminate disparity-defined in-depth facing orientations of biological motions (i.e., approaching vs. receding) due to an excessive perceptual bias nevertheless exhibited a robust perceptual asymmetry in response to the indistinguishable facing orientations, similar to those who could consciously discriminate such 3D information. These results clearly demonstrate that the visual processing of biological motion engages the disparity cues independent of observers' depth awareness. The extraction and utilization of binocular depth signals thus can be dissociable from the conscious representation of 3D structure in high-level visual perception.

The role of consciousness in cognitive control and decision making

Here we review studies on the complexity and strength of unconscious information processing. We focus on empirical evidence that relates awareness of information to cognitive control processes (e.g., response inhibition, conflict resolution, and task-switching), the life-time of information maintenance (e.g., working memory) and the possibility to integrate multiple pieces of information across space and time. Overall, the results that we review paint a picture of local and specific effects of unconscious information on various (high-level) brain regions, including areas in the prefrontal cortex. Although this neural activation does not elicit any conscious experience, it is functional and capable of influencing many perceptual, cognitive (control) and decision-related processes, sometimes even for relatively long periods of time. However, recent evidence also points out interesting dissociations between conscious and unconscious information processing when it comes to the duration, flexibility and the strategic use of that information for complex operations and decision-making. Based on the available evidence, we conclude that the role of task-relevance of subliminal information and meta-cognitive factors in unconscious cognition need more attention in future work.

Postdictive modulation of visual orientation

The present study investigated how visual orientation is modulated by subsequent orientation inputs. Observers were presented a near-vertical Gabor patch as a target, followed by a left- or right-tilted second Gabor patch as a distracter in the spatial vicinity of the target. The task of the observers was to judge whether the target was right- or left-tilted (Experiment 1) or whether the target was vertical or not (Supplementary experiment). The judgment was biased toward the orientation of the distracter (the postdictive modulation of visual orientation). The judgment bias peaked when the target and distracter were temporally separated by 100 ms, indicating a specific temporal mechanism for this phenomenon. However, when the visibility of the distracter was reduced via backward masking, the judgment bias disappeared. On the other hand, the low-visibility distracter could still cause a simultaneous orientation contrast, indicating that the distracter orientation is still processed in the visual system (Experiment 2). Our results suggest that the postdictive modulation of visual orientation stems from spatiotemporal integration of visual orientation on the basis of a slow feature matching process.

Attentional routes to conscious perception

The relationships between spatial attention and conscious perception are currently the object of intense debate. Recent evidence of double dissociations between attention and consciousness cast doubt on the time-honored concept of attention as a gateway to consciousness. Here we review evidence from behavioral, neurophysiologic, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging experiments, showing that distinct sorts of spatial attention can have different effects on visual conscious perception. While endogenous, or top-down attention, has weak influence on subsequent conscious perception of near-threshold stimuli, exogenous, or bottom-up forms of spatial attention appear instead to be a necessary, although not sufficient, step in the development of reportable visual experiences. Fronto-parietal networks important for spatial attention, with peculiar inter-hemispheric differences, constitute plausible neural substrates for the interactions between exogenous spatial attention and conscious perception.

Task-irrelevant blindsight and the impact of invisible stimuli

Despite their subjective invisibility, stimuli presented within regions of absolute cortical blindness can both guide forced-choice behavior when they are task-relevant and modulate responses to visible targets when they are task-irrelevant. We here tested three hemianopic patients to learn whether their performance in an attention-demanding rapid serial visual presentation task would be affected by task-irrelevant stimuli. Per trial, nine black letters and one white target letter appeared briefly at fixation; the white letter was to be named at the end of each trial. On 50% of trials, a task-irrelevant disk (-0.6 log contrast) was presented to the blind field; in separate blocks, the same or a very low negative contrast distractor was presented to the sighted field. Mean error rates were high and independent of distractor condition, although the high-contrast sighted-field disk impaired performance significantly in one participant. However, when trials with and without distractors were considered separately, performance was most impaired by the high-contrast disk in the blind field, whereas the same disk in the sighted field had no effect. As this disk was least visible in the blind and most visible in the sighted field, attentional suppression was inversely related to visibility. We suggest that visual awareness, or the processes that generate it and are compromised in the blind hemisphere, enhances or enables effective attentional suppression.

Unconscious High-Level Information Processing

Theories about the neural correlates and functional relevance of consciousness have traditionally assigned a crucial role to the prefrontal cortex in generating consciousness as well as in orchestrating high-level conscious control over behavior. However, recent neuroscientific findings show that prefrontal cortex can be activated unconsciously. The depth, direction, and scope of these activations depend on several top-down factors such as the task being probed (task-set, strategy) and on (temporal/spatial) attention. Regardless, such activations—when mediated by feedforward activation only—do not lead to a conscious sensation. Although unconscious, these prefrontal activations are functional, in the sense that they are associated with behavioral effects of cognitive control, such as response inhibition, task switching, conflict monitoring, and error detection. These findings challenge the pivotal role of the prefrontal cortex in consciousness. Instead, it appears that specific brain areas (or cognitive modules) may support specific cognitive functions but that consciousness is independent of this. Conscious sensations arise only when the brain areas involved engage in recurrent interactions enabling the long-lasting exchange of information between brain regions. Moreover, recent evidence suggests that also the state of consciousness, for example, in vegetative state patients or during sleep and anesthesia, is closely related to the scope and extent of residual recurrent interactions among brain regions.

Consciousness and attention: on sufficiency and necessity

Recent research has slowly corroded a belief that selective attention and consciousness are so tightly entangled that they cannot be individually examined. In this review, we summarize psychophysical and neurophysiological evidence for a dissociation between top-down attention and consciousness. The evidence includes recent findings that show subjects can attend to perceptually invisible objects. More contentious is the finding that subjects can become conscious of an isolated object, or the gist of the scene in the near absence of top-down attention; we critically re-examine the possibility of "complete" absence of top-down attention. We also cover the recent flurry of studies that utilized independent manipulation of attention and consciousness. These studies have shown paradoxical effects of attention, including examples where top-down attention and consciousness have opposing effects, leading us to strengthen and revise our previous views. Neuroimaging studies with EEG, MEG, and fMRI are uncovering the distinct neuronal correlates of selective attention and consciousness in dissociative paradigms. These findings point to a functional dissociation: attention as analyzer and consciousness as synthesizer. Separating the effects of selective visual attention from those of visual consciousness is of paramount importance to untangle the neural substrates of consciousness from those for attention.

Modulations of temporal perception by consciously and unconsciously perceived stimuli

Temporal processing is of fundamental importance to the understanding of orders and durations of events in daily life. While recent research found that the perception of event durations is modulated by the visibility of perceived stimuli, it is still not known whether consciously and unconsciously perceived stimuli modulate temporal perception of a following stimulus in a similar vein. We investigated this using a temporal-comparison task that requires duration judgments of a standard stimulus and a probe. A prime prior to the standard stimulus reduced the subjective duration of the standard stimulus when observers were aware of the prime, and this effect changed with the temporal distance between the prime and standard. In contrast, a prime increased the subjective duration of the following standard stimulus when observers were unaware of the presence of the prime. Our findings indicate that a temporally neighbouring transient stimulus produces essentially different effects on temporal perception of following events when it is consciously and unconsciously perceived, leading to compression and expansion of subjective time, respectively.

Consciousness mediated by neural transition states: how invisibly rapid motions can become visible

When observers view a rapidly moving stimulus they may see only a static streak. We report that there can be a transient percept of motion if such a moving stimulus is preceded or followed by a stationary image of that stimulus. A ring of dots was rotated so rapidly observers only saw a continuous outline circle and could not report its rotation direction. When an objectively stationary ring of dots preceded or followed this rotating ring, the stationary ring appeared to visibly launch into motion from a standstill or visibly rotate to a halt, principally in the same direction as the actual rapid rotation. Thus, motions too rapid to be consciously perceived as motion can nonetheless be processed by the visual system, and generate neural transition states that are consciously experienced as motion percepts. We suggest such transition states might serve a unifying function by bridging discontinuous motion states.

Seeing the invisible: the scope and limits of unconscious processing in binocular rivalry

When an image is presented to one eye and a very different image is presented to the corresponding location of the other eye, the two images compete for conscious representations, such that only one image is visible at a time while the other is suppressed. Called binocular rivalry, this phenomenon and its deviants have been extensively exploited to study the mechanism and neural correlates of consciousness. In this paper, we propose a framework - the unconscious binding hypothesis - to distinguish unconscious processing from conscious processing. According to this framework, the unconscious mind not only encodes individual features but also temporally binds distributed features to give rise to cortical representations; unlike conscious binding, however, unconscious binding is fragile. Under this framework, we review evidence from psychophysical and neuroimaging studies and come to two important conclusions. First, processing of invisible features depends on the "level" of the features as defined by their neural mechanisms. For low-level simple features, prolonged exposure to visual patterns (e.g. tilt) and simple translational motion can alter the appearance of subsequent visible features (i.e. adaptation). For invisible high-level features, complex spiral motion cannot produce adaptation, nor can objects/words enhance subsequent processing of related stimuli (i.e. priming). Yet images of tools can activate the dorsal pathway. Second, processing of invisible features has functional significance. Although invisible central cues cannot orient attention, invisible erotic pictures in the periphery can nevertheless guide attention, likely through emotional arousal; reciprocally, the processing of invisible information can be modulated by attention.

Invisible motion contributes to simultaneous motion contrast

The purpose of the present study was two-fold. First we examined whether visible motion appearance was altered by the spatial interaction between invisible and visible motion. We addressed this issue by means of simultaneous motion contrast, in which a horizontal test grating with a counterphase luminance modulation was seen to have the opposite motion direction to a peripheral inducer grating with unidirectional upward or downward motion. Using a mirror stereoscope, observers viewed the inducer and test gratings with one eye, and continuous flashes of colorful squares forming an annulus shape with the other eye. The continuous flashes rendered the inducer subjectively invisible. The observers' task was to report whether the test grating moved upward or downward. Consequently, simultaneous motion contrast was observed even when the inducer was invisible (Experiment 1). Second, we examined whether the observers could correctly respond to the direction of invisible motion: It was impossible (Experiment 2).

Perceptual and physiological evidence for a role for early visual areas in motion-induced blindness

Visual disappearance illusions, such as motion-induced blindness, are commonly used to study the neural correlates of visual perception. In such illusions a salient visual target becomes perceptually invisible. Previous studies are inconsistent regarding the role of early visual areas in these illusions. Here we provide physiological and psychophysical evidence suggesting a role for early visual areas in generating motion-induced blindness, and we provide a conceptual model by which different brain areas might contribute to the perceptual disappearance in this illusion.

Retinotopy of the face aftereffect

Physiological results for the size of face-specific units in inferotemporal cortex (IT) support an extraordinarily large range of possible sizes--from 2.5 degrees to 30 degrees or more. We use a behavioral test of face-specific aftereffects to measure the face analysis regions and find a coarse retinotopy consistent with receptive fields of intermediate size (10 degrees -12 degrees at 3 degrees eccentricity). In the first experiment, observers were adapted to a single face at 3 degrees from fixation. A test (a morph of the face and its anti-face) was then presented at different locations around fixation and subjects classified it as face or anti-face. The face aftereffect (FAE) was not constant at all test locations--it dropped to half its maximum value for tests 5 degrees from the adapting location. Simultaneous adaptation to both a face and its anti-face, placed at opposite locations across fixation, produced two separate regions of opposite aftereffects. However, with four stimuli, faces alternating with anti-faces equally spaced around fixation, the FAE was greatly reduced at all locations, implying a fairly coarse localization of the aftereffect. In the second experiment, observers adapted to a face and its anti-face presented either simultaneously or in alternation. Results showed that the simultaneous presentation of a face and its anti-face leads to stronger FAEs than sequential presentation, suggesting that face processing has a dynamic nature and its region of analysis is sharpened when there is more than one face in the scene. In the final experiment, a face and two anti-face flankers with different spatial offsets were presented during adaptation and the FAE was measured at the face location. Results showed that FAE at the face location was inhibited more as the distance of anti-face flankers to the face stimulus was reduced. This confirms the spatial extent of face analysis regions in a test with a fixed number of stimuli where only distance varied.

Priming by motion too rapid to be consciously seen

When a rapidly rotating ring of dots was briefly flashed, observers saw only a solid ring with no discriminable rotation. However, when this stimulus served as a prime that was followed by a target that consisted of a clearly rotating ring of dots, response times (RTs) to report the target's rotation were shorter when the prime and target directions were congruent than when they were incongruent. In accord with shape priming data, this priming effect increased monotonically with the prime-target stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA). The prime also biased the perceived direction of an ambiguous apparent motion target, but only at an intermediate SOA. At the same SOA, we also found that target presentations enabled above-chance discrimination of prime's rotation direction. These outcomes demonstrate the processing of motion direction information that is not phenomenally represented. They suggest a common mechanism may mediate the priming of RTs by shape and motion, whereas a different mechanism mediates perceptual measures of motion priming.

The scope and limits of top-down attention in unconscious visual processing

Attentional selection plays a critical role in conscious perception. When attention is diverted, even salient stimuli fail to reach visual awareness. Attention can be voluntarily directed to a spatial location or a visual feature for facilitating the processing of information relevant to current goals. In everyday situations, attention and awareness are tightly coupled. This has led some to suggest that attention and awareness might be based on a common neural foundation, whereas others argue that they are mediated by distinct mechanisms. A body of evidence shows that visual stimuli can be processed at multiple stages of the visual-processing streams without evoking visual awareness. To illuminate the relationship between visual attention and conscious perception, we investigated whether top-down attention can target and modulate the neural representations of unconsciously processed visual stimuli. Our experiments show that spatial attention can target only consciously perceived stimuli, whereas feature-based attention can modulate the processing of invisible stimuli. The attentional modulation of unconscious signals implies that attention and awareness can be dissociated, challenging a simplistic view of the boundary between conscious and unconscious visual processing.

Attention and consciousness: two distinct brain processes

The close relationship between attention and consciousness has led many scholars to conflate these processes. This article summarizes psychophysical evidence, arguing that top-down attention and consciousness are distinct phenomena that need not occur together and that can be manipulated using distinct paradigms. Subjects can become conscious of an isolated object or the gist of a scene despite the near absence of top-down attention; conversely, subjects can attend to perceptually invisible objects. Furthermore, top-down attention and consciousness can have opposing effects. Such dissociations are easier to understand when the different functions of these two processes are considered. Untangling their tight relationship is necessary for the scientific elucidation of consciousness and its material substrate.

Preceding stimulus awareness augments offset-evoked potentials: evidence from motion-induced blindness

Event-related potentials (ERPs) were measured in response to the objective offset of a visual disk under two physically similar conditions: (1) visible conditions in which the target disk was well perceived and (2) invisible conditions in which participants reported to have not seen the target because of motion-induced blindness (Bonneh, Cooperman, & Sagi in Nature 411:798-801, 2001). Electrophysiological responses to the physical offset of the target disk were almost completely absent in the invisible conditions (Experiment 2). In the same conditions, the physical offset was almost completely invisible (Experiment 1). Results suggest an augmenting function of prior awareness of a stimulus for the offset-triggered ERP of that stimulus.

Suppressed Patterns Alter Vision during Binocular Rivalry

Binocular rivalry occurs when incongruent patterns are presented to corresponding regions of the retinas, leading to fluctuations of awareness between the patterns . One attribute of a stimulus may rival whereas another may combine between the eyes , but it is typically assumed that the dominant features are perceived veridically. Here, we show this is not necessarily the case and that a suppressed visual feature can alter dominant perception. The cortical representations of oriented gratings can interact even when one of them is perceptually suppressed, such that the perceived orientation of the dominant grating is systematically biased depending on the orientation of the suppressed grating. A suppressed inducing pattern has the same qualitative effect as a visible one, but suppression reduces effective contrast by a factor of around six. A simple neural model quantifies and helps explain these illusions. These results demonstrate that binocular rivalry suppression operates in a graded fashion across multiple sites in the visual hierarchy rather than truncating processing at a single site and that suppressed visual information can alter dominant vision in real-time.

Continuous flash suppression reduces negative afterimages

Illusions that produce perceptual suppression despite constant retinal input are used to manipulate visual consciousness. Here we report on a powerful variant of existing techniques, continuous flash suppression. Distinct images flashed successively at approximately 10 Hz into one eye reliably suppress an image presented to the other eye. The duration of perceptual suppression is at least ten times greater than that produced by binocular rivalry. Using this tool we show that the strength of the negative afterimage of an adaptor was reduced by half when it was perceptually suppressed by input from the other eye. The more completely the adaptor was suppressed, the more strongly the afterimage intensity was reduced. Paradoxically, trial-to-trial visibility of the adaptor did not correlate with the degree of reduction. Our results imply that formation of afterimages involves neuronal structures that access input from both eyes but that do not correspond directly to the neuronal correlates of perceptual awareness.

Contextual modulation outside of awareness

Contextual effects are ubiquitous in vision and reveal fundamental principles of sensory coding. Here, we demonstrate that an oriented surround grating can affect the perceived orientation of a central test grating even when backward masking of the surround prevents its orientation from being consciously perceived. The effect survives introduction of a gap between test and surround of over a degree even under masking, suggesting either that contextual information can effectively propagate across early visual cortex in the absence of awareness of the signaled context or that it can proceed undetected to higher processing levels at which such horizontal propagation may not be necessary. The effect under masking also shows partial interocular transfer, demonstrating processing of orientation by binocular neurons in visual cortex in the absence of conscious orientation perception. This pattern of results is consistent with the suggestion that simultaneous orientation contrast is mediated at multiple levels of the visual processing hierarchy, and it supports the view that propagation of signals to and, possibly, back from higher visual areas is necessary for conscious perception.

Predicting the orientation of invisible stimuli from activity in human primary visual cortex

Humans can experience aftereffects from oriented stimuli that are not consciously perceived, suggesting that such stimuli receive cortical processing. Determining the physiological substrate of such effects has proven elusive owing to the low spatial resolution of conventional human neuroimaging techniques compared to the size of orientation columns in visual cortex. Here we show that even at conventional resolutions it is possible to use fMRI to obtain a direct measure of orientation-selective processing in V1. We found that many parts of V1 show subtle but reproducible biases to oriented stimuli, and that we could accumulate this information across the whole of V1 using multivariate pattern recognition. Using this information, we could then successfully predict which one of two oriented stimuli a participant was viewing, even when masking rendered that stimulus invisible. Our findings show that conventional fMRI can be used to reveal feature-selective processing in human cortex, even for invisible stimuli.

Face adaptation depends on seeing the face

Retinal input that is suppressed from visual awareness can nevertheless produce measurable aftereffects, revealing neural processes that do not directly result in a conscious percept. We here report that the face identity-specific aftereffect requires a visible face; it is effectively cancelled by binocular suppression or by inattentional blindness of the inducing face. Conversely, the same suppression does not interfere with the orientation-specific aftereffect. Thus, the competition between incompatible or interfering visual inputs to reach awareness is resolved before those aspects of information that are exploited in face identification are processed. We also found that the face aftereffect remained intact when the visual distracters in the inattention experiment were replaced with auditory distracters. Thus, cross-modal or cognitive interference that does not affect the visibility of the face does not interfere with the face aftereffect. We conclude that adaptation to face identity depends on seeing the face.

Motion-induced blindness does not affect the formation of negative afterimages

Aftereffects induced by invisible stimuli constitute a powerful tool to investigate what type of neural information processing can occur in the absence of visual awareness. This approach has been successfully used to demonstrate that awareness of oriented gratings or translating stimuli is not necessary to obtain a robust orientation-specific or motion-specific aftereffect. We exploit motion-induced blindness (MIB, Bonneh, Cooperman, & Sagi, 2001) to investigate the related question of the influence of visual awareness on the formation of negative afterimages. Our results show that MIB does not affect the persistence and intensity of afterimages. Thus, there is no significant contribution to the formation of afterimages beyond the sites mediating MIB.