The McCollough effect reveals orientation discrimination in a case of cortical blindness

■ REVIEW : Parallel Processing, Asynchronous Perception, and a Distributed System of Consciousness in Vision

The primate visual brain is characterized by a set of parallel, multistage systems that are specialized to process different attributes of the visual scene. They occupy spatially distinct positions in the visual brain and do not project to a unique common area. These processing systems are also perceptual systems, because the result of activity in each leads to the perception of the relevant visual attribute. But the different processing-perceptual systems require different times to complete their tasks, thus leading to another char acteristic of the visual brain, a temporal hierarchy for perception. Together, these two characteristics—of parallel processing and temporal hierarchy—suggest that each processing-perceptual system can act with fair autonomy. Studies of the diseased human brain show that activity in separate processing-perceptual systems—especially those concerned with color and motion—can lead to the perception of the relevant attribute even when the other processing systems are inactive and that activity in individual processing- perceptual systems has a conscious experience as a correlate, which suggests that consciousness itself is a modular, distributed system. NEUROSCIENTIST 4:365-372, 1998

Perception of the Mccollough Effect Correlates with Activity in Extrastriate Cortex: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study

The McCollough effect is a striking color aftereffect that is linked to the orientation of the patterns used to induce it. To produce the McCollough effect, two differently oriented grating patterns, such as a red-and-black vertical grating and a green-and-black horizontal grating, are viewed alternately for a few minutes. After such colored gratings are viewed, the white sections of a vertical black-and-white test grating appear to be tinged with green, and the white sections of a horizontal grating appear to be tinged with pink. We present evidence from a functional magnetic resonance imaging study that the perception of the McCollough effect correlates with increased activation in the lingual and fusiform gyri—extrastriate visual areas that have been implicated in color perception in humans.

The Interaction of Spatial and Object Pathways: Evidence from Balint's Syndrome

An earlier report described a patient (RM) with bilateral parietal damage who showed severe binding problems between shape and color and shape and size (Friedman-Hill, Robertson, & Treisman, 1995). When shown two different-colored letters, RM reported a large number of illusory conjunctions (ICs) combining the shape of one letter with the color of the other, even when he was looking directly at one of them and had as long as 10 sec to respond. The lesions also produced severe deficits in locating and reaching for objects, and difficulty in seeing more than one object at a time, resulting in a neuropsychological diagnosis of Balint's syndrome or dorsal simultanagnosia. The pattern of deficits supported predictions of Treisman's Feature Integration Theory (FIT) that the loss of spatial information would lead to binding errors. They further suggested that the spatial information used in binding depends on intact parietal function. In the present paper we extend these findings and examine other deficits in RM that would be predicted by FIT. We show that: (1) Object individuation is impaired, making it impossible for him correctly to count more than one or two objects, even when he is aware that more are present. (2) Visual search for a target defined by a conjunction of features (requiring binding) is impaired, while the detection of a target defined by a unique feature is not. Search for the absence of a feature (0 among Qs) is also severely impaired, while search for the presence (Q among 0s) is not. Feature absence can only be detected when all the present features are bound to the nontarget items. (3) RM's deficits cannot be attributed to a general binding problem: binding errors were far more likely with simultaneous presentation where spatial information was required than with sequential presentation where time could be used as the medium for binding. (4) Selection for attention was severely impaired, whether it was based on the position of a marker or on some other feature (color). (5) Spatial information seems to exist that RM cannot access, suggesting that feature binding relies on a relatively late stage where implicit spatial information is made explicitly accessible. The data converge to support our conclusions that explicit spatial knowledge is necessary for the perception of accurately bound features, for accurate attentional selection, and for accurate and rapid search for a conjunction of features in a multiitem display. It is obviously necessary for directing attention to spatial locations, but the consequences of impairments in this ability seem also to affect object selection, object individuation, and feature integration. Thus, the functional effects of parietal damage are not limited to the spatial and attentional problems that have long been described in patients with Balint's syndrome. Damage to parietal areas also affects object perception through damage to spatial representations that are fundamental for spatial awareness.

Preserved Striate Cortex is Not Sufficient to Support the McCollough Effect: Evidence from two Patients with Cerebral Achromatopsia

The McCollough effect (ME) is a colour aftereffect contingent on pattern orientation. This effect is generally thought to be mediated by primary visual cortex (V1) although this has remained the subject of some debate. To determine whether V1 is in fact sufficient to subserve the ME, we compared McCollough adaptation in controls to adaptation in two patients with damage to ventrotemporal cortex, resulting in achromatopsia, but who have spared V1. Each of these patients has some residual colour abilities of which he is unaware. Participants performed a 2AFC orientation-discrimination task for pairs of oblique and vertical/horizontal gratings both before and after adaptation to red/green oblique induction gratings. Successful ME induction would manifest itself as an improvement in oblique-orientation discrimination owing to the additional colour cue after adaptation. Indeed, in controls oblique grating discrimination improved post-adaptation. Further, a subdivision of our control group demonstrated successful ME induction despite a lack of conscious awareness of the added colour cue, indicating that conscious colour awareness is not required for ME induction. The patients, however, did not show improvement in oblique-orientation discrimination, indicating a lack of ME induction. This suggests that V1 must be connected to higher cortical colour areas to drive ME induction.

Neural adaptation reveals state-dependent effects of transcranial magnetic stimulation

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is now widely used as a 'virtual' lesion paradigm to investigate behavioural functions, but the mechanisms through which it influences neural processing are unclear. To understand the differential effects of TMS on spatially overlapping populations of neurons we manipulated the relative activity levels of visual neurons by adapting subjects to a range of visual stimuli. By applying TMS to the visual cortex representing the central visual field we have shown in two experiments that the behavioural and perceptual effects of TMS depend on the state of adaptation of the neural population stimulated by TMS. Specifically, we have demonstrated that within the stimulated area TMS perceptually facilitates the attributes encoded by the less active neural population. We have demonstrated the generality of this principle for both suprathreshold and subthreshold TMS as well as for colour and orientation-contingent colour using both subjective reports and psychophsyical measures. These findings can explain how TMS disrupts cognitive functions and therefore have implications for all studies which use TMS to disrupt behaviour.

Visual feature conjunction in patients with schizophrenia: an event-related brain potential study

The neural mechanisms supporting performance during single feature and feature conjunction detection were investigated in patients with schizophrenia and age-matched controls using event-related brain potentials. In different blocks of trials, participants responded to visual targets defined by one of two colors, one of two orientations, or both color and orientation. All participants were faster and more accurate in detecting targets defined by a single feature than for targets defined by a conjunction of features. Relative to controls, patients made more errors and were slower in detecting targets defined by a combination of features. Patients also generated a smaller N2 wave to single and conjunctive targets, and showed greater P3b reduction over the right hemisphere for conjunctive targets than for targets defined by color only. In addition, target stimuli generated an increased negativity at the occipital sites that varied in scalp distribution with the attended features in controls but not in patients. Both behavioral and electrophysiological data provide converging evidence for deficits in integrating visual features in schizophrenia and suggest that processing features of visual objects in schizophrenia are partly supported by distinct functional networks.

Short-term depression at thalamocortical synapses contributes to rapid adaptation of cortical sensory responses in vivo

In vivo whole-cell recordings revealed that during repeated stimulation, synaptic responses to deflection of facial whiskers rapidly adapt. Extracellular recordings in the somatosensory thalamus revealed that part of the adaptation occurs subcortically, but because cortical adaptation is stronger and recovers more slowly, cortical mechanisms must also contribute. Trains of sensory stimuli that produce profound sensory adaptation did not alter intrinsic membrane properties, including resting membrane potential, input resistance, and current-evoked firing. Synaptic input evoked via intracortical stimulation was also unchanged; however, synaptic input from the somatosensory thalamus was depressed by sensory stimulation, and this depression recovered with a time course matching that of the recovery of sensory responsiveness. These data strongly suggest that synaptic depression of thalamic input to the cortex contributes to the dynamic regulation of neuronal sensitivity during rapid changes in sensory input.

Localization and globalization in conscious vision

The primate visual brain consists of many separate, functionally specialized processing systems, each consisting of several apparently hierarchical stages or nodes. The evidence reviewed here leads me to speculate (a) that the processing systems are autonomous with respect to one another, (b) that activity at each node reaches a perceptual end point at a different time, resulting in a perceptual asynchrony in vision, and (c) that, consequently, activity at each node generates a microconsciousness. Visual consciousness is therefore distributed in space and time, with the universal organizing principle of abstraction applied separately within each processing system. The consequence of spatially and temporally distributed microconsciousnesses is that their integration is a multistage, nonhierarchical process that may involve a neural "glue."

A conscious route to unconscious vision

Damage to the primary visual cortex can leave subjects with unconscious residual vision, or 'blindsight'. New research suggests that 'top-down' modulation by intact conscious visual processes can improve performance in the impaired visual domain, even though that domain still remains quite inaccessible to consciousness.

Unconscious letter discrimination is enhanced by association with conscious color perception in visual form agnosia

Adaptive behavior guided by unconscious visual cues occurs in patients with various kinds of brain damage as well as in normal observers, all of whom can process visual information of which they are fully unaware [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]. Little is known on the possibility that unconscious vision is influenced by visual cues that have access to consciousness [9]. Here we report a 'blind' letter discrimination induced through a semantic interaction with conscious color processing in a patient who is agnosic for visual shapes, but has normal color vision and visual imagery. In seeing the initial letters of color names printed in different colors, it is normally easier to name the print color when it is congruent with the initial letter of the color name than when it is not [10]. The patient could discriminate the initial letters of the words 'red' and 'green' printed in the corresponding colors significantly above chance but without any conscious accompaniment, whereas he performed at chance with the reverse color-letter mapping as well as in standard tests of letter reading. We suggest that the consciously perceived colors activated a representation of the corresponding word names and their component letters, which in turn brought out a partially successful, unconscious processing of visual inputs corresponding to the activated letter representations.

The neurological basis of conscious color perception in a blind patient

We have studied patient PB, who, after an electric shock that led to vascular insufficiency, became virtually blind, although he retained a capacity to see colors consciously. For our psychophysical studies, we used a simplified version of the Land experiments [Land, E. (1974) Proc. R. Inst. G. B. 47, 23-58] to learn whether color constancy mechanisms are intact in him, which amounts to learning whether he can assign a constant color to a surface in spite of changes in the precise wavelength composition of the light reflected from that surface. We supplemented our psychophysical studies with imaging ones, using functional magnetic resonance, to learn something about the location of areas that are active in his brain when he perceives colors. The psychophysical results suggested that color constancy mechanisms are severely defective in PB and that his color vision is wavelength-based. The imaging results showed that, when he viewed and recognized colors, significant increases in activity were restricted mainly to V1-V2. We conclude that a partly defective color system operating on its own in a severely damaged brain is able to mediate a conscious experience of color in the virtually total absence of other visual abilities.

The clinical and functional measurement of cortical (in)activity in the visual brain, with special reference to the two subdivisions (V4 and V4 alpha) of the human colour centre

We argue below that, at least in studying the visual brain, the old and simple methods of detailed clinical assessment and perimetric measurement still yield important insights into the organization of the visual brain as a whole, as well as the organization of the individual areas within it. To demonstrate our point, we rely especially on the motion and colour systems, emphasizing in particular how clinical observations predicted an important feature of the organization of the colour centre in the human brain. With the use of data from functional magnetic resonance imaging analysed by statistical parametric mapping and independent component analysis, we show that the colour centre is composed of two subdivisions, V4 and V4 alpha the two together constituting the V4 complex of the human brain. These two subdivisions are intimately linked anatomically and act cooperatively. The new evidence about the architecture of the colour centre might help to explain why the syndrome, cerebral achromatopsia, produced by lesions in it is so variable.

Toward a theory of visual consciousness

The visual brain consists of several parallel, functionally specialized processing systems, each having several stages (nodes) which terminate their tasks at different times; consequently, simultaneously presented attributes are perceived at the same time if processed at the same node and at different times if processed by different nodes. Clinical evidence shows that these processing systems can act fairly autonomously. Damage restricted to one system compromises specifically the perception of the attribute that that system is specialized for; damage to a given node of a processing system that leaves earlier nodes intact results in a degraded perceptual capacity for the relevant attribute, which is directly related to the physiological capacities of the cells left intact by the damage. By contrast, a system that is spared when all others are damaged can function more or less normally. Moreover, internally created visual percepts-illusions, afterimages, imagery, and hallucinations-activate specifically the nodes specialized for the attribute perceived. Finally, anatomical evidence shows that there is no final integrator station in the brain, one which receives input from all visual areas; instead, each node has multiple outputs and no node is recipient only. Taken together, the above evidence leads us to propose that each node of a processing-perceptual system creates its own microconsciousness. We propose that, if any binding occurs to give us our integrated image of the visual world, it must be a binding between microconsciousnesses generated at different nodes. Since any two microconsciousnesses generated at any two nodes can be bound together, perceptual integration is not hierarchical, but parallel and postconscious. By contrast, the neural machinery conferring properties on those cells whose activity has a conscious correlate is hierarchical, and we refer to it as generative binding, to distinguish it from the binding that might occur between the microconsciousnesses.

The theory of multistage integration in the visual brain

The theory of multistage integration is based on evidence that the visual brain consists of several parallel multistage processing systems, each specialized for a given attribute such as colour or motion. Each stage of a given system processes information at a distinct level of complexity. Our theory supposes that activity at any stage of a given multistage processing system is perceptually explicit--that is to say, it requires no further processing to generate a conscious experience. This activity can be integrated, or bound, with the perceptually explicit activity at any given stage of another or the same multistage processing system. Such binding is therefore not a process that generates a conscious experience, but rather one that brings different conscious experiences together. Many perceptual advantages result from such a flexible and dynamic integrative system. Conversely, there would be disadvantages to limiting perception and binding to hypothetical 'terminal' stages of such processing systems or to hypothetical 'integrator' areas. Although we formulate our hypothesis in terms of the visual brain, we believe it might form a general principle of brain functioning.

The autonomy of the visual systems and the modularity of conscious vision

Anatomical and physiological evidence shows that the primate visual brain consists of many distributed processing systems, acting in parallel. Psychophysical studies show that the activity in each of the parallel systems reaches its perceptual end-point at a different time, thus leading to a perceptual asynchrony in vision. This, together with clinical and human imaging evidence, suggests strongly that the processing systems are also perceptual systems and that the different processing-perceptual systems can act more or less autonomously. Moreover, activity in each can have a conscious correlate without necessarily involving activity in other visual systems. This leads us to conclude not only that visual consciousness is itself modular, reflecting the basic modular organization of the visual brain, but that the binding of cellular activity in the processing-perceptual systems is more properly thought of as a binding of the consciousnesses generated by each of them. It is this binding that gives us our integrated image of the visual world.

Motion after-effects and word contingency

Stimulus-selectivity in phenomena such as the McCollough effect and other contingent after effects are controversial. Word specific McCollough effects have been reported (Allan et al., Percept Psychophys 1989;45:104-113) that suggest an associative model rather then a neural one. However, failures to replicate make this finding controversial (Humphrey et al., J Exp Psychol: Gen 123:86-90). We applied the same contingency to the motion after-effect. Moving words, words paired with sine wave gratings and words composed of sine wave gratings failed to generate text contingent after-effects in stimulus situations that normally evoke motion after-effects. Thus, there was little evidence that motion adaptation can be made textually contingent.

Probing unconscious visual processing with the McCollough effect

The McCollough effect, an orientation-contingent color aftereffect, has been known for over 30 years and, like other aftereffects, has been taken as a means of probing the brain's operations psychophysically. In this paper, we review psychophysical, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging studies of the McCollough effect. Much of the evidence suggests that the McCollough effect depends on neural mechanisms that are located early in the cortical visual pathways, probably in V1. We also review evidence showing that the aftereffect can be induced without conscious perception of the induction patterns. Based on these two lines of evidence, it is argued that our conscious visual experience of the world arises in the cortical visual system beyond V1.

The asynchrony of consciousness

We present below a simple hypothesis on what we believe is a characteristic of visual consciousness. It is derived from facts about the visual brain revealed in the past quarter of a century, but it relies most especially on psychophysical evidence which shows that different attributes of the visual scene are consciously perceived at different times. This temporal asynchrony in visual perception reveals, we believe, a plurality of visual consciousnesses that are asynchronous with respect to each other, reflecting the modular organization of the visual brain. We further hypothesize that when two attributes (e.g. colour and motion) are presented simultaneously, the activity of cells in a given processing system is sufficient to create a conscious experience of the corresponding attribute (e.g. colour), without the necessity for interaction with the activities of cells in other processing systems (e.g. motion). Thus, any binding of the activity of cells in different systems should be more properly thought of as a binding of the conscious experiences generated in each system.

Towards the neuronal correlate of visual awareness

Several encouraging developments towards identifying the neuronal correlate of visual awareness have emerged recently. Increasingly sophisticated behavioral paradigms permit the study of visual awareness in humans as well as in non-human primates. In patients with anatomically restricted lesions in striate and extrastriate cortex, highly informative deficits of visual awareness are observed. Similar deficits can be obtained in normal observers with a novel class of psychophysical displays. Taken together, these results suggest that the contents of visual awareness reflect neuronal activity in certain extrastriate, but not in striate, visual cortical areas.

Visual aftereffect of texture density contigent on color of frame

An aftereffect of perceived texture density contingent on the color of a surrounding region is reported. In a series of experiments, participants were adapted, with fixation, to stimuli in which the relative density of two achromatic texture regions was perfectly correlated with the color presented in a surrounding region. Following adaptation, the perceived relative density of the two regions was contingent on the color of the surrounding region or of the texture elements themselves. For example, if high density on the left was correlated with a blue surround during adaptation (and high density on the right with a yellow surround), then in order for the left and right textures to appear equal in the assessment phase, denser texture was required on the left in the presence of a blue surround (and denser texture on the right in the context of a yellow surround). Contingent aftereffects were found (1) with black-and-white scatter-dot textures, (2) with luminance-balanced textures, and (3) when the texture elements, rather than the surrounds, were colored during assessment. Effect size was decreased when the elements themselves were colored, but also when spatial subportions of the surround were used for the presentation of color. The effect may be mediated by retinal color spreading (Pöppel, 1986) and appears consistent with a local associative account of contingent aftereffects, such as Barlow's (1990) model of modifiable inhibition.