Framework for the design and operation of high-level isolation units: consensus of the European Network of Infectious Diseases

Implementation of a High-Level Isolation Unit Readiness Checklist in the Irish Setting

A high-level isolation unit (HLIU) is a specially designed biocontainment unit for suspected or confirmed high-consequence infectious diseases. For most HLIUs, maintaining readiness during times of inactivity is a challenge. In this case study, we describe a checklist approach to assess HLIU readiness to rapidly operate upon activation. This checklist includes readiness criteria in several domains, such as infrastructure, human resources, and material supplies, that are required to safely activate the unit at any time. The checklist audit tool was derived from a novel activation readiness checklist published by the biocontainment unit at The Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Maryland. It was then adapted for the Irish healthcare setting and implemented at the Mater Misericordiae University Hospital, Ireland's current isolation facility. Results from the audit were also used to inform recommendations for the construction of a new HLIU to open in 2025. The audit tool is user friendly, practical, and focuses on the essential elements of readiness to ensure a successful rapid operation.

Building a High-Level Isolation Unit in Rwanda and Establishing a Training Program for the Medical Management of Patients With High-Consequence Infectious Diseases

Rwanda is a country in East Africa, a region characterized by highly mobile populations and outbreaks of high-consequence infectious diseases occurring on a regular basis. To increase the level of outbreak preparedness in the region, the Rwandan government and the German Ministry of Health signed a joint agreement to construct a new high-level isolation unit in Rwanda, the first in East Africa, and implement a training program for Rwandan healthcare workers to equip them with the necessary skills and knowledge for medical management of patients under high-level isolation conditions, including intensive care treatment. To better understand the scope and format of the planned training program, a needs assessment was performed based on findings from a standardized survey of 4 intensive care units in Rwanda as well as observations from 2 members of a German high-level isolation unit who completed clinical internships at Rwandan hospitals. In this case study, we describe the necessary steps to promote the sustainability and capabilities of the new high-level isolation unit in Kigali and ensure the successful implementation of the training program.

High-Level Isolation: A Landscape Analysis of Global Capabilities and Opportunities to Advance the Field

High-level isolation units (HLIUs) have been established by countries to provide safe and optimal medical care for patients with high-consequence infectious diseases. We aimed to identify global high-level isolation capabilities and determine gaps and priorities of global HLIUs, using a multiple method approach that included a systematic review of published and gray literature and a review of Joint External Evaluations and Global Health Security Index reports from 112 countries. A follow-up electronic survey was distributed to identified HLIUs. The landscape analysis found 44 previously designated/self-described HLIUs in 19 countries. An additional 33 countries had potential HLIUs; however, there were not enough details on capabilities to determine if they fit the HLIU definition. An electronic survey was distributed to 36 HLIUs to validate landscape analysis findings and to understand challenges, best practices, and priorities for increased networking with a global HLIU cohort; 31 (86%) HLIUs responded. Responses revealed an additional 30 confirmed HLIUs that were not identified in the landscape analysis. To our knowledge, this was the first mapping and the largest ever survey of global HLIUs. Survey findings identified major gaps in visibility of HLIUs: while our landscape analysis initially identified 44 units, the survey unveiled an additional 30 HLIUs that had not been previously identified or confirmed. The lack of formalized regional or global coordinating organizations exacerbates these visibility gaps. The unique characteristics and capabilities of these facilities, coupled with the likelihood these units serve as core components of national health security plans, provides an opportunity for increased connection and networking to advance the field of high-level isolation and address identified gaps in coordination, build an evidence base for HLIU approaches, and inform HLIU definitions and key components.

Improving Safety and Comfort of Healthcare Workers Caring for Patients With High-Consequence Infectious Diseases in a High-Level Isolation Unit Using Innovative Approaches

Patients with high-consequence infectious diseases (HCIDs) require high-quality care by specially trained staff in a high-level isolation unit (HLIU) that follows strict infection prevention and control (IPC) measures. Caring for patients with (suspected) HCID is challenging, mainly because of the strict personal protective equipment (PPE) and IPC protocols healthcare workers (HCW) must adhere to for protection. The Radboud University Medical Center, located in Nijmegen, the Netherlands, has been a dedicated HLIU facility since 2008. A newly built HLIU opened in May 2022, and encouraged us to review the existing PPE selection, IPC protocols, and HCID training program to improve safety and comfort for HCWs working in the HLIU. Based on a systematic search through (inter)national HCID PPE guidelines and semistructured interviews with end users, we selected an improved, more comfortable set of PPE. Additionally, we developed a more concise and easier-to-use patient care process flow and implemented a new teaching strategy. The new way of working was tested in October 2022 when the first 2 patients with suspected HCID were admitted to our unit. We used surveys to evaluate the experiences of HCWs involved in this care to further improve the workflow of the unit. When optimizing safety and comfort for HCWs, it is important to consider (inter)national guidelines as well as user preferences. By systematically evaluating recent experiences of patient admission to the HLIU and then adjusting protocols and training, we can ensure that the quality of provided healthcare and the safety of HCWs working in the HLIU remains high.

Building a biocontainment unit: Infrastructure and organizational experiences of the 13 regional biocontainment units in the United States

In the United States, the system for special pathogen patient care incorporates a network of federally funded US biocontainment units that maintain operational readiness to care for patients afflicted by high-consequence infectious diseases (HCIDs). This network has expanded in number of facilities and in scope, serving as a regional resource for special pathogen preparedness. Lessons learned for maintaining these units are shared with the intent of informing new and existing biocontainment units.

A narrative review of high-level isolation unit operational and infrastructure features

High-level isolation units (HLIUs) are specially designed facilities for care and management of patients with suspected or confirmed high-consequence infectious diseases (HCIDs), equipped with unique infrastructure and operational features. While individual HLIUs have published on their experiences caring for patients with HCIDs and two previous HLIU consensus efforts have outlined key components of HLIUs, we aimed to summarise the existing literature that describes best practices, challenges and core features of these specialised facilities. A narrative review of the literature was conducted using keywords associated with HLIUs and HCIDs. A total of 100 articles were used throughout the manuscript from the literature search or from alternate methods like reference checks or snowballing. Articles were sorted into categories (eg, physical infrastructure, laboratory, internal transport); for each category, a synthesis of the relevant literature was conducted to describe best practices, experiences and operational features. The review and summary of HLIU experiences, best practices, challenges and components can serve as a resource for units continuing to improve readiness, or for hospitals in early stages of developing their HLIU teams and planning or constructing their units. The COVID-19 pandemic, a global outbreak of mpox, sporadic cases of viral haemorrhagic fevers in Europe and the USA, and recent outbreaks of Lassa fever, Sudan Ebolavirus, and Marburg emphasise the need for an extensive summary of HLIU practices to inform readiness and response.

A Restructured Hospital Into a One-Building Organization for COVID-19 Patients: A Resilient and Effective Response to the Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic is a unique crisis challenging healthcare institutions as it rapidly overwhelmed hospitals due to a large influx of patients. This major event forced all the components of the healthcare systems to adapt and invent new workflows. Thus, our tertiary care hospital was reorganized entirely. During the cruising phase, additional staff was allocated to a one-building organization comprising an intensive care unit (ICU), an acute care unit, a physical medicine and rehabilitation unit, and a COVID-19 screening area. The transfer of patients from a ward to another was more efficient due to these organizations and pavilion structure. The observed mortality was low in the acute care ward, except in the palliative unit. No nosocomial infection with SARS-CoV-2 was reported in any other building of the hospital since this organization was set up. This type of one-building organization, integrating all the components for comprehensive patient care, seems to be the most appropriate response to pandemics.

The Effectiveness of the Anteroom (Vestibule) Area on Hospital Infection Control and Health Staff Safety: A Systematic Review

The emergence of SARS-CoV2 in 2019 showed again that the world's healthcare system is not fully equipped and well-designed for preventing the transmission of nosocomial respiratory infections. One of the great tools for preventing the spread of infectious organisms in hospitals is the anteroom. Several articles have investigated the role of the anteroom in disease control but the lack of a comprehensive study in this field prompted us to provide more in-depth information to fill this gap. Also, this study aimed to assess the necessity to construct an anteroom area for hospital staff members at the entrance of each ward of the hospital, and specify the equipment and facilities which make the anteroom more efficient. Articles were identified through searches of Scopus, Web of Sciences, PubMed, and Embase for studies published in English until May 2020 reporting data on the effect of the anteroom (vestibule) area in controlling hospital infections. Data from eligible articles were extracted and presented according to PRISMA's evidence-based data evaluation search strategy. Also, details around the review aims and methods were registered with the PROSPERO. From the database, 209 articles were identified, of which 25 studies met the study criteria. Most studies demonstrated that an anteroom significantly enhances practical system efficiency. The results showed that the equipment such as ventilation system, high-efficiency particulate absorption filter, hand dispensers, alcohol-based disinfection, sink, mirror, transparent panel, UVC disinfection, and zone for PPE change, and parameters like temperature, door type, pressure, and size of the anteroom are factors that are effective on the safety of the hospital environment. Studies demonstrated that providing an anteroom for changing clothing and storing equipment may be useful in reducing the transmission of airborne infections in hospitals. Since the transmission route of SARS-CoV2 is common with other respiratory infectious agents, it can be concluded that a well-designed anteroom could potentially decrease the risk of SARS-CoV2 transmission during hospitalization as well.

Preparing for patients with high-consequence infectious diseases: Example of a high-level isolation unit

Introduction

Patients with high-consequence infectious diseases (HCID) are rare in Western Europe. However, high-level isolation units (HLIU) must always be prepared for patient admission. Case fatality rates of HCID can be reduced by providing optimal intensive care management. We here describe a single centre’s preparation, its embedding in the national context and the challenges we faced during the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus type 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic.

Methods

Ten team leaders organize monthly whole day trainings for a team of doctors and nurses from the HLIU focusing on intensive care medicine. Impact and relevance of training are assessed by a questionnaire and a perception survey, respectively. Furthermore, yearly exercises with several partner institutions are performed to cover different real-life scenarios. Exercises are evaluated by internal and external observers. Both training sessions and exercises are accompanied by intense feedback.

Results

From May 2017 monthly training sessions were held with a two-month and a seven-month break due to the first and second wave of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, respectively. Agreement with the statements of the questionnaire was higher after training compared to before training indicating a positive effect of training sessions on competence. Participants rated joint trainings for nurses and doctors at regular intervals as important. Numerous issues with potential for improvement were identified during post processing of exercises. Action plans for their improvement were drafted and as of now mostly implemented. The network of the permanent working group of competence and treatment centres for HCID (Ständiger Arbeitskreis der Kompetenz- und Behandlungszentren für Krankheiten durch hochpathogene Erreger (STAKOB)) at the Robert Koch-Institute (RKI) was strengthened throughout the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic.

Discussion

Adequate preparation for the admission of patients with HCID is challenging. We show that joint regular trainings of doctors and nurses are appreciated and that training sessions may improve perceived skills. We also show that real-life scenario exercises may reveal additional deficits, which cannot be easily disclosed in training sessions. Although the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic interfered with our activities the enhanced cooperation among German HLIU during the pandemic ensured constant readiness for the admission of HCID patients to our or to collaborating HLIU. This is a single centre’s experience, which may not be generalized to other centres. However, we believe that our work may address aspects that should be considered when preparing a unit for the admission of patients with HCID. These may then be adapted to the local situations.

Capabilities of global high-level isolation units: A pre-workshop survey

OBJECTIVE

To assess experience, physical infrastructure, and capabilities of high-level isolation units (HLIUs) planning to participate in a 2018 global HLIU workshop hosted by the US National Emerging Special Pathogens Training and Education Center (NETEC).

DESIGN

An electronic survey elicited information on general HLIU organization, operating costs, staffing models, and infection control protocols of select global units.

SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS

The survey was distributed to site representatives of 22 HLIUs located in the United States, Europe, and Asia; 19 (86%) responded.

METHODS

Data were coded and analyzed using descriptive statistics.

RESULTS

The mean annual reported budget for the 19 responding units was US$484,615. Most (89%) had treated a suspected or confirmed case of a high-consequence infectious disease. Reported composition of trained teams included a broad range of clinical and nonclinical roles. The mean number of HLIU beds was 6.37 (median, 4; range, 2-20) for adults and 4.23 (median, 2; range, 1-10) for children; however, capacity was dependent on pathogen.

CONCLUSIONS

Responding HLIUs represent some of the most experienced HLIUs in the world. Variation in reported unit infrastructure, capabilities, and procedures demonstrate the variety of HLIU approaches. A number of technical questions unique to HLIUs remain unanswered related to physical design, infection prevention and control procedures, and staffing and training. These key areas represent potential focal points for future evidence and practice guidelines. These data are important considerations for hospitals considering the design and development of HLIUs, and there is a need for continued global HLIU collaboration to define best practices.

Are coveralls required as personal protective equipment during the management of COVID-19 patients?

OBJECTIVES

Few studies have investigated the contamination of personal protective equipment (PPE) during the management of patients with severe-to-critical coronavirus disease (COVID-19). This study aimed to determine the necessity of coveralls and foot covers for body protection during the management of COVID-19 patients.

METHODS

PPE samples were collected from the coveralls of physicians exiting a room after the management of a patient with severe-to-critical COVID-19 within 14 days after the patient's symptom onset. The surface of coveralls was categorized into coverall-only parts (frontal surface of the head, anterior neck, dorsal surface of the foot cover, and back and hip) and gown-covered parts (the anterior side of the forearm and the abdomen). Sampling of the high-contact surfaces in the patient's environment was performed. We attempted to identify significant differences in contamination with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) between the coverall-only and gown-covered parts.

RESULTS

A total of 105 swabs from PPEs and 28 swabs from patient rooms were collected. Of the PPE swabs, only three (2.8%) swabs from the gown-covered parts were contaminated with SARS-CoV-2. However, 23 of the 28 sites (82.1%) from patient rooms were contaminated. There was a significant difference in the contamination of PPE between the coverall-only and gown-covered parts (0.0 vs 10.0%, p = 0.022).

CONCLUSIONS

Coverall contamination rarely occurred while managing severe-to-critical COVID-19 patients housed in negative pressure rooms in the early stages of the illness. Long-sleeved gowns may be used in the management of COVID-19 patients.

Optimizing Highly Infectious Disease Isolation Unit Management: Experiences From the Infectious Diseases Isolation and Research Unit, Fort Portal, Uganda

Infectious disease outbreaks on the scale of the current coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic are a new phenomenon in many parts of the world. Many isolation unit designs with corresponding workflow dynamics and personal protective equipment postures have been proposed for each emerging disease at the health facility level, depending on the mode of transmission. However, personnel and resource management at the isolation units for a resilient response will vary by human resource capacity, reporting requirements, and practice setting. This study describes an approach to isolation unit management at a rural Uganda Hospital and shares lessons from the Uganda experience for isolation unit managers in low- and middle-income settings.

Leveraging a preexisting global infectious disease network for local decision-making during a pandemic

Emerging infectious disease epidemics require a rapid response from health systems; however, evidence-based consensus guidelines are generally absent early in the course of events. Formed in 2017 by five high-level isolation units spanning three continents, the experience of the Global Infectious Disease Preparedness Network (GIDPN) early in the course of COVID-19 provides a model for accelerating best practice development and improving decision-making in health emergencies. The network served as a platform for real-time, open and transparent information-sharing during unknowns of an active outbreak by clinicians caring for patients, by researchers conducting clinical trials and transmission and infection prevention studies, and by teams advising local and national policymakers. Shared knowledge led to earlier adoption of some treatment modalities as compared to most peer institutions and to implementation of protocols prior to incorporation into national guidelines. GIDPN and similar networks are integral in enhancing preparedness for and response to future epidemics/pandemics.

Viewpoint of a WHO Advisory Group Tasked to Consider Establishing a Closely-monitored Challenge Model of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Healthy Volunteers

WHO convened an Advisory Group (AG) to consider the feasibility, potential value, and limitations of establishing a closely-monitored challenge model of experimental severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection and coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in healthy adult volunteers. The AG included experts in design, establishment, and performance of challenges. This report summarizes issues that render a COVID-19 model daunting to establish (the potential of SARS-CoV-2 to cause severe/fatal illness, its high transmissibility, and lack of a "rescue treatment" to prevent progression from mild/moderate to severe clinical illness) and it proffers prudent strategies for stepwise model development, challenge virus selection, guidelines for manufacturing challenge doses, and ways to contain SARS-CoV-2 and prevent transmission to household/community contacts. A COVID-19 model could demonstrate protection against virus shedding and/or illness induced by prior SARS-CoV-2 challenge or vaccination. A limitation of the model is that vaccine efficacy in experimentally challenged healthy young adults cannot per se be extrapolated to predict efficacy in elderly/high-risk adults.

A medicalized hotel as a public health resource for the containment of Covid-19: more than a place for quarantining

Background

To describe the implementation of a medicalized hotel in the community of Madrid as a public health resource for the containment of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) and to describe the characteristics of population benefitted.

Methods

A descriptive study of the implementation of the Via Castellana Medicalised Hotel (VCMH) was conducted. The average monthly household income, educational level and occupational social class of the subjects admitted were obtained through a survey conducted during their stay.

Results

There was no guidance for launching; however the hotel was coordinated by a tertiary referral hospital and attended the preventive medicine regulations and the decrees of legal regimes and authorization of health services in Madrid. Between 19 March and the 9 May 2020, 399 patients were admitted; 59% (235) were migrant; the main reason for referral (58%) was a lack of house conditions for quarantining, including overcrowding, which when compared with the migrant status a positive correlation was found. Some other reasons for referral were homelessness and eviction. Most of the survey participants had low monthly household income, educational level and social class.

Conclusions

This medicalized hotel provided medical care and offered housing to a subgroup of vulnerable population who could not afford a safe quarantine.

Prevention of SARS-CoV-2 transmission from international arrivals: Xiaotangshan Designated Hospital, China

A surge in the number of international arrivals awaiting coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) screening overwhelmed health-care workers and depleted medical resources in designated hospitals in Beijing, China in March 2020. The People’s Government of Beijing Municipality therefore issued a policy which required the mandatory transfer of all asymptomatic passengers arriving from a foreign country to designated quarantine hotels, and the transfer of passengers with fever or respiratory symptoms to designated hospitals. Xiaotangshan Designated Hospital, a severe acute respiratory syndrome hospital in 2003, was rapidly renovated and put into operation with the main tasks of screening and isolating symptomatic international arrivals at Beijing Capital International Airport, providing basic medical care for mild to moderate COVID-19-positive cases, and rapidly referring severe to critical COVID-19-positive cases to higher-level hospitals. During the month-long period of its operation, 2171 passengers were screened and 53 were confirmed as having COVID-19 (six severe to critical). We describe how the use of Xiaotangshan Designated Hospital in this way enabled the efficient grouping and assessment of passengers arriving from a foreign country, the provision of optimal patient care without compromising public safety and the prioritization of critically ill patients requiring life-saving treatment. The designated hospital is a successful example of the World Health Organization’s recommendation to renovate existing medical infrastructures to improve the COVID-19 response capacity. The flexible design of Xiaotangshan Designated Hospital means that it can be repurposed and reopened at any time to respond to the changing pandemic conditions.

The Risk of Not Being Ready: A Novel Approach to Managing Constant Readiness of a High-Level Isolation Unit During Times of Inactivity

The biocontainment unit at Johns Hopkins Hospital is a specially designed, inactive high-level isolation unit designated to care for patients infected with high-consequence pathogens. The unit team designed a facility-specific readiness scale and checklist that focus on infrastructure, consumable supplies, and staffing to assess activation readiness of the biocontainment unit. Over a period of 50 days and 14 days, these tools were used as part of a routine risk assessment to first identify barriers and then tier the impact of these barriers into activation categories of "Ready," "Ready with Considerations," and "Not Ready." The assessment identified the greatest risks to activation readiness were staffing and waste management capabilities. Assessing threats to activation readiness and the risk of not being ready should be a priority for maintaining facility, regional, and national capacity to safely isolate and care for patients infected with high-consequence pathogens while maintaining healthcare worker safety.

Elective Surgery During the SARS-CoV-2 Pandemic (COVID-19): A Morbimortality Analysis and Recommendations on Patient Prioritisation and Security Measures

Introduction

The spread of the SARS-CoV-2 infection (COVID-19) has required adaptation by hospitals affected by the pandemic, which has caused a reduction in elective surgical activity.

Methods

Retrospective study of patients operated on in the previous month and during the peak of the pandemic. We analysed the COVID-19 infection rate, the severity of respiratory infection according to the Brescia respiratory COVID-19 severity scale, the adopted therapeutic measures and the overall postoperative complications.

Results

From 17th February to 31st March 2020, there was a progressive decrease in surgical activity, with only 213 patients operated on. This comprised 59 (27.8%) elective operations for oncological diseases, 97 (45.5%) elective operations for benign diseases and 57 (26.7%) as urgent procedures.

There was a progressive increase in the rate of infection by COVID-19, with a total of 15 cases (7%). This included 10 patients (16.9%) in the elective group for oncological disease, 1 (1%) in the elective surgery group for benign disease and 4 (7%) in the urgent surgery group (P<.001). Five patients presented with a severe respiratory infection, of which 4 were affected by oncological disease. There were 3 deaths (1.4%), which were all due to the worsening of a respiratory infection.

Conclusions

The patients undergoing the surgical procedures showed high rates of COVID-19 infection and postoperative complications, especially the patients with oncological diseases. Local resumption of surgical activity must be based on the prioritisation of the cases to be operated on, respecting certain premises of security and optimisation of the available resources.

[Elective surgery during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic (COVID-19): a morbimortality analysis and recommendations on patient prioritisation and security measures]

INTRODUCTION

The spread of the SARS-CoV-2 infection (COVID-19) has required adaptation by hospitals affected by the pandemic, which has caused a reduction in elective surgical activity.

METHODS

Retrospective study of patients operated on in the previous month and during the peak of the pandemic. We analysed the COVID-19 infection rate, the severity of respiratory infection according to the Brescia respiratory COVID-19 severity scale, the adopted therapeutic measures and the overall postoperative complications.

RESULTS

From 17th February to 31st March 2020, there was a progressive decrease in surgical activity, with only 213 patients operated on. This comprised 59 (27.8%) elective operations for oncological diseases, 97 (45.5%) elective operations for benign diseases and 57 (26.7%) as urgent procedures.There was a progressive increase in the rate of infection by COVID-19, with a total of 15 cases (7%). This included 10 patients (16.9%) in the elective group for oncological disease, 1 (1%) in the elective surgery group for benign disease and 4 (7%) in the urgent surgery group (p < 0.001). Five patients presented with a severe respiratory infection, of which 4 were affected by oncological disease. There were 3 deaths (1.4%), which were all due to the worsening of a respiratory infection.

CONCLUSIONS

The patients undergoing the surgical procedures showed high rates of COVID-19 infection and postoperative complications, especially the patients with oncological diseases. Local resumption of surgical activity must be based on the prioritisation of the cases to be operated on, respecting certain premises of security and optimisation of the available resources.

Should Australian states and territories have designated COVID hospitals in low community transmission? Case study for Western Australia

This case study describes the process of selecting the most appropriate state-wide hospital system to manage COVID-19 cases in a setting of low community transmission of COVID-19 infection. A rapid review of the literature was conducted of the advantages and disadvantages of having designated COVID hospitals. This led to three different options being presented for discussion. Following consultation, the option chosen was for all hospital facilities to remain prepared to care for COVID-19 patients where they present rather than having specified designated hospitals because this was considered the most practical option currently.

Transforming a General Hospital to an Infectious Disease Hospital for COVID-19 Over 2 Weeks

Pandemics like the coronavirus disease (COVID)-19 can cause a significant strain on the healthcare system. Healthcare organizations must be ready with their contingency plans for managing many patients with contagious infectious disease. Ideally, every large hospital should have a facility that can function as a high-level isolation unit. An isolation unit ensures that the healthcare staff and the hospital are equipped to deal with infectious disease outbreaks. Unfortunately, such facilities do not exist in several hospitals, especially in resource-limited settings. In such a scenario, healthcare setups need to convert their existing general structure into an infectious disease facility. Herein, we describe our experience in transforming a general hospital into a functional infectious disease isolation unit.

Transport of COVID-19 and other highly contagious patients by helicopter and fixed-wing air ambulance: a narrative review and experience of the Swiss air rescue Rega

Background

The current COVID-19 pandemic highlights the challenges air ambulance services are facing when transporting highly infectious patients for several hours in enclosed spaces. This overview provides an example of a standard operating procedure (SOP) for infection prevention measures in HEMS missions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, we describe different methods used by several organizations in Europe and the experience of the Swiss air rescue organization Rega in transporting these patients.

Possible benefits of the use of small patient isolation units (PIU) are discussed, including the fact that accompanying medical personnel do not need to wear personal protective equipment (PPE) during the transport but can still maintain full access to the patient. Rega has developed and patented its own PIU. This device allows spontaneously breathing or mechanically ventilated patients to be transported in pressurized jet cabins, small helicopters and ambulance vehicles, without the need to change between transport units. This PIU is unique, as it remains air-tight even when there is a sudden loss of cabin pressure.

Conclusion

A wide variety of means are being used for the aeromedical transport of infectious patients. These involve isolating either the patient or the medical crew. One benefit of PIUs is that the means of transport can be easily changed without contaminating the surroundings and while still allowing access to the patient.

Fangcang shelter hospitals: a novel concept for responding to public health emergencies

Fangcang shelter hospitals are a novel public health concept. They were implemented for the first time in China in February, 2020, to tackle the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak. The Fangcang shelter hospitals in China were large-scale, temporary hospitals, rapidly built by converting existing public venues, such as stadiums and exhibition centres, into health-care facilities. They served to isolate patients with mild to moderate COVID-19 from their families and communities, while providing medical care, disease monitoring, food, shelter, and social activities. We document the development of Fangcang shelter hospitals during the COVID-19 outbreak in China and explain their three key characteristics (rapid construction, massive scale, and low cost) and five essential functions (isolation, triage, basic medical care, frequent monitoring and rapid referral, and essential living and social engagement). Fangcang shelter hospitals could be powerful components of national responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as future epidemics and public health emergencies.

Principles and Practices of Establishing a Hospital-Based Ebola Treatment Unit

Outbreaks of Ebola virus disease and high-risk transmissible infections are increasing and pose threats to health care workers and global health systems. Previous outbreaks offer lessons for health system preparedness and response, including establishment of hospital-based high-risk pathogen treatment units. Their creation demands early preparation and interprofessional coordination; infection prevention and control; case management training; prepositioning of supplies; conversion of existing structures to treatment units; and strengthening communication and research platforms. Hospital-based Ebola and high-risk pathogen treatment units may improve case detection, interrupt transmission, and improve staff safety and patient care.

US State Public Health Departments Special Pathogen Planning

CONTEXT

US state public health departments played key roles in planning for and responding to confirmed and suspected cases of Ebola virus disease (EVD) during the 2014-2016 outbreak, including designating select hospitals as high-level isolation units (HLIUs) for EVD treatment in conjunction with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

OBJECTIVE

To identify existing guidelines and perspectives of state health departments pertaining to the management and transport of patients with EVD and other highly hazardous communicable diseases (HHCDs).

DESIGN

An electronic 8-question survey with subquestions was administered as a fillable PDF.

SETTING

The survey was distributed to publicly accessible e-mails of state health department employees.

PARTICIPANTS

State epidemiologists, emergency preparedness directors, or chief medical officers from each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia were contacted; a representative from 36 states and the District of Columbia responded (73%).

MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES

Descriptive statistics were used to identify the proportion of state health departments with various existing protocols.

RESULTS

A majority of states reported that they would prefer patients confirmed with viral hemorrhagic fevers (eg, EVD, Marburg fever) and smallpox be transported to an HLIU for treatment rather than remain at the initial hospital of diagnosis. While most (89%) states had written guidelines for the safe transportation of patients with HHCDs, only 6 (16%) had written protocols for the management of accidents or other travel disruptions that may occur during HHCD transport within the state. Twenty-two state health departments (59%) had operationally exercised transport of a patient to an HLIU.

CONCLUSIONS

Nearly half of states in the United States lack an HLIU, yet most prefer to have patients with HHCDs treated in high-level isolation. Recent budget cuts and uncertainty of future funding threaten the abilities of health departments to devote the necessary resources and staff to prepare for and deliver the desired care to HHCD cases. The lack of HLIUs in some states may complicate transport to a geographically proximate HLIU. Moreover, limited guidance on diseases that warrant high-level isolation may cause disagreement in HHCD patient placement between health departments, diagnosing facilities, and HLIUs.

Review of Literature for Air Medical Evacuation High-Level Containment Transport

INTRODUCTION

Aeromedical evacuation (AE) is a challenging process, further complicated when a patient has a highly hazardous communicable disease (HHCD). We conducted a review of the literature to evaluate the processes and procedures utilized for safe AE high-level containment transport (AE-HLCT) of patients with HHCDs.

METHODS

A literature search was performed in PubMed/MEDLINE (from 1966 through January 2019). Authors screened abstracts for inclusion criteria and full articles were reviewed if the abstract was deemed to contain information related to the aim.

RESULTS

Our search criteria yielded 14 publications and were separated based upon publication dates, with the natural break point being the beginning of the 2013-2016 Ebola virus disease epidemic. Best practices and recommendations from identified articles are subdivided into pre-flight preparations, inflight operations, and post-flight procedures.

CONCLUSIONS

Limited peer-reviewed literature exists on AE-HLCT, including important aspects related to healthcare worker fatigue, alertness, shift scheduling, and clinical care performance. This hinders the sharing of best practices to inform evacuations and equip teams for future outbreaks. Despite the successful use of different aircraft and technologies, the unique nature of the mission opens the opportunity for greater coordination and development of consensus standards for AE-HLCT operations.

Conserved B and T cell epitopes prediction of ebola virus glycoprotein for vaccine development: An immuno-informatics approach

Ebola virus (EBOV), a non-segmented single-stranded RNA virus, is often-most transmitted through body fluids like sweat, tears, saliva, and nasal secretions. Till date, there is no licensed vaccine of EBOV is available in the market; however, the world is increasingly vulnerable to this emerging threat. Hence, it is the need of time to develop a vaccine for EBOV to hinder its dissemination. The current study has been designed for identification and characterization of the potential B and T-cell epitopes using the Immuno-informatics tools, and it helped in finding the potent vaccine candidates against EBOV. Prediction, antigenicity and allergenicity testing of predicted B and T cells' epitopes was done as well to identify their potential as a vaccine candidate and to measure their safety level respectively. Among B-cell epitopes "WIPAGIGVTGVIIA" showed a high antigenicity score and it would play an important role in evoking the immune response. In T-cell epitopes, peptides "AIGLAWIPY" and "IRGFPRCRY" presented high antigenicity score, which binds to MHC class-I and MHC class-II alleles respectively. All predicted epitopes were analyzed and compared with already reported peptides carefully. Comparatively, Peptides predicted in the present study showed more immunogenicity score than already reported peptides, used as positive control, and are more immunogenic as compared to them. Peptides reported in the present study do not target only Zaire EBOV (ZEBOV), as in previous studies, but also other species, i.e. Tai Forest EBOV (TAFV), Sudan EBOV (SUDV), Bundibugyo EBOV (BDBV), and Reston EBOV (RESTV) and would bring the promising results as potent vaccine candidates.

Caring for patients with Ebola virus disease: Are U.S. biocontainment centers ready for the next outbreak?

The 2014 West African Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak is the largest and deadliest EVD epidemic to date, resulting in fivefold more cases than all other outbreaks combined. This outbreak was particularly devastating to healthcare workers in West Africa and resulted in several EVD patients being medically evacuated for treatment in the U.S. and Europe. Governmental agencies provide recommendations for triaging and testing patients with EVD, however best laboratory practices are still unknown and are very resource dependent.

Biocontainment Units: Moving to the Next Phase of Evolution

The concept and belief in the idea of "biocontainment" has undergone significant evolution during the past 20 years. The authors believe that the time is right to move to the next phase of this evolution to reassess establishment of formal standards for what constitutes a biocontainment unit and what diseases might be considered for admission to a biocontainment unit.

Clinical Management of Patients Infected with Highly Pathogenic Microorganisms

The clinical management of high consequence infectious diseases (HCID) poses an immense challenge, seen largely varying standards in terms of infection prevention control (IPC) as well as in quality of clinical care. This chapter gives an overview of possible treatment as well as IPC options. Lessons learned within the German Permanent Working Group of Competence and Treatment Centres for highly infectious, life-threatening diseases (STAKOB) are taken into account.

Personnel Management and Biosecurity of U.S. High-Level Isolation Units

OBJECTIVE

To describe strategies used by US high-level isolation units (HLIUs) to recruit, train, and sustain a full team of multidisciplinary staff and identify how units are secured.

BACKGROUND

Fifty-six US hospitals have been designated HLIUs, capable of providing safe care to patients with highly infectious disease.

METHODS

An electronic survey was administered to the 56 HLIUs in spring of 2016. Responses were collected via a fillable PDF and analyzed using descriptive statistics.

RESULTS

Thirty-six HLIUs (64%) responded; 33 completed surveys, and 3 reported no longer being a designated HLIU. HLIUs reported large numbers of multidisciplinary staff, primarily consisting of RNs and critical care clinicians. Nearly all HLIUs (94%) required orientation training, although hours varied.

CONCLUSIONS

Over a short period, HLIUs recruited and trained significant numbers of staff with little guidance. Costs of ongoing trainings are considerable, and it remains unclear how HLIUs will continue funding these activities.

Therapeutic management of Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever

Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever has been reported in more than 30 countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, with an increasing incidence in recent years, especially in Europe. Because no specific treatments have demonstrated efficacy, supportive treatment is essential, as well as the provision of a centre with the appropriate means to guarantee the safety of its healthcare professionals. Laboratory monitoring of thrombocytopenia, severe coagulopathy or liver failure is of critical importance. Patients with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever should be admitted to High Level Isolation Units where appropriate biocontainment procedures can prevent nosocomial transmission through infected fluids or accidents with contaminated material. In case of high-risk exposures, early administration of ribavirin should be considered.

Therapeutic management of Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever

Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever has been reported in more than 30 countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, with an increasing incidence in recent years, especially in Europe. Because no specific treatments have demonstrated efficacy, supportive treatment is essential, as well as the provision of a centre with the appropriate means to guarantee the safety of its healthcare professionals. Laboratory monitoring of thrombocytopenia, severe coagulopathy or liver failure is of critical importance. Patients with Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever should be admitted to High Level Isolation Units where appropriate biocontainment procedures can prevent nosocomial transmission through infected fluids or accidents with contaminated material. In case of high-risk exposures, early administration of ribavirin should be considered.

Highly infectious diseases in the Mediterranean Sea area: Inventory of isolation capabilities and recommendations for appropriate isolation

Epidemics such as viral haemorrhagic fevers, severe acute respiratory syndrome, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus or yet unknown ones have few chances of disappearing. Globalization, worldwide travel, climate change, social conflicts and wars, among others, are likely to favor the emergence of epidemics. Preparedness of hospitals to prevent the spread of these outbreaks is among the prioritized political programmes of many countries. The EuroNHID network has in the past drawn a map of features and equipment of hospitals across Europe to take care of highly contagious patients. We update the data regarding isolation capabilities and recommendations, with an emphasis on Mediterranean countries.

High-Level Isolation Unit Infection Control Procedures

The 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa prompted a select group of US hospitals to establish high-level isolation units equipped with advanced engineering controls, trained staff, and stringent protocols to safely treat highly infectious disease patients. This survey details the comprehensive infection control protocols developed by these units, including for decontamination of units, post-mortem management, liquid waste disposal, and personal protective equipment (PPE) use. In spring 2016, a survey was electronically distributed to the 56 original Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)-designated high-level isolation units. Responses were collected via a fillable PDF and analyzed using descriptive statistics. Thirty-six (64%) high-level isolation units responded; 33 completed the survey, and 3 reported they no longer maintained high-level isolation unit capabilities. Nearly all responding units had written procedures for decontamination, liquid waste disposal, and PPE use; however, infection control protocols varied between units. High-level isolation units implemented multiple strategies in promoting hand hygiene among staff and in monitoring correct PPE use. Maximum time allowed in full PPE was restricted in all but 2 units (average of 3.45 hours per shift). Almost all (94%) had written procedures for the management of human remains, although only 2 units had written protocols for an autopsy of a patient with a highly infectious disease. While the vast majority of high-level isolation units reported having written protocols for infection control practices, staff compliance and procedural application are the true indicators of the state of preparedness. Therefore, rigorous training and staff adherence to infection control practices is critical to minimizing exposure risks.

Delivering modern, high-quality, affordable pathology and laboratory medicine to low-income and middle-income countries: a call to action

Modern, affordable pathology and laboratory medicine (PALM) systems are essential to achieve the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals for health in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs). In this last in a Series of three papers about PALM in LMICs, we discuss the policy environment and emphasise three crucial high-level actions that are needed to deliver universal health coverage. First, nations need national strategic laboratory plans; second, these plans require adequate financing for implementation; and last, pathologists themselves need to take on leadership roles to advocate for the centrality of PALM to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals for health. The national strategic laboratory plan should deliver a tiered, networked laboratory system as a central element. Appropriate financing should be provided, at a level of at least 4% of health expenditure. Financing of new technologies such as molecular diagnostics is challenging for LMICs, even though many of these tests are cost-effective. Point-of-care testing can substantially reduce test-reporting time, but this benefit must be balanced with higher costs. Our research analysis highlights a considerable deficiency in advocacy for PALM; pathologists have been invisible in national and international health discourse and leadership. Embedding PALM in LMICs can only be achieved if pathologists advocate for these services, and undertake leadership roles, both nationally and internationally. We articulate eight key recommendations to address the current barriers identified in this Series and issue a call to action for all stakeholders to come together in a global alliance to ensure the effective provision of PALM services in resource-limited settings.

Building an Intelligent Hospital to Fight Contagion

The idea of building hospitals to fight contagion was born with the lazarettos. At the time when the microorganisms were not yet known, the mechanisms of transmission of contagion were already well apprehended. Based on the same knowledge but thanks to new technologies, such hospitals have now been built downtown, next to the most highly performing technological plateau. Regrouping patient care, diagnostics, research, and development, the University Hospital Institute Méditerranée Infection building offers a wonderful tool to contain and understand contagion, in a well-designed setting, creating excellent working conditions that are attractive for interested scientists.

A Highly Infectious Disease Care Network in the US Healthcare System

During the 2014-15 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, the United States responded by stratifying hospitals into 1 of 3 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)-designated categories-based on the hospital's ability to identify, isolate, assess, and provide care to patients with suspected or confirmed Ebola virus disease (EVD)-in an attempt to position the US healthcare system to safely isolate and care for potential patients. Now, with the Ebola epidemic quelled, it is crucial that we act on the lessons learned from the EVD response to broaden our national perspective on infectious disease mitigation and management, build on our newly enhanced healthcare capabilities to respond to infectious disease threats, develop a more cost-effective and sustainable model of infectious disease prevention, and continue to foster training so that the nation is not in a vulnerable position once more. We propose the formal creation of a US Highly Infectious Disease Care Network (HIDCN) modeled after 2 previous highly infectious disease consensus efforts in the United States and the European Union. A US Highly Infectious Disease Care Network can provide a common platform for the exchange of training, protocols, research, knowledge, and capability sharing among high-level isolation units. Furthermore, we envision the network will cultivate relationships among facilities and serve as a means of establishing national standards for infectious disease response, which will strengthen domestic preparedness and the nation's ability to respond to the next highly infectious disease threat.

Sustainability of High-Level Isolation Capabilities among US Ebola Treatment Centers

To identify barriers to maintaining and applying capabilities of US high-level isolation units (HLIUs) used during the Ebola virus disease outbreak, during 2016 we surveyed HLIUs. HLIUs identified sustainability challenges and reported the highly infectious diseases they would treat. HLIUs expended substantial resources in development but must strategize models of sustainability to maintain readiness.

U.S. High-Level Isolation Unit Clinical Laboratory Capabilities Update

In late 2014, 56 hospitals in the United States were designated by state and federal public health authorities as specially designed high-level isolation units (HLIUs) equipped with advanced infrastructure, laboratory capabilities, and trained staff to care for patients with highly hazardous communicable diseases (HHCDs), such as Ebola virus disease. This survey describes the clinical laboratory support capabilities of U.S. HLIUs, including the specific test menus that HLIUs have identified to safely manage HHCD patients and the locations where such testing would be performed. In spring 2016, a survey was electronically distributed, as a fillable pdf file, to the 56 U.S. HLIUs. Site representatives completed the surveys, and data were coded and analyzed in an electronic spreadsheet, using descriptive statistics. Thirty-six HLIUs (64%) responded, and 33 completed the laboratory capabilities section. Thirty-one HLIUs (94%) had performed risk analyses for all laboratory procedures and equipment. Twenty-nine (88%) had decontamination procedures specified for all laboratory equipment used for patients with suspected or confirmed HHCDs. On-site laboratories in 27 HLIUs (81%) had the capacity to inventory and to securely store HHCD patient specimens. Ten HLIUs (31%) had at least one test they would conduct within the patient isolation room. The high-risk nature of HHCDs and the occupational exposures that may occur in clinical laboratories demand advanced preparation and risk assessment of work practices, laboratory equipment, and instrumentation by HLIU laboratories. Although risk analyses of clinical laboratory testing and equipment that HLIUs have conducted have likely focused on those for Ebola virus, HLIUs must be prepared to revise their current procedures for other HHCDs.

Murthy AR. Designing Medical Facilities to Care for Patients with Highly Hazardous Communicable Diseases

Certain highly hazardous communicable diseases (HHCD), including viral hemorrhagic fevers, the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), and severe acute respiratory syndrome virus (SARS), have caused nosocomial outbreaks in unprepared facilities. Consequently, biocontainment units have been constructed to protect caregivers, patients, and family members, in addition to providing optimal care of the infected patient. Biocontainment units have adopted many of the design features originally found in biocontainment laboratories and can serve as national referral facilities for the most severe and highly hazardous infections.

Although a patient with a HHCD can show up at any healthcare facility unannounced, not every hospital can or should attempt to establish a biocontainment unit. Nevertheless, there are design features or management principles found in biocontainment units that can be adopted in most facilities. Awareness of the potential risk, in addition to adopting structural and policy control measures, can do a lot to prepare a facility for the next unexpected infectious disease outbreak.

Maintenance of Preparedness

The medical management of patients with highly hazardous communicable diseases (HHCD) will suddenly become important during public health emergencies of international concern but will receive little attention in between those events. It is very important to use those times to maintain and improve the level of preparedness and adjust it to advances in the field. The infrastructure provided needs to be regularly adjusted but also requires intensive maintenance. Every high-level isolation unit (HLIU) needs to plan individually and very precisely what kind of equipment, materials and medications need to be stockpiled and in what amount, in order to be able to provide adequate care. Providing HLIU treatment is a highly qualified and differentiated task, and training efforts should provide a multidisciplinary HLIU team with an intricate training schedule. The medical and psychological aspects of occupational health and safety need to be addressed as well in order to maintain preparedness.

Viral Hemorrhagic Fever Preparedness

The 2014–2016 outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in West Africa marked the 25th such occurrence but was noteworthy in its massive scope, causing more human morbidity and mortality than the previous 24 recorded outbreaks combined. As of April 2016, there were 28,652 cases resulting in at least 11,325 deaths, nearly all in the three nations of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/index.html. Accessed 2 June 2016). Moreover, the 2014–2016 outbreak was the first in which patients, albeit few in number, were afforded sophisticated intensive care in the United States and in Europe. This “high-level containment care” (HLCC) was provided in specially designed purpose-built biocontainment units (BCUs). In this chapter, we explore the history and evolution of biocontainment, discuss its unique engineering and infection control modalities, and offer recommendations for the clinical and operational management of Ebola and other viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHFs).

The French Infectious Diseases Society's readiness and response to epidemic or biological risk-the current situation following the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus and Ebola virus disease alerts

CONTEXT

In 2012, the French Infectious Diseases Society (French acronym SPILF) initiated the "Coordination of epidemic and biological risk" (SPILF-COREB - Emergences [SCE]) group to support the readiness and response of healthcare workers (HCWs) to new alerts.

OBJECTIVE

To present the SCE group, its functioning, and the main support it provided for frontline HCWs.

METHODS

A multidisciplinary group of heads of infectious disease departments from reference hospitals was created to build a network of clinical expertise for care, training, and research in the field of epidemic and biological risk (EBR). The network developed a set of standardized operational procedures (SOPs) to guide interventions to manage EBR-suspect patients.

RESULTS

A working group created the SOP aimed at frontline HCWs taking care of patients. Priority was given to the development of a generic procedure, which was then adapted according to the current alert. Five key steps were identified and hierarchized: detecting, protecting, caring for, alerting, and referring the EBR patient. The interaction between clinicians and those responsible for the protection of the community was crucial. The SOPs validated by the SPILF and its affiliates were disseminated to a wide range of key stakeholders through various media including workshops and the SPILF's website.

CONCLUSION

SPILF can easily adapt and timely mobilize the EBR expertise in case of an alert. The present work suggests that sharing and discussing this experience, initiated at the European level, can generate a new collective expertise and needs to be further developed and strengthened.