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Evolution of Social Learning with Payoff and Content Bias. GAMES 2021. [DOI: 10.3390/g13010007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
There has been much theoretical work aimed at understanding the evolution of social learning; and in most of it, individual and social learning are treated as distinct processes. A number of authors have argued that this approach is faulty because the same psychological mechanisms underpin social and individual learning. In previous work, we analyzed a simple model in which both individual and social learning are the result of a single learning process. Here, we extend this approach by showing how payoff and content biases evolve. We show that payoff bias leads to higher average fitness when environments are noisy and change rapidly. Content bias always evolves when the expected fitness benefits of alternative traits differ.
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de Courson B, Fitouchi L, Bouchaud JP, Benzaquen M. Cultural diversity and wisdom of crowds are mutually beneficial and evolutionarily stable. Sci Rep 2021; 11:16566. [PMID: 34400679 PMCID: PMC8368188 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-95914-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/17/2021] [Accepted: 08/02/2021] [Indexed: 11/25/2022] Open
Abstract
The ability to learn from others (social learning) is often deemed a cause of human species success. But if social learning is indeed more efficient (whether less costly or more accurate) than individual learning, it raises the question of why would anyone engage in individual information seeking, which is a necessary condition for social learning's efficacy. We propose an evolutionary model solving this paradox, provided agents (i) aim not only at information quality but also vie for audience and prestige, and (ii) do not only value accuracy but also reward originality-allowing them to alleviate herding effects. We find that under some conditions (large enough success rate of informed agents and intermediate taste for popularity), both social learning's higher accuracy and the taste for original opinions are evolutionarily-stable, within a mutually beneficial division of labour-like equilibrium. When such conditions are not met, the system most often converges towards mutually detrimental equilibria.
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Affiliation(s)
- Benoît de Courson
- LadHyX, UMR CNRS 7646, Ecole Polytechnique, 91128, Palaiseau Cedex, France
- Chair of Econophysics & Complex Systems, Ecole Polytechnique, 91128, Palaiseau Cedex, France
| | - Léo Fitouchi
- Institut Jean Nicod, Département d'études cognitives, ENS, EHESS, PSL Research University, CNRS, Paris, France
| | - Jean-Philippe Bouchaud
- Chair of Econophysics & Complex Systems, Ecole Polytechnique, 91128, Palaiseau Cedex, France
- Capital Fund Management, 23-25, Rue de l'Université, 75007, Paris, France
| | - Michael Benzaquen
- LadHyX, UMR CNRS 7646, Ecole Polytechnique, 91128, Palaiseau Cedex, France.
- Chair of Econophysics & Complex Systems, Ecole Polytechnique, 91128, Palaiseau Cedex, France.
- Capital Fund Management, 23-25, Rue de l'Université, 75007, Paris, France.
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