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Abstract
In this paper we discuss the historical origins and conceptual debts of the Theory of Mind framework (ToM). We investigate its affinities to Chomsky’s psychology, and Paul Grice’s work on meaning. We find that the ToM framework is resourced by the ideas found in Chomsky and Grice, adding very little new to them, and suffering from the same problems of dualism. ToM inherits the traditional dualistic problem of other minds, tries to solve it, and ends up profoundly intellectualizing social interactions.
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Searle's Freudian slip. Behav Brain Sci 2011. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00080389] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
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Abstract
AbstractCognitive science typically postulates unconscious mental phenomena, computational or otherwise, to explain cognitive capacities. The mental phenomena in question are supposed to be inaccessible in principle to consciousness. I try to show that this is a mistake, because all unconscious intentionality must be accessible in principle to consciousness; we have no notion of intrinsic intentionality except in terms of its accessibility to consciousness. I call this claim the “Connection Principle.” The argument for it proceeds in six steps. The essential point is that intrinsic intentionality has aspectual shape: Our mental representations represent the world under specific aspects, and these aspectual features are essential to a mental state's being the state that it is.Once we recognize the Connection Principle, we see that it is necessary to perform an inversion on the explanatory models of cognitive science, an inversion analogous to the one evolutionary biology imposes on preDarwinian animistic modes of explanation. In place of the original intentionalistic explanations we have a combination of hardware and functional explanations. This radically alters the structure of explanation, because instead of a mental representation (such as a rule) causing the pattern of behavior it represents (such as rule-governed behavior), there is a neurophysiological cause of a pattern (such as a pattern of behavior), and the pattern plays a functional role in the life of the organism. What we mistakenly thought were descriptions of underlying mental principles in, for example, theories of vision and language were in fact descriptions of functional aspects of systems, which will have to be explained by underlying neurophysiological mechanisms. In such cases, what looks like mentalistic psychology is sometimes better construed as speculative neurophysiology. The moral is that the big mistake in cognitive science is not the overestimation of the computer metaphor (though that is indeed a mistake) but the neglect of consciousness.
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The neurophysiology of consicousness and the unconscious. Behav Brain Sci 2011. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00080572] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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What's it like to be a gutbrain? Behav Brain Sci 2011. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00080481] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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Is Searle conscious? Behav Brain Sci 2011. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x0008047x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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Consciousness, historical inversion, and cognitive science. Behav Brain Sci 2011. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00080638] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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The ability versus intentionality aspects of unconscious mental processes. Behav Brain Sci 2011. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00080365] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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Abstract
AbstractNoam Chomsky and other linguists and psychologists have suggested that human linguistic behavior is somehow governed by a mental representation of a transformational grammar. Challenges to this controversial claim have often been met by invoking an explicitly computational perspective: It makes perfect sense to suppose that a grammar could be represented in the memory of a computational device and that this grammar could govern the device's use of a language. This paper urges, however, that the claim that humans are such a device is unsupported and that it seems unlikely that linguists and psychologists really want to claim any such thing. Evidence for the linguists' original claim is drawn from three main sources: the explanation of language comprehension and other linguistic abilities; evidence for formal properties of the rules of the grammar; and the explanation of language acquisition. It is argued in this paper that none of these sources provides support for the view that the grammar governs language processing in something like the way a program governs the operation of a programmed machine. The computational approach, on the contrary, suggests ways in which linguistic abilities can be explained without the attribution of any explicit representation of rules governing linguistic behavior.
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COMMENTARIES ON "On Parametric Continuities in the World of Binary Either Ors," "Duality Models in Social Psychology: From Dual Processes to Interacting Systems" and "On Building a Better Process Model: It's Not Only How Many, but Which Ones and By Which Means?". PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY 2006. [DOI: 10.1207/s15327965pli1703_4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/31/2022]
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Abstract
The distinction between rule-based and similarity-based processes in cognition is of fundamental importance for cognitive science, and has been the focus of a large body of empirical research. However, intuitive uses of the distinction are subject to theoretical difficulties and their relation to empirical evidence is not clear. We propose a 'core' distinction between rule- and similarity-based processes, in terms of the way representations of stored information are 'matched' with the representation of a novel item. This explication captures the intuitively clear-cut cases of processes of each type, and resolves apparent problems with the rule/similarity distinction. Moreover, it provides a clear target for assessing the psychological and AI literatures. We show that many lines of psychological evidence are less conclusive than sometimes assumed, but suggest that converging lines of evidence may be persuasive. We then argue that the AI literature suggests that approaches which combine rules and similarity are an important new focus for empirical work.
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Affiliation(s)
- U Hahn
- Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK.
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Steklis HD, Walter A. Culture, biology, and human behavior. HUMAN NATURE-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY BIOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVE 1991; 2:137-69. [DOI: 10.1007/bf02692185] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/29/1990] [Accepted: 10/25/1990] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
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When functions are causes. Behav Brain Sci 1990. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00080559] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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The causal capacities of linguistic rules. Behav Brain Sci 1990. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00080596] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
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The possibility of irreducible intentionality. Behav Brain Sci 1990. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00080584] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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Intention itself will disappear when its mechanisms are known. Behav Brain Sci 1990. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00080328] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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Does cognitive science need “real” intentionality? Behav Brain Sci 1990. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x0008050x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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“Consciousness” is the name of a nonentity. Behav Brain Sci 1990. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00080456] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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Zombies are people, too. Behav Brain Sci 1990. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00080511] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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Conscious mental episodes and skill acquisition. Behav Brain Sci 1990. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x0008033x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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Grammar and consciousness. Behav Brain Sci 1990. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00080407] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
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Language and the deep unconscious mind: Aspectualities of the theory of syntax. Behav Brain Sci 1990. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00080377] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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Unintended thought and nonconscious inferences exist. Behav Brain Sci 1990. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00080602] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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On speculating across opaque barriers. Behav Brain Sci 1983. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00016770] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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Grammars-as-programs versus grammars- as-data. Behav Brain Sci 1983. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00016824] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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