Can irrationality be intelligently discussed?

Can overconfidence be debiased by low-probability/high-consequence events?

During the first half of 2008, China suffered three natural disasters: a heavy snow storm, an outbreak of hand-foot-mouth disease, and a severe earthquake. The aim of the present study is to explore how low-probability/high-consequence events influence overconfidence. In Study 1, opportunity samples were obtained by recruiting residents in three different types of disaster-hit areas to answer a peer-comparison probability judgment questionnaire about 1 month after the corresponding disaster occurred. The performance of 539 participants in disaster-hit areas was compared with that of 142 residents in a nondisaster area. The findings indicate that residents in disaster-hit areas were less overconfident than those in the nondisaster area on both positive and negative events. In Study 2, we surveyed a total of 336 quake-victims 4 and 11 months after the earthquake to examine whether the impact of disasters on overconfidence would decay with time. The resulting data indicate that the disaster victims became more overconfident as time elapsed. The overall findings suggest that low-probability/high-consequence events could make people less overconfident and more rational and seem to serve as a function of debiasing.

Heuristic and analytic processing: age trends and associations with cognitive ability and cognitive styles

Developmental and individual differences in the tendency to favor analytic responses over heuristic responses were examined in children of two different ages (10- and 11-year-olds versus 13-year-olds), and of widely varying cognitive ability. Three tasks were examined that all required analytic processing to override heuristic processing: inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning under conditions of belief bias, and probabilistic reasoning. Significant increases in analytic responding with development were observed on the first two tasks. Cognitive ability was associated with analytic responding on all three tasks. Cognitive style measures such as actively open-minded thinking and need for cognition explained variance in analytic responding on the tasks after variance shared with cognitive ability had been controlled. The implications for dual-process theories of cognition and cognitive development are discussed.

Discrepancies between normative and descriptive models of decision making and the understanding/acceptance principle

Several tasks from the heuristics and biases literature were examined in light of Slovic and Tversky's (1974) understanding/acceptance principle-that the deeper the understanding of a normative principle, the greater the tendency to respond in accord with it. The principle was instantiated both correlationally and experimentally. An individual differences version was used to examine whether individuals higher in tendencies toward reflective thought and in cognitive ability would be more likely to behave normatively. In a second application of the understanding/acceptance principle, subjects were presented with arguments both for and against normative choices and it was observed whether, on a readministration of the task, performance was more likely to move in a normative direction. Several discrepancies between performance and normative models could be explained by the understanding/acceptance principle. However, several gaps between descriptive and normative models (particularly those deriving from some noncausal base rate problems) were not clarified by the understanding/acceptance principle-they could not be explained in terms of varying task understanding or tendencies toward reflective thought. The results demonstrate how the variation and instability in responses can be analyzed to yield inferences about why descriptive and normative models of human reasoning and decision making sometimes do not coincide.