The fallibility of first-person knowledge of intentionality

Interpreting self-ascriptions

I argue that the same general principles apply in ascribing mental states and their contents to self and to others. Nevertheless Goldman is right that there is such a thing as FPA (First Person Authority). But Gopnik is right that FPA cannot be explained by reference to a special way of knowing or a special land of knowledge.

The epistemological illusion

I argue against the mentalist view that commonsense psychology (CSP) is about the intrinsic properties of the mind, and in particular against the notion that the evidence privately or publicly available to the CS psychologists confirms the mentalist view. I suggest that the internal phenomenology of mental attitudes merely provides access to a body of procedural knowledge, and that the propositional forms of the attitudes normally summarize extensive units of procedural knowledge.

Speaking of beliefs: Reporting or constituting mental entities?

Gopnik's argument that instead of having privileged access we must develop a theory about our minds is criticized. First, the theory metaphor is too vague, and scientific concepts of what a theory is are left unexploited. Second, the studies Gopnik interprets as showing that children must develop a theory about their mental states are also compatible with the view that children have to develop these states.

Epistemology, two types of functionalism, and first-person authority

My target article did not attribute a pervasive ontological significance to phenomenology, so it escapes Bogdan's “epistemological illusion.” Pust correctly pinpoints an ambiguity between contentinclusive and content-exclusive forms of folk functionalism. Contrary to Fodor, however, only the former is plausible, and hence my third argument against functionalism remains a threat. Van Brakel's charity approach to first-person authority cannot deal with authority vis-a-vis sensations, and it has some extremely odd consequences.

Two kinds of representational functionalism: Defusing the combinatorial explosion

Alvin Goldman (1993) presents three arguments against the psychological plausibility of representational functionalism (RF) as a theory of how subjects self-ascribe mental predicates. Goldman appears to construe RF as an account of attitude type self-ascription. His “combinatorial explosion” argument, however, proves devastating only to an implausible construal of RF as an account of attitude content self-ascription.

How to understand beliefs

In this response various possible objections to the critique of first-person-authority in Gopnik (1993), are considered. The heart of all three objections is that “beliefs” and other notions of commonsense psychology should not be construed as attempts to describe the functional character of our minds. Rather, they are 1) an evolutionarily determined technique for dealing with our conspecifics (Bogdan) or 2) the result of interpretation (Van Brakel) or 3) self-constitutive entities which exist only when we have the concept of their existence (Greve and Buchner). While the word belief might be construed in all these ways, they do not correspond either to the construals of our commonsense psychology or of a scientific psychology.