The hippocampus: Relational processor or antiprocessor?

The hippocampal system: Dissociating its functional components and recombining them in the service of declarative memory

Continuing commentary raised several issues concerning our proposal that the hippocampus, parahippocampal region, and cortical association areas mediate different aspects of memory function. Recent relevant findings strengthen our argument that neocortical areas and the parahippocampal region maintain persistent encodings of specific single items and that the hippocampus mediates representations of the relations among these items. The reciprocally and closely interconnected structures that compose the hippocampal memory system work interactively to support flexible memory expression that is relevant to the natural behavior of animals and to conscious recollection in humans.

The hunting of the hippocampal function

Eichenbaum et al.'s (1994a) theory suffers from a lack of ecological validation. It is not at all clear why the hypothesized faculties would have evolved and what their adaptive value would be. I argue that hippocampal function can only be understood if the animal is seen in its natural context.

Sequential processing of “items” and “relations”

Eichenbaum et al. (1994a) hypothesized that perceptually distinct items and the relations among them are processed sequentially by the parahippocampal region and the hippocampal formation, respectively. Predictions based solely on their model's sequential-processing feature might prove easier to disconfirm than those based on its representational features. Two such predictions are discussed: (1) double dissociations should be impossible following hippocampal vs. parahippocampal lesions, and (2) hippocampal lesions should not exacerbate impairments that follow complete parahippocampal lesions.

Recovered consciousness: A proposal for making consciousness integral to neuropsychological theories of memory in humans and nonhumans

Why is consciousness associated with recovery of memories that are initially dependent on the hippocampal system? A hypothesis is proposed that the medial temporal lobe/hippocampal complex (MTL/H) receives as its input only information that is consciously apprehended. By a process termed “cohesion,” the MTL/H binds into a memory trace those neural elements that mediated the conscious experience so that effectively, “consciousness” is an integral part of the memory trace. It is the phenomenological records of events (Conway 1992), integrated consciousness-content packets, that are recovered when memory traces are retrieved.

Hippocampus, delay neurons, and sensory heterogeneity

We raise three issues concerning the Eichenbaum, Otto & Cohen (1994) model. (1) We argue against the strict division of labor that Eichenbaum et al. attribute to neocortical and limbic regions. (2) We raise the possibility that the anterior and posterior portions of the hippocampus may be important for different types of information processing. (3) We argue that, rather than reflecting relational processing, different neural responses to “match” and “nonmatch” trials may relate to different required spatial responses.

The hippocampus seen in the context of declarative and procedural control

Various apparently incompatible theories of hippocampal function have been proposed but integration is now needed. It is argued that the involvement of the hippocampus is most clearly seen when the animal needs to extrapolate beyond current sensory information. Such control can involve both the initiation of behaviour in the absence of appropriate sensory input and the inhibition of behaviour that might otherwise be triggered by current sensory input.

Cognitive dysfunction resulting from hippocampal hyperactivity--a possible cause of anxiety disorder?

Pure cognition and hence pure cognitive dysfunction might be expected to have no direct relation to any specific emotion. Changes in cognitive processing will change the assessment of stimuli and thus could change emotional responses nonspecifically. However, neurology suggests a more direct relation between at least some aspects of cognition and emotion. The limbic system in general and the hippocampus in particular have been suggested at different times to be crucial for both memory and emotion. Even recently, O'Keefe and Nadel (The hippocampus as a cognitive map, Oxford University Press, 1978) proposed that the hippocampus is a spatial, or cognitive, map, while Gray (The neuropsychology of anxiety: An enquiry into the functions of the septo-hippocampal system. Oxford University Press, 1982) proposed that it is central to anxiety. This apparent incongruity can be resolved by combining recent developments in the psychology of anxiety (which emphasise changed processing biases), recent extensions of Gray's theory (which bring it closer to cognitive views), and recent theories of the role of the hippocampus in memory (which see it as controlling rather than storing information). This paper proposes that at least some instances of clinical anxiety could result from hyperactivity of the septo-hippocampal system, which would produce cognitive dysfunction in the form of increased negative association of stimuli with a consequential increase in anxiety when the stimuli are subsequently presented.

New approaches to the study of amnesic patients: what can a neurofunctional philosophy and neural network methods offer?

In this paper I first consider a neurofunctional approach to the study of amnesic patients. This approach stresses the need for theorising about the processing operations of brain regions and circuits rather than for theorising about neuropsychological syndromes. A syndrome such as amnesia-may not exist, in any meaningful sense, if there is marked heterogeneity within the patients grouped together in this way. Powerful neuroimaging techniques may now allow a more useful basis for grouping patients in terms of lesion location rather than aetiology. In turn this will allow an evaluation of the information processing functions subserved by the lesioned structures. The second strand to the present paper stresses the weakness in the specification of current theories. This has made it difficult to select experimental tasks that decisively measure the key components of those theories. The paper makes the case that explicit neural network models are a useful way to try to overcome this problem. In line with these ideas, the paper begins to build a model of how the brain may achieve useful kinds of stimulus representations. Considerations of human behaviour in category learning tasks have emphasised parallel and interacting roles for both exemplar- and element-based stimulus representations. It is suggested that the hippocampus itself may encode exemplar representations, and these may provide a basis for episodic memory as well as some types of category learning. It is further suggested that the ventral striatum may encode the element-based representations. The model allows some new and detailed predictions for the performance of amnesic subjects related to lesion location.