Experiencing two selves: The history of a mistake

The Stream of Consciousness: VIII. James's Ejective Consciousness (First Part)

The present series concerning the stream of consciousness continues with two articles that examine James's conception of “ejective” consciousness in The Principles. During certain altered states, and perhaps at other times as well, mental-occurrence instances take place that are not part of the individual's original stream of consciousness. Usually, if not always, such “split-off” mental-occurrence instances comprise a second stream, which, according to James, is no less conscious and personal than the original stream is. However, the durational components of the second stream are distinct from nonconscious mental occurrences. Whereas James argues against the existence of nonconscious mental occurrences, of which there can be no inner awareness by definition, James does countenance a second stream of consciousness, of which the first stream can have only inferential knowledge, and vice versa. Both streams include inner awareness of their own basic durational components.

On the Intrinsic Nature of States of Consciousness: James's Ubiquitous Feeling Aspect

Among problems psychologists of consciousness face is how to conceive of those mental states, events, or processes with which people have an intimate familiarity in their own case. Psychologists must not only determine the causal roles these occurrences play, but also their intrinsic properties. This article seeks to contribute to understanding what and how the conscious mental occurrences are in themselves, starting from W. James's conception of them, according to which every basic durational component of the stream, each successive state of consciousness, is an integral pulse of mentality possessing a feeling aspect and a cognitive aspect. Attention is also given to their reflexive aspect, wherein one has inner awareness of their occurrence and, often, of their type and content.