The ontological status of intentional states: Nailing folk psychology to its perch

Delusion in general and forensic psychiatry--historical and contemporary aspects

Delusion has always been a central topic for psychiatric research with regard to etiology and pathogenesis and to diagnosis, treatment, and forensic relevance. Throughout the history of psychiatry as a scientific discipline, there has been dissent on the issue of whether chronic delusion is a nosological entity of its own or just a specific type of another mental disorder, e.g. schizophrenia, mania, or personality disorder, and there already is a considerable literature on this. This article seeks to elucidate the central lines of thought that have governed the scientific debate on delusions and delusion-associated phenomena since the early 19th century. Special attention is given to the practical relevance of these theoretical considerations for forensic questions and psychiatric research. Due to the complex features of delusions, research in this area may well become paradigmatic for many other complicated psycho(patho)logical phenomena, e.g. consciousness, hallucinations and psychotic depression.

Communicative competence and the architecture of the mind/brain

Cognitive pragmatics is concerned with the mental processes involved in intentional communication. I discuss a few issues that may help clarify the relationship between this area and the broader cognitive science and the contribution that they give, or might give, to each other. Rather than dwelling on the many technicalities of the various theories of communication that have been advanced, I focus on the different conceptions of the nature and the architecture of the mind/brain that underlie them. My aims are, first, to introduce and defend mentalist views of communication in general; second, to defend one such view, namely that communication is a cognitive competence, that is, a faculty, and the underlying idea that the architecture of the mind/brain is domain-specific; and, third, to review the (scarce) neuropsychological evidence that bears on these issues.

Research in psychopathology: epistemologic issues

Etiologic research in psychiatry relies on an objectivist epistemology positing that human cognition is specified by the "reality" of the outer world, which consists of a totality of mind-independent objects. Truth is considered as some sort of correspondence relation between words and external objects, and mind as a mirror of nature. In our view, this epistemology considerably impedes etiologic research. Objectivist epistemology has been recently confronting a growing critique from diverse scientific fields. Alternative models in neurosciences (neuronal selection), artificial intelligence (connectionism), and developmental psychology (developmental biodynamics) converge in viewing living organisms as self-organizing systems. In this perspective, the organism is not specified by the outer world, but enacts its environment by selecting relevant domains of significance that constitute its world. The distinction between mind and body or organism and environment is a matter of observational perspective. These models from empirical sciences are compatible with fundamental tenets of philosophical phenomenology and hermeneutics. They imply consequences for research in psychopathology: symptoms cannot be viewed as disconnected manifestations of discrete localized brain dysfunctions. Psychopathology should therefore focus on how the person's self-coherence is maintained and on the understanding and empirical investigation of the systemic laws that govern neurodevelopment and the organization of human cognition.