The where in the brain determines the when in the mind

Temporal representation in the control of movement

Theories of the representation of specific kinetic and spatiotem-poral features of movement range from the explicit assertion that temporal aspects of movement are not represented (Kugler et al. 1980) to the idea that they are represented and that they have neurophysiological correlates (Ivry & Corcos 1993; Ivry & Keele 1989). Jeannerod's thesis is that mental and visual images have common mechanisms and that there is a link between the image to move and the mechanisms involved with movement. The target article takes the position that certain parameters are coded in motor representations (sect. 4) but that the duration of an action is not one of them. This position is based on the work of Gottlieb et al. (1989b) and of Decety et al. (1989). Both these studies are worth considering in detail. In Note 1, Jeannerod suggests that: “in time-constrained tasks subjects control the amplitude parameter of force impulses, whereas in spatially constrained tasks the duration of the force impulse is affected by accuracy demands.” This is not exactly correct. Excitation pulse intensity (amplitude) is modulated both in tasks that require spatial and those that require temporal accuracy. Excitation pulse duration is modulated for changes in movement distance and inertial load. If subjects are required to be very accurate spatially, they will move at less than maximum speed for a given distance and this is achieved by lower levels of excitation intensity (Gottlieb et al. 1990).

On the relation between motor imagery and visual imagery

Jeannerod's target article describes support, through empirical and neurological findings, for the intriguing idea of motor imagery, a form of representation hypothesized to have levels of functional equivalence with motor preparation, while being consciously accessible. Jeannerod suggests that the subjectively accessible content of motor imagery allows it to be distinguished from motor preparation, which is unconscious. Motor imagery is distinguished from visual imagery in terms of content. Motor images are kinesthetic in nature; they are parametrized by variables such as force and time and they are potentially governed by kinematic rules. Jeannerod acknowledges, however, that motor and visual imagery may not easily be separated, because actions take place in a spatial environment. I agree; in fact, I suggest here that visualization may generally be concomitant with, and may even subjectively dominate, motor imagery.

The representing brain: Neural correlates of motor intention and imagery

This paper concerns how motor actions are neurally represented and coded. Action planning and motor preparation can be studied using a specific type of representational activity, motor imagery. A close functional equivalence between motor imagery and motor preparation is suggested by the positive effects of imagining movements on motor learning, the similarity between the neural structures involved, and the similar physiological correlates observed in both imaging and preparing. The content of motor representations can be inferred from motor images at a macroscopic level, based on global aspects of the action (the duration and amount of effort involved) and the motor rules and constraints which predict the spatial path and kinematics of movements. A more microscopic neural account calls for a representation of object-oriented action. Object attributes are processed in different neural pathways depending on the kind of task the subject is performing. During object-oriented action, a pragmatic representation is activated in which object affordances are transformed into specific motor schemas (independently of other tasks such as object recognition). Animal as well as human clinical data implicate the posterior parietal and premotor cortical areas in schema instantiation. A mechanism is proposed that is able to encode the desired goal of the action and is applicable to different levels of representational organization.

IS TPO HEMINEGLECT THE RESULT OF UNBALANCED INHIBITION?

A neurophysiological hypothesis is offered, together with supporting literature, that hemineglect and/or extinction from a temporo-paneto-occipital lesion (and possibly other lesions) can be understood as the unavailability to consciousness of information well represented in brain, the unavailability being the consequence of temporarily suppressing tonic inhibition of corticothalamic interaction no longer balanced by facilitation from the damaged cortex.

A paradox of temporal perception revealed by a stimulus oscillating in colour and orientation

Psychophysical experiments with stimuli oscillating concurrently in colour and orientation revealed an apparently paradoxical dissociation between the perceived simultaneity of stimulus changes and the perceptual pairing of the events demarked by those changes. When subjects were required to report whether changes in colour and orientation were simultaneous, judgements were generally accurate within +/-10 ms. When subjects were required to report which colour was paired predominantly with which orientation, judgements showed a systematic temporal bias of up to 50 ms in favour of colour. This dissociation between different temporal judgements concerning the same stimulus sequence is not predicted by any of the current models of binding in conscious vision. We propose an account of these data based on the temporal response properties of colour- and orientation-selective model neurons such that the perceived pairing of visual attributes is modelled as the cross-correlation of time-varying neural response profiles and thus reflects both neuronal latencies and the rate of rapid adaptation rather than simply the temporal pattern of responses to stimulus transitions.

Interference from distractors in reach-to-grasp movements

Descriptions of interference effects from non-relevant stimuli are extensive in visual target detection and identification paradigms. To explore the influence of features of non-relevant objects on reach-to-grasp movements, we instructed healthy normal controls to reach for and pick up a cylinder (target) placed midsagittally 30 cm from the starting position of the hand. In Experiment 1, the target was presented alone, or accompanied by a narrower, wider, or same-size distractor positioned to the left or right of the target. In Experiment 2, the target was presented alone or accompanied by a distractor, which was slanted at a different orientation to the target. Reflective markers were placed on the wrist, thumb, and index finger of the right hand, and infra-red light-detecting cameras recorded their displacement through a calibrated 3-dimensional working space. Kinematic parameters were derived and analysed. Consistent changes in the expression of peak velocity, acceleration, and deceleration were evident when the distractor was narrower or wider than the target. The impact of the orientation of the distractor, conversely, was not marked. We discuss the results in the context of physiological findings and models of selective attention.

Does parietal cortex contribute to feature binding?

We studied the involvement of the right parietal cortex in visual conjunction search, where two features are present in the array and spatial attention and feature binding is required, and in subset search, where two features are also present but only one of them is needed in order to group stimuli together (the subset) and allow parallel processing without the need for feature binding. Six patients with right parietal lobe lesions, six age-matched controls, and three control patients with left parietal lesions were tested on these two tasks. Patients with right parietal lesions were significantly slower than normal controls in the conjunction task, especially for target-absent trials. In the subset condition, neither normal control subjects nor patients with left parietal damage showed a difference between target-present and target-absent trials whereas right parietal patients showed a significant difference between target-present and target-absent responses. The results suggest a role for the right parietal cortex in shifting attention to the next stimulus once binding of features has taken place or selecting spatial areas containing the desired feature in a subset search, but that parietal cortex is not required for binding the features of the object.

Mental imagery in the motor context

The working hypothesis of the paper is that motor images are endowed with the same properties as those of the (corresponding) motor representations, and therefore have the same functional relationship to the imagined or represented movement and the same causal role in the generation of this movement. The fact that the timing of simulated movements follows the same constraints as that of actually executed movements is consistent with this hypothesis. Accordingly, many neural mechanisms are activated during motor imagery, as revealed by a sharp increase in tendinous reflexes in the limb imagined to move, and by vegetative changes which correlate with the level of mental effort. At the cortical level, a specific pattern of activation, that closely resembles that of action execution, is observed in areas devoted to motor control. This activation might be the substrate for the effects of mental training. A hierarchical model of the organization of action is proposed: this model implies a short-term memory storage of a 'copy' of the various representational steps. These memories are erased when an action corresponding to the represented goal takes place. By contrast, if the action is incompletely or not executed, the whole system remains activated, and the content of the representation is rehearsed. This mechanism would be the substrate for conscious access to this content during motor imagery and mental training.