Nesting cups and metatools in chimpanzees

Hierarchical object combination and tool use in the great apes and human children

Object manipulation can be used as a comparative scale of cognitive development among primates, including humans. Combinatory object manipulation is a precursor of tool-using behavior that indicates material intelligence in primates. However, developmental data on it regarding the great apes other than chimpanzees is insufficient. We conducted a longitudinal investigation of humans and chimpanzees as well as a cross-sectional examination of other great-ape infants (two bonobos, three gorillas, and four orangutans) in captive settings by using two kinds of tasks that required either inserting or stacking combinatory action. The four species of great apes and humans demonstrated both types of combinatory object manipulation during infancy. However, the order of development in different types of combinatory object manipulations varied among the great apes. Furthermore, we applied a nesting-cup task to examine the hierarchical complexity in the combinatory strategies of human children and adult chimpanzees. Both of them exhibited highly hierarchical combinations in the nesting-cup task and employed the subassembly strategy, indicating that an action merge may exist not only in human children but also in adult chimpanzees. The results were discussed with reviews of the tool-use literature from the wild great apes. The early acquisition of an inserting action in the chimpanzees may explain the tool utilization commonality reported in wild chimpanzees. The combinatory object manipulation may have worked as an external enhancer to achieve an additional hierarchical complexity in cognition and behavior, eventually leading humans to develop a language system.

Young children spontaneously invent three different types of associative tool use behaviour

Associative Tool Use (ATU) describes the use of two or more tools in combination, with the literature further differentiating between Tool set use, Tool composite use, Sequential tool use and Secondary tool use. Research investigating the cognitive processes underlying ATU has shown that some primate and bird species spontaneously invent Tool set and Sequential tool use. Yet studies with humans are sparse. Whether children are also able to spontaneously invent ATU behaviours and at what age this ability emerges is poorly understood. We addressed this gap in the literature with two experiments involving preschoolers (E1, N = 66, 3 years 6 months to 4 years 9 months; E2, N = 119, 3 years 0 months to 6 years 10 months) who were administered novel tasks measuring Tool set, Metatool and Sequential tool use. Participants needed to solve the tasks individually, without the opportunity for social learning (except for enhancement effects). Children from 3 years of age spontaneously invented all of the types of investigated ATU behaviours. Success rates were low, suggesting that individual invention of ATU in novel tasks is still challenging for preschoolers. We discuss how future studies can use and expand our tasks to deepen our understanding of tool use and problem-solving in humans and non-human animals.

The evolution of hierarchical structure building capacity for language and music: a bottom-up perspective

A central property of human language is its hierarchical structure. Humans can flexibly combine elements to build a hierarchical structure expressing rich semantics. A hierarchical structure is also considered as playing a key role in many other human cognitive domains. In music, auditory-motor events are combined into hierarchical pitch and/or rhythm structure expressing affect. How did such a hierarchical structure building capacity evolve? This paper investigates this question from a bottom-up perspective based on a set of action-related components as a shared basis underlying cognitive capacities of nonhuman primates and humans. Especially, I argue that the evolution of hierarchical structure building capacity for language and music is tractable for comparative evolutionary study once we focus on the gradual elaboration of shared brain architecture: the cortico-basal ganglia-thalamocortical circuits for hierarchical control of goal-directed action and the dorsal pathways for hierarchical internal models. I suggest that this gradual elaboration of the action-related brain architecture in the context of vocal control and tool-making went hand in hand with amplification of working memory, and made the brain ready for hierarchical structure building in language and music.

Perspectives on object manipulation and action grammar for percussive actions in primates

The skill of object manipulation is a common feature of primates including humans, although there are species-typical patterns of manipulation. Object manipulation can be used as a comparative scale of cognitive development, focusing on its complexity. Nut cracking in chimpanzees has the highest hierarchical complexity of tool use reported in non-human primates. An analysis of the patterns of object manipulation in naive chimpanzees after nut-cracking demonstrations revealed the cause of difficulties in learning nut-cracking behaviour. Various types of behaviours exhibited within a nut-cracking context can be examined in terms of the application of problem-solving strategies, focusing on their basis in causal understanding or insightful intentionality. Captive chimpanzees also exhibit complex forms of combinatory manipulation, which is the precursor of tool use. A new notation system of object manipulation was invented to assess grammatical rules in manipulative actions. The notation system of action grammar enabled direct comparisons to be made between primates including humans in a variety of object-manipulation tasks, including percussive-tool use.

Apes have culture but may not know that they do

There is good evidence that some ape behaviors can be transmitted socially and that this can lead to group-specific traditions. However, many consider animal traditions, including those in great apes, to be fundamentally different from human cultures, largely because of lack of evidence for cumulative processes and normative conformity, but perhaps also because current research on ape culture is usually restricted to behavioral comparisons. Here, we propose to analyze ape culture not only at the surface behavioral level but also at the underlying cognitive level. To this end, we integrate empirical findings in apes with theoretical frameworks developed in developmental psychology regarding the representation of tools and the development of metarepresentational abilities, to characterize the differences between ape and human cultures at the cognitive level. Current data are consistent with the notion of apes possessing mental representations of tools that can be accessed through re-representations: apes may reorganize their knowledge of tools in the form of categories or functional schemes. However, we find no evidence for metarepresentations of cultural knowledge: apes may not understand that they or others hold beliefs about their cultures. The resulting Jourdain Hypothesis, based on Molière’s character, argues that apes express their cultures without knowing that they are cultural beings because of cognitive limitations in their ability to represent knowledge, a determining feature of modern human cultures, allowing representing and modifying the current norms of the group. Differences in metarepresentational processes may thus explain fundamental differences between human and other animals’ cultures, notably limitations in cumulative behavior and normative conformity. Future empirical work should focus on how animals mentally represent their cultural knowledge to conclusively determine the ways by which humans are unique in their cultural behavior.

The prehistory of handedness: archaeological data and comparative ethology

Homo sapiens sapiens displays a species wide lateralised hand preference, with 85% of individuals in all populations being right-handed for most manual actions. In contrast, no other great ape species shows such strong and consistent population level biases, indicating that extremes of both direction and strength of manual laterality (i.e., species-wide right-handedness) may have emerged after divergence from the last common ancestor. To reconstruct the hand use patterns of early hominins, laterality is assessed in prehistoric artefacts. Group right side biases are well established from the Neanderthals onward, while patchy evidence from older fossils and artefacts indicates a preponderance of right-handed individuals. Individual hand preferences and group level biases can occur in chimpanzees and other apes for skilled tool use and food processing. Comparing these findings with human ethological data on spontaneous hand use reveals that the great ape clade (including humans) probably has a common effect at the individual level, such that a person can vary from ambidextrous to completely lateralised depending on the action. However, there is currently no theoretical model to explain this result. The degree of task complexity and bimanual complementarity have been proposed as factors affecting lateralisation strength. When primatology meets palaeoanthropology, the evidence suggests species-level right-handedness may have emerged through the social transmission of increasingly complex, bimanually differentiated, tool using activities.

Cognitive processes associated with sequential tool use in New Caledonian crows

Background

Using tools to act on non-food objects—for example, to make other tools—is considered to be a hallmark of human intelligence, and may have been a crucial step in our evolution. One form of this behaviour, ‘sequential tool use’, has been observed in a number of non-human primates and even in one bird, the New Caledonian crow (Corvus moneduloides). While sequential tool use has often been interpreted as evidence for advanced cognitive abilities, such as planning and analogical reasoning, the behaviour itself can be underpinned by a range of different cognitive mechanisms, which have never been explicitly examined. Here, we present experiments that not only demonstrate new tool-using capabilities in New Caledonian crows, but allow examination of the extent to which crows understand the physical interactions involved.

Methodology/Principal Findings

In two experiments, we tested seven captive New Caledonian crows in six tasks requiring the use of up to three different tools in a sequence to retrieve food. Our study incorporated several novel features: (i) we tested crows on a three-tool problem (subjects were required to use a tool to retrieve a second tool, then use the second tool to retrieve a third one, and finally use the third one to reach for food); (ii) we presented tasks of different complexity in random rather than progressive order; (iii) we included a number of control conditions to test whether tool retrieval was goal-directed; and (iv) we manipulated the subjects' pre-testing experience. Five subjects successfully used tools in a sequence (four from their first trial), and four subjects repeatedly solved the three-tool condition. Sequential tool use did not require, but was enhanced by, pre-training on each element in the sequence (‘chaining’), an explanation that could not be ruled out in earlier studies. By analyzing tool choice, tool swapping and improvement over time, we show that successful subjects did not use a random probing strategy. However, we find no firm evidence to support previous claims that sequential tool use demonstrates analogical reasoning or human-like planning.

Conclusions/Significance

While the ability of subjects to use three tools in sequence reveals a competence beyond that observed in any other species, our study also emphasises the importance of parsimony in comparative cognitive science: seemingly intelligent behaviour can be achieved without the involvement of high-level mental faculties, and detailed analyses are necessary before accepting claims for complex cognitive abilities.

Comparative cognitive development

This paper aims to compare cognitive development in humans and chimpanzees to illuminate the evolutionary origins of human cognition. Comparison of morphological data and life history strongly highlights the common features of all primate species, including humans. The human mother-infant relationship is characterized by the physical separation of mother and infant, and the stable supine posture of infants, that enables vocal exchange, face-to-face communication, and manual gestures. The cognitive development of chimpanzees was studied using the participation observation method. It revealed that humans and chimpanzees show similar development until 3 months of age. However, chimpanzees have a unique type of social learning that lacks the social reference observed in human children. Moreover, chimpanzees have unique immediate short-term memory capabilities. Taken together, this paper presents a plausible evolutionary scenario for the uniquely human characteristics of cognition.

A New Notation System of Object Manipulation in the Nesting-Cup Task for Chimpanzees and Humans

The nesting-cup task has been used to assess cognitive capability in humans as well as non-human primates. Previous studies have attempted to highlight interesting aspects of behavior by constructing and assessing various categories of manipulation. The present study introduces a new notation system for describing manipulation in nesting-cup tasks in the form of sequential codes. Following this notation, the entire process of manipulating cups can be divided into a sequence of behavioral segments. Each segment corresponds to a single manipulation of a cup, recorded as two numerical and one letter codes indicating object, location, and action, respectively. These codes describe the full extent of the subjects' manipulation, which can thus be traced retrospectively in its entirety by decoding the behavioral segments from the sequence. The subjects were three infant chimpanzees, three adult chimpanzees, and two human children. Segment-based analysis revealed developmental changes in the use of three strategies (pairing, pot, and subassembly), which previous studies have used as reliable indicators of cognitive development. Subassembly, regarded as the most advanced strategy for combining cups in human development, is defined as the placing of a previously constructed structure consisting of two or more cups into or onto another cup or cup structure. The three infant chimpanzees and two adult chimpanzees rarely showed subassembly, in contrast with frequent use by experienced adult chimpanzees and humans. Analysis of transition in cup state revealed a dynamic process in terms of progression and regression within a trial. The tendency to show progressive patterns of transition was related to the use of the subassembly strategy in both humans and chimpanzees. In addition, a case study of nine-cup manipulation by a chimpanzee is reported through sequential codes. Taken together, these data clearly demonstrate the potential of the proposed notation system in describing subjects' performance in nesting-cup tasks.

Experience and materials affect combinatorial construction in tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

Three movement procedures can combine nesting cups into seriated structures. Reliance on these procedures changes with age in human children, and the putatively most advanced emerges as a predominant procedure at 3 or more years. Six monkeys' (Cebus apella) combinatorial procedures and successes at nesting seriated cups were evaluated. The current study examined whether the procedures used (a) shift toward more efficient procedures after unguided experience, (b) are dependent on the type of object being combined, and (c) can be altered by specific training history. All factors produced a change in procedure for some individuals, suggesting that combinatorial procedure is a product of the dynamic influences of preexisting tendencies to act in certain ways, of environmental circumstances, and of prior experiences. Some monkeys preferred the putatively most cognitively complex procedure.

Means-means-end tool choice in cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus): finding the limits on primates' knowledge of tools

Most studies of animal tool use require subjects to use one object to gain access to a food reward. In many real world situations, however, animals perform more than one action in sequence to achieve their goals. Of theoretical interest is whether animals have the cognitive capacity to recognize the relationship between consecutive action sequences in which there may be one overall goal and several subgoals. Here we ask if cotton-top tamarins, a species that in captivity uses tools to solve means-end problems, can go one step further and use a sequence of tools (means) to obtain food (end). We first trained subjects to use a pulling tool to obtain a food reward. After this initial training, subjects were presented with problems in which one tool had to be used in combination with a second in order to obtain food. Subjects showed great difficulty when two tools were required to obtain the food reward. Although subjects attended to the connection between the tool and food reward, they ignored the physical connection between the two tools. After training on a two-tool problem, we presented subjects with a series of transfer tests to explore if they would generalize to new types of connections between the tools. Subjects readily transferred to new connections. Our results therefore provide the first evidence to date that tamarins can learn to solve problems involving two tools, but that they do so only with sufficient training.

Rapid learning of sequential tool use by macaque monkeys

Earlier reports have described monkeys in their natural habitat as being capable of purposefully using tools for activities such as obtaining food. However, little is known regarding the extent of macaque monkeys' ability to understand the functional meaning of objects as tools. We have trained Japanese macaques in tool-use behavior to demonstrate their abilities to solve stick problems involving the use of a novel tool and a sequential combination of different tools. Results suggest that macaque monkeys have cognitive abilities, such as (1). flexibility in applying previous experience in accordance with the requirements of the learning situation, (2). the foresight needed to conduct a series of acts in a continuous sequential manner and the ability to internally plan the necessary strategy.

Transport of tools and mental representation: is capuchin monkey tool behaviour a useful model of Plio-Pleistocene hominid technology?

Capuchin monkeys display greatly developed tool-using capacities, performing successfully a variety of tool-tasks. Impressed by their achievements in this respect, some investigators have suggested that capuchin tool-using behaviour could be used as a model of the tool behaviour of the first hominids. The transport of tools, a task requiring complex cognitive capabilities, is an essential ingredient in the technological behaviour of the first hominids. In this way, to qualify as another source for modelling hominid behavioural evolution, capuchins had to exhibit proficiency in the transport of tools. We investigated this problem through experiments designed to elicit the transport of objects. The results showed that the monkeys were able to transport food to be processed with the use of tools, but failed when the tools themselves had to be transported. Our hypothesis is that a limited capacity for abstract representation, together with the lack of a regulatory system ensuring that the food would not be lost and consumed by another individual during the search for and transport of the tools, were responsible for such a failure. We conclude that the tool-using behaviour of capuchins presents no functional analogy with the tool behaviour of the Plio-Pleistocene hominids, and that capuchin monkeys are a very inadequate source for modelling Plio-Pleistocene hominid's technological behaviour.