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Token-identity, consciousness, and the connection principle. Behav Brain Sci 1995. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00040139] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
AbstractSearle's (1990) argument for the “Connection Principle” seems to rest on a confusion between ontological and epistemological claims. The potential consciousness of a mental state does not yield the same effect as does its actual consciousness, namely, the preservation of aspectual shape. Searle's distinction between the consciousness of an intentional object and that of a mental state, which is meant to counter the objection that deep unconscious rules cease to be deep once they become conscious, fails to do its appointed task.
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The ontology of aspectual shape. Behav Brain Sci 1995. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00040115] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
AbstractSearle (1990) argues that unconscious intrinsic intentional states must be accessible to consciousness because (1) all intrinsic intentional states have aspectual shape, the “ontology” of which cannot be explained in a third-person (e.g., neurophysiological) vocabulary, and (2) ontologically, unconscious mental states are neurophysiological processes. This argument confuses three senses of “ontology,” namely, factuality, individuative properties, and phenomenological presence.
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Searle's argument that intentional states are conscious states. Behav Brain Sci 1995. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00040127] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
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Comments on the Connection Principle. Behav Brain Sci 1993. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00029599] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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Causal dispositions, aspectual shape and intentionality. Behav Brain Sci 1993. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00029629] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
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What next? Ramifications for empirical psychology. Behav Brain Sci 1993. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00029630] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
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Consciousness and focal attention: Answer to John Searle. Behav Brain Sci 1993. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00029605] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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