Précis of doing without concepts

Neural specialization for 'visual' concepts emerges in the absence of vision

The 'different-body/different-concepts hypothesis' central to some embodiment theories proposes that the sensory capacities of our bodies shape the cognitive and neural basis of our concepts. We tested this hypothesis by comparing behavioral semantic similarity judgments and neural signatures (fMRI) of 'visual' categories ('living things,' or animals, e.g., tiger, and light events, e.g., sparkle) across congenitally blind (n = 21) and sighted (n = 22) adults. Words referring to 'visual' entities/nouns and events/verbs (animals and light events) were compared to less vision-dependent categories from the same grammatical class (animal vs. place nouns, light vs. sound, mouth, and hand verbs). Within-category semantic similarity judgments about animals (e.g., sparrow vs. finch) were partially different across groups, consistent with the idea that sighted people rely on visually learned information to make such judgments about animals. However, robust neural specialization for living things in temporoparietal semantic networks, including in the precuneus, was observed in blind and sighted people alike. For light events, which are directly accessible only through vision, behavioral judgments were indistinguishable across groups. Neural responses to light events were also similar across groups: in both blind and sighted people, the left middle temporal gyrus (LMTG+) responded more to event concepts, including light events, compared to entity concepts. Multivariate patterns of neural activity in LMTG+ distinguished among different event types, including light events vs. other event types. In sum, we find that neural signatures of concepts previously attributed to visual experience do not require vision. Across a wide range of semantic types, conceptual representations develop independent of sensory experience.

Modal and amodal cognition: an overarching principle in various domains of psychology

Accounting for how the human mind represents the internal and external world is a crucial feature of many theories of human cognition. Central to this question is the distinction between modal as opposed to amodal representational formats. It has often been assumed that one but not both of these two types of representations underlie processing in specific domains of cognition (e.g., perception, mental imagery, and language). However, in this paper, we suggest that both formats play a major role in most cognitive domains. We believe that a comprehensive theory of cognition requires a solid understanding of these representational formats and their functional roles within and across different domains of cognition, the developmental trajectory of these representational formats, and their role in dysfunctional behavior. Here we sketch such an overarching perspective that brings together research from diverse subdisciplines of psychology on modal and amodal representational formats so as to unravel their functional principles and their interactions.

Which Concept of Concept for Conceptual Engineering?

Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts. However, little has been written about how best to conceive of concepts for the purposes of conceptual engineering. In this paper, I aim to fill this foundational gap, proceeding in three main steps: First, I propose a methodological framework for evaluating the conduciveness of a given concept of concept for conceptual engineering. Then, I develop a typology that contrasts two competing concepts of concept that can be used in conceptual engineering-namely, the philosophical and psychological ones. Finally, I evaluate these two concepts of concept using the proposed methodological framework and I show that, when it comes to making conceptual engineering an actionable method, the psychological concept of concept outclasses its philosophical counterpart on all counts. This provides a baseline from which the concept of concept can be further improved for the purposes of conceptual engineering.

A Tricky Trait: Applying the Fruits of the "Function Debate" in the Philosophy of Biology to the "Venom Debate" in the Science of Toxinology

The "function debate" in the philosophy of biology and the "venom debate" in the science of toxinology are conceptually related. Venom systems are complex multifunctional traits that have evolved independently numerous times throughout the animal kingdom. No single concept of function, amongst those popularly defended, appears adequate to describe these systems in all their evolutionary contexts and extant variations. As such, a pluralistic view of function, previously defended by some philosophers of biology, is most appropriate. Venom systems, like many other functional traits, exist in nature as points on a continuum and the boundaries between "venomous" and "non-venomous" species may not always be clearly defined. This paper includes a brief overview of the concept of function, followed by in-depth discussion of its application to venom systems. A sound understanding of function may aid in moving the venom debate forward. Similarly, consideration of a complex functional trait such as venom may be of interest to philosophers of biology.

"Trees Live on Soil and Sunshine!"--Coexistence of Scientific and Alternative Conception of Tree Assimilation

Successful learning is the integration of new knowledge into existing schemes, leading to an integrated and correct scientific conception. By contrast, the co-existence of scientific and alternative conceptions may indicate a fragmented knowledge profile. Every learner is unique and thus carries an individual set of preconceptions before classroom engagement due to prior experiences. Hence, instructors and teachers have to consider the heterogeneous knowledge profiles of their class when teaching. However, determinants of fragmented knowledge profiles are not well understood yet, which may hamper a development of adapted teaching schemes. We used a questionnaire-based approach to assess conceptual knowledge of tree assimilation and wood synthesis surveying 885 students of four educational levels: 6th graders, 10th graders, natural science freshmen and other academic studies freshmen. We analysed the influence of learner's characteristics such as educational level, age and sex on the coexistence of scientific and alternative conceptions. Within all subsamples well-known alternative conceptions regarding tree assimilation and wood synthesis coexisted with correct scientific ones. For example, students describe trees to be living on "soil and sunshine", representing scientific knowledge of photosynthesis mingled with an alternative conception of trees eating like animals. Fragmented knowledge profiles occurred in all subsamples, but our models showed that improved education and age foster knowledge integration. Sex had almost no influence on the existing scientific conceptions and evolution of knowledge integration. Consequently, complex biological issues such as tree assimilation and wood synthesis need specific support e.g. through repeated learning units in class- and seminar-rooms in order to help especially young students to handle and overcome common alternative conceptions and appropriately integrate scientific conceptions into their knowledge profile.

Concepts as Semantic Pointers: A Framework and Computational Model

The reconciliation of theories of concepts based on prototypes, exemplars, and theory-like structures is a longstanding problem in cognitive science. In response to this problem, researchers have recently tended to adopt either hybrid theories that combine various kinds of representational structure, or eliminative theories that replace concepts with a more finely grained taxonomy of mental representations. In this paper, we describe an alternative approach involving a single class of mental representations called "semantic pointers." Semantic pointers are symbol-like representations that result from the compression and recursive binding of perceptual, lexical, and motor representations, effectively integrating traditional connectionist and symbolic approaches. We present a computational model using semantic pointers that replicates experimental data from categorization studies involving each prior paradigm. We argue that a framework involving semantic pointers can provide a unified account of conceptual phenomena, and we compare our framework to existing alternatives in accounting for the scope, content, recursive combination, and neural implementation of concepts.

What is the significance of The Origin of Concepts for philosophers' and psychologists' theories of concepts?

Carey holds that the study of conceptual development bears on the theories of concepts developed by philosophers and psychologists. In this commentary, I scrutinize her claims about the significance of the study of conceptual development.

On the need for Embodied and Dis-Embodied Cognition

This essay proposes and defends a pluralistic theory of conceptual embodiment. Our concepts are represented in at least two ways: (i) through sensorimotor simulations of our interactions with objects and events and (ii) through sensorimotor simulations of natural language processing. Linguistic representations are "dis-embodied" in the sense that they are dynamic and multimodal but, in contrast to other forms of embodied cognition, do not inherit semantic content from this embodiment. The capacity to store information in the associations and inferential relationships among linguistic representations extends our cognitive reach and provides an explanation of our ability to abstract and generalize. This theory is supported by a number of empirical considerations, including the large body of evidence from cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology supporting a multiple semantic code explanation of imageability effects.