Beyond aerodigestion: Exaptation of feeding-related mouth movements for social communication in human and nonhuman primates

Artificial cognition vs. artificial intelligence for next-generation autonomous robotic agents

The trend in industrial/service robotics is to develop robots that can cooperate with people, interacting with them in an autonomous, safe and purposive way. These are the fundamental elements characterizing the fourth and the fifth industrial revolutions (4IR, 5IR): the crucial innovation is the adoption of intelligent technologies that can allow the development of cyber-physical systems, similar if not superior to humans. The common wisdom is that intelligence might be provided by AI (Artificial Intelligence), a claim that is supported more by media coverage and commercial interests than by solid scientific evidence. AI is currently conceived in a quite broad sense, encompassing LLMs and a lot of other things, without any unifying principle, but self-motivating for the success in various areas. The current view of AI robotics mostly follows a purely disembodied approach that is consistent with the old-fashioned, Cartesian mind-body dualism, reflected in the software-hardware distinction inherent to the von Neumann computing architecture. The working hypothesis of this position paper is that the road to the next generation of autonomous robotic agents with cognitive capabilities requires a fully brain-inspired, embodied cognitive approach that avoids the trap of mind-body dualism and aims at the full integration of Bodyware and Cogniware. We name this approach Artificial Cognition (ACo) and ground it in Cognitive Neuroscience. It is specifically focused on proactive knowledge acquisition based on bidirectional human-robot interaction: the practical advantage is to enhance generalization and explainability. Moreover, we believe that a brain-inspired network of interactions is necessary for allowing humans to cooperate with artificial cognitive agents, building a growing level of personal trust and reciprocal accountability: this is clearly missing, although actively sought, in current AI. The ACo approach is a work in progress that can take advantage of a number of research threads, some of them antecedent the early attempts to define AI concepts and methods. In the rest of the paper we will consider some of the building blocks that need to be re-visited in a unitary framework: the principles of developmental robotics, the methods of action representation with prospection capabilities, and the crucial role of social interaction.

Does Neonatal Imitation Exist? Insights From a Meta-Analysis of 336 Effect Sizes

Neonatal imitation is a cornerstone in many theoretical accounts of human development and social behavior, yet its existence has been debated for the past 40 years. To examine possible explanations for the inconsistent findings in this body of research, we conducted a multilevel meta-analysis synthesizing 336 effect sizes from 33 independent samples of human newborns, reported in 26 articles. The meta-analysis found significant evidence for neonatal imitation (d = 0.68, 95% CI = [0.39, 0.96], p < .001) but substantial heterogeneity between study estimates. This heterogeneity was not explained by any of 13 methodological moderators identified by previous reviews, but it was associated with researcher affiliation, test of moderators (QM) (15) = 57.09, p < .001. There are at least two possible explanations for these results: (a) Neonatal imitation exists and its detection varies as a function of uncaptured methodological factors common to a limited set of studies, and (2) neonatal imitation does not exist and the overall positive result is an artifact of high researcher degrees of freedom.

Re-analysis of data reveals no evidence for neonatal imitation in rhesus macaques

Over the past decade, a growing number of publications have claimed to provide evidence for the existence and function of neonatal imitation in rhesus macaques. Here I show that there is in fact no empirical basis for these claims. Studies of the phenomenon have consistently failed to implement the gold standard cross-target analytical approach, which controls for increases in matching responses that may not be a function of the specific modelled behaviour. Critically, a pre-registered re-analysis of the entire set of existing data using this cross-target approach shows that macaque neonates have failed to produce matching tongue protrusion or lipsmacking responses at levels greater than chance. Furthermore, there is no evidence for intra-individual consistency in 'imitative' responses across different actions, as imitation scores for the two actions are negatively correlated with each other. Macaque tongue protrusion and lipsmacking responses may vary as a function of general factors that fluctuate over testing sessions, rather than as a function of the specific model or of between-individual variations in imitative tendencies.

The Effects of Maternal Mirroring on the Development of Infant Social Expressiveness: The Case of Infant Cleft Lip

Parent-infant social interactions start early in development, with infants showing active communicative expressions by just two months. A key question is how this social capacity develops. Maternal mirroring of infant expressions is considered an important, intuitive, parenting response, but evidence is sparse in the first two months concerning the conditions under which mirroring occurs and its developmental sequelae, including in clinical samples where the infant's social expressiveness may be affected. We investigated these questions by comparing the development of mother-infant interactions between a sample where the infant had cleft lip and a normal, unaffected, comparison sample. We videotaped dyads in their homes five times from one to ten weeks and used a microanalytic coding scheme for maternal and infant behaviours, including infant social expressions, and maternal mirroring and marking responses. We also recorded maternal gaze to the infant, using eye-tracking glasses. Although infants with cleft lip did show communicative behaviours, the rate of their development was slower than in comparison infants. This group difference was mediated by a lower rate of mirroring of infant expressions by mothers of infants with cleft lip; this effect was, in turn, partly accounted for by reduced gaze to the infant's mouth, although the clarity of infant social expressions (indexed by cleft severity) and maternal self-blame regarding the cleft were also influential. Results indicate the robustness of parent-infant interactions but also their sensitivity to specific variations in interactants' appearance and behaviour. Parental mirroring appears critical in infant social development, likely supported by the mirror neuron system and underlying clinical and, possibly, cultural differences in infant behaviour. These findings suggest new avenues for clinical intervention.