Optimal, resource-rational or sub-optimal? Insights from cognitive development

From silos to synergy: Integrating approaches to investigate the role of prior knowledge and expectations on episodic memory

Significant progress in the investigation of how prior knowledge influences episodic memory has been made using three sometimes isolated (but not mutually exclusive) approaches: strictly adult behavioral investigations, computational models, and investigations into the development of the system. Here we point out that these approaches are complementary, each approach informs and is informed by the other. Thus, a natural next step for research is to combine all three approaches to further our understanding of the role of prior knowledge in episodic memory. Here we use studies of memory for expectation-congruent and incongruent information from each of these often disparate approaches to illustrate how combining approaches can be used to test and revise theories from the other. This domain is particularly advantageous because it highlights important features of more general memory processes, further differentiates models of memory, and can shed light on developmental change in the memory system. We then present a case study to illustrate the progress that can be made from integrating all three approaches and highlight the need for more endeavors in this vein. As a first step, we also propose a new computational model of memory that takes into account behavioral and developmental factors that can influence prior knowledge and episodic memory interactions. This integrated approach has great potential for offering novel insights into the relationship between prior knowledge and episodic memory, and cognition more broadly.

Curiosity as a metacognitive feeling

Curious information-seeking is known to be a key driver for learning, but characterizing this important psychological phenomenon remains a challenge. In this article, we argue that solving this challenge requires qualifying the relationships between metacognition and curiosity. The idea that curiosity is a metacognitive competence has been resisted: researchers have assumed both that young children and non-human animals can be genuinely curious, and that metacognition requires conceptual and culturally situated resources that are unavailable to young children and non-human animals. Here, we argue that this resistance is unwarranted given accumulating evidence that metacognition can be deployed procedurally, and we defend the view that curiosity is a metacognitive feeling. Our metacognitive view singles out two monitoring steps as a triggering condition for curiosity: evaluating one's own informational needs, and predicting the likelihood that explorations of the proximate environment afford significant information gains. We review empirical evidence and computational models of curiosity, and show that they fit well with this metacognitive account, while on the contrary, they remain difficult to explain by a competing account according to which curiosity is a basic attitude of questioning. Finally, we propose a new way to construe the relationships between curiosity and the human-specific communicative practice of questioning, discuss the issue of how children may learn to express their curiosity through interactions with others, and conclude by briefly exploring the implications of our proposal for educational practices.

Relevance to the higher order structure may govern auditory statistical learning in neonates

Hearing is one of the earliest senses to develop and is quite mature by birth. Contemporary theories assume that regularities in sound are exploited by the brain to create internal models of the environment. Through statistical learning, internal models extrapolate from patterns to predictions about subsequent experience. In adults, altered brain responses to sound enable us to infer the existence and properties of these models. In this study, brain potentials were used to determine whether newborns exhibit context-dependent modulations of a brain response that can be used to infer the existence and properties of internal models. Results are indicative of significant context-dependence in the responsivity to sound in newborns. When common and rare sounds continue in stable probabilities over a very long period, neonates respond to all sounds equivalently (no differentiation). However, when the same common and rare sounds at the same probabilities alternate over time, the neonate responses show clear differentiations. The context-dependence is consistent with the possibility that the neonate brain produces more precise internal models that discriminate between contexts when there is an emergent structure to be discovered but appears to adopt broader models when discrimination delivers little or no additional information about the environment.

Seizing the opportunity: Lifespan differences in the effects of the opportunity cost of time on cognitive control

Previous work suggests that lifespan developmental differences in cognitive control reflect maturational and aging-related changes in prefrontal cortex functioning. However, complementary explanations exist: It could be that children and older adults differ from younger adults in how they balance the effort of engaging in control against its potential benefits. Here we test whether the degree of cognitive effort expenditure depends on the opportunity cost of time (average reward rate per unit time): if the average reward rate is high, participants should withhold cognitive effort whereas if it is low, they should invest more. In Experiment 1, we examine this hypothesis in children, adolescents, younger, and older adults, by applying a reward rate manipulation in two cognitive control tasks: a modified Erikson Flanker and a task-switching paradigm. We found that young adults and adolescents reflexively withheld effort when the opportunity cost of time was high, whereas older adults and, to a lesser degree children, invested more resources to accumulate reward as quickly as possible. We tentatively interpret these results in terms of age- and task-specific differences in the processing of the opportunity cost of time. We qualify our findings in a second experiment in younger adults in which we address an alternative explanation of our results and show that the observed age differences in effort expenditure may not result from differences in task difficulty. To conclude, we think that our results present an interesting first step at relating opportunity costs to motivational processes across the lifespan. We frame the implications of further work in this area within a recent developmental model of resource-rationality, which points to developmental sweet spots in cognitive control.