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Charbonneau M, Curioni A, McEllin L, Strachan JWA. Flexible Cultural Learning Through Action Coordination. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2024; 19:201-222. [PMID: 37458767 DOI: 10.1177/17456916231182923] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/16/2024]
Abstract
The cultural transmission of technical know-how has proven vital to the success of our species. The broad diversity of learning contexts and social configurations, as well as the various kinds of coordinated interactions they involve, speaks to our capacity to flexibly adapt to and succeed in transmitting vital knowledge in various learning contexts. Although often recognized by ethnographers, the flexibility of cultural learning has so far received little attention in terms of cognitive mechanisms. We argue that a key feature of the flexibility of cultural learning is that both the models and learners recruit cognitive mechanisms of action coordination to modulate their behavior contingently on the behavior of their partner, generating a process of mutual adaptation supporting the successful transmission of technical skills in diverse and fluctuating learning environments. We propose that the study of cultural learning would benefit from the experimental methods, results, and insights of joint-action research and, complementarily, that the field of joint-action research could expand its scope by integrating a learning and cultural dimension. Bringing these two fields of research together promises to enrich our understanding of cultural learning, its contextual flexibility, and joint action coordination.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mathieu Charbonneau
- Africa Institute for Research in Economics and Social Sciences, Université Mohammed VI Polytechnique
| | | | - Luke McEllin
- Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University
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Hsu CT, Sato W. Electromyographic Validation of Spontaneous Facial Mimicry Detection Using Automated Facial Action Coding. SENSORS (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2023; 23:9076. [PMID: 38005462 PMCID: PMC10675524 DOI: 10.3390/s23229076] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/28/2023] [Revised: 11/06/2023] [Accepted: 11/08/2023] [Indexed: 11/26/2023]
Abstract
Although electromyography (EMG) remains the standard, researchers have begun using automated facial action coding system (FACS) software to evaluate spontaneous facial mimicry despite the lack of evidence of its validity. Using the facial EMG of the zygomaticus major (ZM) as a standard, we confirmed the detection of spontaneous facial mimicry in action unit 12 (AU12, lip corner puller) via an automated FACS. Participants were alternately presented with real-time model performance and prerecorded videos of dynamic facial expressions, while simultaneous ZM signal and frontal facial videos were acquired. Facial videos were estimated for AU12 using FaceReader, Py-Feat, and OpenFace. The automated FACS is less sensitive and less accurate than facial EMG, but AU12 mimicking responses were significantly correlated with ZM responses. All three software programs detected enhanced facial mimicry by live performances. The AU12 time series showed a roughly 100 to 300 ms latency relative to the ZM. Our results suggested that while the automated FACS could not replace facial EMG in mimicry detection, it could serve a purpose for large effect sizes. Researchers should be cautious with the automated FACS outputs, especially when studying clinical populations. In addition, developers should consider the EMG validation of AU estimation as a benchmark.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chun-Ting Hsu
- Psychological Process Research Team, Guardian Robot Project, RIKEN, Soraku-gun, Kyoto 619-0288, Japan
| | - Wataru Sato
- Psychological Process Research Team, Guardian Robot Project, RIKEN, Soraku-gun, Kyoto 619-0288, Japan
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Pouscoulous N. More than one path to pragmatics? Insights from children's grasp of implicit, figurative and ironical meaning. Cognition 2023; 240:105531. [PMID: 37611331 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105531] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/10/2022] [Revised: 06/09/2023] [Accepted: 06/20/2023] [Indexed: 08/25/2023]
Abstract
Human communication requires impressive inferential abilities and mind-reading skills. To learn how to speak and become competent communicators children need both. The development of pragmatic abilities presents us with a puzzle. On the one hand, much evidence suggests pragmatics play a grounding role in early communication and language acquisition. On the other, preschoolers find linguistic pragmatic inferences such as implicatures, metaphor and irony difficult to grasp. Apperly and Butterfill (2009) maintain that there are two separate systems for belief reasoning: a simpler one and a more sophisticated one that develops later. Along this line of reasoning we might also expect there to be two separate kinds of pragmatic abilities: an early set using (among other things) the simpler Theory of Mind system, and a more sophisticated one appearing later in childhood and using full-blown Theory of Mind. I will argue there is no need to divide pragmatic abilities in such a way to bridge the gap between the pragmatic inferential skills found in toddlers and the difficulties observed in preschoolers. Evidence from the past two decades indicates that phenomena such as implicatures and metaphor (but not irony) can be understood earlier than previously established. Additionally, children's apparent struggle with specific pragmatic inferences might be better explained by factors independent from pragmatic competence, but which interact with it.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nausicaa Pouscoulous
- University College London, Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, Chandler House, 2 Wakefield Street, London WC1N 1PF, United Kingdom.
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Scott-Phillips T, Heintz C. Great ape interaction: Ladyginian but not Gricean. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2023; 120:e2300243120. [PMID: 37824522 PMCID: PMC10589610 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2300243120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/14/2023] Open
Abstract
Nonhuman great apes inform one another in ways that can seem very humanlike. Especially in the gestural domain, their behavior exhibits many similarities with human communication, meeting widely used empirical criteria for intentionality. At the same time, there remain some manifest differences, most obviously the enormous range and scope of human expression. How to account for these similarities and differences in a unified way remains a major challenge. Here, we make a key distinction between the expression of intentions (Ladyginian) and the expression of specifically informative intentions (Gricean), and we situate this distinction within a "special case of" framework for classifying different modes of attention manipulation. We hence describe how the attested tendencies of great ape interaction-for instance, to be dyadic rather than triadic, to be about the here-and-now rather than "displaced," and to have a high degree of perceptual resemblance between form and meaning-are products of its Ladyginian but not Gricean character. We also reinterpret video footage of great ape gesture as Ladyginian but not Gricean, and we distinguish several varieties of meaning that are continuous with one another. We conclude that the evolutionary origins of linguistic meaning lie not in gradual changes in communication systems, but rather in gradual changes in social cognition, and specifically in what modes of attention manipulation are enabled by a species' cognitive phenotype: first Ladyginian and in turn Gricean. The second of these shifts rendered humans, and only humans, "language ready."
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Affiliation(s)
- Thom Scott-Phillips
- Institute for Logic, Cognition, Language and Information, 20018Donostia-San Sebastian, Spain
| | - Christophe Heintz
- Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, A-1100Vienna, Austria
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Bonalumi F, Bumin FB, Scott-Phillips T, Heintz C. Communication and deniability: Moral and epistemic reactions to denials. Front Psychol 2023; 13:1073213. [PMID: 36687811 PMCID: PMC9845615 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1073213] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/18/2022] [Accepted: 12/05/2022] [Indexed: 01/06/2023] Open
Abstract
People often deny having meant what the audience understood. Such denials occur in both interpersonal and institutional contexts, such as in political discourse, the interpretation of laws and the perception of lies. In practice, denials have a wide range of possible effects on the audience, such as conversational repair, reinterpretation of the original utterance, moral judgements about the speaker, and rejection of the denial. When are these different reactions triggered? What factors make denials credible? There are surprisingly few experimental studies directly targeting such questions. Here, we present two pre-registered experiments focusing on (i) the speaker's incentives to mislead their audience, and (ii) the impact of speaker denials on audiences' moral and epistemic assessments of what has been said. We find that the extent to which speakers are judged responsible for the audience's interpretations is modulated by their (the speakers') incentives to mislead, but not by denials themselves. We also find that people are more willing than we expected to revise their interpretation of the speaker's utterance when they learn that the ascribed meaning is false, regardless of whether the speaker is known to have had incentives to deceive their audience. In general, these findings are consistent with the idea that communicators are held responsible for the cognitive effects they trigger in their audience; rather than being responsible for, more narrowly, only the effects of what was "literally" said. In light of our findings, we present a new, cognitive analysis of how audiences react to denials, drawing in particular on the Relevance Theory approach to communication. We distinguish in particular: (a) the spontaneous and intuitive re-interpretation of the original utterance in light of a denial; (b) the attribution of responsibility to the speaker for the cognitive effects of what is communicated; and (c) the reflective attribution of a particular intention to the speaker, which include argumentative considerations, higher-order deniability, and reputational concerns. Existing experimental work, including our own, aims mostly at (a) and (b), and does not adequately control for (c). Deeper understanding of what can be credibly denied will be hindered unless and until this methodological problem is resolved.
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Affiliation(s)
- Francesca Bonalumi
- Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Vienna, Austria,*Correspondence: Francesca Bonalumi,
| | - Feride Belma Bumin
- Department of Economics and Business, Central European University, Vienna, Austria
| | - Thom Scott-Phillips
- Institute for Logic Cognition Language and Information, University of the Basque Country, San Sebastian, Spain
| | - Christophe Heintz
- Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Vienna, Austria
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Improving weight loss RCTs. Measuring the step weight change from a sustained change in frequency of a particular eating or exercise pattern. Eur J Clin Nutr 2022; 77:511-514. [PMID: 36474081 PMCID: PMC10169651 DOI: 10.1038/s41430-022-01247-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/29/2022] [Revised: 11/22/2022] [Accepted: 11/24/2022] [Indexed: 12/12/2022]
Abstract
AbstractThe public’s trust in the science of avoiding unhealthy weight depends on a radical reform of the design and execution of weight loss programmes and their clinical trials. This Perspective reiterates the longstanding argument for measuring the effectiveness of each component of an intervention on obesity. Body energy content change results from a difference in rates between input and output. These rates are determined by the frequencies of specific patterns of dietary behaviour, physical activity and thermal comfort, plus the cost of resting metabolism. Since fat-free mass changes alongside fat mass, the amount of change in weight from a change in the frequency of a behaviour pattern comes to an asymptote. That step change in weight per unit of behaviour change is measured by regression from the change in frequency of the behaviour that has been maintained from baseline to follow-up. For hard evidence, weight loss programme participants’ own words must be used to specify behaviour. In RCTs of multiple-component programmes, sequences of the behaviour patterns to be changed are randomised among groups. The resulting evidence on effective slimming practices can be delivered directly into therapeutic services and public health interventions for the culture investigated.
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Morin O. The puzzle of ideography. Behav Brain Sci 2022; 46:e233. [PMID: 36254782 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x22002801] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
An ideography is a general-purpose code made of pictures that do not encode language, which can be used autonomously - not just as a mnemonic prop - to encode information on a broad range of topics. Why are viable ideographies so hard to find? I contend that self-sufficient graphic codes need to be narrowly specialized. Writing systems are only an apparent exception: At their core, they are notations of a spoken language. Even if they also encode nonlinguistic information, they are useless to someone who lacks linguistic competence in the encoded language or a related one. The versatility of writing is thus vicarious: Writing borrows it from spoken language. Why is it so difficult to build a fully generalist graphic code? The most widespread answer points to a learnability problem. We possess specialized cognitive resources for learning spoken language, but lack them for graphic codes. I argue in favor of a different account: What is difficult about graphic codes is not so much learning or teaching them as getting every user to learn and teach the same code. This standardization problem does not affect spoken or signed languages as much. Those are based on cheap and transient signals, allowing for easy online repairing of miscommunication, and require face-to-face interactions where the advantages of common ground are maximized. Graphic codes lack these advantages, which makes them smaller in size and more specialized.
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Affiliation(s)
- Olivier Morin
- Max Planck Institute for Geoanthropology, Minds and Traditions Research Group, Jena, Germany ; https://www.shh.mpg.de/94549/themintgroup
- Institut Jean Nicod, CNRS, ENS, PSL University, Paris, France
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Warren E, Call J. Inferential Communication: Bridging the Gap Between Intentional and Ostensive Communication in Non-human Primates. Front Psychol 2022; 12:718251. [PMID: 35095633 PMCID: PMC8795877 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.718251] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/31/2021] [Accepted: 12/13/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Communication, when defined as an act intended to affect the psychological state of another individual, demands the use of inference. Either the signaler, the recipient, or both must make leaps of understanding which surpass the semantic information available and draw from pragmatic clues to fully imbue and interpret meaning. While research into human communication and the evolution of language has long been comfortable with mentalistic interpretations of communicative exchanges, including rich attributions of mental state, research into animal communication has balked at theoretical models which describe mentalized cognitive mechanisms. We submit a new theoretical perspective on animal communication: the model of inferential communication. For use when existing proximate models of animal communication are not sufficient to fully explain the complex, flexible, and intentional communication documented in certain species, specifically non-human primates, we present our model as a bridge between shallower, less cognitive descriptions of communicative behavior and the perhaps otherwise inaccessible mentalistic interpretations of communication found in theoretical considerations of human language. Inferential communication is a framework that builds on existing evidence of referentiality, intentionality, and social inference in primates. It allows that they might be capable of applying social inferences to a communicative setting, which could explain some of the cognitive processes that enable the complexity and flexibility of primate communication systems. While historical models of animal communication focus on the means-ends process of behavior and apparent cognitive outcomes, inferential communication invites consideration of the mentalistic processes that must underlie those outcomes. We propose a mentalized approach to questions, investigations, and interpretations of non-human primate communication. We include an overview of both ultimate and proximate models of animal communication, which contextualize the role and utility of our inferential communication model, and provide a detailed breakdown of the possible levels of cognitive complexity which could be investigated using this framework. Finally, we present some possible applications of inferential communication in the field of non-human primate communication and highlight the role it could play in advancing progress toward an increasingly precise understanding of the cognitive capabilities of our closest living relatives.
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Affiliation(s)
- Elizabeth Warren
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St. Andrews, United Kingdom
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If you presume relevance, you don't need a bifocal lens. Behav Brain Sci 2022; 45:e250. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x22001352] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/11/2022]
Abstract
Abstract
We argue for a relevance-guided learning mechanism to account for both innovative reproduction and faithful imitation by focusing on the role of communication in knowledge transmission. Unlike bifocal stance theory, this mechanism does not require a strict divide between instrumental and ritual-like actions, and the goals they respectively fulfill (material vs. social/affiliative), to account for flexibility in action interpretation and reproduction.
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