The tortoise and the love-machine: Grey Walter and the politics of electroencephalography

One, no-one and a hundred thousand brains: J.C. Eccles, J.Z. Young and the establishment of the neurosciences (1930s-1960s)

Contemporary neurosciences have grown beyond the limits of a natural science. To its most vocal advocates, the study of the human brain can provide nothing short of the basis for a new science of man-the link between the "natural" and "human" sciences-as a simple consequence of the growing mass of facts relating to this most marvelous organ, accumulated in the last four decades. This straightforward picture of the growing import of the neurosciences simplifies and obscures the myriad different interpretations and images of "the brain" that have inspired the development of the neurosciences. Among them, this chapter will consider two deeply contrasting early images of the brain: the cellular-physiological brain proposed since the 1950s by John Carew Eccles, and the model-"whole" brain championed by John Zachary Young. Eccles' program was focused on the vertebrate synapse, and Young's on the whole brain of an "advanced" invertebrate (the octopus). The former was the programmatic extension of a long neurophysiological tradition, and the latter an outspoken attempt at providing a revolutionary model for the organization of an unprecedented research effort. One underscored continuity and scientific "soundness," and the other promised rupture and new, imaginative solutions to age-old problems. Nevertheless, they have been later lumped together into a single, marvelous and progressive history, or mythology, of the Science of the Brain. This chapter will show how the organizing principle of these two opposed (if almost equally successful) research efforts was not the foggy, ever-changing image of an experimental brain-in-becoming, but the clear, fixed horizon of a promised brain.

Wired-up in white organdie: framing women's scientific labour at the Burden Neurological Institute

The Burden Neurological Institute (BNI) is widely considered one of the central sites in the history of British neuroscience. Founded in 1939 to investigate the anatomy, functions, and disorders of the human brain, the BNI rapidly established a reputation as a world-leading centre of research and expertise. Due to the rich insights offered by the BNI Papers, held in the archives of the Science Museum, London, the work of the BNI has become a popular topic among historians of science and technology. However, one key omission in both the archival record and in subsequent historical accounts has been the BNI's prominent employment of women as researchers, technicians and laboratory assistants. To address this absence, this article examines the comparatively underutilised photographic collections of the BNI Papers, in which women feature more prominently. However, rather than providing an unproblematic 'window' onto the experiences of these scientific workers, this article contends that the photographs in question 'frame' women's labour in particular ways so as to devalue, obscure and erase their contributions to the BNI's much-lauded achievements. The article considers three such frames: the objectification of women as the subjects, rather than the practitioners, of neuroscientific research; the elision of women's scientific, domestic, and familial roles; and the visual equation of women's labour with that of the machine. The article concludes by considering some of the ways in which critiques of visual framing might be integrated into both future historical accounts and museum display practices.

Vital brains: On the entanglement of media, minds, and models

The advent of functional imaging, hailed as a breakthrough for marrying morphological and functional approaches in brain research, invites a reflection upon the interplay between models, instruments, and theories. Brain research and theorizing about the brain are generally mediated by the research technologies employed. Going back into the history of brain research, the chapter explores the epistemic effects of research technologies by focusing on the localization debate in relation to different visualization strategies. In this way, one can differentiate between abstracting and concretizing approaches to brain modeling. These approaches form the basis for introducing the concept of vital abstraction by revisiting Grey Walter's The Living Brain. Walter's adventures in visualizing brain activity and constructing lively toys are described as a form of brain theorizing that is anchored in empirical research but focuses on the brain's vital activity instead of identifying morphological and structural details. The concept of vital abstraction is further explored by applying the concept of epistemic virtues to evaluate current brain models and for coming to terms with the dynamics of brain research.

Brainwashing the cybernetic spectator: The Ipcress File, 1960s cinematic spectacle and the sciences of mind

This article argues that the mid-1960s saw a dramatic shift in how 'brainwashing' was popularly imagined, reflecting Anglo-American developments in the sciences of mind as well as shifts in mass media culture. The 1965 British film The Ipcress File (dir. Sidney J. Furie, starr. Michael Caine) provides a rich case for exploring these interconnections between mind control, mind science and media, as it exemplifies the era's innovations for depicting 'brainwashing' on screen: the film's protagonist is subjected to flashing lights and electronic music, pulsating to the 'rhythm of brainwaves'. This article describes the making of The Ipcress File's brainwashing sequence and shows how its quest for cinematic spectacle drew on developments in cybernetic science, multimedia design and modernist architecture (developments that were also influencing the 1960s psychedelic counter-culture). I argue that often interposed between the disparate endeavours of 1960s mind control, psychological science and media was a vision of the human mind as a 'cybernetic spectator': a subject who scrutinizes how media and other demands on her sensory perception can affect consciousness, and seeks to consciously participate in this mental conditioning and guide its effects.

Meanings of Waves: Electroencephalography and Society in Mexico City, 1940-1950

Argument This paper focuses on the uses of electroencephalograms (EEGs) in Mexico during their introductory decade from 1940 to 1950. Following Borck (2006), I argue that EEGs adapted to fit local circumstances and that this adjustment led to the consolidation of different ways of making science and the emergence of new objects of study and social types. I also maintain that the way EEGs were introduced into the institutional networks of Mexico entangled them in discussions about the objective and juridical definitions of social groups, thereby preempting concerns about their technical and epistemic limitations. This ultimately enabled the use of EEGs as normative machines and dispositifs. To this end, the paper follows the arrival of EEGs and the creation of institutional networks then analyzes the extent to which the styles of thinking behind the uses of EEGs and attempts to reify a notion of normal electrical brain behavior-particularly by applying EEGs to a community of Otomí Indians-correlated with the difficulties of defining the socio-anthropological notions that articulated legal and disciplinary projects of the time. Finally, it unveils the shortcomings of alternative attempts to define a brain model and to resist the production of ontological determinations.

Animating Brains

A recent paper famously accused the rising field of social neuroscience of using faulty statistics under the catchy title 'Voodoo Correlations in Social Neuroscience'. This Special Issue invites us to take this claim as the starting point for a cross-cultural analysis: in which meaningful ways can recent research in the burgeoning field of functional imaging be described as, contrasted with, or simply compared to animistic practices? And what light does such a reading shed on the dynamics and effectiveness of a century of brain research into higher mental functions? Reviewing the heated debate from 2009 around recent trends in neuroimaging as a possible candidate for current instances of 'soul catching', the paper will then compare these forms of primarily image-based brain research with older regimes, revolving around the deciphering of the brain's electrical activity. How has the move from a decoding paradigm to a representational regime affected the conceptualisation of self, psyche, mind and soul (if there still is such an entity)? And in what ways does modern technoscience provide new tools for animating brains?

The Endurance of Uncertainty: Antisociality and Ontological Anarchy in British Psychiatry, 1950–2010

Research into the biological markers of pathology has long been a feature of British psychiatry. Such somatic indicators and associated features of mental disorder often intertwine with discourse on psychological and behavioral correlates and causes of mental ill-health. Disorders of sociality – particularly psychopathy and antisocial personality disorder – are important instances where the search for markers of pathology has a long history; research in this area has played an important role in shaping how mental health professionals understand the conditions. Here, I characterize the multiplicity of psychiatric praxis that has sought to define the mark of antisociality as a form of “ontological anarchy.” I regard this as an essential feature of the search for biological and other markers of an unstable referent, positing that uncertainties endure – in part – precisely because of attempts to build consensus regarding the ontology of antisociality through biomedical means. Such an account is suggestive of the co-production of biomarkers, mental disorder, and psychiatric institutions.

The life of concepts: Georges Canguilhem and the history of science

Twelve years after his famous Essay on Some Problems Concerning the Normal and the Pathological (1943), the philosopher Georges Canguilhem (1904-1995) published a book-length study on the history of a single biological concept. Within France, his Formation of the Reflex Concept in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (1955) contributed significantly to defining the "French style" of writing on the history of science. Outside of France, the book passed largely unnoticed. This paper re-reads Canguilhem's study of the reflex concept with respect to its historiographical and epistemological implications. Canguilhem defines concepts as complex and dynamic entities combining terms, definitions, and phenomena. As a consequence, the historiography of science becomes a rather complex task. It has to take into account textual and contextual aspects that develop independently of individual authors. In addition, Canguilhem stresses the connection between conceptual activities and other functions of organic individuals in their respective environments. As a result, biological concepts become tied to a biology of conceptual thinking, analogical reasoning, and technological practice. The paper argues that this seemingly circular structure is a major feature in Canguilhem's philosophical approach to the history of the biological sciences.

Recording the brain at work: the visible, the readable, and the invisible in electroencephalography

The electroencephalogram (EEG), the graphic recording of the electric activity of the human brain, kindled far-reaching speculations about the imminent deciphering of mind and brain in the 1930s. Regardless of the thousands of neurons in the human cortex, recording from a person at rest produced a surprisingly regular line oscillating at 10 per second that disappeared at the moment of mental activity. With ever more groups specializing in electroencephalography, however, the deciphering of mind and brain did not materialize but moved further away in the information produced. In the various approaches employed in EEG research, such as the analysis of the graphic code, the search for pathognomic patterns or the imaging of cognitive processing, visualization guided research as well as theorizing, its productivity continued to keep the epistemological question open.

Between local cultures and national styles: units of analysis in the history of electroencephalography

The history of the discovery of the human electroencephalogram (EEG) and the ensuing implementation of electroencephalography is characterized by striking national differences. The first publication on the EEG in 1929 by the German psychiatrist Hans Berger was met with skepticism. Substantial work in this area did not start before the public demonstration of the EEG by the British neurophysiologist Edgar Douglas Adrian in 1934. Soon afterwards, many groups specialized in the new method, particularly in the US, whereas interest remained more limited in France and Britain. A comparative analysis of the rise of electroencephalography has certainly to account for such national differences, but the trajectory of the implementation of this technology calls for an investigation of local research cultures in order to identify units of productivity and to understand the dynamics along this trajectory.

W. Grey Walter, pioneer in the electroencephalogram, robotics, cybernetics, artificial intelligence

With the announcement by William Lennox at the 1935 London International Neurology Congress of the use of electroencephalography in the study of epilepsy, it became evident that a new and powerful technique for the investigation of seizures had been discovered. William Grey Walter, a young researcher finishing his post-graduate studies at Cambridge, was selected to construct and study the EEG in clinical neurology at the Maudsley Hospital, London. His hugely productive pioneering career in the use of EEG would eventually lead to groundbreaking work in other fields --the emerging sciences of robotics, cybernetics, and early work in artificial intelligence. In this historical note his pioneering work in the fields of clinical neurophysiology is documented, both in the areas of epileptology and tumour detection. His landmark contributions to clinical neurophysiology are worthy of documentation.