Post-Event Processing across Multiple Anxiety Presentations: Is it Specific to Social Anxiety Disorder?

Just do something: An experimental investigation of brief interventions for reducing the negative impact of post-event processing in social anxiety disorder

Post-Event Processing (PEP) is prevalent and problematic in Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) but is typically not a direct target in evidence-based treatments such as cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) for SAD. The primary aim of the current study was to examine the impact of several theoretically and empirically derived interventions for PEP in SAD, including concrete thinking, abstract thinking, and distraction in comparison to a control (i.e., do nothing) condition. Based on prior research, we hypothesized that the concrete and distract conditions would be associated with positive benefits, including reductions in PEP and improvements in self-perception, whereas the abstract and control conditions would not. The second aim of the study was to identify baseline variables that predict the trajectory of change in PEP over time. Participants (N=92) with a principal diagnosis of SAD completed a social stress task and were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. Participants completed measures at baseline, post-intervention/control, and at 1-week, and 1-month follow-up. Contrary to hypotheses, all three active conditions were similarly effective at reducing PEP and improving self-perceptions relative to the control condition. In the absence of an intervention, engagement in PEP remained high up to a month following the social stress task. Higher levels of baseline state anxiety, intolerance of uncertainty, and use of safety behaviours predicted greater PEP, even in the presence of an intervention. These results highlight the benefits of relatively brief interventions that disrupt the course of PEP for people with SAD. Such interventions can be easily incorporated into CBT protocols for SAD to enhance their effects.

Always Saying the Wrong Thing: Negative Beliefs About Losing Control Cause Symptoms of Social Anxiety

Background

Individuals with social anxiety disorder (SAD) often report a fear that they will lose control of their emotions or report intense, unpleasant thoughts or images of uncontrollably humiliating themselves in social situations. These fears and associated beliefs that one is likely to lose control may underlie the anxiety and/or cognitive biases (e.g., self-focused attention and negative post-event processing) experienced during and following social situations. The present experiment examined whether manipulating beliefs about losing control would cause changes in symptoms of SAD.

Methods

One hundred and twenty-six undergraduate psychology students were given false feedback that they were either at high or low risk of losing control, and then completed a social interaction task with an actor. Participants rated their anxiety before and during the interaction and completed a post-event processing questionnaire 24-hours later.

Results

Participants in the high beliefs about losing control (HLC) condition reported significantly greater subjective anxiety than those in the low beliefs about losing control (LLC) condition leading up to the social interaction task, and significantly more negative post-event processing.

Conclusion

Results suggest beliefs about losing control may play a causal role in the development and maintenance of SAD. These beliefs may represent a novel domain to be targeted in CBT.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10608-022-10325-w.

Positive Beliefs about Post-Event Processing in Social Anxiety Disorder

Background: Post-event processing (PEP) is an important maintenance factor of social anxiety disorder (SAD). This study examined psychometric properties of the Positive Beliefs about Post-Event Processing Questionnaire (PB-PEPQ; Fisak & Hammond, 2013), which measures metacognitive beliefs about PEP. Method: Participants receiving treatment for SAD (n = 71) and other anxiety and related disorders (n = 266) completed self-report questionnaires at several timepoints. Results: Confirmatory factor analysis did not support the PB-PEPQ's proposed unidimensional model. Subsequent exploratory factor analysis yielded a three-factor structure consisting of engaging in PEP to (1) review negative events (Negative scale), (2) review positive events (Positive scale), and (3) better understand one's social anxiety (Understand scale). Within the SAD subsample, PB-PEPQ scales demonstrated good internal consistency (α = 0.83–0.85) and test–retest reliability (r = 0.65–0.78). Convergent and criterion validity of the PB-PEPQ Negative scale were supported. PB-PEPQ scale scores were significantly higher within the SAD group, as compared with the other groups (generalised anxiety disorder, panic disorder and agoraphobia, posttraumatic stress disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder), supporting the scales’ discriminative validity. Conclusion: Findings support the reliability and validity of the PB-PEPQ in a clinical sample and reveal the measure's multifactorial structure.