Health plan choice in the Netherlands: restrictive health plans preferred by young and healthy individuals

How to further develop quality competition in the German healthcare system? Results of a Delphi expert study

INTRODUCTION

Many international healthcare systems use quality competition to improve the quality of care. The corresponding instruments include quality measurement, public reporting, selective contracting, and pay for performance. The German healthcare system clearly shows that the possibilities are often limited in the status quo. Therefore, a need for practicable and evidence-based proposals are necessary to further the development of quality competition.

METHODS

We conducted a national analysis and an international comparison (Switzerland, Netherlands and USA) as a pre-study to derive recommendations. On this basis, we designed a Delphi study with a consensus objective. Experts from relevant stakeholder groups in the German healthcare system were selected using purposive sampling for this study.

RESULTS

The experts saw potential for quality improvement in the further development of quality competition. Quality measurement and public reporting were rated as empowering tools. There was mostly disagreement on whether quality competition should be further developed in a more regulatory or entrepreneur-based manner. However, there was a clear consensus that further development must be coordinated between the stakeholders, step-by-step and scientifically supported. In addition, the impulse should be supported by a legislatively introduced reform.

CONCLUSIONS

Finally, these empirically based recommendations highlight the need for a coordinated coexistence of a top-down and a bottom-up approach. The developed blueprint proposal serves as an impetus for practical considerations of implementation.

Doctors as Resource Stewards? Translating High-Value, Cost-Conscious Care to the Consulting Room

After many policy attempts to tackle the persistent rise in the costs of health care, physicians are increasingly seen as potentially effective resource stewards. Frameworks including the quadruple aim, value-based health care and choosing wisely underline the importance of positive engagement of the health care workforce in reinventing the system-paving the way to real affordability by defining the right care. Current programmes focus on educating future doctors to provide 'high-value, cost-conscious care' (HVCCC), which proponents believe is the future of sustainable medical practice. Such programmes, which aim to extend population-level allocation concerns to interactions between an individual doctor and patient, have generated lively debates about the ethics of expanding doctors' professional accountability. To empirically ground this discussion, we conducted a qualitative interview study to examine what happens when resource stewardship responsibilities are extended to the consulting room. Attempts to deliver HVCCC were found to involve inevitable trade-offs between benefits to the individual patient and (social) costs, medical uncertainty and efficiency, and between resource stewardship and trust. Physicians reconcile this by justifying good-value care in terms of what is in the best interest of individual patients-redefining the currency of value from monetary costs to a patient's quality of life, and cost-conscious care as reflective medical practice. Micro-level resource stewardship thus becomes a matter of working reflexively and reducing wasteful forms of care, rather than of making difficult choices about resource allocation.

Selection Incentives for Health Insurers in the Presence of Sophisticated Risk Adjustment

This article analyzes selection incentives for insurers in the Dutch basic health insurance market, which operates with community-rated premiums and sophisticated risk adjustment. Selection incentives result from the interplay of three market characteristics: possible actions by insurers, consumer response to these actions, and predictable variation in profitability of insurance contracts. After a qualitative analysis of the first two characteristics our primary objective is to identify the third. Using a combination of claims data (N = 16.8 million) and survey information (N = 387,195), we find substantial predictable variation in profitability. On average, people in good health are profitable, while those in poor health are unprofitable. We conclude that Dutch insurers indeed face selection incentives. A complete measure of selection incentives, however, captures the correlation between individual-level profitability and consumer response to insurer-actions. Obtaining insight in this correlation is an important direction for further research.

Advice from the health insurer as a channelling strategy: a natural experiment at a Dutch health insurance company

BACKGROUND

In a health care system based on managed competition it is important that health insurers are able to channel their enrolees to preferred care providers. However, enrolees are often very negative about financial incentives and any limitations in their choice of care provider. Therefore, a Dutch health insurance company conducted an experiment to study the effectiveness of a new method of channelling their enrolees. This method entails giving enrolees advise on which physiotherapists to choose when they call customer service. Offering this advice as an extra service is supposed to improve service quality ratings. Objective of this study is to evaluate this channelling method on effectiveness and the impact on service quality ratings.

METHODS

In this experiment, one of the health insurer's customer service call teams (pilot team) began advising enrolees on their choice of physiotherapist. Three data sources were used. Firstly, all enrolees who called customer service received an online questionnaire in order to measure their evaluation of the quality of service. Enrolees who were offered advice received a slightly different questionnaire which, in addition, asked about whether they intended to follow the advice they were offered. Multilevel regression analysis was conducted to analyse the difference in service quality ratings between the pilot team and two comparable customer service teams before and after the implementation of the channelling method. Secondly, employees logged each call, registering, if they offered advice, whether the enrolee accepted it, and if so, which care provider was advised. Thirdly, data from the insurance claims were used to see if enrolees visited the recommended physiotherapist.

RESULTS

The results of the questionnaire show that enrolees responded favorably to being offered advice on the choice of physiotherapist. Furthermore, 45% of enrolees who received advice and then went on to visit a care provider, followed the advice. The service quality ratings were higher compared to control groups. However, it could not be determined whether this effect was entirely due to the intervention.

CONCLUSIONS

Channelling enrolees towards preferred care providers by offering advice on their choice of care provider when they call customer service is successful. The effect on service quality seems positive, although a causal relationship could not be determined.