Comparing fast thinking and slow thinking: The relative benefits of interventions, individual differences, and inferential rules

How Can Debiasing Research Aid Efforts to Reduce Discrimination?

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Scientists studying intergroup biases are often concerned with lessening discrimination (unequal treatment of one social group versus another), but many interventions for reducing such biased behavior have weak or limited evidence. In this review article, we argue one productive avenue for reducing discrimination comes from adapting interventions in a separate field-judgment and decision-making-that has historically studied "debiasing": the ways people can lessen the unwanted influence of irrelevant information on decision-making. While debiasing research shares several commonalities with research on reducing intergroup discrimination, many debiasing interventions have relied on methods that differ from those deployed in the intergroup bias literature. We review several instances where debiasing principles have been successfully applied toward reducing intergroup biases in behavior and introduce other debiasing techniques that may be well-suited for future efforts in lessening discrimination.

The formation and revision of intuitions

This paper presents 59 new studies (N = 72,310) which focus primarily on the "bat and ball problem." It documents our attempts to understand the determinants of the erroneous intuition, our exploration of ways to stimulate reflection, and our discovery that the erroneous intuition often survives whatever further reflection can be induced. Our investigation helps inform conceptions of dual process models, as "system 1" processes often appear to override or corrupt "system 2" processes. Many choose to uphold their intuition, even when directly confronted with simple arithmetic that contradicts it - especially if the intuition is approximately correct.

The effect of incentivization on the conjunction fallacy in judgments: a meta-analysis

The conjunction fallacy is a classical judgment bias that was argued to be a robust cognitive illusion insensitive to the positive effect of incentivization. We conducted a meta-analysis of the literature (n = 3276) and found that although most studies did not report a significant effect of incentivization, the results across studies show a significant positive effect for incentivization, d = 0.19, with an odds ratio of 1.40 for answering correctly when incentivized. There was no moderating effect of payoff size despite the differences in incentive value between studies. Additionally, the effect was relatively smaller when examining absolute differences in the probability of correct judgment instead of odds ratios, suggesting that it may be partly driven by studies with low baseline performance. These findings join those of other judgment-bias studies to suggest a small but nevertheless robust debiasing effect of incentivization.

Fast optimism, slow realism? Causal evidence for a two-step model of future thinking

Many researchers report that people have an optimistic bias when making predictions, but sometimes cautious realism is found. One resolution is that future thinking has two steps: The desired outcome is imagined first, followed by a sobering reflection on potential difficulty of getting there. Five experiments supported this two-step model (USA and Norway; N = 3213; 10,433 judgments), showing that intuitive predictions are more optimistic than reflective predictions. Participants were randomly assigned to rely on fast intuition under time-pressure or slow reflection after time-delay. In Experiment 1, participants in both conditions thought positive events were more likely to happen to them than to other people and that negative events were less likely, replicating the classic finding of "unrealistic optimism". Crucially, this optimistic tendency was significantly stronger in the intuitive condition. Participants in the intuitive condition also relied more on heuristic problem-solving (CRT). Experiments 2-3 found that participants in the intuitive condition thought they were at lower health risk than participants in the reflective condition. Experiment 4 provided a direct replication, with the additional finding that intuitive predictions were more optimistic only for oneself (and not about the average person). Experiment 5 failed to identify any intuitive difference in perceived reasons for success versus failure, but observed intuitive optimism in binary prediction of a future exercise habit. Experiment 5 also found suggestive evidence for a moderating role of social knowledge: Reflective predictions about oneself became more realistic than intuitive predictions only when the person's base-rate beliefs about other people were fairly accurate.

Single-Heuristic Reasoning: Is It Still Dual-Process?

Traditionally, paradigms used to study conflict in reasoning (and metacognition during reasoning) pit heuristic processes against analytical processes. Findings indicate that the presence of conflict between processes prolongs reasoning and decreases accuracy and confidence. In this study, we aimed to explore reasoning and metacognition when only one type of heuristic process is exploited to cue multiple responses. In two experiments, a novel modification of the Base Rate neglect task was used to create versions in which one belief-based heuristic competes, or works in concert, with another of the same type to provide a response. Experiment 1 results reveal that the presence of conflict between cued responses does not affect meta-reasoning, which indicates that reasoning defaulted to a single process. An alternative explanation was that the effect of conflict was masked due to an imbalance in the strength of the dominant response between conflicting and congruent versions. Experiment 2 was designed to test hypotheses based on these competing explanations. Findings show that when the strength of a response was no longer masking the effect, the conflict did result in longer reasoning times and lower confidence. The study provides more robust evidence in favor of the dual-process account of reasoning, introduces a new methodological approach, and discusses how conflict may be modulated during reasoning.

Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking

Human reasoning is often conceived as an interplay between a more intuitive and deliberate thought process. In the last 50 years, influential fast-and-slow dual-process models that capitalize on this distinction have been used to account for numerous phenomena - from logical reasoning biases, over prosocial behavior, to moral decision making. The present paper clarifies that despite the popularity, critical assumptions are poorly conceived. My critique focuses on two interconnected foundational issues: the exclusivity and switch feature. The exclusivity feature refers to the tendency to conceive intuition and deliberation as generating unique responses such that one type of response is assumed to be beyond the capability of the fast-intuitive processing mode. I review the empirical evidence in key fields and show that there is no solid ground for such exclusivity. The switch feature concerns the mechanism by which a reasoner can decide to shift between more intuitive and deliberate processing. I present an overview of leading switch accounts and show that they are conceptually problematic - precisely because they presuppose exclusivity. I build on these insights to sketch the groundwork for a more viable dual-process architecture and illustrate how it can set a new research agenda to advance the field in the coming years.

Cognitive miserliness in argument literacy? Effects of intuitive and analytic thinking on recognizing fallacies

Fallacies are a particular type of informal argument that are psychologically compelling and often used for rhetorical purposes. Fallacies are unreasonable because the reasons they provide for their claims are irrelevant or insufficient. Ability to recognize the weakness of fallacies is part of what we call argument literacy and imporatant in rational thinking. Here we examine classic fallacies of types found in textbooks. In an experiment, participants evaluated the quality of fallacies and reasonable arguments. We instructed participants to think either intuitively, using their first impressions, or analytically, using rational deliberation. We analyzed responses, response times, and cursor trajectories (captured using mouse tracking). The results indicate that instructions to think analytically made people spend more time on the task but did not make them change their minds more often. When participants made errors, they were drawn towards the correct response, while responding correctly was more straightforward. The results are compatible with “smart intuition” accounts of dual-process theories of reasoning, rather than with corrective default-interventionist accounts. The findings are discussed in relation to whether theories developed to account for formal reasoning can help to explain the processing of everyday arguments.

Activating reflective thinking with decision justification and debiasing training

Manipulations for activating reflective thinking, although regularly used in the literature, have not previously been systematically compared. There are growing concerns about the effectiveness of these methods as well as increasing demand for them. Here, we study five promising reflection manipulations using an objective performance measure — the Cognitive Reflection Test 2 (CRT-2). In our large-scale preregistered online experiment (N = 1,748), we compared a passive and an active control condition with time delay, memory recall, decision justification, debiasing training, and combination of debiasing training and decision justification. We found no evidence that online versions of the two regularly used reflection conditions — time delay and memory recall — improve cognitive performance. Instead, our study isolated two less familiar methods that can effectively and rapidly activate reflective thinking: (1) a brief debiasing training, designed to avoid common cognitive biases and increase reflection, and (2) simply asking participants to justify their decisions.